JUDGMENT : S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. By this appeal, the appellant - original respondent in the Arbitration Petition (L) No. 2464 of 2015, has challenged the order of the learned single Judge dated 15th November, 2016, allowing the Arbitration Petition filed by the respondents. 2. Admit. 3. Respondents waive service. 4. Since it is conceded that the volumes together with the paper-book filed by the appellant contain the entire record before the learned single Judge and material documents before the Arbitral Tribunal, filing of paper-book is dispensed with. 5. By consent of both sides, the appeal is heard and finally disposed of by this judgment. 6. Before proceeding further, we shall refer to the parties by their nomenclature before the learned single Judge. 7. The appellant filed Original Application/Reference Petition No. 1 of 2005 before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Mumbai, claiming the relief under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006 (for short "Act 25 of 2006/MSMED Act"). It is a successor legislation to The Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Undertaking Act, 1993 (for short Act 32 of 1993). 8. In this Original Application, it is stated by the appellant-applicant that it is a partnership firm. It is a small scale industrial unit named as M/s. Deltron Electricals, having its factory at an Industrial Estate at Vasai, District Thane. It is stated that this small scale industrial unit manufactures transformers and other electrical equipments along with undertaking the repair works of electrical equipments required by different State Electricity Boards. In terms of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and clause (1) of section 3, a certificate of registration as a small scale industry/SSI registration was filed along with this Original Application. The applicant stated that it has been set up with the noble intention of generating employment in the field of electrical engineering. The respondent before us is the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (for short "MSEDCL"). Its predecessor in title was the Maharashtra State Electricity Board constituted as per the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 9. It is then claimed that the MSEDCL required transformers and various electrical equipments for its use. It entered into valid agreement to purchase these goods from the appellant-applicant and it executed an agreement after following due process of law. There are clearly defined terms and conditions in the agreement. 9. It is then claimed that the MSEDCL required transformers and various electrical equipments for its use. It entered into valid agreement to purchase these goods from the appellant-applicant and it executed an agreement after following due process of law. There are clearly defined terms and conditions in the agreement. The MSEDCL had the responsibility to pay the amount of the material supplied immediately within thirty days to the appellant, but not later than sixty days as per the provisions of the terms and conditions. 10. It is stated that the appellant is extended protection as per sections 4 and 5 of the Act 32 of 1993. Therefore, the buyer, namely, MSEDCL is liable to pay interest from the due date on which the amount of bill became payable till the date of payment to the appellant. This provision is inserted in an Act meant to protect and encourage small scale industrial units. They have to be protected against undue losses and which may occur due to delayed payment of the bills by the buyer units. 11. After setting out the details of the supplies and how the interest claim against various orders arises as on 31st March, 2005, the application proceeds to state that the appellant made sincere efforts to complete the work in time and submitted the bills. It was stated in the application that there was no complaint about the quality and quantity of the goods. Therefore, the bills should have been cleared in time. Since the payment was delayed, the interest became payable in terms of a Circular No. 2464 dated 1st July, 2004, as also the Act 32 of 1993. Thus, there is acceptance of the obligation to pay interest on delayed payment to small scale industrial units. The application proceeds in paragraph 4 to set out the total amount of interest recoverable and crystallizes it at Rs. 83,54,695/- upto 31st March, 2005 and compound interest upon it. 12. It is then claimed that the Divisional Commissioner, Thane, was requested to act as an Arbitrator and Conciliator. Therefore, the relief is based on the factual averment that the Council has territorial jurisdiction since the unit of the applicant is at Vasai Taluka Industrial Cooperative Estate Limited, Gauraipada, Vasai Road (East). 12. It is then claimed that the Divisional Commissioner, Thane, was requested to act as an Arbitrator and Conciliator. Therefore, the relief is based on the factual averment that the Council has territorial jurisdiction since the unit of the applicant is at Vasai Taluka Industrial Cooperative Estate Limited, Gauraipada, Vasai Road (East). The prayer is that the Council should act as an Arbitrator and Conciliator in the matter of non payment of interest upto 9th June, 2004 and ensure that the sum crystallized above with further interest from 10th June, 2004, is paid. This application was filed before the Council and thereafter it is stated that a copy of the said application with all its annexures was duly forwarded. The MSEDCL filed a reply and contended that the agreement was to purchase transformers of various capacities from the applicant and the agreements, details of which are set out in paragraph 4 of the reply, have been executed by and between the parties. The claim was denied by urging that no interest is payable inasmuch as it is incorrect to state that there was no dispute about the account and arithmetical calculation. The applicant is making a claim on the basis of the agreements which were entered into from 1994 to 2000. Such a claim in respect of each and every agreement and in respect of each and every bill submitted in response to each of such agreements is separate and distinct. The cause of action cannot be clubbed or joined together. The application suffers from mis-joinder of causes of action. Equally, to the proceedings before the Council, the law of limitation applies. If at all any claim for interest was to be laid that should have been instituted within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. The claim in the instant application on the basis of the agreements is clearly barred by time as the applications are filed in the month of June and August, 2004. It is in these circumstances and by specifically urging that the agreements were entered into between the parties at Mumbai, the bills were submitted at Mumbai, the payments were made at Mumbai and even the agreements conferred jurisdiction exclusively on the courts at Mumbai. Hence on the ground of territorial jurisdiction this application does not deserve to be granted. 13. It is in these circumstances and by specifically urging that the agreements were entered into between the parties at Mumbai, the bills were submitted at Mumbai, the payments were made at Mumbai and even the agreements conferred jurisdiction exclusively on the courts at Mumbai. Hence on the ground of territorial jurisdiction this application does not deserve to be granted. 13. There are other objections and set out in detail. 14. Thereafter, the applicant submitted a rejoinder and that was also taken on file. That rejoinder is dated 9th October, 2013. 15. It is claimed that the above application was taken up by the Council and initially in terms of the applicable law, for conciliation. The applicant places reliance upon a communication dated 16th January, 2014, informing it that MSEDCL has not only received the application/Review Petition, but it has also received the related documents. It is in these circumstances it was informed by MSEDCL that there were several issues of law and facts. The claim is not an admitted one. Hence there is no question of any mutual discussions. The Council, on such stand of both sides, took up the proceedings and initially in conciliation. The meetings were held between the parties on 6th September, 2013, 11th October, 2013, 21st December, 2013 and 18th January, 2014. The parties were present. However, after considering the records and exhaustive arguments, the Council came to the conclusion that the conciliation has failed. The parties have failed to resolve the dispute amicably. Hence, it is decided to go for arbitration, but when such was the decision taken by the Council, the earlier Act 32 of 1993 stood repealed. It is the MSMED Act, 2006, which intervened. That is how the arbitration under the subsequent legislation was to be held. This decision of the Council to terminate the conciliation proceedings recorded on 30th November, 2014, was then made known to the parties. 16. Thereafter the proceedings styled as arbitration proceedings were taken up and the Council is stated to have proceeded in terms of sub-section (3) of section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 17. This decision of the Council to terminate the conciliation proceedings recorded on 30th November, 2014, was then made known to the parties. 16. Thereafter the proceedings styled as arbitration proceedings were taken up and the Council is stated to have proceeded in terms of sub-section (3) of section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 17. Since this provision, which was invoked, enabled the Council to either take up the dispute for arbitration by itself or refer it to any institution or centre providing an alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration, but the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, applying to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in section 7(1) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, that the applicant filed an affidavit. 18. That was affirming and reiterating the contents of the substantive application. 19. Equally, what we find is that there were replies and rejoinders which were taken on file. Eventually the subject Award came to be made and the Award recites as to how the Council had concluded that the applicant was entitled to get interest from the respondent MSEDCL of Rs. 83,54,695/- upto 31st March, 2005, and subsequent interest as per claim submitted upto the date, namely, 31st October, 2013 of Rs. 6,95,18,435/- with further interest till payment as per section 10 of the MSMED Act, 2006 and onwards till it is effected finally. 20. The Council stipulated the time of one month to the MSEDCL to pay this sum. 21. It is such an Award which was challenged by MSEDCL before the learned single Judge. 22. It is common ground that MSEDCL invoked section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, in challenging the Award. 23. The appellant before us had, in the meanwhile, proceeded to execute the Award as if it were a decree of the Court. The decree was transferred for execution to this Court. A warrant of attachment was levied on the movable properties such as computers, laptops, furniture, fixtures and fittings of the sixth floor of the registered office of the MSEDCL. The Arbitration Petition, therefore, was moved. In terms of the law laid down, namely, the condition stipulated by section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006, the MSEDCL deposited seventy five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree/Award. The Arbitration Petition, therefore, was moved. In terms of the law laid down, namely, the condition stipulated by section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006, the MSEDCL deposited seventy five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree/Award. After satisfaction of such deposit, the Arbitration Petition was taken up. 24. Prior thereto, we must clarify that the Arbitration Petition proceeds to state as under :- "10A. The Impugned Award though purportedly dated 31st January 2015 was received by the Petitioner by post on 18th May 2015. 10B. After receipt of the Award on 18th May 2015, the concerned officers of the Petitioner were considering the Award, they however got involved in the monsoon session of the legislature assembly which took place between 13th July 2015 and 31st July 2015. After the monsoon session of the legislature assembly, the officers of the Petitioner were contemplating/considering steps to challenge the said Award when the Petitioner received a letter dated 24th August 2015 from the Council for rehearing of the Petition. 10C. The letter dated 24th August 2015 was received within the period of 4 months (3+1 months) provided for challenging the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It was mentioned in the said letter dated 24th August 2015 that due to technical and administrative reasons, the order (award) was not signed by the Chairman of the Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council. The matter was thus required to be reviewed as per the discussions of the council held on 11th August, 2015. A re-hearing was fixed on 4th September, 2015. 10D. The concerned officers of the Petitioner were considering the Award, however the Petitioner received letter dated 24th August 2015 wherein it was mentioned that technical and administrative reasons, the order which was issued in accordance with the decision, was not signed by the Hon'ble Chairman of the Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council and the matter required to be reviewed and thus rehearing was fixed. 10E. In view of this action taken by the Council/Arbitration Tribunal which the Petitioner bonafide believe was under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the question of then challenging the impugned Award did not arise. The Petitioner was bonafide under the belief that the Council was reconsidering the matter and would pass a fresh Award in view of its letter dated 24th August 2015. The Petitioner was bonafide under the belief that the Council was reconsidering the matter and would pass a fresh Award in view of its letter dated 24th August 2015. In the circumstances stated above, the Petitioner was on 26th October 2015, shocked and surprised to receive Minutes of Meeting purportedly held on 5th September 2015 where it was stated that the matter does not require any rehearing as the award was purportedly passed as per the provisions of Sections 31(1) and (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being signed by the majority of the members and it was further stated that the said Award stands valid. 10F. In view of the fact that the Council by letter dated 24th August 2015 informed the Petitioner that it was reconsidering the matter and had scheduled the rehearing on account of errors in the Award including the non-signature of the Chairman of the Council and/or in view of the receipt of the order passed under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 dated 5th September, 2015 on 26th October 2015 (disposing of the suo moto application under section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) r/w. Section 33 and 34(3), the period for computing limitation would commence on 26th October 2015. In such circumstances, the present petition filed on 30th December, 2015 is filed in time and within the period of limitation. 10G. Without prejudice to the above, in case, this Hon'ble Court is of the view that the commencement period of limitation is on earlier date (e.g. 5th September 2015 being the date of the purported decision taken under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Council) then the delay in filing the present Petition be condoned. 