JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant - original accused has prayed for the following reliefs : "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order and/or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 19.2.2016 passed by the Ld. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad upon the application dated 18.2.2016 given by the investigation officer Panna Momaya and also to quash and set aside the impugned judgment order dated 28.7.2016 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.147 of 2016 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Court No.11, Ahmedabad whereby confirmed the order dated 19.2.2016. (C) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of the impugned order dated 19.2.2016 passed by the Ld. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad upon the application dated 18.2.2016 given by the investigation officer Panna Momaya and also to impugned judgment order dated 28.7.2016 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.147 of 2016 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Court No.11, Ahmedabad whereby confirmed the order dated 19.2.2016. (D) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, direct the respondent authority or his agency not to proceed further or take any action under the provision of Section 70 of Cr.P.C. against the petitioner. (E) Grant such other and further relief as thought fit, in the interest of justice. 2. This litigation is nothing but an outcome of a serious matrimonial dispute between the parties. The applicant herein got married to one Pratikshaben on 10th December 2009. As the matrimonial disputes cropped up between the husband and the wife, the wife lodged an FIR being CR-I No.186 of 2014 with the Sola Police Station, Ahmedabad, against the husband and his family members for the offences punishable under Sections 294B, 323, 498A read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. 3. At the end of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the filing of the charge-sheet culminated in the Criminal Case No.6853 of 2014 pending as on date in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Mirzapur. 4. Thereafter, the wife filed one another FIR against the applicant being CR-II No.3014 of 2015 before the DCB Police Station, Ahmedabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act. 5. The applicant, apprehending arrest in connection with the above referred FIR, prayed for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court declined to grant anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, the applicant came before this Court by filing the Criminal Misc. Application No.4849 of 2015. This Court, vide order dated 15th June 2015, also declined to grant anticipatory bail. The applicant is absconding. He is evading arrest and is not available for the purpose of interrogation. In such circumstances, the Investigating Officer of the concerned Police Station filed an application before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for a warrant under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court concerned ordered issue of arrest warrant under Section 70 of the Code. 6. The applicant, being dissatisfied with the issue of arrest warrant, preferred a revision application in the Sessions Court. The revision application also came to be rejected by the Sessions Court. In such circumstances, he is here before this Court with this application, seeking the reliefs prayed for in this application. 7. Mr. Kunal S.Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, submitted that the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate committed a serious error in issuing the arrest warrant under Section 70 of the Code. He submitted that the court concerned had no power or jurisdiction to issue a non-bailable warrant for arrest of the applicant. According to the learned counsel, a non-bailable warrant cannot be issued by the court in the aid of the investigation, or to put it in other words, to facilitate the Investigating Officer to secure the presence of the accused. It is submitted that a warrant of arrest can only be for the purpose of production of an accused before the court. It is submitted that a warrant of arrest can only be for the purpose of production of an accused before the court. To put it in other words, the submission is that the warrant of arrest under Section 73 of the Code cannot be issued by the courts solely for the production of the accused before the police in the aid of the investigation. The second submission of the learned counsel is that having regard to the quantum of punishment prescribed for the offence punishable under the Information Technology Act, 2000, it was absolutely imperative on the part of the investigating authority to comply with the procedure postulated in Section 41A of the Code. 8. It is submitted that Section 41A of the Code, which has been inserted by Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009), was introduced, and in that context, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another, (2014)8 SCC 273 , that Section 41A of the Cr.P.C. makes it clear that where the arrest of the person is not required under Section 41(1) of the Cr.P.C., the police officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time. The law obliges such an accused to appear before a police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of the notice, he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary. According to the learned counsel, the police has not issued any notice as contemplated under Section 41A of the Code, and in the absence of the same, could not have obtained an arrest warrant. 9. The learned counsel submitted that at that stage also the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. has to be complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate concerned. The learned counsel places reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rini Johar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2016 SC 2679 . 10. The learned counsel places reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rini Johar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2016 SC 2679 . 10. Relying on one decision of this very court, in the case of Pravinbhai Parsottambhai Chovatiya v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Revision Application No.895 of 2016, decided on 24th January 2017), it was submitted that as no notice was issued by the Investigating Officer under Section 160 of the Code for securing the presence of the accused, the Investigating Officer could not have straightway obtained a non-bailable warrant of arrest. 11. The learned counsel also placed reliance on one another decision of this Court in the case of Jaysukh @ Jayesh Muljibhai Ranpariya v. State of Gujarat, (2016)3 GLH 617 , wherein this Court has taken the view that in compoundable offences, before a non-bailable warrant is issued, the court concerned must inquire with the Investigating Officer as to whether a notice under Section 160 of the Code asking the accused to remain present at the concerned police station had been issued or not. 12. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the warrant of arrest be quashed. 13. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by the learned APP appearing for the State. The learned APP submitted that even after this Court declined to grant anticipatory bail to the applicant, he has been on the run and is not available for the purpose of interrogation. The learned APP submitted that the Investigating Officer is of the firm view that the arrest is necessary for the purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (b)(ii)(b) and (c) of clause (1) of Section 41 of the Code. According to the learned APP, it is the satisfaction of the police officer concerned, which is important. The learned APP pointed out that the allegations in the FIR constituting the offence punishable under Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act are very serious. The allegations are that the applicant, keeping a spite against his wife, uploaded nude pictures of himself and his wife including a video-clip on one of the porn-sites on the internet. The learned APP pointed out that the allegations in the FIR constituting the offence punishable under Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act are very serious. The allegations are that the applicant, keeping a spite against his wife, uploaded nude pictures of himself and his wife including a video-clip on one of the porn-sites on the internet. This act of the applicant was with the intention to tarnish the image of his wife and create all sorts of problems for her in the society. 14. The learned APP submitted that the issue as regards the power of a Magistrate to issue a non-bailable warrant of arrest is now set at rest by a judgment of this Court in the case of Navalsinh Hemubha Parmar v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Misc. Application No.27331 of 2017, decided on 16th November 2017). 15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned APP prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the applicant herein is entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in this application. 17. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the either sides, it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000. 18. Section 66E of the IT Act provides for punishment for violation of privacy. It reads as under : "66E. Punishment for violation of privacy. Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both." 19. Section 67 of the IT Act provides for punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. It reads as under : "67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. Section 67 of the IT Act provides for punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. It reads as under : "67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees." 20. Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides for punishment for publishing or transmitting of materials containing sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form. It reads as under : "67A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting material containing sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form any material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees." 21. Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides for imprisonment upto five years with fine, which may extend to rupees ten lakh, of first conviction, and imprisonment upto seven years with fine, which may extend to rupees ten lakh, in the event of second or subsequent conviction. 22. Section 77A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides for compounding of offences. It reads as under : "77A. Compounding of offences. 22. Section 77A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides for compounding of offences. It reads as under : "77A. Compounding of offences. (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may compound offences, other than offences for which the punishment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding three years has been provided, under this Act: Provided that the court shall not compound such offence where the accused is, by reason of his previous conviction, liable to either enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind: Provided further that the court shall not compound any offence where such offence affects the socio economic conditions of the country or has been committed against a child below the age of 18 years or a woman. (2) The person accused of an offence under this Act may file an application for compounding in the court in which offence is pending for trial and the provisions of sections 265B and 265C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply." 23. Thus, the plain reading of Section 77A of the Act, 2000, would indicate that the court concerned has no power to compound the offence under the Act, 2000, if the imprisonment is for life or for a term exceeding three years. The second proviso to Section 77A makes it clear that the court shall not compound any offence where such offence affects the socio-economic conditions of the country or has been committed against a child below the age of 18 years or a woman. 24. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads as under : "41. The second proviso to Section 77A makes it clear that the court shall not compound any offence where such offence affects the socio-economic conditions of the country or has been committed against a child below the age of 18 years or a woman. 24. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads as under : "41. When police may arrest without warrant (1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person - (a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence; (b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:- (i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence; (ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary- (a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or (b) for proper investigation of the offence; or (c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or (d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or (e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing. (ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of that information that such person has committed the said offence;] (c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State Government; or (d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; or (e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or (f) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or (g) who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or (h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule, made under subsection (5) of section 356; or (i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears there from that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition. (2) Subject to the provisions of section 42, no person concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned, shall be arrested except under a warrant or order of a Magistrate." 25. Section 41A, as inserted by Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 1.11.2010, reads as under : "41A. Section 41A, as inserted by Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 1.11.2010, reads as under : "41A. Notice of appearance before police officer (1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. (4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice." 26. Let me deal with the first submission of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant as regards the power of the Magistrate to issue an arrest warrant under Section 73 of the Code. 27. I am not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel that the Magistrate has no power or jurisdiction to issue a warrant of arrest in aid of the investigation. I had an occasion to deal with this issue in the case of Navalsinh Hemubhai Parmar (supra) at length. I may quote the observations made in the said judgment as contained from paragraphs 15 to 26 thus : "15. Section 73 of the Cr.P.C reads as under ; 73. Warrant may be directed to any person. (1) The Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may direct a warrant to any person within his local jurisdiction for the arrest of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or of any person who is accused of a non- bailable, offence and is evading arrest. Warrant may be directed to any person. (1) The Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may direct a warrant to any person within his local jurisdiction for the arrest of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or of any person who is accused of a non- bailable, offence and is evading arrest. (2) Such person shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the warrant, and shall execute it if the person for whose arrest it was issued, is in, or enters on, any land or other property under his charge. (3) When the person against whom such warrant is issued is arrested, he shall be made over with the warrant to the nearest police officer, who shall cause him to be taken before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, unless security is taken under section 71. 