JUDGMENT : The present petition is directed against judgment and order dated 10th January, 2014, passed by the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal in Revision Application No. 107 of 2013, which confirmed the order dated 28th October, 2013, below Exh. 21 application passed by the Board of Nominees, Vadodara, in Summary Lavad Case No. 306 of 2012. 2. By impugned orders, the prayer of the petitioner herein to condone the delay in filing leave to defend application was refused. The delay of 86 days was not condoned as the Tribunal took the view that time limit prescribed for the purpose in Rule 41-A of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Rules had expired and that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply and hence the principle of sufficient cause could not administered. 3. Now be noticed the necessary facts in a nutshell. The respondent herein instituted Lavad Suit before the court of Board of Nominees against the petitioner for recovery of money, in which it was the case of the petitioner that the summons issued to him was wrongly shown to have been refused. A decree dated 29th July, 2011 came to be passed by the Board of Nominees. Upon coming to know about the decree, the petitioner filed application under section 99(6) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, alongwith application for condonation, whereupon the Lavad Suit was restored and renumbered. 3.1 In response to the fresh summons issued on 14.08.2012, the petitioner filed on 9th November, 2012, the application for leave to defend. The application was delay by 86 days as Rules 41A of the aforesaid rules contemplated period of ten days from the date of service of summons for filing leave to defend application. The grounds raised for condonation were of illness and delay in engaging advocate. The Board of Nominees rejected the condonation application at Eh. 21, and the challenge thereto failed before the Tribunal, which is the order impugned herein. It was ruled by the Tribunal having regard to the provision of the Rule 41A of the Rules, Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be applied, therefore, on that footing the Tribunal did not go into the question of condonability on the ground of sufficiency of cause for delay, treating the time limit in Rule 41A to be mandatory discarding provisions of the Limitation Act. 4. 4. Both at the stage of issuance of notice as well as after issuance of Rule in the petition, through served, the respondent did not appear. This court heard learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Baiju Joshi. 5. Section 41-A of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 reads as under,- “Section 41-A. Summary procedure for deciding disputes. (1) In dispute referred to in sub-sec; (4) of Sec. 99, the disputant shall in addition to the normal averment in Form ‘K’ make the following averment namely :- (a) that the claim of the disputant is for recovery of liquidated sum of money only and no other relief beyond the scopes of this rule is claimed in the dispute. (b) That the disputant believes that there is no valid or bona fide defence to his claim. (2) (i) Within ten days from the service of a notice calling upon the opponent to obtain leave from the Registrar to appear and defend the claim, the opponent or such of the opponents as are interested in defending the claim shall apply to the Registrar by an affidavit of a declaration for the leave setting out the facts on which he relies, and what triable issues are likely to arise. The opponent shall in such application disclose all the documents supporting his contention and as far as possible attach copies of such documents which he considers important from his point of view. A copy of such application shall be served on the disputant and he shall have a right to file a rejoinder in the form of an affidavit or declaration and place before the deciding authority. Such material as in his opinion supports his contentions. A copy of such application shall be served on the disputant and he shall have a right to file a rejoinder in the form of an affidavit or declaration and place before the deciding authority. Such material as in his opinion supports his contentions. (ii) The Registrar, on reading the affidavits and declarations and on hearing of the parties and their pleadings and considering the documents relied on and produced by them, may pass an award or grant leave to defend to such of the opponents, subject to the condition that the opponent shall deposit thirty three and half percent amount of the claim of the dispute or such less amount as may be fixed by the Registrar after taking into consideration of the circumstances and facts of the disputes.” 5.1 In the context of above Rule 41A and the limitation period of 10 days prescribed therein, the question which arises in the facts of the case is whether the said limitation period could be condoned and leave to defend application could be permitted to be filed beyond the said period, if sufficient cause is shown or the delay is found condonable otherwise, by applying the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, more particularly by applying Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act by attracting Section 5 thereof. 5.2 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under,- "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 6. In Mangu Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ AIR 1976 SC 105 ], in which it was stated and held,- “There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. In Mangu Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ AIR 1976 SC 105 ], in which it was stated and held,- “There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, sub-section (2), cl.(b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which there are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (para 10) 6.1 It was further explained,- “S. 29 Sub. S. (2) Cl.