10H. Without prejudice to the above, in any view of the matter, it is submitted that the Petitioner bonafide believed that the letter dated 24th August 2015 was issued under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act that the Council was reconsidering the matter and the time to challenge the award would only commence on the decision being taken and a fresh award/order being passed by the Council after rehearing. It is however submitted that if such bonafide belief of the Petitioner is for any reason found to be mistaken (though the Petitioner reiterates that the same was legally correct), the said belief was in law, a mistaken belief and the Petitioner would thus be also entitled to exclusion of time under the provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 10I. It is submitted that the delay if any, in filing the present Application took place in the circumstances narrated above. There is good and sufficient reason for such delay if any, taking place as narrated above and the same be condoned. Grave injustice would be caused to the Petitioner if the delay in filing the present petition is not condoned. It is significant that the Respondent was admittedly paid its entire dues as far as back in the year 1994 to 2000. After a lapse of more than 4 years (after the expiry of period of 3 years), the Respondent had sought to move an application before the Council claiming interest on the alleged delayed payments as per the provisions of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. Apart from the claim of the Respondent being devoid of merits, the same was ex-facie barred by limitation. The Respondent had purported to claim of Rs. 83,54,695/- upto 31.3.2005 towards interest on delayed payment calculated upto 2005. The Council has however awarded compound interest even during the pendency of the Arbitration proceedings and has accepted the Respondent's computation of the same as amounting to Rs. 6,95,18,435/- as on 31.10.2013. In the execution proceedings, the Respondent has however claimed a sum of Rs. 11,43,05,982/-. It is in these circumstances, grave irreparable loss, harm and injury would be caused to the Petitioner, if the present application is not allowed." 25. It was stated that there is a delay in filing of the petition. Therefore, MSEDCL is moving an application for condonation of delay. The Arbitration Petition was filed on 29th December, 2015, and the application for condonation of delay was also filed in the form of a Notice of Motion. 26. On being served with the Arbitration Petition as also the application seeking condonation of delay, detailed replies were filed by the appellant-applicant and thus, there are affidavits of the parties placed on record. 27. 26. On being served with the Arbitration Petition as also the application seeking condonation of delay, detailed replies were filed by the appellant-applicant and thus, there are affidavits of the parties placed on record. 27. The learned single Judge after taking up the requests together, namely, to condone the delay and to set aside the Award, on hearing both sides, has passed the impugned order. The learned single Judge has assigned reasons for setting aside the Award and we would advert to them a little later. However, the learned single Judge concluded that though the petition was lodged in December, 2015, it was amended on 18th January, 2016, by incorporating further averments, grounds and reliefs. There was a specific objection raised to the maintainability of the petition. That is for the reason that it is beyond limitation and equally that there is no merit in the contentions and particularly the challenge to the subject Award. The learned single Judge dealt with these and other contentions and has proceeded to allow the petition and set aside the Award passed by the Minor and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Konkan Division, Thane. 28. It is this order of the learned single Judge which is challenged in this appeal by the appellant-original applicant. 29. Mr. Madkholkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that this Court, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, could not have entertained the Arbitration Petition of the MSEDCL to set aside the Award. The petition could not have been filed in this Court as it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Mr. 29. Mr. Madkholkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that this Court, in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, could not have entertained the Arbitration Petition of the MSEDCL to set aside the Award. The petition could not have been filed in this Court as it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Madkholkar has firstly invited our attention to the MSMED Act, 2006, its predecessor law, namely, Act 32 of 1993, the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, to submit that section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, coupled with sections 2(d), 2(n), section 18(1) (3) and (4) and section 20 of the MSMED Act would demonstrate that if the applicant is based in Thane District at Vasai, its factory and unit being located there, the Council is functional from Konkan Division and which is also part and parcel of a distinct District, which is neither Greater Bombay nor Bombay Suburban District, then, by virtue of the definition of the term "Court" as appearing in section 2(1)(e), it was not this Court on the original side, but the District Court at Thane which would be competent to entertain a challenge to the Award. Once the learned single Judge was aware of these undisputed facts, he should not have entertained the petition and decided it on merits. 30. Mr. Madkholkar would submit that this is a question, though of territorial jurisdiction of this Court, but going to the root of the case. In the circumstances that have been brought on record if the applicant is able to demonstrate and prove that this Court was not competent to entertain and try the petition, then, such a ground or issue can be raised even at this appellate stage. Once it is going to the root of the jurisdiction of this Court, then, all the more it should be allowed to be raised. 31. Mr. Madkholkar has raised two arguments insofar as the period of limitation and the law of limitation is concerned. 32. Once it is going to the root of the jurisdiction of this Court, then, all the more it should be allowed to be raised. 31. Mr. Madkholkar has raised two arguments insofar as the period of limitation and the law of limitation is concerned. 32. His first argument is that the Arbitration Petition filed in this Court, assuming it could have been so filed in this Court and on the footing that the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction, but without admitting this fact, still, the petition was not filed within the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. An application was made to condone the delay. However, the learned Judge did not pass any order on that application, but decided to take it up along with the Arbitration Petition. Thus, it was taken up while considering the challenge to the Award on merits. Such a course is clearly impermissible in law. Unless and until this Court is satisfied that a petition under section 34(3) is within the prescribed period of limitation or it can be entertained by condoning the delay, but within the powers which are also enumerated by sub-section (3) of section 34, there was no occasion to take up the issue on merits. The only course and permissible in law is to then pass an order on the application seeking condonation of delay and one way or the other. It has to be first condoned, the arbitration Petition registered and thereafter it can be taken up on merits. 33. The second contention on limitation runs as follows. In rendering a finding that the petition is within the period of limitation, the learned Judge has erred in taking assistance of the provisions of section 33 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The provision enables an Arbitral Tribunal to make corrections insofar as arithmetical calculation or computation or clerical errors and disposal of such a request by parties is a distinct matter. If the Arbitral Tribunal suo moto or in its own initiative feels that the Award needs to be corrected on account of any clerical or typographical errors or arithmetical calculation and computation, then, the law provides an outer limit for the Tribunal to exercise its discretionary powers under section 33(3) of the Arbitration Act. If the Arbitral Tribunal suo moto or in its own initiative feels that the Award needs to be corrected on account of any clerical or typographical errors or arithmetical calculation and computation, then, the law provides an outer limit for the Tribunal to exercise its discretionary powers under section 33(3) of the Arbitration Act. However, that does not extend the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 34 to challenge the award. That provision would have to be construed strictly. Mr. Madkholkar would submit that as far as the law of limitation is concerned, equity has no place. If the language of the law is plain, unambiguous and clear, then, there is no scope for interpretation. The considerations of hardship and regard to the consequences, therefore, are out of place. In the circumstances, the learned Judge could not have condoned the delay in filing the Arbitration Petition. 34. The other limb of Mr. Madkholkar's argument, based on the Limitation Act, 1963, and its applicability is concerned, runs as follows. He invites our attention to section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, section 24 of the MSMED Act, and section 43 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 to submit that this is a statutory arbitration. By virtue of the clarification in subsection (4) of section 2 certain provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, are inapplicable to statutory arbitration. That would include section 43 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The consequence, therefore, is that the Limitation Act, 1963, is inapplicable to the arbitration that is contemplated by the MSMED Act. Our attention is invited to sub-section (1) of section 43 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, in that behalf. 35. Once these are the legal consequences, then, according to Mr. Madkholkar, the learned single Judge was in complete error in holding that the claims before the Arbitral Tribunal were barred by limitation. The whole of the Limitation Act, 1963, is inapplicable. 36. Then, Mr. Madkholkar would argue that the petition under section 34 was not maintainable as the Award was already put in execution. Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, was not applicable and cannot be applied to an Award already executed. Mr. Madkholkar would invite our attention to sections 35 and 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, in that behalf. It is in these circumstances, Mr. Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, was not applicable and cannot be applied to an Award already executed. Mr. Madkholkar would invite our attention to sections 35 and 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, in that behalf. It is in these circumstances, Mr. Madkholkar would submit that the ambit and scope of section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, has been enlarged by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge, therefore, could not have set aside the Award on the grounds which have been raised before him. The requirements of section 34, which provides for an application to set aside an Arbitral Award only on limited grounds, are not satisfied in this case. Mr. Madkholkar would submit that the factually incorrect statements made in the Arbitration Petition and in the pleadings before the learned single Judge and equally in this appeal would disentitle the MSEDCL to any discretionary and equitable relief. Their conduct tantamounts to a fraud on the Court. Those who suppress material facts and documents from the Court do not deserve any sympathy, much less justice. In such circumstances, even on this count, the order of the learned single Judge should be set aside. 37. Mr. Madkholkar has tendered a compilation of the judgments relied upon by him. He has also requested the court to look into first the Arbitration Act, 1940, then its successor legislation the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the Act 32 of 1993, the Limitation Act, 1908, the Limitation Act, 1963, the MSMED Act, 2006 and the Code of Civil Procedure. As far as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, our attention is invited to Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code to submit that so long as a petition to challenge the Award is accompanied, in the event of a delay, by an application seeking condonation of delay and any order is not made thereon, the Court does not derive any power or authority to pass an order of interim stay of operation of the award under section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Such power conferred in an Appellate Court is conditioned upon the requirement stipulated in Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such power conferred in an Appellate Court is conditioned upon the requirement stipulated in Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said principles or those analogous to it should be invoked and applied and, therefore, till the delay is not condoned, the learned Judge would not have the jurisdiction to set aside the Award. The first error in the order of the learned single Judge is that he has granted an interim stay of the operation of the award without declaring that the arbitration petition invoking section 34 of the Arbitration Act is maintainable. Secondly, he has taken up the Notice of Motion for condonation of delay and the arbitration petition together. He was obliged in law to pass separate order on the Motion and thereafter another on merits. A combined order of the nature made is not in accordance with law. The impugned order is, therefore, without jurisdiction and should be declared as such. 38. On the other hand, Mr. Gaurav Joshi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf the MSEDCL would submit that there is no substance in the objection to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Such an objection has been raised for the first time in appeal. For it to be raised and for the first time, the requirement of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be fulfilled. Pertinently, the objection raised is to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. That issue is a mixed one and, namely, of fact and law. If such an objection is not raised before the learned single Judge, then, it should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal. All the more when there is no failure of justice established and proved in this case. The appellant has taken the chance and has contested the petition before the learned single Judge on facts and law. Merely because an order is passed against the appellant does not mean that it is entitled to raise such objection in appeal. There is no question of the issue going to the root of the case and that argument has no substance. 39. Alternatively and without prejudice, Mr. Merely because an order is passed against the appellant does not mean that it is entitled to raise such objection in appeal. There is no question of the issue going to the root of the case and that argument has no substance. 