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2017 DIGILAW 1794 (GUJ)

Navalsinh Hemubha Parmar v. State of Gujarat

2017-11-16

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2017
JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant-original accused, has prayed for the following reliefs; "(A) Be pleased to quash the non-bailable warrant dated 11.10.2017 issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chuda, in connection with the FIR recorded as C.R. No.I- 18 of 2016. (B) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution of the non-bailable warrant dated 11.10.2017 issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chuda, in connection with the FIR recroded as C.R. No.I-18 of 2016; (C) Be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper." 2. On 17th May, 2016, a first information report came to be lodged with the Chuda Police Station, District: Surendranagar for the offence punishable under sections 307, 323, 504, 506(2), 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 25(1)(1-B)((A) and 27 of the Arms Act read section 135 of the G.P. Act bearing C.R. No.I-18 of 2016. The applicant herein is one of the accused persons named in the first information report. It appears that apprehending arrest at the hands of the police, he prayed for anticipatory bail before this Court by filing the Criminal Misc. Application No.33585 of 2016. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 3rd March, 2017, rejected the anticipatory bail application. I may quote the relevant observations made by the Co-ordinate Bench while rejecting the anticipatory bail application. "4. Learned advocate Mr.B.M. Mangukiya for the applicant with his usual vociferousness contended that the F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I-18 of 2016 against the applicant was in the nature of a counter-blast to the F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-17 of 2016 lodged on the previous day. He submitted that therefore the allegations in the F.I.R. in questions are motivated looking to the fact that the same was filed as a cross F.I.R. He submitted that the allegations were not tenable on their face value and they did not inspire any credibility. He next submitted that the investigating agency was somehow after the applicant. In order to try seek support for this submission, he relied on the aspect of arrest of the applicant, which, according to him, was a paper creation and now sought to be used as a preliminary ground to object the prayer for anticipatory bail. He next submitted that the investigating agency was somehow after the applicant. In order to try seek support for this submission, he relied on the aspect of arrest of the applicant, which, according to him, was a paper creation and now sought to be used as a preliminary ground to object the prayer for anticipatory bail. He further contended on the basis of orders of anticipatory bail granted to other accused by this Court, that the present applicant deserved to be treated at par. 4.1 Learned advocate for the applicant relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan [ (2010) 1 SCC 684 ] to submit that Section 438 is a salutatory provision which is meant to protect the personal liberty of an individual and to prevent deprivation of such liberty. He submitted that the Court would have to exercise discretion judiciously jettisoning the technicalities. 4.2 On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin assisted by learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.Rutvij Oza, joined by learned advocate Mr.Bhargav Bhatt who appeared for the private complainant, harped on the preliminary aspect to submit that the investigating officer who was investigating pursuant to the instant F.I.R. had already arrested the applicant and after courting arrest, the applicant had managed to flee from the custody of the police. By highlighting the facts related to the arrest and the consequential steps, the details of which are placed on record by filing the affidavits, they seriously submitted that the present application was not competent as no anticipatory bail could be claimed once the applicant was arrested, but then fled. 4.2.1 The respondents-the investigating officer as well as the private complainant both, by filing their respective replies put forth the facts of the aspect that the applicant was arrested and escaped thereafter. It was submitted in the context of such facts, by placing reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1980 SC 1632 ], more particularly referring to paragraph 35 thereof, that the provision of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. It is observed by the Apex Court that, the grant of anticipatory bail to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. It is observed by the Apex Court that, the grant of anticipatory bail to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested. 4.3 Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the role of the applicant-accused as revealed from the F.I.R. and the other aspects showed his direct involvement in a grave offence. The respondents, arguing further, submitted by relying on the aspect that against the F.I.R. in question being C.R. No.I-18 of 2016 as well as F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-32 of 2016 aforementioned, applications being Criminal Miscellaneous Application Nos.4377 of 2016 and 7877 of 2016 were filed for quashment thereof under Section 482, Cr.P.C., 1973 and both those applications came to be dismissed; this Court refused to quash the same. They on that basis submitted that allegations in those F.I.R.s wherein the applicant was accused and sought to have played specific role as above, were accepted at least at their face value. 5. Comprehending role of the accused is a primary and pivotal consideration to be looked into while considering the question of grant or otherwise of anticipatory bail to the accused. Reverting therefore to the contents of the F.I.R. to focus on the role, it was clearly alleged that in the gathering at the place the applicant was present and he had in his hand a pistol; he was speaking threats. When asked not to use abusive language by one Harpalsinh, the applicant actually fired from the pistol. The entire episode appeared to be a feud generated out of rivalry amongst two groups belonging to two different villages where the high-handedness and vengeance-led conduct of the applicant-accused was described and discernible in its gravity from the F.I.R. The genesis of the incident appeared to be of working or taking water from the Narmada canal. The applicant was shown to have played a conspicuous role as he, in addition to his strong headed conduct, had with him a weapon in the nature of pistol and shots were fired by the applicant from his pistol. The applicant was shown to have played a conspicuous role as he, in addition to his strong headed conduct, had with him a weapon in the nature of pistol and shots were fired by the applicant from his pistol. Whether the said weapon-pistol was a licenced one or not is further and another aspect to be a matter of investigation. 5.1 Learned advocate for the applicant wanted to press into service the principle of parity by submitting that the other accused Ranjitsinh Hembha Parmar and Kiritsinh Kanubha, being accused No.2 and accused No.5 respectively in the same F.I.R., were granted anticipatory bail by this Court as per orders passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.31266 of 2016 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.33408 of 2016. He could do so only unsuccessfully. 