16. Section 82 empowers the Court to issue proclamation; and so far as it is relevant for the present case, it reads as: "82(1) If any Court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation." 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote the observations of the Supreme Court as contained in para-22 in the case of Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar (supra); "22. Another factor which clearly indicates that Section 73 of the Code gives a power to the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and that too during investigation is evident from the provisions of part ‘C' of Chapter VI of the Code, which we have earlier adverted to. Needless to say the provisions of proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under Section 82 (quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court only in respect of a person ‘against whom a warrant has been issued by it'. Needless to say the provisions of proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under Section 82 (quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court only in respect of a person ‘against whom a warrant has been issued by it'. In other words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and the other Sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked in a situation where in spite of its best effects the police cannot arrest a person under Section 41. Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions of part ‘C' of Chapter VI. [Section 8 (3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA] 18. The expression warrant of arrest is not defined in the code, but sections 70 to 81 collected under the subheading B-warrant of arrest in chapter-VI deal with the arrests in execution of the warrants issued by a court under the Cr.P.C. In Schedule-II, the form No.2 is given; Form No.2 WARRANT OF ARREST (See Sec. 70) To....................................., (name and designation of the person or person who is or are to execute the warrant). Whereas (name of accused) of (address) stands changed with the offence of &....................... (state the offence), you are hereby directed to arrest the said...................., and to produce him before me. Herein fail not. Dated, this............. day of................, 20......... (Seal of the Court) (Signature) 19. A warrant is an order addressed to a certain person directing him to arrest the accused and to produce the accused before the Court. The warrant may have a further provision for admitting the accused to bail, but in each case, the warrant is an order directed to someone to arrest certain accused and bring him before the Court, and the person to whom it is addressed may if he is a Magistrate or police officer endorse the warrant to someone serving under him. The warrant may have a further provision for admitting the accused to bail, but in each case, the warrant is an order directed to someone to arrest certain accused and bring him before the Court, and the person to whom it is addressed may if he is a Magistrate or police officer endorse the warrant to someone serving under him. Section 73 is of general application and that in the course of the investigation, a Court can issue a warrant in exercise of power There under to apprehend, inter alia, a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. It cannot be gainsaid that a Magistrate plays not infrequently a role during the investigation. In doing so, the Magistrate does not, however, exercise judicial discretion. On production of the accused before him, pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the section, the Court may either release him on bail or authorize his detention in custody (either police or judicial) under section 167 of the Code. Whether the Magistrate, on being moved by the Investigating Agency, will entertain its prayer for police custody will be at his sole discretion which has to be judicially exercised in accordance with Section 167 (3) of the Code. Since warrant is and can be issued for appearance before the Court only and not before the police and since authorization for detention in police custody is neither to be given as a matter of course nor on the mere asking of the police, but only after exercise of judicial discretion based on materials placed before him, it cannot be said that the warrant of arrest under section 73 could be issued by the courts solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation (State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, 1997 Cri. Law. Journal 2989 (SC). 20. On plain reading of the section, it is quite clear that the provision of section 73 has general application and even in the course of the investigation, the concerned Magistrate can issue a warrant of arrest to apprehend a person, who is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. Law. Journal 2989 (SC). 20. On plain reading of the section, it is quite clear that the provision of section 73 has general application and even in the course of the investigation, the concerned Magistrate can issue a warrant of arrest to apprehend a person, who is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. Since I didn’t had the advantage to go through the requisition of the police nor the order of issue of warrant, it is difficult for me to take the view that the purpose of warrant of arrest is for the production of the applicant before the police in the aid of the investigation. Apart from it, in the section itself, there is a provision to check such circumstances. Sub-section (3) of section 73 Cr.P.C clearly provides that after the arrest, on the strength of the warrant of arrest issued under sub-clause (1), the person must be produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case. Thereafter, section 167 Cr.P.C would come into play for the detention of the accused. 