39. Alternatively and without prejudice, Mr. Joshi, relying on the language of sub-section (1) of section 2 clause (e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, would submit that if there was no arbitration and no Award could have been made, the test is whether can a suit be filed in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court touching the subject matter of the arbitration. If that test is applied, it is evident that the MSEDCL is having its office at Mumbai. The tenders were floated at Mumbai. The bid was submitted and considered at Mumbai. The appellant forwarded its bills on the respondent at Mumbai. If the payments were cleared from Mumbai, then, a substantial part of the cause of action has arisen in Mumbai. Once this is the factual position and not disputed, then, this Court did not lack the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Arbitration Petition and decide it. 40. As far as the plea of limitation is concerned, Mr. Joshi would submit that the argument that law of limitation did not apply to the claims before the Council has no merit. Such an argument, if accepted, would result in disastrous consequences. A claim for interest and that too arising on account of delayed payment and clearance of the bills of a supplier like the appellant should be considered cautiously. In the present case, more than ten years had lapsed from the date and time when the payment under the bill was released and made. No claim for interest was made for all these years. The letter of the appellant dated 9th June, 2004, addressed to the Technical Director of the respondent at page 68 Volume I together with the statement annexed thereto is relied upon by Mr. Joshi. From the payment details of 90% bills of 500KV Transformer, according to Mr. Joshi, it is evident that Bill No. 37 dated 26th March, 1995, the amount of Bill is Rs. 6,22,446.20, the date of receipt of material is 27th March, 1995, the date of payment due is also the same. The amount under this Bill is paid between April - June, 1995. Joshi, it is evident that Bill No. 37 dated 26th March, 1995, the amount of Bill is Rs. 6,22,446.20, the date of receipt of material is 27th March, 1995, the date of payment due is also the same. The amount under this Bill is paid between April - June, 1995. Assuming there is a delay in making payment, the interest on such delayed payment cannot be claimed by making an application to the Council in March, 2005. It was suddenly that a claim petition was served and that too filed seeking interest upto 31st March, 2005, in the year 2005 itself. Such a petition could not have been entertained by the Council and the Reference itself was barred by limitation. No suit could have been laid in a competent civil court after such a long period. The claim was, therefore, hopelessly time barred. It is such a time barred claim which has been entertained and accepted by the Council. If this Court were to hold that by virtue of sub-section (4) of section 2 and sub-section (1) of section 43 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the Limitation Act, 1963, has no application, then, the consequences would be that the Council can make Awards of the present nature at any time. There is no restriction nor any time limit. Its powers are not fettered then by the law of limitation. Mr. Joshi has, therefore, submitted that the language of sub-section (4) of section 2 and sub-section (1) of section 43 does not enable this Court to hold that the law of limitation does not apply. 41. Alternatively and without prejudice Mr. Joshi would rely upon the language of sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act 32 of 1993 and the corresponding provisions in the MSMED Act, 2006 to submit that it is the "amount due" from a buyer together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of these two enactments which is recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. The further provisions enacted in the sub-sections would alone enable any party to a dispute and it may make reference to the Council for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters referred to in the above Acts and then the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, shall apply to such disputes as if the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration agreement referred to in section 7(1) of that Act. Once the claim is to recover an amount due, then, even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is expressly not applicable, still, on broad consideration of equity and justice, any claim which is time barred and for which no suit can be laid, can be awarded. Precisely that has been done in awarding a claim which is not only belated, but barred by laches. It is in these circumstances that Mr. Joshi would submit that the learned single Judge was right in allowing the petition. 42. As far as the consideration of the point of delay in filing the petition by the learned single Judge together with the merits is concerned, Mr. Joshi would submit that at best, this is an irregularity and nothing more. The learned single Judge, however, had made the appellant-applicant aware of his intention in advance that not only is he inclined to consider the request for condoning the delay in filing the Arbitration Petition, but if he condones it, then, only the petition would be decided on merits. Further it was adequately clarified that separate orders would not be passed. That is how he has made a composite or a consolidated order. Merely because he approaches the matter in such a manner does not mean that he has failed to apply his mind to the objections of the appellant on the bar of limitation. The learned single Judge has assigned cogent and satisfactory reasons to condone the delay in filing the Arbitration Petition. His manner of approaching the matter may not be strictly in accordance with law, but so long as there in no failure of justice, this Court should not interfere in its appellate jurisdiction. All the more, when the appellant never objected to the above course. The appellant cannot complain because it was heard on all points, including delay. His manner of approaching the matter may not be strictly in accordance with law, but so long as there in no failure of justice, this Court should not interfere in its appellate jurisdiction. All the more, when the appellant never objected to the above course. The appellant cannot complain because it was heard on all points, including delay. The provisions of Order XLI Rule 3A apply to appeals and they cannot be read into the exercise of power under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 43. It is then submitted by Mr. Joshi that the learned single Judge was justified even in condoning the delay. The delay has been condoned because the initial Award is dated 31st January, 2015, but it was not given effect to by completing the requisite procedure and formalities till May, 2015. Once it was communicated the time would begin to run from its communication and receipt by the MSEDCL. However, after the limitation commenced, mid-way, the MSEDCL and the appellant as well, were served with a letter informing the parties that Council intends to re-hear the matter. The Council communicated to the parties to remain present and if they have any objection to such a course, to raise the same. The Council did not wish to leave any grounds or objections to be raised to its Award or the making of it. Eventually, the Council abandoned its idea of rehearing and communicated to the parties that what it had initially done and rendered as an Award is final and conclusive. It does not wish to make any alteration or change in the same. It is on the date of receipt of such a communication and which is within the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 34, that the MSEDCL decided to challenge the Award. It then came to the conclusion that the Award is not going to be changed or altered but remains as it is. When it took a conscious decision to wait till the Council takes a call on whether to re-hear the matter or otherwise, then, so long as it could have taken advantage and assistance of sections 33 and 34, particularly subsection (3), then, the view taken by the learned single Judge to condone the delay cannot be interfered with. When it took a conscious decision to wait till the Council takes a call on whether to re-hear the matter or otherwise, then, so long as it could have taken advantage and assistance of sections 33 and 34, particularly subsection (3), then, the view taken by the learned single Judge to condone the delay cannot be interfered with. It is not contrary to law or vitiated by non-application of mind, leave alone any perversity. The learned single Judge also noted that in subsection (4) of section 34, it was permissible for the Court to have sent the matter back to the Arbitral Tribunal in the event it wanted to avoid furnishing of a ground to challenge the Award. 44. Then, Mr. Joshi submitted that there was a serious legal infirmity in the Award. The Award was set aside by the learned single Judge also on the ground that there was no material to indicate that the Arbitral Council as a whole applied its mind, deliberated and discussed the issues and the making of the ultimate Award. There was no proof of the same on record. There was no reason assigned for the endorsement "transferred" on the Award and above the name of the Chairman. There was no signature of the Chairman of the Council, but this is not the only defect or lacuna. There was no indication, much less any sufficient and cogent reason, as to why the endorsement 'Transferred' appears above his name on the Award. Therefore, this is not a case of mere non signature, but a total lack of participation by the Chairman in the proceedings. Nothing is indicated as to when the Chairman was transferred and to what place. In the circumstances what was his inability which resulted in his staying away from the proceedings has not been clarified. 45. Mr. Joshi has also submitted that the Council has not acted fairly because it purported to act as a conciliator and an arbitrator both. If it was attempting a conciliation of the matter, then, it should have avoided taking up the role of an adjudicator. That should have been left to a distinct body so as to ensure fairness, impartiality and justice. On that count as well, the Award can be faulted and the petition allowed. For these reasons it is submitted that the order of the learned single Judge be maintained. 46. Mr. That should have been left to a distinct body so as to ensure fairness, impartiality and justice. On that count as well, the Award can be faulted and the petition allowed. For these reasons it is submitted that the order of the learned single Judge be maintained. 46. Mr. Joshi has also attempted to question the finding of the learned single Judge on the point of fairness, impartiality and justice in the sense that the Council could have, in the given facts and circumstances, according to the learned single Judge, acted as an arbitrator. Mr. Joshi tried to convince us that this finding suffers from a patent error. 47. Mr. Joshi has also relied upon the following judgments and decisions of this Court as also the Hon'ble Supreme Court. "(1) AIR 2002 SC 2308 M/s. L.T.I Ltd. v. M/s. Siemens Public Communication Network Ltd. (2) AIR 2009 SC 1022 , Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. (3) (1999) 2 SCC 446 , Food Corporation of India v. Evdomen Corporation. (4) (2006) 1 SCC 521, Jindal Vijaynagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) v. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd. (5) AIR 1954 SC 340 (Vol.41, C.N.82) Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors. (6) (2016) 15 SCC 13 Shanti Conductors Pvt. Ltd. v. Assam State Electricity Board & Ors. (7) AIR 2000 SC 761 Corporation Bank v. Navin Shah (8) (2005) 5 SCC 91 , Haryana State Co.op. Land Development Bank v. Neelam (9) (2013) 11 SCC 296 Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. v. Gopi Krishan (Dead through Lrs) and Ors. (10) (2003) 8 SCC 648 South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (11) (1987) 4 SCC 398 Raj Kumar Dey & Ors. v. Tarapada Dey & Ors. (12) AIR 1918 Calcutta 865 Abu Hamid Zahir Ala v. Golam Sarwar." 48. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, we must first notice a few legal provisions. Before that, we feel that on these contentions, the following points arise for our determination : "(I) Whether the arbitral tribunal was right in awarding the appellants claims for interest under section 6 of the Act 32 of 1993 and its successor legislation, namely, the MSMED Act ? (II) Whether, as held by the learned single Judge, these claims were barred by limitation ? (II) Whether, as held by the learned single Judge, these claims were barred by limitation ? (III) Whether the arbitration petition to challenge the Council's award involving section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, was barred by time and could not have been entertained by the learned single Judge ? Whether his conclusion that it is not time-barred is correct in law and on facts ? (IV) Whether this Court lacked the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the Arbitration Petition (Lodg.) No. 2464 of 2016 and decide it on merits ? (V) Whether the Arbitration Petition under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, was maintainable when the same was filed after the award was put in execution ? Was it already executed? (VI) Whether the learned single Judge was right in setting aside the award on grounds other then limitation ? (VII) What order ?" DISCUSSION ON POINTS (I) TO (IV): 49. The Interest on Delayed payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993 was enacted as The Small Scale Industries Board, which is an apex advisory body, on policies relating to small scale industrial units with representatives from all the State Governmental bodies and the industrial sector expressed a view that such industries and undertakings are facing enormous problems. Their health is affected on account of inadequate working capital and issues which were threatening their very existence. One of the issue was that prompt payments of money by buyers should be statutorily ensured and mandatory provisions for payment of interest on the outstanding money in the case of default should be made. The buyer, if required under law to pay interest, would refrain from withholding payments to these industrial undertakings. 50. With this object and purpose, the Act was enacted to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The following definitions appearing in section 2 are relevant for our purpose. "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a) ... ... ... The following definitions appearing in section 2 are relevant for our purpose. "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a) ... ... ... (b) "appointed date" means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, - (i) "the day of acceptance" means, - (a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or (b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within thirty days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier; (ii) "the day of deemed acceptance" means, where no objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within thirty days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; (c) "buyer" means whoever buys any goods or receives any services from a supplier for consideration; (d) "goods" means every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; (e) "small scale undertaking" has the meaning assigned to it by clause (j) of section 3 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951)' (f) "supplier" means an ancillary industrial undertaking or a small scale industrial undertaking holding a permanent registration certificate issued by the Directorate of Industries of a State or Union territory and includes,- (i) the National Small Industries Corporation being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (ii) the Small Industries Development Corporation of a State or a Union territory, by whatever name called, being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)." 51. There is a liability of the buyer to make payment and that is in terms of section 3. The obligation is to make payment for supply of goods or rendering any services to it on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is an agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day. The obligation is to make payment for supply of goods or rendering any services to it on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is an agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day. The proviso to section 3 clarifies that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed 120 days from the date of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Then comes sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 each of which are reproduced below: "4. Date from which and rate at which interest is payable.- Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 3, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at one and half time of prime Lending Rate charged by the State Bank of India. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section," Prime Lending Rate" means the Prime Lending Rate of the State Bank of India which is available to the best borrowers of the bank. 5. Liability of buyer to pay compound interest.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between a supplier and a buyer or in any law for the time being in force, the buyer shall be liable to pay compound interest (with monthly interests) at the rate mentioned in section 4 on the amount due to the supplier. 6. Recovery of amount due.- (1) The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. 6. Recovery of amount due.