5.2 The reason was strong that the doctrine of parity would not be applicable. An attentive examination of the facts and the comparison of role of those accused persons and that of the present applicant would readily negate the case of the applicant for parity. A striking dissimilarity in the role played was clearly discernible, as the present applicant was a person who used and fired from the arm-the pistol, which was in contradistinction to the role shown of the said other two accused Ranjitsinh and Kiritsinh. Though those other two accused were alleged to be possessing weapon, they did not shown to have used the weapon. It is not even indirectly suggested from the contents of the F.I.R. that they had used the weapon. The use of the pistol by firing therefrom while exerting threats and thereby unleashing reign of terror by the applicant makes the applicant stand at a clear disparity with the said two other accused. Merely because other two accused are released on anticipatory bail, the principle of parity could not be mechanically applied when precise facts alleged exacted with the role played by the applicant in the entire incident juxtaposed to the role attributed to other accused with whom parity is claimed, was different as aforesaid and also that it was of a higher degree in terms of gravity. 6. It now takes to the aspect which was seriously urged and was pressed as preliminary ground against maintainability of the present application. 6. It now takes to the aspect which was seriously urged and was pressed as preliminary ground against maintainability of the present application. The investigating officer who was in charge of the investigation of the F.I.R. in question bearing Crime Register No.I-18 of 2016, has filed his affidavit dated 19th January, 2017 to state on oath the tale-telling facts. Having stated that he was investigating the crime pursuant to the aforesaid F.I.R. against the present applicant, since the applicant was also an accused in another F.I.R. bearing Crime Register No.I-32 of 2016 for the offence punishable under Section 307 and other allied sections, IPC, the investigation for that F.I.R. was being carried on by another investigating officer-the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Surendranagar. The said investigating officer issued summons on 27th November, 2016 to the applicant to remain present on 29th November, 2016, which summons was received by the father of the accused. The petitioner had come to the office of the said investigating officer on 29th November, 2016 for interrogative exercise in response to summons and his statement was also recorded in relation to the said other F.I.R. The documents in the nature of copies of issuance of summons and evidencing the receipt thereof as above, etc., are produced on record along with the affidavit (Page 119). 6.1 The investigating officer for C.R. No.I-18 of 2016 further stated in his affidavit that thereafter the applicant was transferred by the said other investigating officer, by addressing a communication with reference to the present offence, that is C.R. No.I-18 of 2016. A copy of said communication dated 29th November, 2016 addressed to the investigating officer by the investigating officer of C.R. No.I-32 of 2016 is on record which communication is shown to have been duly received (Page 120). It was given out in the affidavit that thereafter the investigating officer recorded the statement of the applicant and prepared an arrestmemo with necessary details shown therein including the name of the relative and an entry was also made in the case diary regarding the statement as well as the attendant procedure undertaken. It was given out in the affidavit that thereafter the investigating officer recorded the statement of the applicant and prepared an arrestmemo with necessary details shown therein including the name of the relative and an entry was also made in the case diary regarding the statement as well as the attendant procedure undertaken. It is thereafter stated thus in the affidavit, “Before signature of the present petitioner as well as the relative namely Chandrasinh Bahadursinh Chavda could be taken on the arrest memo, the present petitioner ran away from the office of the deponent.” 6.2 Thereafter, the police control room was informed about the running away of the applicant-accused and for blocking the area to nab him. This is sought to be demonstrated by producing copy of the arrest memo, a copy of letter being information to the control room, copy of log-book of the control room and the entries made in that regard (copies at pages 121 to 125). Not only that, the F.I.R. bearing Crime Register No.I-116 of 2016 was registered with the Surendranagar A Division Police Station for alleging offence under Section 224, IPC, stating that when the accused was being arrested for the offence in relation to F.I.R. C.R. No.I-18 of 2016, he managed to escape and ran away. 6.3 The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Surendranagar Division-the investigating officer for the other F.I.R. being I-C.R. No.32 of 2016 has filed his separate affidavit saying and repeating the very facts as above in fortification, stating all the above sequence and events leading to arrest of the applicant in connection with C.R. No.I-18 of 2016 and his escaping after arrest. It was further revealed in the affidavit that in relation to the other F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-32 of 2016 faced by the applicant, he had filed an anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court. 6.4 Though it was sought to be contended on behalf of the applicant by his learned advocate that there was no actual arrest courted, the case of of the prosecution about the factum of arrest of the applicant which was in respect of the very F.I.R. and the F.I.R. and subsequent running away of the applicant-accused has been based on overwhelming documentary details produced by the investigating officers along with their affidavit on oath. Therefore in absence of any material to the contrary, it is not possible for this Court to conclude that there was no arrest. Mere irregularity in the chronology of entries would not indicate that the case of the respondents about arrest of the applicant was not tenable. There was nothing on record so as to not accept the statements on oath by the investigating officer. It was really not disputed that the applicant-accused had come to the investigating officer investing the very F.I.R. in question and the presence of the applicant-accused had been under the control of the investigating officer concerned who was investigating the very offences, pursuant to F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I-18 of 2016. The case that the applicant was arrested was acceptable on the basis of the documentary indications and circumstantial aspects and that the present applicant is liable to be dismissed on the said ground alone. 6.5 Even considering on demurer, the factum of running away of the applicant, in the minimum demonstrated and established the tendency on part of the applicantaccused to flee away from investigation, which again a strong factor to operate to deny him the bail under section 438 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 7. The parameters in respect of exercise of powers under Section 438, Cr.P.C., 1973 have been set down by the Supreme Court in Siddhram Stalingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [ (2011) 1 SCC 694 ] and in the line of the decisions on that aspect. Weighing the relevant factors emphasised by the Apex Court with the facts of this case, the gravity of offence and the nature thereof was clearly revealed from the contents of the F.I.R. As stated above, the precise role of the applicant could be comprehend which was not only of just high-handed conduct but exerting threats with possession and use of a pistol by firing therefrom. Therefore, the factors of nature of gravity of the accusation and role played by the applicant would deny him anticipatory bail. The attendant circumstances of two further F.I.R.s added to the gravity and prima facie showed criminal conduct. The second F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I-32 of 2016 could be said to be indicative of the possibility and the factum of accused repeating