(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Ranis case can therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 is specifically made applicable by section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he head sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation.” (para 10) 6.1.1 It was next stated,- “It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Ranis case AIR 1964 SC 260 : 1964 (1) CrLJ 152 the time limit of sixty days laid down in subsection (4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of section 5.” (para 10) 6.1.2 And pertinently observed,- “It is true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar.” (para 10) 6.1.3 Following was held in clear terms,- “Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it.” (para 10) [emphasis supplied] 6.2 In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [ (2001) 8 SCC 470 ], the Supreme Court considered the question of applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 in the context of section 34(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to address the question whether in respect to the period of limitation prescribed in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, Section 5 of the Act would apply and whether the delay beyond the said prescribed limitation could be condoned. Section 34 provided that the application to set aside the arbitral award could be made within three months and proviso to the section stated that if the applicant was prevented from making application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days, but not thereafter. 6.2.1 Referring to the language of section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court noticed to hold that the crucial words therein were but not thereafter. It was held that in view of such language employed by the Legislature, it would amount to express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would therefore, bar the application of section 5 of the Act. It was held that exclusion of provisions of Limitation Act within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, may be an expressed exclusion or implied exclusion. 6.2.2 It was stated as under,- “Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5.” 6.3 Wherever a special statute in its provisions or in that matter in Rule in the subordinate Legislation, prescribes the limitation period, in order to ascertain as to whether time beyond such prescribed period in special statute is condonable in terms of the provisions of the Limitation Act in particularly Section 5 thereof, the decisive test is language of provisions in the special statute or rule providing for such limitation. It has to be gathered and judged from the language whether it either expressly or impliedly excludes the applicability of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6.4 Adverting to the Rule 41A of Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, it contemplates period of 10 days for filling leave to defend application. The word used is “within 10 days”. These words are not qualified or superfine by any qualifying prefixed or suffixed. 6.4 Adverting to the Rule 41A of Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, it contemplates period of 10 days for filling leave to defend application. The word used is “within 10 days”. These words are not qualified or superfine by any qualifying prefixed or suffixed. Juxtaposing the language in Section 34 of Arbitration Act where the words are “not thereafter”, on the basis of which the supreme court construed the said special provision of limitation to be applied strictly excluding the application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary nor expedient nor justified to read the language of Rule 41A in this case in such a way. The language of Rule 41A is not prefixed or suffixed by any limiting words or by creating special embargo to construe against applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act. 6.5 It cannot be said that by providing the period of 10 days, Rule 41A of the Rules, displaces the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to view the delay beyond 10 days period as not condonable. In a given case, therefore, if there is a delay in filling the leave to defend application beyond 10 days and sufficient cause is made out, such delay could be condoned and the leave to defend application can be accepted. 6.6 This court addressed identical issue in respect of Rule 22 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 in Cadila Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI being Special Civil Application No. 6417 of 2008 and allowed petition decided as per judgment dated 12.10.2017. Rule 22 which provides power to review, used the same language “within 15 days” and any person aggrieved by notification issued may apply to the government under Rule 22 in a review thereof within 15 days. What is held hereinabove was held in that case also. Limitation Act would apply and the delay beyond a period of 15 days in filling the review application was condonable on sufficient cause being made out. 6.7 In the instant case, delay of 86 days is sought to be explained on the ground of illness. A further ground is urged to explain the delay is that time was consumed in engaging the advocate and thereafter the leave to defend application could be filed. It does not appear that these grounds are artificially raised or that they are not bona fide. A further ground is urged to explain the delay is that time was consumed in engaging the advocate and thereafter the leave to defend application could be filed. It does not appear that these grounds are artificially raised or that they are not bona fide. It could be reasonably accepted that the petitioner could not file his leave to defend within 10 days since he was indisposed and wanted to engage advocate. The time was consumed leading delay of 86 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, sufficient cause could be said to have been made out. 7. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, the impugned orders passed by the Gujarat Co-operative Tribunal dated 10th January, 2014 dismissing the Revision application and order below Exh. 2 dated 28th October, 2013 passed by the Board of Nominees, Vadodara, in Lavad suit No. 306 of 2012, which was confirmed by the Tribunal, are hereby set aside. The delay of 86 days in filling the application for leave to defend is hereby condoned. The Board of Nominees, Vadodara, shall expeditiously proceed and decide in accordance with law the Summary Lavad Suit No. 306 of 2012. Rule is made absolute. Rule is made absolute.