- (1) The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), any party to a dispute may make a reference to the Industry Facilitation Council for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters referred to in that sub- section and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such dispute as if the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration agreement referred to in sub- section (1) of section 7 of that Act. 7. Appeal.- No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy- five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority." 52. A combined reading of these provisions together with the sections prior and following it would denote that on failure to make payment to the supplier as required under section 3, the obligation to pay interest arises and that is notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force. The interest has to be paid immediately following the date agreed upon at the rate and charged as prime lending rate by banks. Even if there is no stipulation in any agreement or in any law, the buyer has to pay compound interest (with monthly interests) at the rate mentioned in section 4 on the amount due to the supplier. Then comes the provision enabling recovery of the amount due. A Council has to be established by the State Government styled as Industry Facilitation Council. That Facilitation Council is at such place exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as may be specified in the Notification in that behalf and to be duly published in the official gazette. Then comes the provision enabling recovery of the amount due. A Council has to be established by the State Government styled as Industry Facilitation Council. That Facilitation Council is at such place exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as may be specified in the Notification in that behalf and to be duly published in the official gazette. Then, the composition of the Council is set out and further provision, including giving the Act an overriding effect. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law for the time being in force (See section 10). Then followed the MSMED Act, 2006. It was enacted on 16th June, 2006 for not only providing and facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness, but bringing within its fold micro, small and medium enterprises and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The object and purpose is more or less identical, but enlarged so as to encompass and include the micro, small and medium enterprises to be set up and established in terms of Chapter II. By Chapter III, classification of enterprises, advisory committee and memorandum of micro, small and medium enterprises is dealt with. By Chapter IV, measures for promotion, development and enhancement of competitiveness of micro small and medium enterprises are provided for. There are various facilities to be granted and in terms of the sections falling in this Chapter. Chapter V deals with delayed payments to micro and small enterprises and contains five important provisions, namely, sections 15 to 19. They read as under : "15. Liability of buyer to make payment.-Where any supplier, supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefore on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day: Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. 16. 16. Date from which and rate at which interest is payable.- Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank. 17. Recovery of amount due.- For any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16. 18. Reference to micro and small enterprises facilitation council.- 1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. 2. On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. 3. Where the conciliation initiated under subsection (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer to it any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of that Act. 4. 4. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. 5. Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference. 19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.- No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose." 53. Thereafter section 24 gives the same sections, namely sections 15 to 23, an effect overriding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 54. Pertinently, we find an emphasis throughout on the words "amount due". Therefore, for any goods supplied or service rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16 and if that is not paid and a dispute is raised, first the Council steps in as a facilitator and conciliator but, having found that there is no conciliation or settlement possible, it can take up an adjudicatory role by itself or entrust it to some other Alternate Dispute Resolution Centre or Forum providing such services. Though this Act repeals the earlier law by virtue of section 32, it is clarified that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Act 32 of 1993 so repealed shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. There is no dispute that the successor legislation, therefore, could have been invoked by the appellant to raise the claim. 55. The other provision and relied upon before us are that of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, since it is conceded before us that in this case there was no conciliation. Eventually the matter was referred to arbitration as if there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and, therefore, the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, applied. The Council made the Award and it could have been challenged by taking recourse to the provisions, namely, Chapter VII of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 34 thereof reads as under : "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3). Section 34 thereof reads as under : "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if - (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that - (i) a party was under some incapacity; or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration : Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the court finds that - (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation 1. - For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if, - (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.- For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. 2-A An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under subsection (1), the court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. (5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon other party." 56. Prior thereto, there are two sections, section 32 and section 33. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon other party." 56. Prior thereto, there are two sections, section 32 and section 33. A perusal of these provisions would reveal that an application for setting aside the Award may not be made after three months having elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the Arbitral Award or if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request has been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. The proviso to sub-section (3) to section 34 enables the Court to entertain the application if the applicant satisfies it that it was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the period of three months. However, the Court can entertain the application if it is made within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. What the Court can do under the circumstances specified in sub-section (4) on receipt of an application under subsection (1) of section 34 need not detain us at this stage. 57. The other provisions that are referred to are section 2(1)(e) and section 2(4). 58. By section 43(1), the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, states that the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court. 59. Mr. Madkholkar would argue that sub-section (4) of section 2 cannot be ignored and its language is imperative. It says that this part of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, namely, Part-I containing Chapter-I General Provisions, but under the title 'Arbitration' except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force as if that arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an agreement. The words and expressions thereafter, according to Mr. Madkholkar, are not relevant. According to him, this provision rules out the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. 60. We are unable to agree with him for more than one reason. 61. The words and expressions thereafter, according to Mr. Madkholkar, are not relevant. According to him, this provision rules out the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. 60. We are unable to agree with him for more than one reason. 61. The Limitation Act, 1963, has been enacted after the predecessor Act of 1908 so as to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. 62. Part-I of the Act contains preliminary provisions. In it falls section 2, namely, the definition section. The period of limitation is defined in section 2 clause (j) to read as under: "2. Definitions.- In this Act unless the context otherwise requires - (a) ... ... ... ... (j) "period of limitation" means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and "prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act;" 63. The word "suit" is defined in section 2(l) not to include an appeal or an application. Section 3 of the Act falls in Part-II and under the heading "Limitation of Suits, Appeals and Applications". It says by sub-section (1), subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 64. We would have to approach this matter from a angle slightly different than the one projected by Mr. Madkholkar and Mr. Joshi before us. 65. The amount which is due and in terms of the Act 32 of 1993 and MSMED Act, 2006, can be recovered. The words "amount due" have been construed and interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of several provisions. In one of its decision and on this expression which was rendered in 1999, in the case of State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty & Anr. reported in AIR 1999 SC 1305 , a three Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the provision, namely, section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. That enables speedy recovery of arrears. reported in AIR 1999 SC 1305 , a three Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the provision, namely, section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. That enables speedy recovery of arrears. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in construing the provisions enabling recovery of the amounts due (section 71) interpreted the same as not enabling recovery of sums in arrears which are otherwise time barred. Looking at the matter from this angle and construing the words appearing "recovery of amounts due", the Honb'le Supreme court in the following paragraphs held thus: "8. Looking to the object of Section 71 we have to examine whether time-barred claims of the State Financial Corporation and the banks can be recovered under it. Is the object only speed of recovery or is it also enlargement of the right to recover? The respondent-institutions rely on the words "amount due" in Section 71 as encompassing time-barred claims also. Now, what is meant by the words "amounts due" used in Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act as also in the notifications issued under Section 71? Do these words refer to the amounts repayable under the terms of the loan agreements executed between the debtor and the creditor irrespective of whether the claim of the creditor has become time-barred or not? Or do these words refer only to those claims of the creditor which are legally recoverable? An amount "due" normally refers to an amount which the creditor has a right to recover. Wharton in Law Lexicon defines "due" as anything owing; that which one contracts to pay to another. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. at page 499 the following comment appears against the word "due". "The word "due" always imports a fixed and settled obligation or liability; but with reference to the time for its payment there is considerable ambiguity in the use of the term, the precise signification being determined in each case from the context. It may mean that the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable, or that it matured at sometime in the past and yet remains unsatisfied, or that it is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived. It may mean that the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable, or that it matured at sometime in the past and yet remains unsatisfied, or that it is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived. But commonly and in the absence of any qualifying expressions, the word "due" is restricted to the first of these meanings, the second being expressed by the term "overdue" and the third by the word "payable"." There is no reference in these definitions to a time-barred debt. In every case the exact meaning of the word "due" will depend upon the context in which that word appears. [Emphasis ours] 9. In the case of Hansraj Gupta & Ors. v. Dehradun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 63 the Privy Council was required to interpret the words "money due" under Section 186 of the Companies Act, 1913. Section 186 dealt with the recovery of any money due to the Company from a contributory. Interpreting the words "money due", the Privy Council said that the phrase would only refer to those claims which were not time-barred. It noted that the section is concerned only with moneys due from a contributory. A debtor who is not a contributory is not affected by it. Moneys due from him can be recovered only by a suit in the Company's name. Secondly, the section creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys. It is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights. Thirdly, the power of the court to order payment under that Section is discretionary. It may refuse to act under that section, leaving the liquidator to sue in the name of the Company. Therefore, the respondent under the procedure of Section 186 cannot be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys. 10. The same reasoning would apply in the present case also. The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act does not create any new right. It merely provides a process for speedy recovery of moneys due. Therefore, the respondent under the procedure of Section 186 cannot be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys. 10. The same reasoning would apply in the present case also. The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act does not create any new right. It merely provides a process for speedy recovery of moneys due. Therefore, instead of filing a suit, (or an application or petition under any special Act), obtaining a decree and executing it, the bank or the financial institution can now recover the claim under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Since this Act does not create any new right, the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a debtor in a suit or other legal proceeding be taken away under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. In fact, under Section 70 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, it is provided that when proceedings are taken under this Act against any person for the recovery of any sum of money due from him, such person may, at any time before the commencement of the sale of any property attached in such proceedings, pay the amount claimed and at the same time deliver a protest signed by himself to the officer issuing the demand or conducting the sale as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 provides that when the amount is paid under protest, the officer issuing the demand or the officer at whose instance the proceedings have been initiated, shall enquire into the protest and pass appropriate orders. If the protest is accepted, the officer disposing of the protest shall immediately order the refund of whole or part of the money paid under protest. Under Subsection (3) of Section 70, the person making a payment under protest shall have the right to institute a suit for the refund of the whole or part of the sum paid by him under protest. 