similar or other offences by so conducting himself. The attendant circumstances of two further F.I.R.s added to the gravity and prima facie showed criminal conduct. The second F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I-32 of 2016 could be said to be indicative of the possibility and the factum of accused repeating similar or other offences by so conducting himself. The applicant is a highly placed government servant and it would not be gainsaid that he would be one capable of exercising his influence and kind of authority in a small village and over the people there where the incident took place. As far as the factor of possibility of the applicant-accused fleeing away from the justice, the case of the respondents that he was once arrested but managed to fled away after arrest being with investigating officer and the unchallenged F.I.R. bearing C.R. No.I-116 of 2016 is a pointer to the kind of tendency and behaviour of the accused. The reasonable apprehension of tampering with the evidence or apprehension of threat by the accused impeding investigation has to be viewed in the aforesaid total context of facts and circumstances emerging. It could be concluded that almost all parameters and factors as delineated by the Apex Court in Siddhram Mhetre (supra) go against in the case of the present applicant and therefore justify the denial of pre-arrest protection to him. For all the aforesaid reasons and discussion, the Court is not inclined to exercise the discretion and powers to grant anticipatory bail to the present applicant and the present application is hereby rejected. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. Rule is discharged. Learned advocate Mr.Mangukiya, at this stage, requested that since the interim protection was operative during the pendency of the present application, the same may be continued for some time. 3. As interim relief was granted by this Court as per order dated 27th December, 2016 and the same remained operative, as the applicant wants to approach higher forum against the present order, the said relief of not taking coercive steps against the applicant shall continue till 15th March, 2017. " 3. It appears that the Investigating Officer is in search of the applicant herein. The applicant is not available for the purpose of interrogation. Prima facie, it appears that the applicant is evading arrest. " 3. It appears that the Investigating Officer is in search of the applicant herein. The applicant is not available for the purpose of interrogation. Prima facie, it appears that the applicant is evading arrest. The case of the applicant is that the Investigating Officer has obtained a non-bailable warrant of arrest from the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chuda. The applicant seeks to challenge the issue of nonbailable warrant of arrest by the JMFC, Chuda in this application. 4. Mr. Y.N. Oza, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, vehemently submitted that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chuda, had no power to issue a non-bailable warrant for the arrest of the applicant. It is submitted that a non-bailable warrant cannot be issued by the Court in the aid of the investigation, or to put it in other words, to facilitate the Investigating Officer to secure the presence of the accused. The learned senior counsel would submit that a warrant of arrest can only be for the purpose of production of an accused before the Court. It is submitted that a warrant of arrest under section 73 of the Code cannot be issued by the courts solely for production of the accused before the police in the aid of the investigation. 5. Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel further submitted that his client is ready and willing to surrender before the court concerned, and for that purpose, the non-bailable warrant be converted to a bailable warrant. 6. Mr. Oza submitted that his client is a public servant. He was serving as an Assistant Director with the All India Radio at New Delhi. Past couple of months, he has been transferred to Ahmedabad. According to the learned senior counsel, his client is attending the office everyday and it cannot be said that he is evading arrest. In support of the above referred submissions, the learned senior counsel has placed reliance on two decisions; (i) Narayan @ Narayan Sai @ Mota Bhagwan S/o. Asharam Bapu v. State of Gujarat, 2014 (5) GLR 4165 and (ii) a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Through C.B.I. v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, AIR 1997 SC 2494 . 7. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor, assisted by Mr. Devnani, the learned APP appearing for the State. 8. Mr. 7. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor, assisted by Mr. Devnani, the learned APP appearing for the State. 8. Mr. Amin submitted that there is no merit worth the name in this application. According to Mr. Amin, after this Court declined to grant the anticipatory bail, till this date, the applicant is not available. The applicant is evading arrest, and in such circumstances, it was within the power of the Investigating Officer to obtain an arrest warrant under section 73 of the Code. Mr. Amin would submit that if, ultimately, the Investigating Officer is not able to secure the presence of the applicant, then the applicant will have to be declared as a proclaimed absconder. However, before declaring an accused to be a proclaimed absconder, there has got to be a warrant under section 73. Mr. Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Nazimuddin Fakruddin Kazi v. State of Gujarat, 2016 (1) GLR 208 . 9. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Amin submitted that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for in this application. 11. In the case of Narayan @ Narayan Sai @ Mota Bhagwan S/o. Asharam Bapu (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that a warrant of arrest under section 73 of the Code cannot be issued solely for the production of the accused before the police in the aid of the investigation. In taking such a view, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dawod Ibrahim Kaskar (supra). The learned Single Judge, in Narayan @ Narayan Sai @ Mota Bhagwan S/o. Asharam Bapu (supra), held as under; "13. At this stage, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar (supra). In the said decision, the question before the Supreme Court was as to when and under what circumstances a court can invoke the provisions of section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the said decision, the question before the Supreme Court was as to when and under what circumstances a court can invoke the provisions of section 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. While deciding the said question, one of the moot questions that arose for consideration was whether a court can issue a warrant to apprehend a person during investigation for his production before the police in aid of the investigation. The court held thus: 20. That Section 73 confers a power upon a Magistrate to issue a warrant and that it can be exercised by him during investigation also, can be best understood with reference to Section 155 of the Code. As already noticed under this Section a police officer can investigate into a non cognizable case with the order of a Magistrate and may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation which he may exercise in a cognizable case, except that he cannot arrest without warrant. If with the order of a Magistrate the police starts investigation into a non- cognizable and non-bailable offence, (like Sections 466 or 467 (Part I) of the Indian Penal Code) and if during investigation the Investigating Officer intends to arrest the person accused of the offence he has to seek for and obtain a warrant of arrest from the Magistrate. If the accused evade the arrest, the only course left open to the Investigating Officer to ensure his presence would be to ask the Magistrate to invoke his powers under Section 73 and thereafter those relating to proclamation and attachment. In such an eventuality, the Magistrate can legitimately exercise his power under Section 73, for the person to be apprehended is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. 