21. I am of the view that the legal debate on the issue of power of the police to obtain a warrant of arrest in the course of the investigation from the court concerned should now be put to rest. I fail to understand why there has been so much of debate up till now on this issue. It is a settled law that the police has got powers to arrest an accused without a warrant if the offence alleged is cognizable. In what manner, a non-bailable warrant would come handy to a police officer for the purpose of arresting an accused, who is on a run or is evading the arrest?. The non-bailable warrant, in no manner, would facilitate the police in apprehending or arresting the accused. A non-bailable warrant will not work as a magic wand in the hands of the police for the purpose of apprehending the accused, who is evading his arrest. To put it in other words, by merely looking at the non-bailable warrant, the exact location of the hiding of the accused will not be found out. The non-bailable warrant of arrest would come handy to the police officer only if the accused who is evading arrest is to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. To put it in other words, by merely looking at the non-bailable warrant, the exact location of the hiding of the accused will not be found out. The non-bailable warrant of arrest would come handy to the police officer only if the accused who is evading arrest is to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. This is evident from the provision of section 82 of the Code. Section 82 of the Code provides that if any court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it, has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation. Sub-clause (2) of section 82 provides how the proclamation is to be published. Section 83 of the Code provides for the attachment of property of person absconding. A person who fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by a proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Cr.P.C is said to have committed an offence punishable under section 174(A) of the IPC and on being convicted, such person can be sentenced to imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both and in a case where a declaration has been made under sub-section (4) of section 82 pronouncing such person as a proclaimed offender, then such person can be sentenced with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, the non-bailable warrant will never be advantageous to the police in actually effecting the arrest of the absconding accused. It is, therefore, a misnomer to say that the warrant is obtained by the police for the production of the accused in aid of the investigation. When we are talking about in aid of the investigation it should be understood as the steps which are necessary to be taken by the police to declare an accused as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. 22. The police should now rectify their mistakes. When we are talking about in aid of the investigation it should be understood as the steps which are necessary to be taken by the police to declare an accused as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. 22. The police should now rectify their mistakes. When any requisition is made by the police before any Court for the purpose of issue of non-bailable warrant, then the requisition should not be for the purpose of the production of the accused before the police in aid of the investigation. The requisition should be very specific. The requisition should state that despite all efforts, the accused could not be arrested and now the accused needs to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder and the steps necessary in accordance with the provisions of the Code are to be taken. The courts should also be careful while issuing the non-bailable warrant as prayed for by the police. While issuing the non-bailable warrant, the courts should be mindful of the form of arrest as provided in the Form No.2 to the 2nd Schedule of the Cr.P.C. Nothing beyond the contents of the form should be in the warrant of arrest. If such procedure is adopted, then there should not be any further difficulty for both, the police as well as the accused. 23. At this stage, I would like to sound a note of caution for the Magistrates across the State as well as the police. The warrant of arrest against a person, accused of a non-bailable offence, should not be granted on mere asking. The requisition to be made by the police in this regard is not an empty formality. The allegation of charging a person of being an accused of a non-bailable offence must be apparent from the requisition filed by the police. An order under section 73 Cr.P.C, which is to make an in road in the personal liberty of an individual, should not be passed casually but only after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, contents of the application and the requirement of law. The requisition filed by the police must disclose that there is evidence to substantiate the allegation that the person concerned is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. The requisition filed by the police must disclose that there is evidence to substantiate the allegation that the person concerned is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. The Court, too, has to record its satisfaction that there is sufficient allegation against the person concerned of being an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. 24. I would like to draw the attention of the police to yet one another provision of the Criminal Procedure Code and that is section 49 of the Code. Section 49 reads as under; "Section 49: No unnecessary restraint:- The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape." 25. This section corresponds to section 50 of the Old Code. The mandate of the section is that no person arrested under any of the provisions of Chapter-V of the Code shall be unnecessarily harassed or put to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape after arrest. It may be pointed out in this connection that in violation of this mandate or abuse of power is an offence punishable under section 220 of the Indian Penal Code. 26. Indisputably, in the present case, this Court has declined to grant the anticipatory bail to the writ applicant. It appears that the writ applicant had filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the order passed by this Court, rejecting the anticipatory bail application, but I am informed that the SLP was withdrawn from the Registry itself. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ applicant that there is nothing on record to suggest that the writ applicant is evading his arrest. If the writ applicant is attending his office everyday, then he should be bold enough to appear before the Investigating Officer and subject himself to the interrogation. The writ applicant knows that his anticipatory bail application has been rejected by this Court, and now the arrest is imminent. In such circumstances, it appears that he has gone in the hiding." 28. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the first contention of the learned counsel is negatived. 29. The writ applicant knows that his anticipatory bail application has been rejected by this Court, and now the arrest is imminent. In such circumstances, it appears that he has gone in the hiding." 28. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the first contention of the learned counsel is negatived. 29. Let me now deal with the second submission as regards the issue of notice or summons under Section 160 of the Code and following the procedure of effecting arrest as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra). 30. In the aforesaid context, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rini Johar (supra) needs to be looked into. In Rini Johar (supra), the petitioner no.1 was a doctor and was pursuing higher studies in the United State of America. The petitioner no.2 was a septuagenarian lady, a practicing advocate in the District Court at Pune. Both were arrested by the police for the offence punishable under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. A writ-petition was filed before the Supreme Court complaining of the highhandedness at the end of the police and violation of the fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, while allowing the writ-petition, observed as under : "19. Mr. Fernandes, learned Amicus Curiae, in a tabular chart has pointed that none of the requirements had been complied with. Various reasons have been ascribed for the same. On a scrutiny of enquiry report and the factual assertions made, it is limpid that some of the guidelines have been violated. It is strenuously urged by Mr. Fernandes that Section 66-A(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 provides maximum sentence of three years and Section 420 CrPC stipulates sentence of seven years and, therefore, it was absolutely imperative on the part of the arresting authority to comply with the procedure postulated in Section 41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another, (2014)8 SCC 273 , while dwelling upon the concept of arrest, was compelled to observe thus:- "Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police has not learnt its lesson: the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police has not learnt its lesson: the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of Independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasised time and again by the courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive." 20. Thereafter, the Court referred to Section 41 CrPC and analyzing the said provision, opined that a person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on his satisfaction that such person had committed the offence. It has been further held that a police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on facts. Eventually, the Court was compelled to state:- "In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest ? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on facts. Eventually, the Court was compelled to state:- "In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest ? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only after these questions are addressed and one or the other conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first the police officers should have reason to believe on the basis of information and material that the accused has committed the offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 CrPC." 21. In the said authority, Section 41-A CrPC, which has been inserted by Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009) was introduced and in that context, it has been held that Section 41- A CrPC makes it clear that where the arrest of a person is not required under Section 41(1) CrPC, the police officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time. Law obliges such an accused to appear before the police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary. At this stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 CrPC has to be complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate as aforesaid. 22. We have referred to the enquiry report and the legal position prevalent in the field. On a studied scrutiny of the report, it is quite vivid that the arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest. Section 41-A CRPC as has been interpreted by this Court has not been followed. The report clearly shows there have been number of violations in the arrest, and seizure. Circumstances in no case justify the manner in which the petitioners were treated. 23. Section 41-A CRPC as has been interpreted by this Court has not been followed. The report clearly shows there have been number of violations in the arrest, and seizure. Circumstances in no case justify the manner in which the petitioners were treated. 23. In such a situation, we are inclined to think that the dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized. Dignity, as has been held in Charu Khurana v. Union of India (2015)1 SCC 192 , is the quintessential quality of a personality, for it is a highly cherished value. It is also clear that liberty of the petitioner was curtailed in violation of law. The freedom of an individual has its sanctity. When the individual liberty is curtailed in an unlawful manner, the victim is likely to feel more anguished, agonized, shaken, perturbed, disillusioned and emotionally torn. It is an assault on his/her identity. The said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution. Therefore, for curtailment of liberty, requisite norms are to be followed. Fidelity to statutory safeguards instil faith of the collective in the system. It does not require wisdom of a seer to visualize that for some invisible reason, an attempt has been made to corrode the procedural safeguards which are meant to sustain the sanguinity of liberty. The investigating agency, as it seems, has put its sense of accountability to law on the ventilator. The two ladies have been arrested without following the procedure and put in the compartment of a train without being produced before the local Magistrate from Pune to Bhopal. One need not be Argus - eyed to perceive the same. Its visibility is as clear as the cloudless noon day. It would not be erroneous to say that the enthusiastic investigating agency had totally forgotten the golden words of Benjamin Disraeli: "I repeat .... that all power is a trust - that we are accountable for its exercise - that, from the people and for the people, all springs and all must exist." 24. We are compelled to say so as liberty which is basically the splendor of beauty of life and bliss of growth, cannot be allowed to be frozen in such a contrived winter. That would tantamount to comatosing of liberty which is the strongest pillar of democracy. 25. Having held thus, we shall proceed to the facet of grant of compensation. We are compelled to say so as liberty which is basically the splendor of beauty of life and bliss of growth, cannot be allowed to be frozen in such a contrived winter. That would tantamount to comatosing of liberty which is the strongest pillar of democracy. 25. Having held thus, we shall proceed to the facet of grant of compensation. The officers of the State had played with the liberty of the petitioners and, in a way, experimented with it. Law does not countenance such kind of experiments as that causes trauma and pain. In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2012]8 SCC 1, while dealing with the harassment in custody, deliberating on the concept of harassment, the Court stated thus:- "22. At this juncture, it becomes absolutely necessary to appreciate what is meant by the term "harassment". In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., the term "harass" has been defined thus: "Harass.-'Injure' and 'injury' are words having numerous and comprehensive popular meanings, as well as having a legal import. A line may be drawn between these words and the word 'harass', excluding the latter from being comprehended within the word 'injure' or 'injury'. The synonyms of 'harass' are: to weary, tire, perplex, distress tease, vex, molest, trouble, disturb. They all have relation to mental annoyance, and a troubling of the spirit." The term "harassment" in its connotative expanse includes torment and vexation. The term "torture" also engulfs the concept of torment. The word "torture" in its denotative concept includes mental and psychological harassment. The accused in custody can be put under tremendous psychological pressure by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." 26. In the said case, emphasizing on dignity, it has been observed:- ".....The majesty of law protects the dignity of a citizen in a society governed by law. It cannot be forgotten that the welfare State is governed by the rule of law which has paramountcy. It has been said by Edward Biggon "the laws of a nation form the most instructive portion of its history". The Constitution as the organic law of the land has unfolded itself in a manifold manner like a living organism in the various decisions of the court about the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution as the organic law of the land has unfolded itself in a manifold manner like a living organism in the various decisions of the court about the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. When citizenry rights are sometimes dashed against and pushed back by the members of City Halls, there has to be a rebound and when the rebound takes place, Article 21 of the Constitution springs up to action as a protector...." 27. In the case at hand, there has been violation of Article 21 and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation. They have been treated with an attitude of insensibility. Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (supra), there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Nilawati Behra (supra), Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006)3 SCC 178 , Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P., (2012)1 SCC 748 , comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised." 31. In the facts of the case, the Supreme Court quashed the entire prosecution. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that no case was made out to prosecute the two accused under Section 66A of the IT Act as well as for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 32. In the case on hand, the learned APP pointed out from the materials on record that the police officer is convinced that the arrest is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence. I have already given a fair idea of the allegations levelled against the applicant herein. 33. 32. In the case on hand, the learned APP pointed out from the materials on record that the police officer is convinced that the arrest is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence. I have already given a fair idea of the allegations levelled against the applicant herein. 33. Having regard to the nature of the allegations, I am of the view that it would be too much to say that the Investigating Officer ought to have issued a notice under Section 160 of the Code asking the applicant to remain present for the purpose of interrogation, and only on failure on the part of the applicant to remain present, could have applied for an arrest warrant. I am saying so, more particularly, when a coordinate bench of this Court did not deem fit to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant for the purpose of granting anticipatory bail. Section 41A of the Code would come into play only in cases where the arrest of the person is not required under the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 41 of the Code. It is not in dispute that way back on 15th June 2015, this Court declined to grant anticipatory bail to the applicant. Since then, the applicant is on the run and is evading arrest. 34. The applicant is worried about his image and dignity if he is arrested by the police. Having humiliated his wife to such an extent, the applicant should not be worried about his dignity. While committing the offence, he did not realize about the dignity of his wife. Whatever may be the differences between the husband and wife and howsoever there may be the bitterness in their hearts for each other, the husband could not have gone to this extent. If, ultimately, the allegations are found to be true, then there cannot be a more shameful act on the part of the husband than what is complained against him. 35. I have gone through the contents of the application filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Women Cell, Crime Branch, Ahmedabad, in the court of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.11, Ahmedabad, for the purpose of obtaining warrant of arrest under Section 70 of the Code. It contains all the necessary details for the purpose of obtaining the arrest warrant. 36. It contains all the necessary details for the purpose of obtaining the arrest warrant. 36. In such circumstances referred to above, the other two decisions of this Court in the case of Jaysukh @ Jayesh Muljibhai Ranpariya (supra) and Pravinbhai Parsottambhai Chovatiya (supra) would not be of any help to the applicant. Both the decisions of this Court were in the facts of those cases. 37. In the overall view of the matter, I am convinced that I should not interfere in this matter in exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 38. In the result, this application fails and is hereby rejected. 39. I propose to say something in addition to what I have stated above in the facts of this case. I propose to say something more keeping in mind the legislative intent of Section 41A of the Code and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra) as, in the course of my present sitting, in many cases, serious complaints were made by the learned counsel appearing for the accused as regards the investigating officer summoning the accused on a mere filing of an application by the complainant and thereafter pressurizing the accused to settle the matter with the complainant, more particularly, in cases relating to the commercial transactions. In few cases, it was pointed out to me that during the police remand, the Investigating Officer would be moving around somewhere in the town and it is the writer who would put questions to the accused in the course of the custodial interrogation. It was something very shocking to this Court. In one matter, the accused pointed out this fact by filing an affidavit. I fail to understand how can the writer interrogate the accused while in the police custody, i.e. during the period of police remand. 40. I have already quoted the provisions of the Information Technology Act as well as Sections 41 and 41A of the Code. In addition to the same, I may quote Section 170 of the Code, which reads as under : "170. Cases to be sent to Magistrate when evidence is sufficient. 40. I have already quoted the provisions of the Information Technology Act as well as Sections 41 and 41A of the Code. In addition to the same, I may quote Section 170 of the Code, which reads as under : "170. Cases to be sent to Magistrate when evidence is sufficient. (1) If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer-in-charge of police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground as aforesaid, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial, or, if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, shall take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed. (2) When the officer-in-charge of a police station forwards an accused person to a Magistrate or takes security for his appearance before such Magistrate under this section, he shall send to such Magistrate any weapon or other article which it may be necessary to produce before him, and shall require the complainant (if any) and so many of the persons who appear to such officer to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case as he may think necessary, to execute a bond to appear before the Magistrate as thereby directed and prosecute or give evidence (as the case may be) in the matter of the charge against the accused. (3) If the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is mentioned in the bond, such Court shall be held to include any Court to which such Magistrate may refer the case for inquiry or trial, provided reasonable notice of such reference is given to such complainant or persons. (4) The officer in whose presence the bond is executed shall deliver a copy thereof to one of the persons who executed it, and shall then send to the Magistrate the original with his report." 