11. Therefore, under Section 70(3) a person who has paid under protest can file a suit for refund of the amount wrongly recovered. In law he would be entitled to submit in the suit that the claim against which the recovery has been made is time-barred. Hence no amount should have been recovered from him. 11. Therefore, under Section 70(3) a person who has paid under protest can file a suit for refund of the amount wrongly recovered. In law he would be entitled to submit in the suit that the claim against which the recovery has been made is time-barred. Hence no amount should have been recovered from him. When the right to file a suit under Section 70(3) is expressly preserved, there is a necessary implication that the shield of limitation available to a debtor in a suit is also preserved. He cannot, therefore, be deprived of this right simply by making a recovery under the said Act unless there is anything in the Act which expressly brings about such a result. Provisions of the said Act, however, indicate to the contrary. Moreover, such a wide interpretation of "amount due" which destroys an important defence available to a debtor in a suit against him by the creditor, may attract Article 14 against the Act. It would be ironic if an Act for speedy recovery is held as enabling a creditor who has delayed recovery beyond the period of limitation to recover such delayed claims. ... ... ... 14. ... ... ... The courts have expressed at least three reasons for supporting the existence of statutes of limitation; (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim; and (3) that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. (See Halsbury 4th Edn. Vol. 28 Paragraph 605). In Nav Rattanmal and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1704 , the Statutes of Limitation have been considered as Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Peace. The generally accepted basis for such statutes is that they are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose. Whether public purpose of speedy recovery would outweigh public purpose behind a statute of limitation is a moot point. 15. It has been submitted before us that the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy without touching the right. Therefore, the right to recover the loan would remain even though the remedy by way of a suit would be time-barred. Reliance was placed on Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, Sarasiya Ghat, Kanpur ( AIR 1978 SC 287 ) (supra) in this connection. Therefore, the right to recover the loan would remain even though the remedy by way of a suit would be time-barred. Reliance was placed on Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, Sarasiya Ghat, Kanpur ( AIR 1978 SC 287 ) (supra) in this connection. The Court there observed that though a debt may be time- barred, it would still be a debt due. The right remains untouched and if a creditor has any means of enforcing his right other than by action or set-off, he is not prevented from doing so. In Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Surendra Prasad Sinha 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 499 at page 503- 504), this Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. Excepting cases which are specifically provided for, as for example, under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right to which the remedy relates subsists. Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred, that right can be exercised in any manner other than by means of a suit. For example, a creditor's right to make adjustment against time-barred debts exists." 66. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in a very wide language that there are good reasons for supporting the existence of defence of limitation. One is that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. It referred to its earlier judgment in Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1704 and reiterated that statutes of limitation have been considered as statutes of repose and statutes of peace. The generally accepted basis for such statutes is that they are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose. 67. Once we approach this matter from this angle, we cannot place a interpretation which would enable the Council and set up under the Acts of 1993 and 2006 to make an Award of the present nature awarding claims which are barred by limitation. In the sense that Award enabled recoveries of amount which were not due. 68. 67. Once we approach this matter from this angle, we cannot place a interpretation which would enable the Council and set up under the Acts of 1993 and 2006 to make an Award of the present nature awarding claims which are barred by limitation. In the sense that Award enabled recoveries of amount which were not due. 68. In a very recent decision and considering the scope of a statutory arbitration in the context of a statute which equally is a parliamentary statute, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had approached the matter from another important but equally significant angle. 69. In the case of A.P. Power Coordination Committee v. M/s. Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 1925 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the inquiry should be not whether the Limitation Act 1963 is applicable to proceedings before statutory Tribunals as that would rule out the application of the law of limitation, but it should be whether a defence based on that law of limitation has been expressly ruled out. The provisions cannot be stretched to infer applicability of the Limitation Act, but what is equally important, according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is whether the parties intended to rule out a defence based on its provisions. In accepting an argument on such lines, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that not only the principles underlying and emphasized by us, namely, delay and laches but to avoid stale claims being awarded and granted, the defence based on the provisions of the Limitation Act being entirely ruled out would mean that public policy is at stake. In following the principles laid down in the case of Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and a famous decision of the Privy Council in Hans Raj Gupta v. Dehra Dun - Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company Limited, AIR 1933 PC 63 , the Court proceeds thus: "15. Yet another submission of Mr. Giri is that the matter does not attract Section 2(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity "the Arbitration Act") rather Section 43 of the Arbitration Act shall govern the rights of the parties and it mandates that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in courts. It may however be noted here that in PPN Power Generating Co. It may however be noted here that in PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) in para 65, the Court held that the Limitation Act would not be applicable in such matters for various reasons including Section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act which was extracted to highlight that sub-section (1) of Section 40, Sections 41 and 43 all in Part I of the Arbitration Act, would not apply to arbitration under any other enactment. Only the rest of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the extent not inconsistent with the other enactment or any rule made thereunder. On that basis in para 66 it was held that the provisions with regard to the Limitation Act under Section 43 of the Arbitration Act would not be applicable to statutory arbitrations conducted under the Electricity Act, 2003. 16. In fairness to the submission of Mr. Giri, it is noted that in PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra), in paras 64 and 68, this Court was satisfied on facts itself that the principle of delay and laches was not attracted. Further, the provisions in the PPA in that case provided that the seat of arbitration shall be in London and that alone made Part I of the Arbitration Act inapplicable to the arbitration proceeding and ruled out applicability of Section 43 also. 17. Mr. Giri has placed considerable reliance upon a judgment by three Judges of this Court in State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1999) 3 SCC 657 : [ AIR 1999 SC 1305 ]. The question of law in that case was whether a debt which is barred by the law of limitation can be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act of 1968. The High Court held that in the absence of any provision in the aforesaid Kerala Act creating a substantive right to recover time-barred debts, such debts could not be recovered through the summary proceedings under that Act. As per Section 71 of the Kerala Act the Government could issue a notification making the provisions of the Act applicable to the recovery of "amounts due" from any person or class of persons to any specified institution or any class of institutions. The say of the State Government and the State Financial Corporation was that the words "amounts due" will encompass time-barred claims also. The say of the State Government and the State Financial Corporation was that the words "amounts due" will encompass time-barred claims also. This Court placed reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun - Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63 . It found that the Kerala Act did not create any new right rather it only provided a process for speedy recovery of monies due. Therefore the person claiming recovery cannot claim amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a debtor in a suit or other legal proceeding be taken away under the provisions of the Kerala Act. The State supported its stand by highlighting the settled legal principle that the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy without touching the right. But such submission did not cut any ice. The relevant provisions of the Kerala Act led to a conclusion that although the necessity of filing a suit stood avoided, the claim which could be legally recovered was not enlarged. In para 16 this Court concluded thus: "..... ... An Act must expressly provide for such enlargement of claims which are legally recoverable, before it can be interpreted as extending to the recovery of those amounts which have ceased to be legally recoverable on the date when recovery proceedings are undertaken." In fact this Court looked to the scheme of the Kerala Act to come to a conclusion that "amounts due" are those amounts which the creditor could have recovered had he filed a suit. 18. It is noteworthy that besides drawing relevant inference from the provisions of the Kerala Act, in para 11 the Court acted cautiously in interpreting the words "amounts due" in view of Article 14 of the Constitution. It expressed its views thus: "....... Moreover, such a wide interpretation of '"amount due" which destroys an important defence available to a debtor in a suit against him by the creditor, may attract Article 14 against the Act. It expressed its views thus: "....... Moreover, such a wide interpretation of '"amount due" which destroys an important defence available to a debtor in a suit against him by the creditor, may attract Article 14 against the Act. It would be ironic if an Act for speedy recovery is held as enabling a creditor who has delayed recovery beyond the period of limitation to recover such delayed claims." In para 12 the Court referred to and relied upon the judgment in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram (1976) 3 SCC 407 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1637 ), wherein this Court had similarly interpreted Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. The words "arrears of rent payable" were given a limited meaning by holding thus: "..... ... In the context of recovery of arrears of rent under Section 7, this Court said that if the recovery is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable. When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the arrears of rent the determination must be in accordance with law." (Emphasis added) ... ... ... ... 22. In reply on this issue, the learned senior advocate Mr. Sundaram took a frontal stand that the Limitation Act does not apply to a proceeding before the Commission because it is not a court stricto sensu. For this proposition he relied upon the judgments in PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) and M.P. Steel Corpn. (supra). He however floated a suggestion that even when no period of limitation is applicable for initiating action before the Commission, if this Court finds it necessary and in the interest of justice, then a reasonable period may be indicated by this Court for the aforesaid purpose. He hastened to add that such reasonable period can only be as an illustration and not as a fixed period. According to him, a reasonable illustrative period indicated by the Court, in practical application, can vary from case to case as per the facts of each case. He hastened to add that such reasonable period can only be as an illustration and not as a fixed period. According to him, a reasonable illustrative period indicated by the Court, in practical application, can vary from case to case as per the facts of each case. He also contended that even if a definite limitation period is found to be attracted, in view of the law laid down clearly in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), the principles underlying Section 14 will be applicable and the same have been rightly applied by APTEL while rendering the impugned order under appeal. 23. Mr. Sundaram referred to PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) and placed reliance upon a solitary sentence at the end of para 64 which reads thus : "In any event, the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding before the State Commission." He also placed reliance upon para 65 which is as follows : "65. The submission of the appellant that the Limitation Act would be available in case the reference was to be made to arbitration, in our opinion, is also without merit. Firstly, the State Commission exercised its jurisdiction to decide the dispute itself. The matter was not referred to arbitration, therefore, the Limitation Act would not be applicable. Secondly, Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would not be applicable even if the matter was referred to arbitration by virtue of Section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act reads as under : '2(4) This Part except sub-section (1) of Section 40, Sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except insofar as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder." 24. Mr. Sundaram placed reliance upon the judgment in M.P. Steel Corpn. (supra) to support his submission that the Limitation Act applies only to courts stricto sensu and not to quasi-judicial tribunals. Mr. Sundaram placed reliance upon the judgment in M.P. Steel Corpn. (supra) to support his submission that the Limitation Act applies only to courts stricto sensu and not to quasi-judicial tribunals. It may be noted here that the matter in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra) had arisen from the proceedings under the Customs Act and hence in that case there was no occasion to consider the issue whether the Limitation Act is applicable to an action initiated before the Commission by virtue of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. However, this judgment does help the respondents to an extent by holding that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be applicable even in matters filed before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the Commission. But the moot question remains to be answered-Whether the bar of limitation is required to be respected by the Commission on the ground that there is no provision in the Electricity Act conferring additional rights upon a party moving the Commission for relief so as to claim even such reliefs which stand barred by limitation before the civil court or even for arbitral proceedings. The other ancillary issue required to be answered is - Whether by virtue of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 the Limitation Act has been made applicable to an action before the Commission by express provision or even by necessary intendment. 