21. xxx xxx Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions of part `C' of Chapter VI. [Section 8 (3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA] 23. [Section 8 (3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA] 23. Now that we have found that Section 73 of the Code is of general application and that in course of the investigation a Court can issue a warrant in exercise of power thereunder to apprehend, inter alia, a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest, we need answer the related question as to whether such issuance of warrant can be for his production before the police in aid of investigation. It cannot be gainsaid that a Magistrate plays, not infrequently, a role during investigation, in that, on the prayer of the Investigating agency he holds a test identification parade, records the confession of an accused or the statement of a witness, or takes or witnesses the taking of specimen handwritings etc. However, in performing such or similar functions the Magistrate does not exercise judicial discretion like while dealing with an accused of a non-bailable offence who is produced before him pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under Section 73. On such production, the Court may either release him on bail under Section 439 or authorise his detention in custody (either police or judicial) under Section 167 of the Code. Whether the Magistrate, on being moved by the Investigating agency, will entertain its prayer for police custody will be at his sole discretion which has to be judicially exercised in accordance with Section 167 (3) of the Code. Since warrant is and can be issued for appearance before the Court only and not before the police and since authorisation for detention in police custody is neither to be given as a matter of course nor on the mere asking of the police, but only after exercise of judicial discretion based on materials placed before him, Mr. Desai was not absolutely right in his submission that warrant of arrest under Section 73 of the Code could be issued by the Court solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation. 14. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that warrant of arrest under section 73 of the Code cannot be issued by the courts solely for production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation. 14. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that warrant of arrest under section 73 of the Code cannot be issued by the courts solely for production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation. Examining the facts of the present case, in the light of the above decision, it is clear that the impugned order is contrary to the law laid down in the said decision, inasmuch as, the warrant under section 70 of the Code has been issued solely in aid of investigation. Thus, the impugned order clearly suffers from a legal infirmity, which fact is also not disputed on behalf of the respondents. However, it has been contended that ultimately, the said error in the judgement stands rectified when the actual warrant is issued, because the same is in the format provided under the Code and that ultimately after arresting the accused under the warrant under section 70 of the Code, the same procedure would be followed even if the warrant is issued in aid of investigation, because the procedure for making remand application would still be required to be followed. In the opinion of this court, such contention does not merit acceptance, inasmuch as, the subsequent issuance of warrant in the standard format cannot cure the defect in the order, which goes to the root of the matter. Besides, the validity of the impugned order cannot be decided on the basis of a subsequent step which is required to be taken pursuant thereto, which is more or less ministerial in nature. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from a legal infirmity which would render it unsustainable." 12. The decision of this Court in the case of Narayan @ Narayan Sai @ Mota Bhagwan S/o. Asharam Bapu (supra) was looked into by one another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Nazimuddin Fakruddin Kazi (Supra). This Court negatived the contention that the warrant of arrest under section 73 cannot be issued by the court solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of the investigation. I may quote the relevant observations of this Court as contained in the judgment of Nazimuddin Fakruddin Kazi (Supra); "11. Before adverting to the real issue, the first aspect with regard to the appropriate writ and the prayer clause is required to be considered. I may quote the relevant observations of this Court as contained in the judgment of Nazimuddin Fakruddin Kazi (Supra); "11. Before adverting to the real issue, the first aspect with regard to the appropriate writ and the prayer clause is required to be considered. Though the Writ of Mandamus has been prayed for, it would not be maintainable as the petition is under Art. 227 and though Art. 21 is mentioned, basically it could be a Writ of Certiorari. It is well-settled with regard to the nature of writs which can be issued as prerogative writs and the mandamus qua the authority cannot be asked without there being any demand or representation to the authority and failure of the authority to comply with the same. In the facts of the case, rather in a criminal proceedings, where CrPC is a complete code by itself providing for the procedure as well as different stages for the criminal trial. Therefore, one is required to focus on the different stages of criminal trial or investigation with reference to the provisions of CrPC. It cannot be said that the Code does not envisage for any such powers to the Magistrate for issuance of warrant or proclamation before the stage of trial. In fact, as it has been relied upon by learned counsel Shri Shah on the judgment in the case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors. (supra) it has been clearly observed about the role of the Magistrate during the investigation. 12. Further, as provided in sec. 73, the warrant could be issued to any person for arrest of (i) escaped convict, (ii) a proclaimed offender, and (iii) a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. Therefore, when the person is hiding or concealing himself the warrant is issued as stated above. However, if the person is evading his arrest and still the warrant could not be issued, then, further steps as provided under sec. 82 for proclamation could not be taken. Thus, it contemplates a situation where a person is accused of non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest, necessary steps could be taken by the investigating agency to arm itself with the warrant for the arrest by the Magistrate. 82 for proclamation could not be taken. Thus, it contemplates a situation where a person is accused of non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest, necessary steps could be taken by the investigating agency to arm itself with the warrant for the arrest by the Magistrate. Thus, on one hand the investigating agency is armed with the powers of arrest pursuant to such warrant and at the same time the Magistrate has issued the warrant, the arrested person is required to be produced before the Magistrate as contemplated in the CrPC and future course of action could take place as provided in the CrPC which has also been discussed and contemplated in para 24 of the judgment in the case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors. (supra). 13. Therefore, it is after such execution of the warrant and arrest of the person who is absconding or evading arrest the consequences may follow and it is at that stage the Magistrate, in exercise of judicial discretion, may entertain the prayer of the investigating agency for the police custody or otherwise. Therefore, the submission made by learned counsel Shri Shah that the warrant of arrest under sec. 73 could not be issued by the court solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch as when the scheme of the legislature by way of statutory provision of sec. 73 has contemplated and provided for issuance of warrant by the Magistrate qua any person who is accused of nonbailable offence and is evading arrest, it cannot be said that there are no such powers or there is inherent lack of power for issuance of such warrant or subsequently the proclamation as provided under sec. 82 when the warrant could not be executed. 14. It is required to be mentioned that if the rule of law is required to prevail, the machinery or the procedure as contemplated in a statutory provision which has been enacted by the legislature has to be given effect by which the purpose is sought to be achieved. It cannot be interpreted by which it could curtail or negate the powers statutorily provided by the Legislature. It cannot be interpreted by which it could curtail or negate the powers statutorily provided by the Legislature. In fact, if the rule of law is to prevail, a person like the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he would avoid or evade the arrest, cause hurdle in investigation and the investigating agency should not have any recourse. The statutory provisions as provided in sec. 82 of CrPC for the proclamation require issuance of warrant as a condition precedent and it is only then further recourse could be adopted by the investigating agency like taking further steps for attachment of the property if the person has absconded abroad. Further, it is only if such a warrant has been issued, further steps could be taken to bring him to the process of law. Therefore, even if the person has not co-operated during the investigation and is not arrested or has evaded arrest, irrespective of the stage of the investigation culminating into the charge-sheet or otherwise qua him, the warrant could be issued and the investigating agency could have further recourse. If the person accused of non-bailable offence has evaded his arrest or co-operation in the investigation, the investigating agency may have to follow such procedure to secure presence of such person who is accused of commission of a crime and he is brought within the process of law. At the same time, care has been taken to balance the rival claims or right of a person accused that once he is arrested he is required to be produced before the Magistrate as contemplated in the Code and not before the investigating agency. Thereafter, in exercise of judicial discretion, appropriate order could be passed with regard to further course of action and appropriate order with regard to exercise of power under sec. 167 for either police custody or judicial custody and/or also for bail under sec. 439 of CrPC could be made. 15. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dawood Ibrahim (supra) wherein it has been observed specifically as referred to above, "Section 73 of the Code is of general application and that in course of the investigation a Court can issue a warrant in exercise of power thereunder to apprehend, inter alia, a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest...... On such production, the Court may either release him on bail under Section 439 or authorize his detention in custody (either police or judicial) under Section 167 of the Code. Whether the Magistrate, on being moved by the Investigating Agency, will entertain its prayer for police custody will be at his sole discretion which has to be judicially exercised in accordance with Section 163 (3) of the Code. Since warrant is and can be issued for appearance before the Court only and not before the police and since authorization for detention in police custody is neither to be given as a matter of course nor on the mere asking of the police, but only after exercise of judicial discretion based on materials placed before him, it cannot be said that warrant of arrest could be issued by the Courts solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation." (emphasis supplied) This clearly suggests that what has been made clear is that a warrant could be issued as it is of general application in the course of investigation to apprehend a person who is accused of non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. Thus, it has two aspects, (i) a person is accused of non-bailable offence, and (ii) he is evading arrest. 16. It does not speak of arrest of a person and production before the police in aid of investigation. This has been discussed in this para making it clear that the Magistrate plays a role even during the investigation and could exercise the power and issue a warrant of arrest under sec. 73 of CrPC. However, it has been made clear that on such production before the court after the arrest the court may have recourse either under sec. 439 granting bail or under sec.167 authorizing custody (either police or judicial). This itself suggests that there is no lack of power or jurisdiction as sought to be canvassed. The Hon'ble Apex Court, on the contrary, has made it clear that such power of issuance of warrant under sec. 73 is justified. Further, it has been emphasised that in such case once the warrant is used for production of a person accused of non-bailable offence and is evading arrest to be produced before the court and not before the police and/or the investigating agency. 17. 73 is justified. Further, it has been emphasised that in such case once the warrant is used for production of a person accused of non-bailable offence and is evading arrest to be produced before the court and not before the police and/or the investigating agency. 17. Therefore, the bogey of such contention that the warrant could not be issued for production in aid of investigation appears to have been raised referring to the broad background of the case (Dawood Ibrahim) or some submissions made which may not have been approved. The fact remains that the Legislature or the law made by the Parliament in the form of sec. 73 empowers the court (Magistrate) to issue such warrant in exercise of power which has also been interpreted in the same judgment relied upon by learned counsel Shri Shah in the case of Dawood Ibrahim (supra). Therefore, the submissions are misconceived. 18. In other words, what has been emphasised is that while exercise power of issuance of warrant under sec. 73 pending investigation, care has to be taken that the court/Magistrate will reach the satisfaction about sufficiency of the material and evidence justifying the issuance of warrant against the person who is accused of non-bailable offence and who is evading arrest. Thus, again, the court (magistrate) has to satisfy, (i) on the aspect of sufficiency of material, and (ii) whether the person is evading arrest or is not cooperating with the investigating agency from the material placed before it. 19. It may also be noted that the same issue has been considered in a judgment reported by the Patna High Court in the judgment reported in 2009 Law Suit(Pat) 464 in the case of Randhir Sharma alias Rupesh v. State of Bihar and ors. and the Hon'ble Patna High Court framed the following points for determination, (i) Whether pending investigation warrant of arrest can be issued against the person who is an accused of non-bailable offence and is evading arrest? (ii) Whether in the facts of the instant case it can be said that the requisition filed by the police and the order passed by learned Magistrate for arrest of an accused was in aid of investigation? (ii) Whether in the facts of the instant case it can be said that the requisition filed by the police and the order passed by learned Magistrate for arrest of an accused was in aid of investigation? (iii) Whether the impugned order satisfied the requirement of law necessary for passing an order under Section 73, Cr.P.C?, 1973 As could be seen from the judgment, Issue No. 1 is answered in affirmative, meaning thereby, that pending investigation, warrant of arrest can be issued against a person accused of non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. 