41. (4) The officer in whose presence the bond is executed shall deliver a copy thereof to one of the persons who executed it, and shall then send to the Magistrate the original with his report." 41. The import of the provisions noted above is that normally where an accused has been named in the FIR and the offence is punishable with upto seven years imprisonment, the arrest of the accused may not be necessary at the initial stage and his attendance may be secured by issuing a notice to him to appear before the police officer under Section 41A of the Code. 42. In such cases, it would be advisable to arrest the accused only after sufficient evidence of his involvement in the crime has been collected and the charge-sheet needs to be submitted. Under section 170(1) of the Code, it has been provided that on completion of the investigation if sufficient evidence has been collected the accused shall be forwarded in custody to the Magistrate concerned, unless he has been released on bail, if the offence was bailable, in which event security may be taken for his appearance before the Magistrate. This practice of not arresting the accused straightaway and arresting them only after sufficient evidence has been collected is normally followed by the CBI in their investigations. 43. Where, however, the accused has not been named in the FIR, or at the time when the co-accused have been picked up, for example in a case of theft of a vehicle or recovery of other stolen goods, or where the co-accused has been arrested while committing a crime, and he names another accused as also having participated in the crime, whose custodial interrogation may be necessary and the police officer is of the opinion that the disclosure furnishes credible information or gives rise to a reasonable suspicion for inferring that this accused whose arrest is sought could also be involved, or there are chances that such an accused would abscond or not respond to a notice under Section 41A to appear, looking to the nature of the crime and the background of the particular accused, these may be appropriate cases where immediate arrests may be needed. Likewise, where the accused whose arrest is sought appears to be habitually engaged in committing crimes or appears to be participating in some organized crimes, and there is probability of the accused repeating the offence, these would also be the circumstances where it may be necessary to arrest such accused without delay. 44. Take a case, for the purpose of illustration, of an FIR for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC, where the wife, on account of harassment at the end of her husband and in-laws, has gone back to her parental home, it may not be necessary in a particular case to immediately arrest the husband and other family members who have been made accused in the FIR until adequate evidence has been collected, as she is unlikely to encounter violence or harassment when she is away from her matrimonial home. It would all depend on the facts of each case and the nature of the offence. It is with the objective of striking a balance on the need to provide the Constitutional protection from arbitrary arrest guaranteed under Article 21 and the restraint on arrests for offences punishable with upto seven years imprisonment, that the Legislature thought fit to insert by Act 5 of 2009 Section 41(A) in the Code, with effect from 1st November 2010. The very same object weighed with the Legislature in adding the clauses (a) and (b) by Act 5 of 2009, with effect from 1st November 2010, in Section 41 of the Code. 45. This Court expects the police officer to record reasons in a bonafide and honest manner, why it has become necessary to arrest the accused in a particular case punishable with upto seven years imprisonment. The police officer should not mechanically and routinely write down in the case diary that there is likelihood of the accused running away, or presume that the accused would not respond to the notice to appear under Section 41A of the Code, or that he would tamper with the evidence, unless there are strong reasons with concrete material like in the case in hand for taking such a view, and this satisfaction along with the concrete reasons for taking the view needs to be spelt out clearly in the case diary before the accused is arrested. 46. 46. As explained by the Supreme Court in Rini Johar (supra) that strong reasons are to be noted for arresting an accused with respectable antecedents, who is an income tax payee with roots in the community, and a permanent resident, no history of earlier abscondance or non-cooperation with the police and who is not likely to tamper with the evidence or to again commit a crime unless he is immediately arrested. 47. The propriety, honesty and genuineness of the reasons given for arrests in particular cases punishable with upto seven years imprisonment and whether they conform to the requirements of Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Code, therefore need to be strictly monitored by the superior officers, i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Commissioner of Police, etc. 48. In the event this Court finds that the accused who are wanted in cases punishable with upto seven years imprisonment are being arrested in a routine and mechanical manner, without the existence of the conditions necessary for arresting them as mentioned in Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Code, and if it is found that the police machinery is being misused or that the police is pressurizing the complainant to settle the matter at the instance of the complainant, this Court will have no hesitation in summoning the concerned police officers or even the superior police officers and they may even have to face contempt charges. For persistent unwarranted arrests in such matters in violation of the provisions of Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A the Court may even recommend disciplinary action against such errant police officers to the superior officers or the Director General of Police, State of Gujarat. 49. Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also requires production of the case diary before the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced for remand. Section 167(1) reads thus:- "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. 49. Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also requires production of the case diary before the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced for remand. Section 167(1) reads thus:- "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. ----(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate." 50. As pointed out by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v D.M., Azamgarh, AIR 1959 Allahabad 384, the forwarding of case diary entries under Section 167(1) of the Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality, and the Magistrate is not simply to "rubber stamp" the prayer of the police officer seeking remand of the accused, but he has to apply his judicial mind to satisfy himself that the requirements of law are met when the police produces an accused for remand. At the time of granting the remand it is expected of a Magistrate to examine the case diary for satisfying himself whether the police officer's reasons for immediate arrest in the cases punishable with imprisonment upto seven years are held by him in a bonafide manner and whether the reasons for remand are restricted to the preconditions for arrest mentioned in the newly introduced Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C. The Magistrate needs to closely examine as to how the police officer could reach to a conclusion that unless the accused was arrested he would repeat the offence, or why without arrest the investigation could not proceed, or whether the particular accused was, as a matter of fact, likely to cause the evidence to disappear, or would tamper with the evidence, or the accused would try and influence witnesses, or without arrest the particular accused would not appear in Court. These opinions of the police officer are to be based on concrete material and cannot be the mere ipse dixit of the officer. If he finds that no genuine reasons which accord with the requirements of Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A exist, the Magistrate may even refuse to grant remand to the accused, and allow the accused to be released on a personal bond with a direction to appear before the competent court or before the police, when called upon to do so, with or without security. 51. There would be no impediment in the Magistrate remanding the accused to the judicial custody at later stages as authorized under Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) and Section 170(1) of the Cr.P.C. when the accused is produced before the Magistrate and the case diary shows that sufficient evidence for submitting a charge-sheet has been collected. Needless to mention that in case the accused has already secured bail, then the police officer would be disentitled to arrest an accused person for seeking his remand because the charge-sheet is to be submitted. The accused could then be summoned to appear by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence in exercise of powers under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. 52. If the accused who are required in cases punishable with upto seven years sentence are not routinely arrested by the police, or are granted bail by the lower court itself, without any undue delay in disposing of their bail applications, and in appropriate cases the facility of releasing the accused on interim bails on personal bonds pending consideration of their regular bails with or without security with a direction to appear when required is also extended to them, as has been laid down in the Apex Court Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009)4 SCC 437 , the Full Bench in Amaravati and another v. State of U.P., 2005 Cri.L.J. 755, and the Division Bench in Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(65) ACC 781, considerable time of the High Court could be spent more productively in hearing grave matters like the criminal appeals of short sentence wherein the appellant convict is not on bail, etc. 53. 53. As the subordinate courts have failed to exercise their discretion, in the right manner in accordance with law, the High Court is left to deal with the inordinately large number of applications for bail, applications under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. etc. 54. In the aforesaid context, I would like to issue few directions. DIRECTIONS : (1) I direct the Magistrates that when the accused punishable with upto seven years imprisonment are produced before them remands may be granted only after the Magistrates satisfy themselves that the application for remand by the police officer has been made in a bonafide manner and the reasons for seeking remand mentioned in the case diary are in accordance with the requirements of Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C. and further there is concrete material in existence to substantiate the ground mentioned for seeking remand. Even where the accused himself surrenders or where the investigation has been completed and the Magistrate needs to take the accused in judicial custody as provided under Section 170(1) and Section 41(1)(b)(ii) (e) of the Cr.P.C, the prolonged imprisonment at this initial stage, when the accused has not been adjudged guilty, may not be called for, and the Magistrates and Sessions Courts are to consider the bails expeditiously and not to mechanically refuse the same, especially in the short sentence cases punishable with upto seven years imprisonment unless the allegations are grave and there is any legal impediment in allowing the bail, as laid down in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437 , and Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(65) ACC 781. The facility of releasing the accused on interim bail pending consideration of their regular bails may also be accorded by the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in appropriate cases. The facility of releasing the accused on interim bail pending consideration of their regular bails may also be accorded by the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in appropriate cases. (2) The Magistrate may also furnish information to the Registrar General of the High Court through the District Judge, in case he is satisfied that a particular police officer has been persistently arresting the accused in cases punishable with upto seven year terms, in a mechanical or malafide and dishonest manner, in contravention of the requirements of Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C., and thereafter the matter may be placed by the Registrar in this case, so that appropriate directions may be issued to the DGP to take action against such errant police officer for his persistent default or this Court may initiate contempt proceedings against the defaulting police officer. (3) The District Judges should also be directed to impress upon the Magistrates not to routinely grant remands to the police officers seeking remand for the accused if the pre-conditions for granting the remands mentioned in Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C. are not disclosed in cases punishable with seven year terms, or where the police officer appears to be seeking remand for the accused in a malafide manner in the absence of concrete material. The issue of compliance with Sections 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C and the directions of this Court in this regard may also be discussed in the monthly meetings of the District Judges with the administration and the superior police officials. (4) The Registrar General may issue a circular within a period of one month with directions to the Sessions Courts and Magistrates to monitor and oversee the applications for remand sought by the arresting police officers and to comply with the other directions mentioned herein above. 55. As already indicated above, I am of the view that by routinely mentioning in the case diary that a particular condition referred to in Section 41(1)(b) and 41A of the Cr.P.C. has been met for seeking the police remand, would not provide adequate reason for effecting the arrest. The Director General of Police, State of Gujarat, is also directed to circulate the present order to all the subordinate police officers. 56. The Director General of Police, State of Gujarat, is also directed to circulate the present order to all the subordinate police officers. 56. Let a copy of this order be sent to : (i) the Director General of Police, State of Gujarat, (ii) the Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of Gujarat, and (iii) the District Judges in all the districts of the State of Gujarat for compliance and communication to all the concerned judicial magistrates before whom the accused are produced for remand by the police officers. 57. One copy of this judgment shall also be furnished to the learned APP appearing for the State in this matter for its onward communication. (Application rejected)