25. Before answering the aforesaid two issues and then adverting to the question whether the principles of Section 14 were rightly applied by APTEL (in case any period of limitation is held to be attracted), it will be proper to note some relevant contentions advanced by the learned senior advocate Mr. Jayant Bhushan who has appeared for some of the respondents. 26. Mr. Bhushan pointed out that the Commission is a creature of statute and hence it cannot reject a claim on the ground of limitation unless limitation is found to be applicable by virtue of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. Jayant Bhushan who has appeared for some of the respondents. 26. Mr. Bhushan pointed out that the Commission is a creature of statute and hence it cannot reject a claim on the ground of limitation unless limitation is found to be applicable by virtue of the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. According to him if the Limitation Act does not apply, courts cannot import limitation and the exceptional cases where this Court has introduced principles of delay and laches relate to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals which are vested with discretionary or suo motu jurisdiction like revisional power; the other exception being courts having extraordinary or equity jurisdiction such as writ jurisdiction vested in the High Courts or the Supreme Court. In support of the limited and exceptional applicability of the principles of delay and laches as distinguished from limitation, Mr. Bhushan placed reliance upon an old judgment of the Supreme Court of United States in the case of Henry Hauenstein v. John A. Lynham 100 U.S. 483 and also upon extracts from Halsbury's Laws of England and a judgment of the Chancery Division in the case of Re. Jarvis (Deceased) Edge v. Jarvis (1958) 2 All ER 336. Since the principle noted above is well settled, the above authorities need not be discussed particularly when this Court has taken similar view in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva 1964 (3) SCR 709 ; ( AIR 1964 SC 752 ) and Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 242 : ( AIR 1998 SC 688 ). In the latter case the issue under consideration was of delay in passing order levying damages under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Court distinguished a long line of cases such as State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 : ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) and Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 : (1993 AIR SCW 3479) by pointing out that the same principles will not apply to monies withheld by a defaulter when he actually holds the money in trust for the beneficiaries. Paragraph 1.9 of that judgment highlights that the statute concerned did not contain any provision prescribing a period of limitation either for assessment or recovery and although the monies payable into the fund are for the ultimate benefit of the employees but there is no provision by which the employees can directly recover the due amounts. The power of recovery is vested in the statutory authorities to be exercised in the manner provided by the statute and not by way of suit. 27. Mr. Bhushan also referred to some judgments in support of the principle that the statute of limitation only bars a remedy through ordinary suit and not a remedy provided under a special statute such as the Industrial Disputes Act which must be given effect to on the basis of various provisions contained therein. For this purpose he relied upon a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 328 . He sought to explain the Constitution Bench judgment in Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110 : ( AIR 1970 SC 898 ) by pointing out that delay and laches were held to be applicable to a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the reason that such jurisdiction was always recognised and held to be a discretionary one. 28. Coming back to the issues relating to limitation, in view of law noticed above and for the reasons noted in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), we respectfully concur and hold that by itself the Limitation Act will not be applicable to the Commission under the Electricity Act, 2003 as the Commission is not a court stricto sensu. The further stand of the respondents that the Commission being a statutory tribunal, cannot act beyond the four walls of the Electricity Act also does not brook any exception. In PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) this Court examined the issue of limitation in a very summary manner and without referring to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, at the end of para 64 it was observed in a single sentence that the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding before the State Commission. In PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) this Court examined the issue of limitation in a very summary manner and without referring to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, at the end of para 64 it was observed in a single sentence that the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding before the State Commission. But in view of detailed discussion in the case of M.P. Steel Corporation (supra), we have held above that by itself the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding or action brought before the State Commission. However, the Electricity Act, 2003 requires a further scrutiny to find out whether by virtue of Section 175 of the Electricity Act or otherwise it can be inferred that the provisions of the Limitation Act will govern or curtail the powers of the Commission in entertaining a claim under Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act. Section 175 reads thus: "175. Provisions of this Act to be in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.-The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force." A plain reading of this section leads to a conclusion that unless the provisions of the Electricity Act are in conflict with any other law when this Act will have overriding effect as per Section 174, the provisions of the Electricity Act will not adversely affect any other law for the time being in force. In other words, as stated in the section the provisions of the Electricity Act will be additional provisions without adversely affecting or subtracting anything from any other law which may be in force. Such provision cannot be stretched to infer adoption of the Limitation Act for the purpose of regulating the varied and numerous powers and functions of the authorities under the Electricity Act, 2003. In this context it is relevant to keep in view that the State Commission or the Central Commission have been entrusted with large number of diverse functions, many being administrative or regulatory and such powers do not invite the rigours of the Limitation Act. Only for controlling the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission under Section 86(1)(f), it will not be possible to accept the contention of the appellants that by Section 175 the Electricity Act, 2003 adopts the Limitation Act either explicitly or by necessary implication. 29. Only for controlling the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission under Section 86(1)(f), it will not be possible to accept the contention of the appellants that by Section 175 the Electricity Act, 2003 adopts the Limitation Act either explicitly or by necessary implication. 29. The only other weighty contention of Mr. Giri that there is nothing in the Electricity Act, 2003 to create a right in a suitor before the Commission to seek claims which are barred by law of limitation, merits a serious consideration. There is no possibility of any difference of opinion in accepting that on account of the judgment of this Court in Gujarat Urja (AIR 2008 SCC 1921) (supra) the Commission has been elevated to the status of a substitute for the civil court in respect of all disputes between the licensees and generating companies. Such dispute need not arise from the exercise of powers under the Electricity Act. Even claims or disputes arising purely out of contract like in the present case have to be either adjudicated by the Commission or the Commission itself has the discretion to refer the dispute for arbitration after exercising its power to nominate the arbitrator. It is in view of such far-reaching judicial powers vested in the Commission that in PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. (supra) this Court advised the State to exercise enabling power under Section 84(2) to appoint a person who is/has been a Judge of a High Court as Chairperson of the State Commission. In such a situation it falls for consideration whether the principle of law enunciated in State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty ( AIR 1999 SC 1305 ) (supra) and in the case of New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram ( AIR 1976 SC 1637 ) (supra) is attracted so as to bar entertainment of claims which are legally not recoverable in a suit or other legal proceeding on account of bar created by the Limitation Act. On behalf of respondents those judgments were explained by pointing out that in the first case the peculiar words in the statute - "amount due" and in the second case "arrears of rent payable" fell for interpretation in the context of powers of concerned tribunal and on account of aforesaid particular words of the statute this Court held that the duty cast upon the authority to determine what is recoverable or payable implies a duty to determine such claims in accordance with law. In our considered view a statutory authority like the commission is also required to determine or decide a claim or dispute either by itself or by referring it to arbitration only in accordance with law and thus sections 174 and 175 of the Electricity Act assume relevance. Since no separate limitation has been prescribed for exercise of power under section 86 (1) (f) nor this adjudicatory power of the Commission has been enlarged to entertain even the time barred claims, there is no conflict between the provisions of the Electricity Act and Limitation Act to attract the provisions of Section 174 of the Electricity Act. In such a situation on account of provisions in Section 175 of the Electricity Act or even otherwise the power of adjudication and determination or even the power of deciding whether a case requires reference to arbitration must be exercised in a fair manner and in accordance with law. In the absence of any provision in the Electricity Act creating a new right upon a claimant to claim even monies barred by law of limitation, or taking away a right of the other side to take a lawful defence of limitation, we are persuaded to hold that in the light of nature of judicial power conferred on the Commission, claims coming for adjudication before it cannot be entertained or allowed if it is found legally not recoverable in a regular suit or any other regular proceeding such as arbitration, on account of law of limitation. We have taken this view not only because it appears to be more just but also because unlike Labour laws and Industrial Disputes Act, the Electricity has no peculiar philosophy or inherent underlying reasons requiring adherence to a contrary view. 30. We have taken the aforesaid view to avoid injustice as well as the possibility of discrimination. We have taken this view not only because it appears to be more just but also because unlike Labour laws and Industrial Disputes Act, the Electricity has no peculiar philosophy or inherent underlying reasons requiring adherence to a contrary view. 30. We have taken the aforesaid view to avoid injustice as well as the possibility of discrimination. We have already extracted a part of para 11 of the judgment in State of Kerala v V.R. Kalliyanikutty ( AIR 1999 SC 1305 ) (supra) wherein the Court considered the matter also in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that case the possibility of Article 14 being attracted against the statute was highlighted to justify a particular interpretation as already noted. It was also observed that it would be ironic if in the name of speedy recovery contemplated by the statute, a creditor is enabled to recover claims beyond the period of limitation. In this context, it would be fair to infer that the special adjudicatory role envisaged under Section 86(1)(f) also appears to be for speedy resolution so that a vital developmental factor - electricity and its supply is not adversely affected by delay in adjudication of even ordinary civil disputes by the civil court. Evidently, in the absence of any reason or justification the legislature did not contemplate to enable a creditor who has allowed the period of limitation to set in, to recover such delayed claims through the Commission. Hence we hold that a claim coming before the Commission cannot be entertained or allowed if it is barred by limitation prescribed for an ordinary suit before the civil court. But in an appropriate case, a specified period may be excluded on account of the principle underlying the salutary provisions like Section 5 or Section 14 of the Limitation Act. We must hasten to add here that such limitation upon the Commission on account of this decision would be only in respect of its judicial power under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and not in respect of its other powers or functions which may be administrative or regulatory." 70. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the learned single Judge, but for different reasons. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the learned single Judge, but for different reasons. The Act in the present case namely, the Act of 32 of 1993 and the MSMED Act, should create a right in the appellant before us to seek claims which are barred by the law of limitation. Therefore, it is not as if we have to only limit our inquiry or restrict it in finding out whether the law of limitation which applies to arbitration under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is wholly ruled out in its application to proceedings under the above two laws, but whether a right is created by the other two laws in a claimant like the appellant to seek claims which are barred by the law of limitation. 