20. Further, the discussion is made referring to the same judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dawood Ibrahim (supra) and it has been observed that pursuant to the execution of warrant under sec. 73(1) CrPC he should be produced before the Magistrate forthwith. Thereafter, as stated above, recourse can be had as provided in the CrPC under sec. 167 granting police or judicial custody and thereafter bail under sec. 439. However, at that stage, balance has to be struck between the rival claims of the investigating agency and the liberty or right of and individual who is accused of a non-bailable offence. Legislature has therefore taken care to maintain this balance by providing that though the warrant is issued, such a person arrested is produced not before the investigating agency or police, but before the Magistrate and thereafter the Magistrate in exercise of judicial discretion could pass appropriate order with regard to exercise of power under sec. 167 for either police custody or judicial custody and also for bail under sec. 439 of CrPC 21. The submissions made by learned counsel Shri Shah referring to the application requires a closer scrutiny to consider whether for issuance of warrant there was a justification or not. It refers to the gravity of the offence as well as the stage of investigation and/or the position of the investigation. In the application for proclamation under sec. 82 it refers to the details about the antecedents which has a reference to 38 offences and detention under PASA. 22. It refers to the gravity of the offence as well as the stage of investigation and/or the position of the investigation. In the application for proclamation under sec. 82 it refers to the details about the antecedents which has a reference to 38 offences and detention under PASA. 22. Therefore, the submission made by learned counsel Shri Shah that during the stage of investigation before it has culminated into a charge-sheet qua the accused like the present petitioner, a warrant could not be issued at the instance of the investigating agency and there is total lack of power is misconceived. A useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in (2007) 8 SCC 770 in the case of Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI, where the judgment in the case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors. (supra) has also been referred to while discussing about the scheme of the Code. In that case, the accused was absconding and the warrant was issued, though the focus was on the aspect of charge-sheet as to once the charge-sheet is filed, the right under sec. 167(2) proviso ceases or not and the cognizance by the magistrate. Thus, the person who is accused of a nonbailable offence is required to be brought to the book and submitted to the process of law and thereafter the court may take appropriate recourse. Again, at that time, he will have sufficient opportunity to be heard and also claim for appropriate protection of his right or liberty. Therefore, the submission made by learned counsel Shri Shah cannot be accepted. 23. The reliance placed by learned counsel Shri Shah on the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench (Harsha Devani, J.) in Special Criminal Application No. 3366 of 2013 with Special Criminal Application No. 3370 of 2013 would not have application to the facts of the case and assuming that there are other provisions in the Code like sec. 41 would not necessarily deprive the court from passing appropriate order inasmuch as such orders are required to be passed depending upon the facts of the case and the material produced. Therefore, it is a matter of discretion of exercise of powers rather than total lack of powers. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors. Therefore, it is a matter of discretion of exercise of powers rather than total lack of powers. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State through CBI v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and ors. (supra) has observed, "...In other words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and the other sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked in a situation where in spite of its best efforts the police cannot arrest a person under Section 41. Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions of Part C of Chapter VI. [Section 8(3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA.]" 24. Therefore, before exercising such power, the Magistrate must be satisfied and only after considering the material and totality of the circumstances with regard to the contents of the application and the requirement of law, such a warrant could be issued. In other words, the investigating agency must disclose that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations that the petitioner is accused of non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. The court has to record the satisfaction that there is sufficient material prima facie satisfying about the involvement of the accused of such non-bailable offence and evading arrest at the same time." 13. I take notice of the fact that in this application, neither the copy of the requisition filed by the Investigating Officer before the court concerned for securing a non-bailable warrant is annexed nor the order passed by the Magistrate issuing the warrant has been annexed. This Court had no advantage to go through the contents of the requisition filed by the Investigating Officer and the order of issue of non-bailable warrant by the Magistrate. 14. I inquired about both the documents referred to above from Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, however, Mr. Oza submitted that his client has not been able to procure the copy of the requisition nor the copy of the warrant. 15. section 73 of the Cr.P.C , 1973reads as under; "73. Warrant may be directed to any person. Oza, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, however, Mr. Oza submitted that his client has not been able to procure the copy of the requisition nor the copy of the warrant. 15. section 73 of the Cr.P.C , 1973reads as under; "73. Warrant may be directed to any person. (1) The Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may direct a warrant to any person within his local jurisdiction for the arrest of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or of any person who is accused of a non- bailable, offence and is evading arrest. (2) Such person shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the warrant, and shall execute it if the person for whose arrest it was issued, is in, or enters on, any land or other property under his charge. (3) When the person against whom such warrant is issued is arrested, he shall be made over with the warrant to the nearest police officer, who shall cause him to be taken before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, unless security is taken under section 71. 16. Section 82 empowers the Court to issue proclamation; and so far as it is relevant for the present case, it reads as: "82(1) If any Court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation." 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote the observations of the Supreme Court as contained in para-22 in the case of Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar (supra); "22. Another factor which clearly indicates that Section 73 of the Code gives a power to the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and that too during investigation is evident from the provisions of part `C' of Chapter VI of the Code, which we have earlier adverted to. Needless to say the provisions of proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Needless to say the provisions of proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under Section 82 (quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court only in respect of a person `against whom a warrant has been issued by it'. In other words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and the other Sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked in a situation where in spite of its best effects the police cannot arrest a person under Section 41. Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions of part `C' of Chapter VI. [ Section 8 (3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA] 18. The expression "warrant of arrest" is not defined in the code, but sections 70 to 81 collected under the sub-heading "B"-warrant of arrest" in chapter-VI deal with the arrests in execution of the warrants issued by a court under the Cr.P.C. In Schedule-II, the form No.2 is given; "Form No. 2 WARRANT OF ARREST (See Sec. 70) To....................................., (name and designation of the person or person who is or are to execute the warrant). Whereas (name of accused) of (address) stands changed with the offence of ............. ............. (state the offence), you are hereby directed to arrest the said...................., and to produce him before me. Herein fail not. Dated, this............. day of................, 20......... (Seal of the Court) (Signature)" 19. A warrant is an order addressed to a certain person directing him to arrest the accused and to produce the accused before the Court. The warrant may have a further provision for admitting the accused to bail, but in each case, the warrant is an order directed to someone to arrest certain accused and bring him before the Court, and the person to whom it is addressed may if he is a Magistrate or police officer endorse the warrant to someone serving under him. The warrant may have a further provision for admitting the accused to bail, but in each case, the warrant is an order directed to someone to arrest certain accused and bring him before the Court, and the person to whom it is addressed may if he is a Magistrate or police officer endorse the warrant to someone serving under him. Section 73 is of general application and that in the course of the investigation, a Court can issue a warrant in exercise of power thereunder to apprehend, inter alia, a person who is accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. It cannot be gainsaid that a Magistrate plays not infrequently a role during the investigation. In doing so, the Magistrate does not, however, exercise judicial discretion. On production of the accused before him, pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the section, the Court may either release him on bail or authorize his detention in custody (either police or judicial) under section 167 of the Code. Whether the Magistrate, on being moved by the Investigating Agency, will entertain its prayer for police custody will be at his sole discretion which has to be judicially exercised in accordance with Section 167 (3) of the Code. Since warrant is and can be issued for appearance before the Court only and not before the police and since authorization for detention in police custody is neither to be given as a matter of course nor on the mere asking of the police, but only after exercise of judicial discretion based on materials placed before him, it cannot be said that the warrant of arrest under section 73 could be issued by the courts solely for the production of the accused before the police in aid of investigation (State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, 1997 Cri. Law. Journal 2989 (SC). 20. On plain reading of the section, it is quite clear that the provision of section 73 has general application and even in the course of the investigation, the concerned Magistrate can issue a warrant of arrest to apprehend a person, who is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. Law. Journal 2989 (SC). 20. On plain reading of the section, it is quite clear that the provision of section 73 has general application and even in the course of the investigation, the concerned Magistrate can issue a warrant of arrest to apprehend a person, who is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading his arrest. Since I didn't had the advantage to go through the requisition of the police nor the order of issue of warrant, it is difficult for me to take the view that the purpose of warrant of arrest is for the production of the applicant before the police in the aid of the investigation. Apart from it, in the section itself, there is a provision to check such circumstances. Sub-section (3) of section 73 Cr.P.C , 1973 clearly provides that after the arrest, on the strength of the warrant of arrest issued under sub-clause (1), the person must be produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case. Thereafter, section 167 Cr.P.C , 1973would come into play for the detention of the accused. 21. I am of the view that the legal debate on the issue of power of the police to obtain a warrant of arrest in the course of the investigation from the court concerned should now be put to rest. I fail to understand why there has been so much of debate up till now on this issue. It is a settled law that the police has got powers to arrest an accused without a warrant if the offence alleged is cognizable. In what manner, a nonbailable warrant would come handy to a police officer for the purpose of arresting an accused, who is on a run or is evading the arrest?. The non-bailable warrant, in no manner, would facilitate the police in apprehending or arresting the accused. A non-bailable warrant will not work as a magic wand in the hands of the police for the purpose of apprehending the accused, who is evading his arrest. To put it in other words, by merely looking at the non-bailable warrant, the exact location of the hiding of the accused will not be found out. The non-bailable warrant of arrest would come handy to the police officer only if the accused who is evading arrest is to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. To put it in other words, by merely looking at the non-bailable warrant, the exact location of the hiding of the accused will not be found out. The non-bailable warrant of arrest would come handy to the police officer only if the accused who is evading arrest is to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. This is evident from the provision of section 82 of the Code. Section 82 of the Code provides that if any court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it, has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation. Sub-clause (2) of section 82 provides how the proclamation is to be published. Section 83 of the Code provides for the attachment of property of person absconding. A person who fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by a proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Cr.P.C , 1973is said to have committed an offence punishable under section 174(A) of the IPC and on being convicted, such person can be sentenced to imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both and in a case where a declaration has been made under sub-section (4) of section 82 pronouncing such person as a proclaimed offender, then such person can be sentenced with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, the non-bailable warrant will never be advantageous to the police in actually effecting the arrest of the absconding accused. It is, therefore, a misnomer to say that the warrant is obtained by the police for the production of the accused in aid of the investigation. When we are talking about "in aid of the investigation" it should be understood as the steps which are necessary to be taken by the police to declare an accused as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. 22. The police should now rectify their mistakes. When we are talking about "in aid of the investigation" it should be understood as the steps which are necessary to be taken by the police to declare an accused as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder. 22. The police should now rectify their mistakes. When any requisition is made by the police before any Court for the purpose of issue of non-bailable warrant, then the requisition should not be for the purpose of the production of the accused before the police in aid of the investigation. The requisition should be very specific. The requisition should state that despite all efforts, the accused could not be arrested and now the accused needs to be declared as a proclaimed offender or proclaimed absconder and the steps necessary in accordance with the provisions of the Code are to be taken. The courts should also be careful while issuing the non-bailable warrant as prayed for by the police. While issuing the non-bailable warrant, the courts should be mindful of the form of arrest as provided in the Form No.2 to the 2nd Schedule of the Cr.P.C. Nothing beyond the contents of the form should be in the warrant of arrest. If such procedure is adopted, then there should not be any further difficulty for both, the police as well as the accused. 23. At this stage, I would like to sound a note of caution for the Magistrates across the State as well as the police. The warrant of arrest against a person, accused of a non-bailable offence, should not be granted on mere asking. The requisition to be made by the police in this regard is not an empty formality. The allegation of charging a person of being an accused of a non-bailable offence must be apparent from the requisition filed by the police. An order under section 73 Cr.P.C,, 1973 which is to make an in road in the personal liberty of an individual, should not be passed casually but only after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, contents of the application and the requirement of law. The requisition filed by the police must disclose that there is evidence to substantiate the allegation that the person concerned is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. The requisition filed by the police must disclose that there is evidence to substantiate the allegation that the person concerned is an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. The Court, too, has to record its satisfaction that there is sufficient allegation against the person concerned of being an accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest also at the same time. 24. I would like to draw the attention of the police to yet one another provision of the Criminal Procedure Code and that is section 49 of the Code. Section 49 reads as under; "Section 49: No unnecessary restraint:- The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape. 25. This section corresponds to section 50 of the Old Code. The mandate of the section is that no person arrested under any of the provisions of Chapter-V of the Code shall be unnecessarily harassed or put to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape after arrest. It may be pointed out in this connection that in violation of this mandate or abuse of power is an offence punishable under section 220 of the Indian Penal Code. 26. Indisputably, in the present case, this Court has declined to grant the anticipatory bail to the writ applicant. It appears that the writ applicant had filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court challenging the order passed by this Court, rejecting the anticipatory bail application, but I am informed that the SLP was withdrawn from the Registry itself. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ applicant that there is nothing on record to suggest that the writ applicant is evading his arrest. If the writ applicant is attending his office everyday, then he should be bold enough to appear before the Investigating Officer and subject himself to the interrogation. The writ applicant knows that his anticipatory bail application has been rejected by this Court, and now the arrest is imminent. In such circumstances, it appears that he has gone in the hiding. 27. In view of the above, I see no good reason to interfere at this stage and find fault with the issue of the non-bailable warrant by the court concerned for the arrest of the applicant. 28. Mr. In such circumstances, it appears that he has gone in the hiding. 27. In view of the above, I see no good reason to interfere at this stage and find fault with the issue of the non-bailable warrant by the court concerned for the arrest of the applicant. 28. Mr. Oza, the learned senior counsel, submitted that his client is ready and willing to surrender before the court concerned and if he surrenders, then he would be deemed to be in custody. Well, it is for the applicant to decide whether he wants to surrender before the Court or appear before the Investigating Officer. If the warrant is effected and the accused is arrested, then he would be produced by the Investigating Officer before the court of the learned Magistrate, who, in turn, would pass the necessary orders under section 167 of the Code. As the offences are all Sessions Triable, it is also open for the applicant to surrender before the Sessions Court having jurisdiction to try the offence and if the applicant surrenders to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court concerned, then it would be within the sole discretion of that particular Sessions Court, which is to be exercised by him judicially either to release him on bail under section 439 of the Code or forward him to the Magistrate concerned. 29. I had an occasion to consider the law on the subject of surrender of an accused before the Sessions Judge and the procedure to be adopted thereafter by the court concerned in the case of Urveshbhai Baldevbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat & Ors., Special Criminal Application No.4608 of 2014, decided on 01.12.2014. In the said decision, I have explained two situations; (i) surrender of an accused before the Sessions Judge without the orders of the High Court and (ii) under the orders of the High Court. If, ultimately, the accused surrenders before the competent Sessions Court, then the procedure as explained by this Court in the case of Urvesh Baldevbhai Patel (supra) shall be followed. Let me clarify that it is for the applicant to decide whether he wants to surrender or not. As stated above, the applicant has two options, either to appear before the Investigating Officer so that the non-bailable warrant would come to an end or surrender before the court concerned in accordance with law. 30. Let me clarify that it is for the applicant to decide whether he wants to surrender or not. As stated above, the applicant has two options, either to appear before the Investigating Officer so that the non-bailable warrant would come to an end or surrender before the court concerned in accordance with law. 30. For the foregoing reasons, this application fails and is hereby rejected. 31. The Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of Gujarat. The Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of Gujarat, on receipt of the copy of this judgment, shall, at the earliest, prepare a circular issuing necessary instructions or guidelines in accordance with what has been explained by this Court in this judgment and see to it that all the police stations across the State are informed about the principles of law explained in this judgment. The Registry is also directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Gujarat State Judicial Academy so that the same can be discussed with the Judicial Officers. The Registry shall also circulate this judgment amongst all the judges of the Subordinate Court across the State of Gujarat. Application dismissed.