71. We have also noted that the interest for delayed payment to the industries covered by the Act 32 of 1993 and the MSMED can be claimed in proceedings other than an arbitration under these Acts. The interest can be awarded by a civil court in a suit. An incongruous situation will emerge then in the sense that the claim for interest involved in such a suit filed in the competent civil court will be considered by applying the law of limitation but in arbitral proceedings before the Council or other forum that law will be inapplicable. A civil court will not award the claim if it is time-barred, but a Council under the above two Acts can award it even if it is hopelessly barred by time and ignoring even the general principles of laches. Apart from the fact that the Act 32 of 1993 and the MSMED Act employing the same expression "recovery of amounts due" additionally section 6 of the Act 32 of 1993 and section 19 of the MSMED Act read together would denote that a decree for payment of interest can be passed by a civil court in terms of the MSMED Act. The reference to the Council for recovery of such interest and a civil suit, therefore, can lie only if the claims are not barred by limitation and the defence that they are so barred even by delay and laches is available in both proceedings. The reference to the Council for recovery of such interest and a civil suit, therefore, can lie only if the claims are not barred by limitation and the defence that they are so barred even by delay and laches is available in both proceedings. In this behalf, the principle laid down in the Privy Council decision (Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Sassoon & Co.) reported in AIR 1929 Privy Council 103 squarely applies to the case before us. The principle is as under: "The first question of law which arises is the important general one, whether the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applies to arbitration proceedings. The relevant section of that Act is S. 3: "Subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 inclusive, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not bean set up as a defence." Their Lordships will consider subsequently what effect, if any, is to be given to Ss. 4 to 25, but it is admitted that Art. 115, Sch. 1 is that which applies to the subject matter of the present suit. It is expressed as follows: "For compensation for the breach of any contract expressed or implied not in writing, registered and not herein specially provided for," and the period of limitation is three years. It will be observed that S. 3 has in view primarily suits, appeals and applications made in the law Courts and makes no reference to arbitration proceedings. Their Lordships were not referred to any case decided in India as to whether this clause can be extended by analogy to arbitration proceedings, but similar language is employed in the English Statute of Limitations, and the question has been considered and decided in one case in England. This is the case of Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co., and Tyldesley Coal Co. In re (1). This is the case of Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co., and Tyldesley Coal Co. In re (1). In that case it was held by the Divisional Court consisting of Bruce and Ridley, JJ., that "a submission to arbitration does not per se exclude the right of either party to raise the defence of the Statute of Limitations, but if it be intended to exclude such a defence an express term to that effect must be imported into the agreement of submission." In his judgment Bruce, J., said: "There is nothing in the submission to take away the right of the Tyldesley Coal Co. to raise any defence in relation to their liability to damages. It seems to me unreasonable that parties to a submission should be precluded from raising the defence of the Statute of Limitation unless a provision to that effect be drawn up and embodied in the submission." Previous to that decision there had been general statements in other cases which lay down more clearly the principle upon which the decision must be taken to have proceeded. In Aubert v. Maze (2) at p. 375, Chambre, J., said: "There is no doubt that an arbitrator is bound by the rules of law like every other Judge," and in Jager v. Tolme (3) at p. 953 the Judge said: "the Council [that was the Council of the London Produce Clearing House] are to give a decision. They are to decide and in the absence of fuller and wider powers expressly given, that means to decide according to the legal rights of parties." The decision in Tyldesley's case (1) was cited in a recent case that came before the King's Bench Division, Board of Trade v. Cayzer Irvine and Co. (4). In the course of his judgment, Rowlatt, J., before whom the case first came, said that "the Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. 1 Cap. 16) does not in terms apply to arbitrations. It does not affect the debt. It only limits the remedy, and therefore it seems to me that in an arbitration it is a question of construction whether the submission requires the arbitrator to follow the analogy of the Statute." In the Court of appeal Lord Hanworth, M. R., found it unnecessary to consider this question, which as he observed involved the point whether Tyldesley's case (1) was correctly decided. Scrutton L. J., reserved to himself liberty to consider "when the case arises whether it was rightly decided" and Romer, J., also reserved his opinion upon that point. The case was taken to the House of Lords and is reported in (1927) A.C., p. 610. Viscount Cave in giving judgment, said : "My Lords, I am far from wishing to throw doubt upon the view which has been commonly held, and which was affirmed by the decision of a Divisional Court in the case of In re Astley and Tyldesley Coal and Salt Co. v. Tyldesley Coal Co. (1), that an arbitrator acting under an ordinary submission to arbitration is bound to give effect to all legal defences, including a defence under any statute of limitation. A decision against that view might seriously prejudice the practice of referring disputes to arbitration; and, while I am unwilling to pronounce a final opinion upon a question which does not really arise in this case, I certainly say nothing which is adverse to the view to which I have referred.' None of the other Judges who took part in the decision of that case found it necessary to express any definite opinion upon the point, although for the purposes of the decision they were content to assume it. Such being the state of the authorities (the paucity of which may be explained by the fact that where contracts contain an arbitration clause the parties usually contemplate that their dispute will be disposed of), their Lordships are of opinion that the law was correctly laid down in Tyldesley's case (1). Although the Limitation Act does not in terms apply to arbitrations, they think that in mercantile references, of the kind in question it is an implied term of the contract that the arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract, and that every defence which would have been open in a Court of law can be equally proponed for the arbitrator's decision unless the parties have agreed (which is not suggested here) to exclude that defence. Were it otherwise a claim for breach of a contract containing a reference clause could be brought at any time, it might be 20 or 30 years after the cause of action had arisen although the legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of such a claim in any application that might be made to the law Courts. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that the first question of law must be answered in the affirmative." The principle finds acceptance even today as is evident from the recent Supreme Court judgment. It is that argument and which heavily weighed with the Hon'ble Supreme Court its decision in A.P. Power (supra). 72. We have, therefore, to see whether the claims in the present case could have been awarded by accepting a Reference Application or Petition No. 1 of 2005. 73. The Award itself proceeds on the admitted dates and events. The Award does not state that the initial contract which was awarded decades back and the obligation thereunder to payment of interest or under the above Acts can still be discharged. The Award proceeds to consider these claims and which have been based on the contract which was awarded, the supplies made thereunder to the buyer, the date of the bill, the date of acceptance of the goods and the date on which the payment or amount under the bill fell due and the date on which it was actually paid. In considering such claims the Award itself recites that the appellant before us got ten purchase orders from the MSEDCL and the dates of them are as under : "2) The petitioner got the various ten purchase orders from the respondent M.S.E.B. as under :- (1) SP/L-134/T-1202/0393/11194 dt. 1.8.1994 (2) SP/L-T-1302/395/P-407/3076 dt. 24.4.1995 (3) SP/L-T-156/T-1205/794/14030 dt. 19.10.1995 (4) SP/L/399/T-1205/794/411 dt. 12.01.1996 (5) SP/L-156/T-205/Extn.order/12189 dt. 13.10.1997 (6) SP/L-156/T-1205/Extn.order/1081 dt. 22.01.1998 (7) SP/L-268/T-1208/1907/14071 dt. 21.11.1998 (8) SP/L-77/T-1207/599/6162 dt. 21.6.2000 (9) SP/L-230/T-1208/599/10179 dt. 10.10.2000 (10) SP/L-447/T-1207/1097/352 dt. 07.1.1999" 74. Then, in paragraph 3, the terms have been referred and the term "payments of bills" specified that 100% payment of the contract to be paid by account payee cheque within sixty days from the date of receipt of the entire lot as per the monthly delivery schedule. The appellant supplied the material against the order vide various invoices. The respondent accepted the material. The appellant supplied the material against the order vide various invoices. The respondent accepted the material. The detailed statement, demonstrating bill number, date, amount of bill, rate of material, quantity supplied, date of receipt of the material, amount receivable, the date of completion of the lot, the due date of payment, the payment made by cheque by MSEDCL, date of cheque, days of delay in effecting the payment, the bank rate and interest till the receipt of payment, all prepared by the appellant-applicant and placed on record from page Nos. 68 to 149/monthly even as late as on 7th October, 2005, which is the date on which the Reference/Petition was presented to the Council and it held that the appellant-applicant was entitled to the sums mentioned. The very reference to the Act 32 of 1993 would indicate that the Council had before it a claim of interest worked out upto 31st October, 2013, in the sum of Rs. 6,95,18,435/- and what it purports to then award is a claim of interest upto 31st March, 2005 i.e. the date of the submission of the claim petition and subsequent interest as per the claim submitted upto 31st October, 2013. 75. It has only indicated in its findings its acceptance of the version of the appellant and which is entirely one-sided. The version was that the issue of limitation is dealt with in the enactment itself. The buyer has to mention the due amount payable to the supplier till it is paid finally to the supplier. The responsibility is fastened upon the buyer to pay interest upto the delayed payment as per the provisions of the Act No. 32 of 1993 and the MSMED Act, 2006. The petition was filed in the year 2005 and there was an improvement in the Act 32 of 1993 by the subsequent enactment. It is in these circumstances the Council proceeds to hold that there is no justification for applying the law of limitation. We do not see how this could be a satisfactory answer and to the objection of the MSEDCL. It is in these circumstances the Council proceeds to hold that there is no justification for applying the law of limitation. We do not see how this could be a satisfactory answer and to the objection of the MSEDCL. If the objection is that going by the admitted facts and evidence if the payment was delayed as per the terms and conditions of the contract, then, interest on such delayed payment was payable and if that was not paid in terms of the provisions, namely, the Act 32 of 1993 or MSMED Act later on, whether that can be claimed long after the period for institution of a civil suit has expired. This is nothing but claim for recovery of money. If the amount or money is due even under the statutory instrument as above, if that rules out completely the applicability of law of limitation and enables a Council to award time barred claims, then, such a stipulation must be expressly found in that statute or its provisions read together and harmoniously only ought to lead to this implied conclusion. It is that statute which empowers the Council to enter as arbitrator and which arbitration must proceed in terms of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, by treating the whole arrangement as an agreement for arbitration. That statute, namely, Act 32 of 1993 and the successor law does not enable, to our mind, granting of a time barred claim. 76. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the learned single Judge that the claims which were hopelessly time barred have been awarded and such an Award cannot stand the scrutiny on the touchstone of public policy. It could have been, therefore, set aside by taking recourse to an application under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 77. The argument then is that the petition to set aside the Award itself was time barred. In that the learned single Judge dealt with the rival contentions and concluded as under : "4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, in the first place, raised an objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petition itself is filed beyond the period of limitation. In that the learned single Judge dealt with the rival contentions and concluded as under : "4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, in the first place, raised an objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petition itself is filed beyond the period of limitation. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the limitation of three months and the further period of 30 days for filing of an application for setting aside an award within the meaning of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, begins on the date a party making the application receives a signed copy of the arbitral award from the arbitral tribunal. Admittedly the signed copy of the award in the present case was received by the Petitioners on 18 May 2015. The period of limitation thus originally began with effect from that date. Admittedly before the expiry of this period, the Petitioners received a communication from the Arbitral Tribunal/Council (letter dated 21 August 2015), communicating the Arbitral Tribunal/Council's decision to review the reference petition, and communicating the date of rehearing of the reference petition as 4 September 2015. The Petitioners could not have, in the premises, applied for setting aside of the award within the period of limitation. The Arbitral Tribunal/Council was entitled to correct any mistake in the award or interpret the award under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Even the Court under sub section (4) of Section 34, on an application for setting aside the award under sub-section (1) of Section 34 was empowered to adjourn the proceedings in order to give the Arbitral Tribunal/Council an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings. On these facts and the law as it stands, there is a clear communication by the Arbitral Tribunal/Council that the award served on the Petitioners was not a final award and that the Arbitral Tribunal/Council had proposed to rehear the matter. There is no question, in the premises, of the Petitioners approaching this Court for setting aside the award between the date of receipt of the communication and expiry of the period of limitation originally available in respect of the award. The Arbitral Tribunal/Council in fact fixed a date of hearing of the reference, i.e. on 4 September 2015, which was later rescheduled to 5 September 2015. The Arbitral Tribunal/Council in fact fixed a date of hearing of the reference, i.e. on 4 September 2015, which was later rescheduled to 5 September 2015. In its meeting (between the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/Council) held on 5 September 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal/Council decided that the award passed in the matter and communicated to the Petitioners earlier, was valid and there was no question of rehearing the matter. Accordingly, by its Minutes of Meeting dated 5 September 2015 (received by the Petitioners on 26 October 2015), the Arbitral Tribunal/Council decided to withdraw the notice of rehearing of the petition. The communication of the minutes along with the notice of withdrawal of hearing, as mentioned above, was received by the Petitioners on 26 October 2016. Effectively, therefore, the final award on the reference petition can be said to have been communicated by the Arbitral Tribunal/Council to the Petitioners on 26 October 2015. The present petition, which is filed in December 2015, is, accordingly, clearly within time." 78. It is common ground that since the Award is stated to have been made on 31st January, 2015, though its making and its publication was faulted on other grounds, but the MSEDCL received a signed copy of the Award from the Arbitral Tribunal on 18th May, 2015. Going by the statutory prescription and of subsection (3) of section 34, the Award could have been challenged and within the period specified, namely, three months from the date on which the party making the application had received the Arbitral Award. The period of three months would then, according to the learned Judge, begin to run from this date, but before the expiry of that date, a letter dated 21st August, 2015, was received by the parties from the Tribunal communicating its endeavour and intent to re-hear the matter. It stipulated the date of appearance and re-hearing as 4th September, 2015. 79. The learned single Judge is of the view that the MSEDCL could not have, in the premises, applied for setting aside the Award within the prescribed period of limitation. 80. With great respect to the learned single Judge, this approach is not supported by the language of sub-section (3). 81. The application for setting aside could have been made, but whether it not having made itself and without anything more enables this Court to dismiss the petition as time barred. 80. With great respect to the learned single Judge, this approach is not supported by the language of sub-section (3). 81. The application for setting aside could have been made, but whether it not having made itself and without anything more enables this Court to dismiss the petition as time barred. The answer to that would depend upon the construction that can be placed and whether that is possible, of the words "or if a request had been made under section 33 from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal". These words are appearing in section 34(3) and after the first part thereof. They appear after the first and the last part are separated by us of the word "or". These parts, therefore, cover a situation and enable computation of the period of limitation under section 34(3) after disposal of the request made vide section 33 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, an application for setting aside the Award may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the Arbitral Award, but if the language of the statute was imperative and had ended there, the question would have been altogether different. What are the consequences then if a request had been made under section 33 and that was not disposed of within three months and if that request was pending and not disposed of by the Tribunal within the period specified, then, merely because the petition is not made within three months from the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award, can it be said to be barred by limitation. 82. Section 33 enables correction and interpretation of the Award and making of an additional Award. That, by subsection (1) says that within thirty days from the receipt of the original Award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the Award. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 33 covers a situation where if so agreed by parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 33 covers a situation where if so agreed by parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. In the instant case, the power of the arbitral tribunal as enumerated in sub-section (1) was not invoked by a party or by agreement of parties. Thus, they did not approach the arbitral tribunal. Neither a party with notice to the other party or both parties by agreement requested the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation errors or any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of similar nature occurring in the Award or to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the Award. Therefore, sub-section (2) which comes in when the Arbitral Tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt of the notice and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award, does not apply. By sub-section (3) the arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) on its own initiative within thirty days from the date of the arbitral award. Then comes the request for an additional award which is to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of section 33 and if that request is made the Tribunal gets sixty days from the receipt of such request to make the additional arbitral award. It is subsection (6) of section 33 which gives a discretion to the arbitral tribunal to extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, give interpretation or make an additional award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5) of section 33 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. 83. In the present case, on facts, a situation, which is peculiar, emerged. The parties appeared before the arbitral tribunal pursuant to its communication of 21st August, 2015, on 4th September, 2015, they were informed that the tribunal will communicate its decision to them. It appears that on 5th September, 2015, the tribunal met and drew up the minutes. 84. 83. In the present case, on facts, a situation, which is peculiar, emerged. The parties appeared before the arbitral tribunal pursuant to its communication of 21st August, 2015, on 4th September, 2015, they were informed that the tribunal will communicate its decision to them. It appears that on 5th September, 2015, the tribunal met and drew up the minutes. 84. These minutes, as drawn up, was the decision and that was not to re-hear the matter further but to abandon the exercise commenced by the communication dated 21st August, 2015. That communication was received by the respondent MSEDCL on 26th October, 2015. It computed the period of limitation to challenge the award and was of the view that the period of three months would commence from 26th October, 2015. Thus, the petition filed on 29th December, 2015, was held to be within limitation. 85. We have to note these peculiar facts and circumstances. They cannot be ignored. What we have noted is that it is within the period of three months stipulated by sub-section(3) of section 34 the communication of 21st August, 2015, was issued and received. The view of the learned single Judge is that until and unless the initiative and taken by the tribunal itself was concluded, the period of three months which was otherwise available and from the date of receipt of a copy of the award, had not come to an end. The learned single Judge further held that if within that period this initiative was taken by the Tribunal but sub-section (6) of section 33 which enables the Tribunal to extend the period of time within which it shall make a correction to give an interpretation or make an additional award can be invoked by the present respondent - MSEDCL, that, to our mind, given the dates and admitted events, cannot be said to be totally perverse view. It is a view which is imminently possible and on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 86. Once we take this view of the matter, any larger question or wider controversy posed for our determination by Mr. Joshi relying on the doctrine that act of Court prejudices no one need not be gone into and considered. 87. It is a view which is imminently possible and on the facts and circumstances of the present case. 86. Once we take this view of the matter, any larger question or wider controversy posed for our determination by Mr. Joshi relying on the doctrine that act of Court prejudices no one need not be gone into and considered. 87. We are of the view that the Arbitration Petition could have been entertained and when it was capable of being entertained, given the peculiar facts and circumstances, then, that view of the learned single Judge does not run contrary to the plain language of the applicable legal provisions. The interpretation of the same by the learned single Judge placed in the backdrop of these facts is certainly not perverse. It is a possible view of the matter. 88. We need not then consider the issue of the arbitral tribunal stepping in though it was intended to be a conciliator and facilitator. We do not think that any arguments on this point need be considered any further and in the light of the view that we take so also our final conclusion. FINDINGS ON POINT NO. IV : 89. The only argument then remains is of the issue of territorial jurisdiction and in that we find that the documents which are annexed to the References themselves would indicate that if section 2(1)(e) which is relied upon is to be considered in its entirety, had a suit been filed to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration, it could have been filed on the original side of this Court. Though this is a point of territorial jurisdiction and is, therefore, a mixed question, what we find is that the arguments were based on the pleadings before the learned single Judge. The pleadings are that the respondent - original arbitral petitioner, challenged an award made by the Industry Facilitation Council, Bench at Mumbai. The Council was seized of a claim and based on a contract which has been placed by the buyer on the supplier. That contract, the details of which have been extensively referred, would enable us to conclude that had a suit been filed, that suit could have been filed by the appellant before us in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court. The predecessor in title of the MSEDCL is MSEB. That contract, the details of which have been extensively referred, would enable us to conclude that had a suit been filed, that suit could have been filed by the appellant before us in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court. The predecessor in title of the MSEDCL is MSEB. Its Material Management Cell (stores), Prakashgad, Bandra, Mumbai, was the one which dealt with the appellant. The order was placed for the goods from this office and establishment of the MSEDCL. It is at Prakashgad, Bandra East, Mumbai. It is that purchase order which resulted in the supply of goods and the raising of bills. The bills were raised on the respondent - MSEDCL at Mumbai. The payment under these bills, after the invoices were duly scrutinized, was to be made and was made from Mumbai. Once the cheques were drawn at Mumbai they were despatched from Mumbai, then, a substantial part of the cause of action, coupled with the prior steps under the contract arose at Mumbai. That would have enabled the parties to file a suit and to recover the sum or amount due as interest at Mumbai and in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this court. In such circumstances, even if Mr. Madkholkar's argument based on the ground introduced in appeal is considered, we do not think that this Court lacked the territorial jurisdiction in taking cognizance and deciding the arbitration petition. We do not think that the arbitration petition was decided without jurisdiction. Equally, there is merit in the argument of Mr. Joshi that an objection to the territorial jurisdiction could have been raised before us but there is no proof of any failure of justice. The entire arbitration petition was contested before the learned single Judge and equally in appeal on all points. Before the learned single Judge the arbitration petition was contested on merits by the appellant. The appellant having taken its chance, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it does not lie in its mouth to now urge that this Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. More so, it has approached this Court so as to seek enforcement and institution of the award. FINDINGS ON POINT NO. V & VI : 90. We do not think that the argument on these points have any substance ground have any substance and equally the other that the award was already executed. More so, it has approached this Court so as to seek enforcement and institution of the award. FINDINGS ON POINT NO. V & VI : 90. We do not think that the argument on these points have any substance ground have any substance and equally the other that the award was already executed. It is common ground and from the record it is evident that the order/decree has not been marked as fully satisfied. The execution is underway. When the execution was underway and an attachment of movables was levied and the warrant of attachment in that behalf was recalled, it does not mean that the MSEDCL was prevented from filing a petition to challenge the award, more so, when the period for challenging it had not expired. It is in these circumstances that Mr. Madkholkar's reliance, on section 35 on the finality of the arbitral award and section 36 on enforcement of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, is misplaced. That is merely providing a mechanism to enforce the award, but it is only when the requirement of sections 35 and 36 is satisfied that this award can be said to be enforceable. It is only on fulfillment of the statutory conditions these provisions in Chapter VII which are subject to the Part-I, that the arbitral award can be said to be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming through them respectively. It is to the entire Part that these provisions are subjected to. That would include section 34. Therefore, the challenge to the Award was maintainable. The award was not enforced and executed, but it was under execution. In the circumstances, this objection also has no merit. 91 As a result of the above discussion, we do not find that the reliance that Mr. Madkholkar places on the judgments, which enumerate the principles that fraud vitiates all judicial proceedings and underlying claims, have any application. Equally, the reliance on the decisions on the point of jurisdiction need not be considered further. We have allowed the appellant to raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court even though it was not raised, but have answered it against it. 92. Equally, the reliance on the decisions on the point of jurisdiction need not be considered further. We have allowed the appellant to raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court even though it was not raised, but have answered it against it. 92. In the view that we have taken on maintainability of the reference made by the appellant under section 18 of the MSMED Act and its predecessor law, we do not think that the issue of propriety of the Council in adjudicating and determining it, raised by Mr. Joshi, should be considered. Even otherwise, we are of the view that the Council merely attempted to settle this claim amicably. When the MSEDCL was not agreeable to settlement that the reference to arbitration became necessary. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, we do not think that the Council lacked the authority to adjudicate upon the claim on merits. More so, when it only attempted earlier to settle it and that too with the assistance of the parties. There was thus no impropriety. Nor the Council had pre-judged the issue in any manner. 93. We also clarify that both Mr. Madkholkar and Mr. Joshi elaborately and extensively addressed us, with the assistance of the record and decided cases on the finding of the learned single Judge that there is nothing in the award or the subsequent orders of the arbitral tribunal/Council to indicate that the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal was available and actually participated in the deliberations of the Council for making of the award (See paragraph 6 pages 46 to 48 of the impugned order). However, assuming for the sake of argument and agreeing with Mr. Madkholkar that the record speaks otherwise and proves the participation of the Chairman Mr. Dilip Shinde throughout and till the actual signing of the award and there is a good reason for absence of his signature on the award, still, there is total non-application by the arbitral tribunal to a vital issue of limitation/time bar/delay and laches. The claims were admittedly time barred and still awarded. That renders the award illegal and contrary to public policy. 94. The claims were admittedly time barred and still awarded. That renders the award illegal and contrary to public policy. 94. In the passing we would like to observe that to avoid any challenge of the nature raised before us and which would be said to be technical in nature, it would be advisable if the application for condoning the delay in filing the Arbitration Petition is taken up first and decided. It is only when that application is decided that the challenge to the award on merits can be considered. That application was separately made in this case. That application was opposed and seriously by the appellant. The learned Judge, therefore, with great respect, would have been well advised in first taking up that application and disposing it off. Even if the delay was condoned, nothing prevented the learned Judge from taking up the Arbitration Petition immediately. However, simultaneous adjudication of both has led to a unnecessary controversy and which was, in the facts and circumstances, imminently avoidable. We hope and trust that the Registry would now place the Motions or applications for condonation of delay first and upon their disposal, they will register the petitions and it is open for the learned Judge to take them up forthwith by directing the Registry to number the petition in a time-frame determined by him. It is eventually the jurisdiction and power to set aside a arbitral award with which we do not tinker, but it is only on a procedural aspect which may result in miscarriage of justice, that we are observing as above. 95. As a result of the above discussion and for our independent reasons, we conclude that the award was liable to be set aside. This appeal deserves to be dismissed. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs.