ORDER : 1. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ("the 2013 Act" for short), confers rights not only on those whose lands, and other immovable property, is to be acquired by the State, but also on families which do not own land, but one of whose members is an agricultural labourer, an agricultural tenant, an artisan or a share-cropper whose primary source of livelihood is adversely affected by the acquisition of land. Certain rights are also conferred by the 2013 Act on the Scheduled Tribes, other traditional forest dwellers who have lost their forest rights, gatherers of forest produce, hunters, fisher-folk and boatsmen, and on those who have been assigned lands by the State Government. While G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 claims to protect the interests of the land owners by offering them a compensation higher than their entitlement under the 2013 Act, do G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016 and G.O. Ms. No. 191 dated 15.08.2016, which seek to provide certain welfare measures to such of those families whose only means of livelihood would be affected by the procurement of land under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, adequately safeguard the statutory rights, conferred on these marginalised sections of society, under the 2013 Act; and can these statutory rights, conferred on these deprived Sections, either be waived by them or circumvented by the State Government in the exercise of its executive power either under Article 162 or Article 298 of the Constitution? 2. In these batch of Writ Petitions, wherein the present interlocutory applications were filed, the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 75 dated 05.06.2015 and G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, along with its amendment in G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 07.10.2015 and G.O. Ms. No. 214 dated 28.11.2015, are questioned as ultra vires the 2013 Act, and a consequential direction is sought to the respondents to follow and implement the provisions of the 2013 Act, and not to resort to any negotiation process or forcible dispossession or acquisition. The petitioners, in this batch of Writ Petitions, are either land owners or assignees of land or other affected persons living in villages which will be submerged on construction of several irrigation projects by the State. The petitioners, in this batch of Writ Petitions, are either land owners or assignees of land or other affected persons living in villages which will be submerged on construction of several irrigation projects by the State. In W.P. No. 25036 of 2016, several of the petitioners are agricultural labourers, village artisans and landless poor who are dependent, on the lands purchased by the State under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, for their livelihood. 3. The Government of Telangana issued G.O. Ms. No. 75 Revenue (JA & LA) Department dated 05.06.2015 formulating a policy called "The Telangana State Policy for Acquisition of Land through Agreement under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013". G.O. Ms. No. 75 dated 05.06.2015 refers to the Director, R & R, and Land Acquisition I & CAD Department having submitted proposals to the Government on 18.02.2015 for formulation of a policy to guide and facilitate district collectors to acquire lands, in strips or pockets, which become critical for proper viability of the Project; and to bring the envisaged components of the Project to their logical deliverable stage in any irrigation project, or a road work by the R & B, and land for R & R Centres, through negotiated consent. The Government, after examining the issue in detail, constituted a three member committee vide Memo dated 16.05.2015 and directed them to submit a report for formulation of a policy under Section 108 of the 2013 Act, giving a proper preamble and to frame laws to provide for consent awards, duly defining the parameters mentioned therein. The Committee submitted its report on 21.05.2015 preparing a draft policy called the Telangana State Policy for Acquisition of Land through Agreement under the 2013 Act. The Government considered the report of the Committee, and decided to issue a policy under Section 108 of the 2013 Act, and in consonance with Rule 30 of the Telangana State Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Rules, 2014 issued in G.O. Ms. No. 50 Revenue (JA & LA) Department, dated 19.12.2014 (the "2014 Rules" for short). 4. No. 50 Revenue (JA & LA) Department, dated 19.12.2014 (the "2014 Rules" for short). 4. In the exercise of the powers conferred under the aforesaid provisions, the Government of Telangana made the policy called "The Telangana State Policy for Acquisition of Land through Agreement under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 annexed to the order. The detailed policy is applicable to land acquisition by agreement, and prohibits the policy from being used by the Government at the district level to procure lands beyond an extent of Ac. 10.00 in strip acquisition, for any canal or bund work in any irrigation project or a road work by the R&B. It also stipulates that land acquisition by agreement, under the policy, should be resorted upto a maximum extent of 50 Acres, by the appropriate Government at the district level, in case of land requirement for R & R centres of PDFs in any project. It provides for several other requirements, and also prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the Committee constituted to operationalise the policy. It also requires an award to be passed by the Collector under Section 30 of the 2013 Act after a negotiated settlement, and for such an award to be final. Further reference under Section 64 of the Act, or for any claim for higher compensation, is prohibited. The policy does not envisage any negotiations in R & R entitlements, and requires strict compliance with the Second and Third Schedules of the 2013 Act. It also enables the Government, from time to time, to issue such guidelines or executive instructions as may be deemed necessary. 5. Shortly after this policy was formulated, the Government of Telangana issued G.O. Ms. No. 123 Revenue (JA & LA) Department dated 30.07.2015 for procuring land, and other structures thereon, from willing land owners by the procuring agencies for public purposes. The said G.O. stipulates that, in order to expeditiously procure land for public projects, the Government deems it fit to come out with a framework that allowed land owners to participate in the development process by willingly selling their land, and properties thereon, for a consideration on the basis of an agreement between the land owners and the user department/undertaking/society/authority called the Procuring Agency as approved by the District Level Land Procurement Committee. The said G.O. prescribes a detailed procedure for procuring land from willing land owners and others. The consideration, as agreed by the individual land owner or owners and the Procuring Agency before the District Level Land Procurement Committee, is, inter alia, to include the value of the land and property, perceived loss of livelihood, equivalent costs required for rehabilitation and resettlement of willing land owners and others. Under the said G.O, the land owners are required to give an affidavit that she/he will not have any right to further enhancement of consideration, finalised by the Committee, to any other forum. It requires the District Level Land Procurement Committee, while determining the consideration, to take into account all taxes as admissible under various Central/State/Local Laws. It also requires the District Collector, on signing the agreement, to ensure registration of a conveyance deed or a sale deed in favour of the Procuring Agency duly making on-line payment of the consideration. It enables the Government, from time to time, to issue such guidelines or executive instructions as may be deemed necessary. 6. It is relevant to note that G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 makes no reference to the earlier policy notified in G.O. Ms. No. 75 dated 05.06.2015. Clause (2)(viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 relates to the conduct of the business by the District Level Land Procurement Committee, and sub-clause (h) thereof stipulates that, once the agreement is reached, the Collectors, after executing the agreements in Form-I and Form-II, are required to publish details of the land owners including others, and their respective shares, in two newspapers inviting claims and objections within fifteen days of publication of such a notification. 7. G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 was hitherto amended by the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 07.10.2015 and Para 2 (VII)(h) of G.O. Ms. No. 123 was substituted with the following: "Once the agreement is reached, the Collector, after executing the agreement in Form-I and II, shall publish details of the land owners including others, and their respective shares, in two newspapers inviting claims and objections within (7) days of publication of such a notification." Thereafter G.O. Ms. No. 214 dated 28.11.2015 was issued amending para 2 (viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 214 dated 28.11.2015 was issued amending para 2 (viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 and the words "equivalent costs required for rehabilitation and resettlement of willing land owners and others", referred to in Para 2(viii) of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, was directed to be deleted. 8. In his counter-affidavit, the 4th respondent district collector submits that G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 was issued in order to procure lands in an expeditious manner from the land owners who come forward willingly and voluntarily to sell their lands and properties for an agreed consideration determined on an agreement, between the land owners and the requisition agency, without any force or coercion; as and when the State requires land for a public purpose, and the land owners voluntarily come forward to sell their lands, the State would procure the said land under G.O. Ms. No. 123 by paying the agreed consideration to the owners by following the procedure set out in the said G.O; in case the land owners are not willing to sell their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123, the State would acquire the land under Act 30 of 2013, or any other law in force; there was no bar or prohibition on the State to procure or purchase landed properties from willing land owners on payment of sale consideration; the State can enter into an agreement under Article 299 of the Constitution, and can also acquire properties under Article 298 of the Constitution, in addition to the common law right of contractual power, depending upon the convenience and prevailing local conditions, without causing any loss or inconvenience to the land owners; whenever any land is required for a public purpose, and the land owners are not willing to part with their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123, the lands, of such persons, would be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Act 30 of 2013 by paying compensation in accordance with law; for the last more than one year, the experience of the State has been that the land owners are eagerly coming forward to receive consideration from the Government to part with their lands for development purposes under G.O. Ms. No. 123; the State Government was paying better compensation to the land owners, than what is payable under Act 30 of 2013; as a welfare measure, the State has issued G.O. Ms. No. 123; the State Government was paying better compensation to the land owners, than what is payable under Act 30 of 2013; as a welfare measure, the State has issued G.O. Ms. No. 190 and 191 dated 10.08.2016 and 15.08.2016 respectively, providing certain benefits to the affected families where lands are procured under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, to protect their livelihood; rehabilitation benefits were provided to all affected families whose livelihood would be affected i.e., agricultural labourers, artisans and more particularly people from the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the backward classes who are working as labourers, but do not own any lands, and have been residing in the area for the last three years; these welfare measures include payment for housing, annuity, subsistence grant, one time grant for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Schedule areas, transport allowance, resettlement assistance, and fishing rights to the affected families if storage tanks are created and fishing is feasible. 9. In his counter-affidavit in W.P. No. 27371 of 2016, the District Collector further submits that, in the present case, the Irrigation department had filed requisitions in the year 2008 for acquisition of about Ac. 1817.09 gts of land in several villages for construction of the Gouravelli reservoir with a capacity of 1.44 TMC; the Special Deputy Collectors had acquired the land, and had paid compensation to the land holders; a socio-economic survey was conducted for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits to the displaced families, and the Project affected families, whose lands/structures were already acquired; details of such families were also published in the District gazette; the Rehabilitation and Resettlement benefits, under G.O. Ms. No. 68, I&CAD (PW), would be paid to the beneficiaries; the sites, under the R&R package, have been identified in Gandipalli and Choutapalli villages, and the members of the Gramsabha held on 24.08.2016 were accordingly informed; and efforts are being made to expedite the process of R&R in consultation with the beneficiaries. 10. It is further stated that, subsequently, the Government took a policy decision, and has decided to raise the storage capacity of the reservoir to 9 TMC; the Executive Engineer had submitted a new requisition for land of an extent of Ac. 10. It is further stated that, subsequently, the Government took a policy decision, and has decided to raise the storage capacity of the reservoir to 9 TMC; the Executive Engineer had submitted a new requisition for land of an extent of Ac. 1868.32 gts in several villages; during the negotiations, held with the land losers on 04.05.2016, the District Level Procurement Committee has finalised the rates for payment 176 of sale consideration for various categories of lands, based on the sale of land which took place in the vicinity, the Sub-Registrar value, the sale consideration paid in the last three years, and the prevailing market value; and he had fixed the compensation as (1) rain fed dry land for 1st time landlosers - Rs. 5,50,000/-, (2) Land having borewells/wells, and being cultivated with wet crops and other crops, for 1st time land losers - Rs. 6,25,000/-, (3) Rain fed dry land for 2nd time land losers - Rs. 6,00,000/-, and (4) Land having borewells/wells and being cultivated with wet crops and other crop for 2nd time land losers - Rs.6,50,000/-. 11. It is further stated that the land holders have agreed to these rates, and have executed agreement bonds; a notification was published in the daily newspapers; affected farmers, who agreed to these rates, were coming forward to sign Form-I and II, as the consideration amount is more than what they would receive if their land is acquired under the 2013 Act; lands are procured from those land owners who have given their consent in accordance with G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015; no compulsion or force has been exerted on those land owners who do not come forward to offer their lands under the prescribed procurement procedure; the allegation that the revenue machinery had descended on their village along with police, and the respondents have coerced the villagers to sign on the agreement forms/consent to sell their lands to the Government, for the proposed Gouravelli project, was not correct; the administration/respondents have never resorted to such acts; the land of farmers are being procured, as per G.O. Ms. No. 123, only in respect of those who were coming forward on their own; no force has been exerted on any of the land owners; and no particulars have been furnished of those land owners who are said to have given their consent unknowingly. 12. No. 123, only in respect of those who were coming forward on their own; no force has been exerted on any of the land owners; and no particulars have been furnished of those land owners who are said to have given their consent unknowingly. 12. In his affidavit dated 11.08.2016, filed in W.P. No. 26601 of 2016 and batch, the Special Chief Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department, has stated that neither the State of Telangana nor its authorities are procuring or purchasing land by force, or against the wishes of the land owners; they were procuring land only from those who voluntarily came forward expressing their willingness to sell their lands; the authorities were procuring/purchasing land for a public purpose, after payment of consideration to the satisfaction of the owners, on the basic principle of a willing seller and a willing purchaser; neither the Government nor its authorities have resorted to coercion or pressure in procuring lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015; several safeguards are provided in G.O. Ms. No. 123, before procuring the lands; at any stage, till the execution of sale deeds, the land owners are entitled to withdraw from the process of sale of their lands; the State Government has the constitutional power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and to make contract for any purpose under Article 298 of the Constitution, in addition to the common law, keeping in view the welfare of the State, apart from the public interest; some of the petitioners are seeking a direction to acquire their lands in accordance with the 2013 Act; and, if the State requires the lands of such of those petitioners for a public purpose, they would acquire the land in exercise of their powers under the provisions of Act 30 of 2013, or the law in force in the State of Telangana as on the date of acquisition of the lands, by paying the required compensation. 13. In his Additional affidavit dated 12.11.2016, the Special Chief Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, submits that the State Government, in order to expeditiously procure land for a public purpose, for the use of public projects, has issued G.O. Ms. 13. In his Additional affidavit dated 12.11.2016, the Special Chief Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, submits that the State Government, in order to expeditiously procure land for a public purpose, for the use of public projects, has issued G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 which allows the owners of the land to participate in the developmental process voluntarily, and on their own volition to willingly sell their lands on a consideration mutually arrived at between the owners of the land, and the procuring agencies, as specified in G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. 14. Elaborate submissions were put forth by Sri Vedula Venkataramana, Sri L. Ravichander and Sri A. Satya Prasad, Learned Senior Counsel and Sri K.S. Murthy, Sri K. Lakshman, Smt. Rachana Reddy and Sri Ch. Arjun Kumar, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, and the Learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana on the scope and ambit of Article 298 of the Constitution of India, and on the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 and other related G.Os. As the Learned Advocate General stated that his submissions were confined only to the interlocutory applications, and the State reserved its right to file a detailed counter-affidavit in the Writ Petitions later, we have considered the rival submissions in the context of grant/refusal to grant interlocutory relief in the aforesaid W.P.M. Ps. It is convenient to examine the rival submissions, made by Learned Counsel on either side, under different heads. I. ARE LAND OWNERS BEING COERCED TO SELL THEIR LANDS TO THE STATE UNDER G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015? 15. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the petitioners have specifically pleaded coercion, and that the State was forcing them to part with their lands for the purpose of the project; this contention has not been denied; while the State has proclaimed that it would purchase land, only from those who voluntarily part with their land, the material on record discloses that coercive steps are being resorted to, in order to deprive owners of their land, by G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, instead of resorting to the provisions of the 2013 Act; the State action, in seeking to acquire lands through G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, instead of resorting to the provisions of the 2013 Act; the State action, in seeking to acquire lands through G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, necessitates being set aside; and the State is resorting to false and deliberate misrepresentation and misinformation to lure hapless land owners, in order to indulge in speedy land acquisition. 16. While the Learned Senior Counsel, and the Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, allege coercion by the State, and claim that the petitioners, and other land owners, are being forced to part with their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would contend that people in large numbers are approaching the authorities concerned expressing their willingness to sell their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. 17. In judicial review proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court would, ordinarily, not examine disputed questions of fact save where there is unimpeachable evidence on record to show that the State, or its officers, are exerting pressure on those, who are not willing to part with their lands, to sell their lands to the State under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. It would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to either hold in favour of the petitioners that the State has resorted to coercive means to force them to sell their lands to the Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, or to hold In favour of the State that people are flocking in large numbers, and are ready and willing to sell their lands to the Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. We had, while passing interim orders earlier, made it clear that on such of those land owners, who are not willing to sell their lands to the Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, approaching this Court, the State would be injuncted from purchasing their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. II. IS G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015 ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, AND IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA? 18. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, approaching this Court, the State would be injuncted from purchasing their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. II. IS G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015 ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, AND IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA? 18. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the effort of the State Government is to divide farmers into two categories, i.e., those who are willing to part with their land at a higher rate, and those who will be paid a far lesser amount under the 2013 Act because they are unwilling to part with their property; classification of farmers into these two categories is by the executive act of the State; the State cannot divide and rule; the discrimination, arising out of this classification, is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India; G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 smacks of the take it or leave it formula, and suffers the wrath of Article 14; larger public interest is adversely affected by payment of a higher price, than the market price of the land, to a chosen few; the government cannot, thereby, squander precious public money; the State is the custodian of public money, and cannot misutilise public funds to purchase land at any price it wants; the Latin Maxim, which is applicable in the present case, is "Ut res magis Valeat Quam Pereaf - i.e., Statute ought to have a logical meaning and premise; the State cannot acquire land, under the guise of 'voluntary sale transactions', from land owners on terms which are highly discriminatory, leaving room for coercion and intimidation claiming 'public purpose'; and the State has violated Article 14 by paying a certain unexplained amount which has been arbitrarily arrived at, to the land losers under the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, and threatening other land losers, who are similarly placed but have opted to give up their land under Act 30 of 2013, with severe restrictions and a severely reduced amount without revising the market value of the lands in these areas for the past four years and more. 19. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would submit that, in the absence of any specific plea or proof, and without support of any material (documentary evidence), the petitioners cannot allege that G.O. Ms. 19. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would submit that, in the absence of any specific plea or proof, and without support of any material (documentary evidence), the petitioners cannot allege that G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; even on merits, the land of the owner which is compulsorily acquired, and who is voluntarily selling the land to the State, fall under two different and independent class of persons; they are not similarly situated; and, hence, the question of violation of Article 14 does not arise. 20. Allegations in the Writ Petition must be specific, clear and unambiguous. There must be proper pleadings and averments in the substantive petition before the question of denial of equal protection, or the infringement of the fundamental right to equality, can be decided. The burden is upon him who attacks a classification to show that there has been a clear transgression of the Constitutional principles. The claim of equal protection under Article 14 is examined on the presumption that the actions of the State are reasonable and justified. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 34 : 2002 (2) ALT 22.4 (DN SC) If a person complains of unequal treatment, the burden squarely lies on him to place before the Court sufficient material from which it can be inferred that there is unequal treatment. Where, however, the necessary material has not been placed to show how there has been unequal treatment, the plea of violation of Article 14 cannot be entertained. (Ashutosh Gupta (supra)). 21. The burden is on the petitioners to set out facts necessary to sustain the plea of discrimination, and to adduce "cogent and convincing evidence" to prove those facts for "there is a presumption that every factor which is relevant or material has been taken into account in formulating the classification. (State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19 ). Unless the classification is unjust on the face of it, the onus lies upon the party attacking the classification to show, by pleading and placing necessary material before the Court, that the said classification is unreasonable and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. (G.D. Kelkar v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports AIR 1967 SC 839 ; Shri Triloki Nath Khosa (supra). 22. (G.D. Kelkar v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports AIR 1967 SC 839 ; Shri Triloki Nath Khosa (supra). 22. A statute should be construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim "ut res megis valeat quam per eat". (It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it). (Hindustan Lever v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 9 SCC 438 ). To make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is, by itself, not sufficient. An applicant, pleading that Article 14 has been violated, must show not only that he has been treated differently from another, but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. (Ramchand Jagdish Chand v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 563 ; Probhudas Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 1044 ). The burden of establishing that the classification has transgressed the constitutional mandate is always on the person who challenges its validity. (Hindustan Lever (supra)). 23. The State claims that the amounts paid by them under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, for voluntary purchase of lands from willing land owners, is higher than the compensation payable by the State for compulsory acquisition of these lands under the 2013 Act. What is, however, unclear is the extent of variance in the amounts being paid under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, and the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition under the 2013 Act. As is evident from a bare reading of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, and the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, the amounts paid to these willing land owners, for voluntary purchase of lands from them by the State, includes not only the value of the land but also the compensation in lieu of all the other benefits which land owners are entitled to under the Schedules to the 2013 Act. It is only if the benefits under the Schedules to the 2013 Act are computed in monetary terms will we be in a position to know the extent of variation, and whether such variance is so arbitrary as to violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is only if the benefits under the Schedules to the 2013 Act are computed in monetary terms will we be in a position to know the extent of variation, and whether such variance is so arbitrary as to violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is only after ascertaining the basis, on which the State Government has fixed the amount payable for different categories of lands purchased under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, would this Court be able to decide whether such a basis is so wholly arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution. This exercise can only be undertaken after the State Government files its counter affidavits in the main writ petitions and not in these interlocutory applications. Suffice it to hold that the material placed on record by the petitioners is not sufficient to conclusively establish that G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 is arbitrary or in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 24. The plea of discrimination does not, however, merit acceptance. Persons who voluntarily sell their lands to the State Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, prima-facie, constitute a class distinct and different from those land owners who are not willing to part with their lands under the said G.O. It is only if the lands, of those who are not willing to part with it, are needed by it for a public purpose, would the State be required to exercise its power of eminent domain to compulsorily acquire their lands under the 2013 Act. Even though the amount payable under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 is at variance, with the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition of lands under the 2013 Act, that, by itself, may not result in discrimination as those land owners, who have not parted with their lands, are not precluded from voluntarily selling their lands to the State Government, and receive compensation under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. It is not even the case of the petitioners that the State Government is refusing to extend the benefits of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 to all those land owners who are willing to part with the lands required by the State Government for construction of these irrigation projects. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. It is not even the case of the petitioners that the State Government is refusing to extend the benefits of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 to all those land owners who are willing to part with the lands required by the State Government for construction of these irrigation projects. We may not be justified, therefore, in injuncting the State from resorting to voluntary purchase of land under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 on grounds of arbitrariness and discrimination, or in holding that exercise of executive power of the State, to issue G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. III. CAN THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE BE EXERCISED IN CONTRAVENTION OF LEGISLATION MADE EITHER BY PARLIAMENT OR THE STATE LEGISLATURE? 25. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the State, which has been continuously stressing on the applicability of Section 108 of the 2013 Act, cannot change its stance and claim that Section 108 does not apply; Section 108(1) of the 2013 Act applies only to higher compensation and, under Section 108(2), only to better rehabilitation and resettlement; these provisions have no application to a 'policy' which the State can formulate on land acquisition, deviating from the clear provisions of the 2013 Act; the State cannot, therefore, claim that the draconic 'policy', i.e. G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, is a 'land acquisition policy', when the 2013 Act clearly bars them from doing so; the State, which wishes to acquire lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 has, despite the pendency of the present batch of Writ Petitions wherein the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 123 is under challenge, started issuing notifications for irrigation projects violating all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to Social Impact Assessment (SIA) under Section 6(2), and food security provisions under Section 10; and the State has, arrogantly, initiated land acquisition proceedings under the emergency provisions of Section 40of the 2013 Act. 26. It is no doubt true that the Government of Telangana has formulated the policy called "The Telangana State Policy for Acquisition of Land through Agreement under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in G.O. Ms. 26. It is no doubt true that the Government of Telangana has formulated the policy called "The Telangana State Policy for Acquisition of Land through Agreement under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in G.O. Ms. No. 75 dated 05.06.2015, whereunder the District Collectors have been empowered to acquire lands, in strips or pockets, which are critical for proper viability of the project. While the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 75 dated 05.06.2015 is also under challenge in these batch of Writ Petitions, the emphasis placed, and the arguments put forth, on behalf of the petitioners is mainly on the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 and G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016. 27. Section 107 of the 2013 Act stipulates that nothing in the 2013 Act shall prevent any State from enacting any law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under the 2013 Act which confers higher compensation than payable under the 2013 Act or to make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than those provided under the 2013 Act. Section 108(1) stipulates that, where a State law or a policy framed by the Government of a State provides for a higher compensation than calculated under the 2013 Act for the acquisition of land, the affected person or his family or member of his family may, at their option, opt to avail such higher compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement under such State law or such policy of the State. Section 108(2) stipulates that, where a State law or a policy framed by the Government of a State offers more beneficial rehabilitation and resettlement provisions under that Act or policy, than under the 2013 Act, the affected persons or his family or member of his family may, at his option, opt to avail such rehabilitation and resettlement provisions under such State law or such policy of the State instead of under the 2013 Act. 28. Section 107 enables the State Legislature to make a law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under the 2013 Act conferring higher compensation than payable under the 2013 Act. Similarly it confers power on the State legislature to make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than the provisions of the 2013 Act. 28. Section 107 enables the State Legislature to make a law to enhance or add to the entitlements enumerated under the 2013 Act conferring higher compensation than payable under the 2013 Act. Similarly it confers power on the State legislature to make provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement which is more beneficial than the provisions of the 2013 Act. As the 2013 Act, in so far as land owners are concerned, is a legislation for compulsory acquisition of their lands, the power conferred on the State legislature, under Section 107 of the 2013 Act, would be available only in case of compulsory acquisition of lands. Likewise the State Government has been conferred power to make a policy, under Section 108(1) of the 2013 Act, providing for higher compensation than calculated under the 2013 Act, for acquisition of land. In such a case, option is given to the affected person or his family to opt for such higher compensation, and rehabilitation and resettlement under the State policy. 29. While Section 107 of the 2013 Act enables the State Legislature to enact a law more beneficial to the affected families, Section 108(1) confers power on the State Government to frame a policy providing for higher compensation than calculated under the 2013 Act for acquisition of land. Acquisition of land under the 2013 Act is compulsory acquisition, and the power conferred on the State Government under Section 108(1) is to frame a policy providing for higher compensation than calculated under the 2013 Act, which can only mean that a policy can be formulated by the State Government for payment of higher compensation, on compulsory acquisition of land, than what is provided under the 2013 Act. 30. It is no doubt true that the requirement of a social impact assessment under Chapter-II, and the food security provisions under Chapter-III of the 2013 Act, are not adhered to on lands being purchased by the State Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. The power to purchase lands, from those land owners who voluntarily and willingly sell their lands to the Government, is referable to Article 298 of the Constitution of India, and it is only when the State resorts to compulsory acquisition of lands would the provisions of the 2013 Act, including Chapter-II and Chapter-III thereof, apply. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. The power to purchase lands, from those land owners who voluntarily and willingly sell their lands to the Government, is referable to Article 298 of the Constitution of India, and it is only when the State resorts to compulsory acquisition of lands would the provisions of the 2013 Act, including Chapter-II and Chapter-III thereof, apply. The question, under what circumstances the State can invoke the emergency provisions of Section 40 of the 2013 Act, does not arise for consideration in these batch of Writ Petitions, and it is wholly unnecessary for us to dwell on this aspect. 31. G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 has been issued by the State Government in the exercise of its executive power under Articles 154, 162 and 298 of the Constitution of India. The power of the State Government to frame an executive policy, under Articles 154, 162 and 298 of the Constitution of India, is available as long as such a policy does not fall foul of any law in force, be it plenary or subordinate. As it is coextensive with the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws, and is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the State can be exercised only to supplement, and not supplant, the law made by the State Legislature, {Senior Supdt. of Post Offices v. Izhar Hussain (1989) 4 SCC 318 ; St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE (2003) 3 SCC 321 , and cannot be so framed or utilised as to override the provisions of law as it would then destroy the very basis of the rule of law, and strike at the very root of orderly administration of the law. (Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam AIR 1962 SC 386 . If, however, the law or the rules are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the law or the rules and issue orders not inconsistent with the law or rules already framed. (Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1910 . 32. It is neither necessary that there must be a law already in existence before the executive is enabled to function nor that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these laws. (Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1910 . 32. It is neither necessary that there must be a law already in existence before the executive is enabled to function nor that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these laws. The power of the Executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution is not abridged without a law. If, however, there is a statutory enactment or a rule on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or Rule and it cannot, in the exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution, ignore or act contrary to that Rule or the Act. (B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942 ; Rai Sahib Ram Jawava Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549 ; Sant Ram Sharma (supra). In the absence of any Law or Rules made in relation thereto, the State Government can exercise its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution. (V. Balasubramaniam v. T.N. Housing Board (1987) 4 SCC 738 ). 33. While the executive power of the State under Article 298 of the Constitution is a further extension of the executive power under Article 154 as extended by Article 162 of the Constitution, the questions which necessitate examination are whether G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, issued by the State Government in the exercise of its executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution falls foul of the provisions of the 2013 Act; whether the said G.O., which relates to voluntary purchase of land from willing land owners, is independent of the provisions of the 2013 Act which relate to compulsory acquisition of lands; and whether the State Government can acquire lands, in the exercise of its executive power under Article 298, even if it is in contravention of the provisions of the 2013 Act? These questions shall be examined in detail hereinafter. Before doing so, it is necessary to examine the scope and ambit of the executive power of the State under Article 298 of the Constitution. IV. ARTICLE 298 OF THE CONSTITUTION : ITS SCOPE: 34. These questions shall be examined in detail hereinafter. Before doing so, it is necessary to examine the scope and ambit of the executive power of the State under Article 298 of the Constitution. IV. ARTICLE 298 OF THE CONSTITUTION : ITS SCOPE: 34. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the Executive has not been conferred power by the Constitution to purchase lands of citizens without resorting to acquisition in accordance with the 2013 Act; the word 'and' in Article 298 restricts exercise of the executive power of the State; the executive power of the State to acquire land, under Article 298 of the Constitution, is only for the purpose of trade or business, that too where such acquisition is other than for a public purpose; acquisition of land for a public purpose can only be resorted to under the 2013 Act; Article 298 has no application to the present scenario of forced acquisition of land, under the guise of 'public purpose', for major irrigation projects; Article 298 should be understood in the context of its opening and preceding functions - vis-à-vis trade and commerce, and all corollary activities including land acquisition for the said purpose of facilitating the State's involvement in trade and commerce; the "Ejusdem Generis" rule, i.e. general words always take the inference given to the Special preceding functions/words to wholly understand the Statutes' interpretation, should be applied; and Articles 162 and 298 of the Constitution should be read together. 35. 35. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would submit that the power of the State Government to voluntarily acquire land from a willing seller is traceable to Article 298; it is evident, from Clause 19 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the seventh Amendment to the Constitution, that the power of the State Government to voluntarily acquire land under Article 298 is not confined to trade or business, but can extend to any purpose; the State can enter into contracts for any purpose, including for the development activity of the State, without constitutional impropriety; Article 298 confers on the Union Government, and each State Government, powers with respect to three matters: (1) to carry on trade and business; (2) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and (3) to make contracts for any purpose; no prior legislative sanction (law) is required; and prior Legislative sanction is required only for statutory bodies like the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation which cannot exercise power under Article 298 of the Constitution. 36. The functions of a modern State, unlike the Police States of old, are not confined to mere collection of taxes or maintenance of laws and protection of the realm from external or internal enemies. A modern State is expected to engage in all such activities as are necessary for the promotion of the social and economic welfare of the community. (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra). 37. The Government, under the Constitution, is both the State and a public authority having powers over the public, and owing duties to them. These duties may be imposed on the Government either by the Constitution or by a Statute. The Government is also a legal entity like a natural or an artificial person. The object of conferring powers on the Government under Article 298 is to obviate any objection that the Constitution has not intended the Government to possess and exercise the normal powers and duties of any legal person. (Niranjan Lal Dalmia v. Union of India AIR 1976 Delhi 154). Whatever is necessary, for the purpose of carrying on business, can be exercised by the Government by entering into contracts. This power to make contracts is expressly vested in the Government under Article 298 of the Constitution. (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra). (Niranjan Lal Dalmia v. Union of India AIR 1976 Delhi 154). Whatever is necessary, for the purpose of carrying on business, can be exercised by the Government by entering into contracts. This power to make contracts is expressly vested in the Government under Article 298 of the Constitution. (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra). Article 298 of the Constitution stipulates that the executive power of the Union, and of each State, shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. Under proviso (b) thereto, the said executive power of each State shall, in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws, be subject to legislation by Parliament. The Executive power of the Union is vested in the President under Article 53. The Executive power of the State, under Article 154, is similarly vested in the Governor of each State. The Constitution makes it clear that the executive power of the Union extends to all matters in regard to which Parliament is competent to legislate and similarly, under Article 162, the executive power of the State extends to all matters in respect of which the State Legislature has the power of Legislation. Article 298 confers on the Government of the Union, and of each of the States, power in regard to the following three matters: (1) to carry on any trade or business; (2) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and (3) to make contracts for any purpose. Exercise of the executive power does not require a specific legislative enactment to authorise the action taken. (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra); Constitutional Law of India Volume-II Edited by Justice M. Hidayatullah and published by the Bar Council of India Trust in Association with Anrold-Heinemann). 38. Article 298, both before and after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 came into force with effect from 01.11.1956, reads thus: Before After Article 298. (Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra); Constitutional Law of India Volume-II Edited by Justice M. Hidayatullah and published by the Bar Council of India Trust in Association with Anrold-Heinemann). 38. Article 298, both before and after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 came into force with effect from 01.11.1956, reads thus: Before After Article 298. Power to acquire property, - (1) The executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend, subject to any law made by the appropriate Legislature, to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property held for the purposes of the Union or of such State, as the case may be, and to the purchase or acquisition of property for those purposes respectively, and to the making of contracts. (2) All property acquired for the purposes of the Union or of State shall vest in the Union or in such State, as the case may be. Article 298. Power to carry on trade, etc.- The executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. Provided that- (a) the said executive power of the Union shall, in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament may make laws, be subject in each State to legislation by the State; and (b) the said executive power of each State shall, in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which State Legislature may make laws, be subject to legislation by Parliament. 39. The power to carry on business is an incident of the proprietary power. Even before Article 298 was substituted by the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956, the State was entitled to engage itself in all activities necessary for the promotion of the social and economic welfare of the community and, for doing so, no specific legislation was necessary except where the State proposed to encroach upon private rights in order to enable it to carry on its business. With a view to put the matter beyond doubt, Article 298 was substituted altogether by the Seventh Constitution Amendment Act. {Municipal Commissioner of Dum Dum Municipality v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. (1995) 5 SCC 251 . With a view to put the matter beyond doubt, Article 298 was substituted altogether by the Seventh Constitution Amendment Act. {Municipal Commissioner of Dum Dum Municipality v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. (1995) 5 SCC 251 . According to the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill, the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956, whereby Article 298 was substituted, was brought in "to make it clear that the Union Government, as well as the State Governments, are competent to carry on any commercial of industrial undertaking, whether or not it is related to a matter within the legislative competence of the Union, or as the case may be, of the State. Similarly the holding, acquisition and disposal of property and the making of contracts by the Union or a State can be for any purpose without constitutional impropriety. {Indian Tourism Development Corporation (supra). 40. The original Article 298 was substituted by the Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1956 with the object of making it clear that the power to hold, acquire and dispose of property, and to make contracts can be exercised by the Union or a State for any purpose. At the same time, the revised Article 298 provides that this extended executive power of the Union and of the States will be subject, in the former case, to legislation by the State and, in the latter case, to legislation by Parliament. Article 298 is intended to supplement the 'executive power' conferred on the Union and the State under Articles 73 and 162, and to empower the Government to enter into contracts, in the exercise of its executive power, without legislative sanction. The executive power referred to in Article 298 includes not only determination of policy of the Government in regard to a matter, but also taking of steps necessary for carrying out that policy. (Constitutional Law of India Volume-II Edited by Justice M. Hidayatullah and published by the Bar Council of India Trust in association with Anrold-Heinemann). The compendium, Constitutional Law of India, (Edited by Hidayatullah, J., published by the Bar Council of India Trust), has been referred with approval in R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1994) Supp. (1) SCC 324. 41. The executive power under Article 298 gives capacity to the Government to carry on the activities mentioned therein. The compendium, Constitutional Law of India, (Edited by Hidayatullah, J., published by the Bar Council of India Trust), has been referred with approval in R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1994) Supp. (1) SCC 324. 41. The executive power under Article 298 gives capacity to the Government to carry on the activities mentioned therein. However, the contracts entered into by the Government under Article 298 would nonetheless be governed by the laws relating to contract. When the Government enters into a contract with a private person, only the formalities attending such contracts are prescribed by Article 299. Otherwise, the Government as well as the other contracting party are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract. The duty of the Government to perform the contract is not a public duty imposed on it either by the Constitution or by any statute. {Niranjan Lal Dalmia (supra)). 42. Under Article 298 of the Constitution, the State can carry on its executive functions by making a law or without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution. {Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India (2012) 11 SCC 257 ; Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. (1975) 1 SCC 70 : AIR 1975 SC 266 ; Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 1496 : 1977) 3 SCC 457). Article 162 merely provides an extensible limit and not the maximum limit of the executive power of the State Government. It does not define the limits of the executive power of the State Government, but sets out matters to which such executive power shall extend. Article 298 enlarges the scope of the executive power of the State Government by adding various matters in respect of which the State Government may exercise its executive power. It includes, within the executive power of the State Government, the power to carry on any trade or business and to acquire, hold and dispose of property for any purpose. (Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v. Union of India AIR 1973 Gujarat 117). (a) CAN THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE BE APPLIED IN INTERPRETING ARTICLE 298 OF THE CONSTITUTION? 43. In examining the question whether the ejusdem generis rule should be applied in interpreting Article 298 of the Constitution, it is necessary, at the outset, to understand what "ejusdem generis" means. (Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v. Union of India AIR 1973 Gujarat 117). (a) CAN THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE BE APPLIED IN INTERPRETING ARTICLE 298 OF THE CONSTITUTION? 43. In examining the question whether the ejusdem generis rule should be applied in interpreting Article 298 of the Constitution, it is necessary, at the outset, to understand what "ejusdem generis" means. The expression ejusdem generis - 'of the same kind or nature' - signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute, which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words, are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words. (Ms. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1989 SC 1019 ). 44. The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something, which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items, has been omitted. The principle, underlying this approach to statutory construction, is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier, and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption, and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, the ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction, as the subsequent words may admit, will be favoured. (Statutory Interpretation Rupert Cross (p. 116). 45. The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. (Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura AIR 1972 SC 1863 ). (Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura AIR 1972 SC 1863 ). The rule of "ejusdem generis'' should be "applied with caution and not pushed too far". (UPSEB v. Hari Shankar Jain (1978) 4 SCC 16 : AIR 1979 SC 65 ; Sukhu Ram Tamrakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1978) 41 STC 376 ; Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal AIR 1967 SC 1857 ; Craies on Statute Law). 46. The ejusdem generic rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are to be given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole, and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. (Tribhuwan Parkash Nair v. Union of India (1969) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1970 SC 540 ). The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words (which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus) is required to be determined. By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words, which follow certain specific words constituting a genus, is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them, unless the context otherwise requires. General words must, ordinarily, bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect, and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. Unless there is a genus, which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words. (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company AIR 1991 SC 506 ). 47. The expressions, "carrying on any trade or business", "the acquisition, holding and disposal of property", and "the making of contracts for any purpose", used in Article 298, do not form a common category for the application of the ejusdem generis rule. 'Unless you can find a category' 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine'. 47. The expressions, "carrying on any trade or business", "the acquisition, holding and disposal of property", and "the making of contracts for any purpose", used in Article 298, do not form a common category for the application of the ejusdem generis rule. 'Unless you can find a category' 'there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine'. The only test is whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. This means that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature. (S.S. Magnhild (Owners) v. Mclntyre Bros, and Co (1920) 3 KB 321. The ejusdem generis rule of construction must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment. It is a requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before this rule can be applied. (State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan AIR 1955 SC 810 ). For the ejusdem generis principle to apply there must be sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore, the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it. It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus for, if it cannot be formulated, it does not exist. (Francis Bennion : Statutory Construction [pgs 830-831). 48. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is not an inviolable rule of law. Inference can be drawn by applying it only in the absence of an indication to the contrary. This rule cannot be applied when the preceding words and the general words constitute description of two categories or the general words In question themselves constitute description of a distinct category. (Sukhu Ram Tamrakar (supra)). As the aforesaid three expressions cannot be said to form a common genus, the ejusdem generis rule has no application. Consequently, acquisition, holding and disposal of property, and the making of contract for any purpose, cannot be confined only to the trade or business being carried on by the State. (Sukhu Ram Tamrakar (supra)). As the aforesaid three expressions cannot be said to form a common genus, the ejusdem generis rule has no application. Consequently, acquisition, holding and disposal of property, and the making of contract for any purpose, cannot be confined only to the trade or business being carried on by the State. While property can be acquired, held and disposed of, and contracts can be made by the State for the purpose of carrying on trade or business, it can also be exercised for purposes other than to carry on trade or business. 49. The executive power of the State under Article 154, as extended by Article 162, has been further extended by Article 298 to (a) carrying on any trade or business; (b) acquiring, holding and disposing of property; and (c) making contracts for any purpose. The contention, urged on behalf of the petitioners, that the word "and" in Article 298 would require the activities specified therein to be read conjunctively, and not disjunctively, does not merit acceptance. Article 298 enables the State to exercise its executive power to each one of the subjects mentioned therein. 50. The word "'any" means "one, some, every or all without specification". When used as an adverb the word "any" means "to any degree or extent". The words "any purpose''' in Article 298 would mean all purposes including, but also apart from, (1) carrying on trade or business, and (2) acquire, hold and dispose of property. The executive power under Article 298 is not limited to the making of contracts for acquisition, holding and disposal of property by the State only for the purpose of carrying on trade or business. The said power can be exercised to make contracts (i) for the purpose of carrying on trade or business, or (ii) to acquire, hold and dispose of property, or (iii) for any other purpose. 51. The words "for any purpose''' were introduced in Article 298 when it was amended by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, and the object clearly was that the executive power of the State Government to acquire, hold and dispose of property, or to make contracts should not be limited by the division of legislative powers between the Union and the States. Prior to the amendment, the power of acquisition and disposal of property of the Union and the States was confined to the respective purposes of the two Governments. By amending Article 298, and adding the words for any purpose, it is clear that the Union or the State Government may acquire, hold and dispose of property and make contracts for any purpose irrespective of whether it is a purpose of the Union or a purpose of the State. These words, which were added to expand the width and amplitude of the executive power of the Union and the States, cannot be construed as limiting such executive power. The State Government has, after the amendment, undoubted executive power to acquire hold and dispose of property for any purpose. (Amritlal Nathubhai Shah (supra). 52. As the State Government has the power under Article 298 of the Constitution to make contracts, among others, for the purpose of acquiring property, it cannot be said that it lacks power to voluntary acquire/purchase lands from willing land owners, and to make contracts with them, (have sale deeds executed by land owners in its favour), for purchase of property. As G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 has been issued in the exercise of the executive power of the State under Articles 162 and 298 of the Constitution, it is only if it is contrary to any law in force, would the executive power of the State be required to yield. Admittedly, there is no State Legislation which disables the State from exercising its executive power under Article 298 to voluntarily purchase of land from willing land owners. Does G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 contravene the provisions of the 2013 Act disabling the State Government from purchasing lands from willing land owners? This question shall be examined in greater detail later in this order. V. DOES G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015 VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(g) AND ARTICLE 21, AS ALSO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 300-A? 53. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that, by declaring the entire area as required for a public purpose even without hearing the objections, and without following the due process of law, the State is depriving the petitioners of their fundamental rights as well as their right to property; those who are not willing to part with their lands, under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, would not be able to sell their lands to private parties, at a mutually agreed price, as no one would buy land which is "to be submerged'; in addition, obstacles are being created on the seamless enjoyment of such lands; by allowing surrounding lands to be procured under G.O. Ms. 123, the petitioners private rights, as well as 201 their statutory rights under the 2013 Act, are being severely undermined, and irreparable loss is being caused to them; and procurement of land, under the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 123, is in violation of Articles 19(i)(g), 21 and 300-A of the Constitution. 54. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution confers on citizens the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 300-A stipulates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The right to carry on any trade or occupation under Article 19(1)(g), or the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, is, prima-facie, not violated by the State while exercising its executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution, and in purchasing lands voluntarily from willing land owners under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 for the agreed consideration. The possibility of those, who are not willing to sell their lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, being affected thereby, as no one else may purchase their lands which are likely to be submerged in future, cannot result in denial of the rights of those who voluntarily and willingly sell their lands, for the agreed consideration, to the Government. 55. It is only on a preliminary notification being issued under Section 11(1) of the 2013 Act, can the Government be said to have expressed its intention to acquire the notified lands for a public purpose, and till then there is no legal bar for a land owner to sell his land to a willing buyer, even to a person other than the State Government. The market value of the land, which would form the basis for determining the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition under the 2013 Act, would be its value on the date on which a preliminary notification is issued under Section 11(1) of the 2013 Act and, till a preliminary notification is issued, the land owner retains all his rights over the land including the right of cultivation, the right to mortgage or lease it, or even to sell it to others. 56. The right to property, though not a fundamental right, is nonetheless a constitutional and a statutory right. (Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10 SCC 448 ; Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 10 SCC 43 ; State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639 ; State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar 2012 (1) ALT 1 (SC) : (2011) 10 SCC 404 and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 354 ; Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013) 1 SCC 353 : 2013 (2) ALT 19 .2 (DN SC)).No person can be deprived of his property except in accordance with law is the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution. While the petitioners cannot claim to have any fundamental right to property, as Article 19(1)(f) was omitted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20.06.1979, they have the constitutional right not to be deprived of their lands, except in accordance with law. 57. The power of the State to deprive a citizen of his property is the power of eminent domain. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign State to appropriate the private property within the territorial sovereignty for public uses or purposes. It is the exercise of the strong arm of the Government to take property for public use without the owner's consent. It is an attribute of sovereignty. [Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 14, 1952 West Publishing Co; Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector (2008) 9 SCC 552 ; Anand Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 11 SCC 242 . The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for a public purpose. (Anand Singh (supra)). [Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 14, 1952 West Publishing Co; Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector (2008) 9 SCC 552 ; Anand Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 11 SCC 242 . The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for a public purpose. (Anand Singh (supra)). The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode, (Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra)), as the State, which is governed by the rule of law, cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond that provided by the Constitution. (Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra)). Compulsory acquisition is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land. (Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra); Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128 : 2002 (2) ALT 14.2 (DN SC); Scindia Employees' Union v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 10 SCC 150 . 58. The State Government cannot, while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law, and not by a mere executive fiat or order. As Article 162 is subject to other provisions of the Constitution, it is necessarily subject to Article 300-A. The word "law" in the context of Article 300-A means an Act of Parliament or of a State legislature, a rule, or a statutory order having the force of law, i.e., State made law. (Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. (1982) 1 SCC 39 ; Hindustan Times v. State of U.P. 2003 (1) ALT 18 (SC) : (2003) 1 SCC 591 . The effect of the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955, is that there can be no "deprivation" unless there is extinction of the right to property. (Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan (supra)). Acquisition means taking not by voluntary agreement, but by authority of an Act of Parliament, and by virtue of the compulsory powers thereby conferred. In the case of compulsory acquisition, the property is taken by the State permanently and the title to the property vests in the State. (R.L. Jain v. DDA (2004) 4 SCC 79 ). 59. Acquisition means taking not by voluntary agreement, but by authority of an Act of Parliament, and by virtue of the compulsory powers thereby conferred. In the case of compulsory acquisition, the property is taken by the State permanently and the title to the property vests in the State. (R.L. Jain v. DDA (2004) 4 SCC 79 ). 59. While the State, in the exercise of its executive power either under Article 162 or 298 of the Constitution, cannot deprive any person of his property, deprivation of property would arise only where there is an extinguishment of the right to property. The possibility of the land owners not being able to sell their lands, as the State may acquire these lands under the 2013 Act in future, does not result in the right of the land owners, over their property, being extinguished for, till a preliminary notification is issued under Section 11(1) of the 2013 Act, the land owners are free to deal with their property in any manner they choose. The fact that the State Government is purchasing land from willing neighbouring land owners, cannot be said to have resulted in deprivation of the property of land owners, such as the petitioners, as they continue to retain ownership of such lands with all the rights which flow therefrom. 60. The submission of Learned Advocate- General that G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 applies only to voluntary purchase of land and it is only when the State would require land for a public purpose, and if the land owner is not willing to part with the land voluntarily, would the State be required to take recourse to the 2013 Act, is not without merit. We have also passed interim orders to the effect that, if a person is not willing to part with his property, the State would not resort to G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 to purchase his land, but only take recourse to the provisions of the 2013 Act. As the State has the power to acquire property and to make contracts for such purposes, G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 can be resorted to for voluntary purchase of land from willing land owners. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 to purchase his land, but only take recourse to the provisions of the 2013 Act. As the State has the power to acquire property and to make contracts for such purposes, G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 can be resorted to for voluntary purchase of land from willing land owners. As to whether the said G.O can be applied to deprive the statutory rights of other categories of persons, who are not land owners but are dependent upon it for their survival, is a different matter altogether. VI. CLAUSE (b) OF THE PROVISO TO ARTICLE 298 OF THE CONSTITUTION: ITS SCOPE: 61. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution relates to acquisition and requisition of property; the executive power of the State cannot be larger or broader than the legislative power of the State; if the State cannot make a law for purchasing the land of its citizens under Article 246 r/w the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, it does not have the executive power to purchase lands of citizens; since the 2013 Act enacted by Parliament is still in force, the State Government lacks power to acquire property under Article 298; the three components of the 2013 Act i.e., acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement would be avoided by the State if they resort to voluntary purchase of land in the exercise of its executive power; the proviso to Article 298 makes it clear that the executive power of the State is subject to legislation by Parliament; the State cannot claim protection under Article 298 when the field is occupied by the 2013 Act requiring 'compulsory' land acquisition; even if the State's right to acquire land, in complete derogation of the 2013 Act exists under Article 298, it is the 2013 Act which occupies the field; and the executive action of the State in procuring lands for a public purpose, relying upon Article 298 without conclusively establishing the necessity of procuring certain lands in certain locations for a stated public purpose as per the existing law, is in violation of the 2013 Act. 62. 62. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would submit that the 2013 Act covers the field with respect to compulsory land acquisition (i.e. involuntary acquisition against the will of the owner), but does not cover the field of voluntarily acquisition or purchase of land by the State from the willing seller; and the 2013 Act does not, in any way, annihilate the executive power of the State Government to voluntarily acquire or purchase land under Article 298. He would rely on Amritlal Nathubhai Shah (supra) 63. "The quintessence of our Constitution is the rule of law. The State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. (Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan (supra); Dr. P. Rajaji v. The State of Tamil Nadu Judgment in WA. No. 932 and 827 of 2008 dt. 29.09.2008 of Madras HC. Every executive action, which operates to the prejudice of any person, must have the sanction of law. The executive cannot interfere with the rights and liabilities of any person unless the legality thereof is supportable by law. {Hindustan Times (supra)). By virtue of Article 162, the State or its officers cannot, in the exercise of executive authority and without any legislation in support thereof, infringe upon the rights of citizens merely because the legislature of the State has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is issued. (State of M.P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh (supra)); Dr. P. Rajaji (supra). Every act done by the Government or by its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority. (Thakur Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170 ; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi AIR 1967 SC 1836 and Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 Supp. SCC 1). The wisdom in exercising executive power in matters which are governed by the provisions of law is doubtful. Even if it be considered necessary to do so, it cannot be so utilised as to override the provisions of law. Such a method 'will destroy the very basis of the rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly administration of law. (Mannalal Jain (supra). 64. Even if it be considered necessary to do so, it cannot be so utilised as to override the provisions of law. Such a method 'will destroy the very basis of the rule of law and strike at the very root of orderly administration of law. (Mannalal Jain (supra). 64. As shall be elaborated hereinafter, the 2013 Act requires persons, other than land owners, to be provided certain benefits, including towards their rehabilitation and resettlement on their displacement from the lands acquired by the State for the purpose of construction of irrigation projects. While the State Government has the power under Article 298 to purchase lands from those who voluntarily sell their lands to it, can it thereby violate the statutory rights of affected families, other than land owners, under the 2013 Act? The answer to this question, for reasons more than one, must be in the negative. 65. The State Government can act in the exercise of its executive power in relation to any matter with respect to which the State Legislature has power to make laws, even if there is no legislation to support such executive action. Such executive action must, however, not infringe the rights of any person. If the executive action of the State Government encroaches on any private rights, it would have to be supported by legislative authority for, under the rule of law which prevails in our country, every executive action which operates to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. (Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of M.P. AIR 1974 SC 1232 ; Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra); Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788 ). If it were "necessary to encroach upon private rights, in order to enable the Government to enter into contracts, a specific legislation, sanctioning such a course, would have to be passed. (Naraindas Indurkhya (supra); Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra); Thakur Bharat Singh (supra)). 66. Although a legislative enactment is not necessary for the exercise of any of the three categories of executive power mentioned therein, yet the provisions of Article 298 must be taken as being subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the exercise of the powers under Article 298 would be subject to the fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in Part-III. Thus, the exercise of the powers under Article 298 would be subject to the fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in Part-III. In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court held that citizens are entitled to have equal treatment in respect of executive functions of the State as provided in Article 298. (Khazan Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 669 : (1974) 1 SCC 295 ; Constitutional Law of India Volume II Edited by Justice M. Hidayatullah and published by the Bar Council of India Trust in association with Anrold-Heinemann). 67. Article 298 of the Constitution extends the executive power of the Union and each State with the stipulation that, if the purpose is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws, the said executive power of the State shall be subject to legislation by Parliament. Thus, while the Government of a State is free to acquire property or make contracts in respect of which it may not have the power to make laws, the power to do so shall be subject to legislation by Parliament. (H. Anraj v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 2 SCC 292 . Though Article 298 does not provide specifically, but in substance it is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. Article 298 is subject to parliamentary legislation. It is subject to the provisions of Articles 245 and 246. The provisions of Article 298 should also be read to be subject to the provisions of Articles 53 and 258 of the Constitution. (B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. (1999) 9 SCC 700 . It is thus evident that the statutory rights conferred on the affected families, other than land owners, under the 2013 Act cannot be violated by the exercise of the executive power under Articles 162 and 298 or by G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. 68. This question can be examined from another angle also. The proviso to Article 298 contains two clauses (a) and (b). As clause (a) of the proviso relates to the executive power of the Union, it is unnecessary for us to examine its scope in these proceedings wherein exercise of the executive power of the State is alone in issue. 68. This question can be examined from another angle also. The proviso to Article 298 contains two clauses (a) and (b). As clause (a) of the proviso relates to the executive power of the Union, it is unnecessary for us to examine its scope in these proceedings wherein exercise of the executive power of the State is alone in issue. Article 298 expressly extends the executive power of the State to the carrying on of any trade or business subject only to legislation by Parliament if the trade or business is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws. Article 298 does not open with the words "subject to the provisions of the Constitution", as does Article 162. However, on Articles 162 and 298 being read together, it is clear that the executive power of a State, in matters with respect to which the State Legislature may not make laws, is subject to legislation by Parliament but is not subject to the executive power of the Union. The Government of a State is not required to obtain permission of the Union Government in order to make contracts in the absence of Parliamentary legislation. (H. Anraj (supra)). The only restriction on the executive power of the State in this respect is contained in clause (b) of the proviso to Article 298 according to which the executive power of the State shall, in so far as the making of contracts is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws, be subject to legislation by Parliament. (Khazan Singh (supra)). 69. The prefix "such", in Clause (b) of the proviso to Article 298, is used for both the words "trade or business" and "purpose", as referred to in the main limb of Article 298. The executive power of the State, to (i) carry on trade or business, and (ii) make contracts for any purpose, is restricted by clause (b) of the proviso. Where exercise of the executive power, in relation to trade or business or for the making of contract for any purpose, is not with respect to matters for which the State Legislature has been conferred the power to make laws, Clause (b) of the proviso makes exercise of the executive power subject to legislation by Parliament. The source of the executive power of the State Government, to issue G.O. Ms. The source of the executive power of the State Government, to issue G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 and to make contracts with willing land owners to voluntarily purchase lands from them, is referable to Article 298. It is clear from clause (b) of the proviso thereto, that exercise of this executive power is subject to legislation by Parliament. We must, therefore, consider whether there is anything in the Parliamentary legislation which annihilates this executive power of the State Government, or in any manner controls or regulates it. If there is any such provision it would prevail, and the executive power of the State Government would have to give way. (Amritlal Nathubhai (supra)). 70. As exercise of the executive power of the State to carry on trade or business, or to make contracts for purposes, with respect to matters in the Union list (which are not matters with respect to which the State Legislature is empowered to make laws), is subject to laws made by Parliament, the executive power of the State to make contracts for purposes (which would include, but not be restricted to, (i) carrying on trade or business or (ii) acquisition, holding and disposal of the property) in the Union List would undoubtedly be subject to the laws made by Parliament. 71. The 2013 Act is, however, not referable to any Entry in the Union list i.e. List-I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution as it was made under Entry 42 of List-III which relates to "acquisition and requisition of property". While the State Legislature has, undoubtedly, the power to make laws under Entry 42 of List-III and, consequently, its executive power under Article 298 would extend to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and making of contracts for such purposes, does Clause (b) of the proviso to Article 298 make the executive power of the State subject to laws made by Parliament under List-III (concurrent list) of the VII Schedule to the Constitution? 72. The power of the State Legislature to make laws, with respect to matters enumerated in the Entries in List-III to the VII Schedule to the Constitution, is circumscribed by Article 254 of the Constitution. Article 254 maintains Parliamentary supremacy in matters under List I and List III (List I - Union List and List III - Concurrent List). (Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 ). Article 254 maintains Parliamentary supremacy in matters under List I and List III (List I - Union List and List III - Concurrent List). (Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 ). The doctrine of covered field is applicable only to the Entries in List III. {State of Rajasthan v. Vatan Medical and General Store (2001) 4 SCC 642 : 2001 (3) ALT 10.2 (DN SC); State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709 . Likewise, the doctrine of occupied field is relevant in the case of laws made with reference to Entries in List III. (Hindustan Lever (supra); McDowell and Co (supra); Vatan Medical and General Store (supra); and Shri Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2003) 4 SCC 378 : 2003 (2) SCALE 226 . 73. With respect to a subject in the concurrent list, the State legislature has competence to make laws as long as the relevant provision does not conflict with any provision in any Central Act. {Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Ajmer Municipality AIR 1969 SC 227 . Clause (1) of Article 254 stipulates that if any provision of a law made by a State Legislature is repugnant to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the existing law shall prevail, and the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void. {Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-op. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109 ). 74. Article 254 of the Constitution makes provision firstly, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central and a State law with regards the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List and, secondly, for resolving such conflict. Article 254(1) enunciates the normal rule that, in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. (T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe AIR 1983 SC 150 . Article 254(1) gives supremacy to the law made by Parliament, which Parliament is competent to enact. For application of this Article, firstly, there must be repugnancy between the State law and the law made by Parliament. Secondly, if there is repugnancy, the State legislation would be void only to the extent of repugnancy. Article 254(1) gives supremacy to the law made by Parliament, which Parliament is competent to enact. For application of this Article, firstly, there must be repugnancy between the State law and the law made by Parliament. Secondly, if there is repugnancy, the State legislation would be void only to the extent of repugnancy. {Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha v. Narayanamma (2003) I SCC 228; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) 3 SCC 431 . Before any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) There must be a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act; (2) Such an inconsistency must be absolutely irreconcilable; (3) The inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts must be of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other, and in a situation being reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. (M. Karunanidhi (supra); Dharappa (supra); Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1019 . To the extent the State legislation is in conflict with the Central legislation made under an Entry in the Concurrent List, it would be void and inoperative. If there is a conflict between the two legislations, unless the State legislation is saved by the provisions of the main part of clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation, being repugnant to the Central legislation, would be inoperative. {State of T.N. v. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute (1995) 4 SCC 104 ). One of the circumstances under which repugnancy, between the law made by the State and the law made by the Parliament, may result is when the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable. (Raghbir v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 2037 . 75. Where there exists a law made by Parliament, in respect of an Entry in the concurrent list, Article 254(1) disables the State Legislature from making a law repugnant thereto i.e., the State Legislature may not make a law contrary to the law already made by Parliament. (Raghbir v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 2037 . 75. Where there exists a law made by Parliament, in respect of an Entry in the concurrent list, Article 254(1) disables the State Legislature from making a law repugnant thereto i.e., the State Legislature may not make a law contrary to the law already made by Parliament. As the State Legislature cannot make a law repugnant to the 2013 Act (a law made by Parliament under Entry 42 of List III), the executive power of the State under Article 298 to make contracts, for purposes which fall within the ambit of the 2013 Act, would not be one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws (in view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution). The executive power of the State Government under Article 298 can be exercised to make contracts for "such purposes" as long as it does not contravene any of the provisions of the 2013 Act. As the State Legislature is disabled from making laws, with respect to Entries in the concurrent list, which are repugnant to Parliamentary legislation on the subject, it is only if the exercise of executive power, to make contracts for purchase of property (voluntary acquisition), falls foul of any of the provisions of the 2013 Act, would the State Government be disabled from exercising its executive power to make such contracts. The question which we must examine is whether G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 contravenes any of the provisions of the 2013 Act? VII. DOES VOLUNTARY PURCHASE OF LANDS FROM WILLING LAND OWNERS, UNDER G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015, VIOLATE THE STATUTORY RIGHTS OF AFFECTED FAMHJDES, OTHER THAN LAND OWNERS, CONFERRED ON THEM UNDER THE 2013 ACT? 76. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the interests of the marginalised and weaker sections of Society are adversely affected by the voluntary parting of land by the landholders; the rights of these persons, under the 2013 Act, is being circumvented by the executive act of the State in purchasing land from land owners under G.O. Ms. 76. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the interests of the marginalised and weaker sections of Society are adversely affected by the voluntary parting of land by the landholders; the rights of these persons, under the 2013 Act, is being circumvented by the executive act of the State in purchasing land from land owners under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015; this results in arbitrary and irrational acts by the State; the landless agricultural labourers, artisans etc, are forced to abandon their only source of livelihood, and migrate to places outside, resulting in violation of their right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution; the title of G.O. No. 123 is "Procurement of land and other structures thereon from Witling Land Owners by the Procuring Agencies for public purposes"; there are two components in the said G.O, the first conclusively decides a "purpose" as a "public purpose", and the second seeks to procure extents of land from certain persons in a certain location for that purpose; in order to exercise the power of acquiring/procuring land for a public purpose, either under the 2013 Act or under Article 298 of the Constitution, it should first be established that such land is required for a public purpose; the questions that need to be answered are how and when a purpose becomes a public purpose?, and when it is conclusively decided that only such extents and types of land, of such number of people in a particular location, is required for such a public purpose?; as the executive has the discretion in deciding on the extent and location of the land, and the genuineness of the proposed public purpose, arbitrariness that strikes at the root of Article 14, in the exercise of such discretion, must be prevented or eliminated; the 2013 Act is the existing law that mandates a participatory, transparent and non-arbitrary procedure to conclusively decide that the proposed purpose is a public purpose, and only the required extent of a particular type of land, of a particular number of people in a particular location, is necessary for such purpose; the 2013 Act specifically provides for checks and balances, and guarantees a right to transparency, to all project affected persons, in the payment of compensation, and rehabilitation and resettlement, to eliminate or atleast reduce the scope for arbitrariness; the Government has commenced the tender process, for construction of the proposed irrigation projects, without an Environment impact assessment, or a social impact assessment or even a declaration of the public purpose; the Social Impact assessment, presentation of the findings of its impact in the gram sabha, taking its opinion, scrutiny of the Social impact assessment report, recommendations by the expert committee, approval/notification by the appropriate government under Chapter-II, and restriction on acquisition of certain types of lands under Chapter-III, are the prior mandatory provisions required to be complied with before arriving at a preliminary conclusion that the said land is required for a public purpose; such a proposal transforms into a conclusive decision only after issuance of (I) preliminary notification giving complete details of the proposed public purpose and acquisition, and inviting objections thereto; (2) disposing of the objections in a reasonable manner after giving a reasonable opportunity to the project affected persons; a conclusive declaration can only be made after conducting a household survey, preparation, consultation with the gram sabha, and notification of the R & R scheme for all the project affected families; only after such a conclusive declaration, that such an extent of land of such a number of people in such a location is required for such a public purpose, can proceedings be initiated for determination of compensation, after conducting an award enquiry and after passing an award; a negotiation mechanism can be evolved and incorporated only after this stage; only then can purchase of lands, from the so called willing land owners, be resorted to; it cannot be declared beforehand that certain lands are required for a stated public purpose, and later seek objections from the remaining few, on the proposed public purpose, as it would be a mockery of the provisions of law, and against principles of natural justice; the meaning and significance of Sections 2, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 19 of the 2013 Act should be understood in accordance with the objectives of the 2013 Act; the power of eminent domain of the State is severely restricted, and in some instances even negated, by the provisions of the 2013 Act; and this paradigm shift, from the 1894 Land Acquisition Act to the 2013 Act, should be taken into consideration. 77. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate-General for the State of Telangana would submit that the State Government, pursuant to its welfare obligations, is providing benefits, for those who are dependent on the purchased land, vide G.O. Ms. Nos. 190 and 191; and an affidavit has also been filed, before this Court, to that effect. 78. Certain sections of Society, such as agricultural labourers, village artisans, scheduled tribes, forest dwellers, assignees etc do not own land, but are dependent upon it for their survival, nay their very existence. Their right for rehabilitation and resettlement, on acquisition of lands which would result in their displacement, is protected by the 2013 Act. Can their rights be denied by the State by resorting to voluntary purchase of land from willing land owners under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015? 79. Construction of irrigation projects results in submergence of villages and mass displacement of, among others, the marginalised and the less fortunate sections of Society. Can their rights be denied by the State by resorting to voluntary purchase of land from willing land owners under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015? 79. Construction of irrigation projects results in submergence of villages and mass displacement of, among others, the marginalised and the less fortunate sections of Society. In a similar, though not identical context, the Supreme Court, in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram (2010) 11 SCC 269 , held that the mineral wealth of India lay mostly under dense forests and areas inhabited by people who can claim to be the oldest dwellers of this ancient country; large-scale mining needed not only huge investments and application of highly developed technology, but also en masse relocation of the people dwelling upon the land that needed to be mined, or at any rate getting the land freed from its inhabitants for whom it may be the only source of sustenance; the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which envisaged compulsory acquisition of land by the Government for any public purpose, was based on the twin principles of eminent domain of the sovereign, and the largest good of the largest number; a blinkered vision of development, complete apathy towards those who are affected by the development process, and a cynical unconcern for the enforcement of the laws had led to a situation where the rights and benefits, promised and guaranteed under the Constitution, hardly ever reached the most marginalised citizens; there were various studies that detailed the impact of dispossession from their lands on the tribals; for a people whose lives and livelihoods were intrinsically connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be traumatic; the scheme of land acquisition often came with assurance of schools, hospitals, roads, and employment; the initial promises, however, mostly remained illusory; and the aims of income restoration and house resettlement proved to be very difficult. 80. Unlike the colonial legislation i.e., the 1894 Act, which only provided for compensation to land owners whose lands were compulsorily acquired by the State, the 2013 Act, besides providing enhanced compensation to the land owners, also confers certain rights on the deprived sections of society who do not own land, but are dependent on it for their survival. 80. Unlike the colonial legislation i.e., the 1894 Act, which only provided for compensation to land owners whose lands were compulsorily acquired by the State, the 2013 Act, besides providing enhanced compensation to the land owners, also confers certain rights on the deprived sections of society who do not own land, but are dependent on it for their survival. The 2013 Act confers, on these weaker sections of society, the right of rehabilitation and resettlement on their displacement from villages which would come under submergence because of construction of these irrigation projects. 81. Let us take note, albeit in brief, of the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements of affected persons (other than land owners) for, though land owners are also entitled for rehabilitation and resettlement under the 2013 Act, the Learned Advocate-General is justified in his submission that the amount paid by the State Government, for voluntary purchase of land under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, includes payment not only towards the value of the land but also towards all other benefits which the land owners may, otherwise, be entitled to including for their rehabilitation and resettlement. 82. Section 3(a) of the 2013 Act defines an "Administrator" to mean an officer appointed under Section 43(1) for the purpose of rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families. 82. Section 3(a) of the 2013 Act defines an "Administrator" to mean an officer appointed under Section 43(1) for the purpose of rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families. Section 3(c) defines "affected family" to include (i) a family whose land or other immovable property has been acquired; (ii) a family which does not own any land but a member or members of such family may be agricultural labourers, tenants including any form of tenancy or holding of usufruct right, share-croppers or artisans or who may be working in the affected area for three years prior to the acquisition of the land, whose primary source of livelihood stands affected by the acquisition of land; (iii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have lost any of their forest rights recognised under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 due to acquisition of land; (iv) a family whose primary source of livelihood, for three years prior to the acquisition of the land, is dependent on forests or water bodies, and includes gatherers of forest produce, hunters, fisher folk and boatsmen, and such livelihood is affected due to acquisition of land; (v) a member of the family who has been assigned land by the State Government or the Central Government under any of its schemes, and such land is under acquisition. 83. Section 3(i) defines "cost of acquisition" to include, among others, the cost of development of infrastructure and amenities at the resettlement areas; and cost of rehabilitation and resettlement as determined in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. Section 3(k) defines "displaced family" to mean any family who, on account of acquisition of land, has to be relocated and resettled from the affected area to the resettlement area. Section 3(m) defines "family" to include a person, his or her spouse, minor children, minor brothers and minor sisters dependent on him. Under the proviso thereto, widows, divorcees and women deserted by families shall be considered as separate families. Under the Explanation thereto, an adult of either gender, with or without spouse or children or dependents, shall be considered as a separate family for the purposes of the Act. Section 3(o) defines "infrastructure project" to include any one or more of the items specified in Section 2(1)(b), which includes irrigation projects for which lands are being acquired under G.O. Ms. Section 3(o) defines "infrastructure project" to include any one or more of the items specified in Section 2(1)(b), which includes irrigation projects for which lands are being acquired under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. Section 3(zb) defines "requiring body" to mean a company, a body corporate, an institution, or any other organisation or person for whom land is to be acquired by the appropriate Government, and includes the appropriate Government if the acquisition of land is for such Government, either for its own use or, for subsequent transfer of such land for public purpose, to a company, body corporate etc. Section 3(zc) defines "resettlement area" to mean an area where the affected families, who have been displaced as a result of land acquisition, are resettled by the appropriate Government. 84. Under Section 4(4), the Social Impact Assessment study, referred to in sub-section (I.) of Section 2, shall, among other matters, include the following namely (b) estimation of affected families and the number of families among them likely to be displaced; (d) whether the extent of land, proposed for acquisition, is the absolute bare- minimum extent needed for the project; and (e) whether land acquisition at an alternate place has been considered and found not feasible. Section 4(5) stipulates that, while undertaking a Social Impact Assessment study under sub-section (1), the appropriate Government shall, among others, take into consideration the impact that the project is likely to have on various components such as livelihood of the affected families etc. Section 10(1) stipulates that, save as otherwise provided in Section 10(2) thereof, no irrigated multi-cropped land shall be acquired under the Act. 85. The Administrator appointed under Section 43(1) of the 2013 Act, (an officer not below the rank of a Joint Collector or an Additional Collector or a Deputy Collector or equivalent official of the revenue department), is required to be provided with such powers, duties and responsibilities as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government, and with office infrastructure, and to be assisted by officers and employees to discharge his duties. (Section 43(2)). The task of formulating, executing and monitoring the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is entrusted to him. (Section 43(3)). (Section 43(2)). The task of formulating, executing and monitoring the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is entrusted to him. (Section 43(3)). The Administrator is obligated to conduct a survey and undertake a census of the affected families, in the manner prescribed by the Rules, to determine the livelihood lost in respect of land losers and the landless poor whose livelihood is primarily dependent on the lands being acquired, and to gather details of the amenities and infrastructural facilities which would be affected by the displacement of these persons, common property resources required to be acquired etc. (Section 16(1)). 86. Based on such a survey and census undertaken by him, the Administrator is required to prepare a draft rehabilitation and resettlement scheme. (Section 16(2)). This draft rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is required to include, among others, particulars of the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements of the landless poor whose livelihood is dependent on the land being acquired and who would be displaced on the acquisition of lands, as also the time limit within which the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme would be implemented. (Sections 16(2) and (3)). This draft rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is not only required to be given wide publicity and discussed in the gram sabha, but a public hearing in the affected area is also required to be conducted in this regard. (Sections 16(4) and (5)). A comprehensive report is then required to be submitted by the Administrator to the District Collector who is required to review the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme in consultation with the rehabilitation and resettlement committee at the project level. (Section 17(1) and Section 45). A rehabilitation and resettlement committee is required to be constituted at the project level under the chairmanship of the Collector, and with a representative of women residing in the affected area, a representative of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes residing in the affected area, a representative of a voluntary organization working in the area, the Chairpersons of the Panchayats and District Planning Committees, M.Ps., and M.L. As., of the concerned area or their nominees, a representative of the requiring body, and the Administrator, as its members (Section 45(2) to monitor and review the progress of implementation of the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme, and to carry out post-implementation social audits in consultation with the gram sabha in rural areas. (Section 45). 87. (Section 45). 87. After such consultation, the Collector is required to forward the draft rehabilitation and resettlement scheme, along with his suggestions, to the Commissioner, Rehabilitation and Resettlement for his approval. (Section 17(2)). The Commissioner is responsible for supervising the formulation of the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme, and for its proper implementation. (Section 44(2)). The Commissioner is required to approve the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme, and make available such an approved scheme to the panchayats, and the offices of the revenue officials, to be published in the affected areas as prescribed under the Rules, and to upload it on the web-site of the State Government (Section 18). It is only, thereafter, is the appropriate Government empowered to make a declaration, along with the declaration of an area identified as the "resettlement area" for the purpose of rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families. The summary of the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme, along with the aforesaid declaration, is required to be published by the District Collector. (Sections 19(1) and 19(2)). No declaration can be made for acquisition of land under Section 19 unless a summary of the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is published along with the declaration. 88. The District Collector is, thereafter, required to pass a rehabilitation and resettlement award for each affected family in terms of the entitlements provided to them in the Second Schedule.(Section 31). This award is required to include the rehabilitation and resettlement amount payable to the family, particulars of the land allotted to the displaced families, particulars of one time subsistence allowance and transportation allowance to the displaced families, particulars of payment for cattle shed and petty shops, particulars of onetime amount to artisans and small traders, details of mandatory employment to be provided to the members of the affected families, particulars of any fishing rights, particulars of annuity and other entitlements, and particulars of special provisions for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. (Section 31(2)). 89. The Collector is required to ensure that, in every resettlement area, the infrastructural facilities and basic minimum amenities, specified in the Third Schedule, are provided. (Section 32). (Section 31(2)). 89. The Collector is required to ensure that, in every resettlement area, the infrastructural facilities and basic minimum amenities, specified in the Third Schedule, are provided. (Section 32). The Collector is empowered to take possession of land only after ensuring that the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are paid or tendered to the entitled persons within a period of six months for the monetary part of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements listed in the Second Schedule commencing from the date of the award. (Section 38(1)). The components of the rehabilitation and resettlement package in the Second and Third Schedules, in so far as they relate to infrastructural entitlements, are required to be provided within a period of eighteen months from the date of the award, (first proviso to Section 38(1)). In case of acquisition of land for irrigation projects, rehabilitation and resettlement is required to be completed six months prior to the submergence of the lands acquired. (second provision to Section 38(1)). 90. Special provisions are also made in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes who are likely to be displaced from their lands on the construction of irrigation projects. (Section 41). A development plan is required to be prepared laying down the procedure for settling land rights due but not settled, and restoring titles of the Scheduled Tribes as well as the Scheduled Castes on the alienated land, by undertaking a special drive together with land acquisition. (Section 41(4)). The development plan is required to contain a programme for development of alternate fuel, fodder and non-timber forest produce resources on non-forest lands to meet the requirements of Tribal communities as well as the Scheduled Castes. (Section 41(5)). Where land is acquired from members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, at least one-third of the compensation is required to be paid to the affected families initially as the first instalment. (Section 41 (6)). Resettlement areas, predominantly inhabited by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, should get land, free of cost, for community and social gatherings. (Section 41 (8)). Where the affected families, belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, are relocated outside the district, they are required to be paid additional 25% towards rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, apart from what they are entitled to in monetary terms, along with a onetime entitlement of fifty thousand rupees. (Section 41(11)). (Section 41 (8)). Where the affected families, belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, are relocated outside the district, they are required to be paid additional 25% towards rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, apart from what they are entitled to in monetary terms, along with a onetime entitlement of fifty thousand rupees. (Section 41(11)). All benefits including reservation benefits, available to the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes in the affected areas, are required to be continued in the resettlement area. (Section 42(1)). Where community rights have been settled under Act 2 of 2007, they are required to be quantified in monetary terms to be paid, to the individuals who have been displaced because of acquisition of land, in proportion to his share in such community rights. (Section 42(3)). 91. The provisions, relating to rehabilitation and resettlement, apply also to cases where certain persons, other than the specified persons, purchase land through private negotiations. (Section 46). Purchase of land by a person other than specified persons, without complying with the provisions of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, is void ab initio. (Section 46(5)). The State Government, which is among the specified persons included under Explanation (b) to Section 46, is excluded from the ambit of Section 46 of the 2013 Act only because it is entrusted with the obligation of providing for, and implementing, a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme under the 2013 Act, which obligation a private individual or a private body may seek to avoid when it purchases land through private negotiations. Sections 46 and 47 of the 2013 Act ensure that a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme is implemented even in cases where land is purchased, beyond the specified extent, by private parties through private negotiations. 92. The State Government is also obligated to establish a State Monitoring Committee for rehabilitation and resettlement, for reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the rehabilitation and resettlement schemes or plans under the 2013 Act. (Section 50). The 2013 Act also requires the State Government to establish the land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement authority for speedy disposal of disputes relating, among others, to rehabilitation and resettlement. (Section 51(1)). Any person, aggrieved by the rehabilitation and resettlement award, is entitled to approach the authority under Section 64(1). 93. (Section 50). The 2013 Act also requires the State Government to establish the land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement authority for speedy disposal of disputes relating, among others, to rehabilitation and resettlement. (Section 51(1)). Any person, aggrieved by the rehabilitation and resettlement award, is entitled to approach the authority under Section 64(1). 93. The Second Schedule to the 2013 Act contains elements of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements for all the affected families (both land owners and the families of those whose livelihood is primarily dependent on the land acquired), in addition to those provided in the First Schedule. These elements of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements include (i) provision of housing units in the case of displacement; (ii) land for land; (iii) offer for developed land; (iv) choice of annuity or employment; (v) subsistence allowance for displaced families for a period of one year; (vi) transportation cost for displaced families; (vii) cattle sheds/petty shops cost; (viii) one time grant to artisans, small traders and certain others; (ix) fishing rights; (x) one time rehabilitation allowance; and (xi) stamp duty and registration fee. 94. The Third Schedule, which contains provisions for infrastructural amenities, stipulates that, for resettlement of populations, the following infrastructural facilities and basic minimum amenities are to be provided at the cost of the requisitioning authority, (which, under Section 3(zb) of the 2013 Act includes the State Government), to ensure that the resettled population, in the new village or colony, can secure for themselves a reasonable standard of community life, and can attempt to minimise the trauma involved in displacement. A reasonably habitable and planned settlement is required to have, as a minimum, the following facilities and resources as are appropriate. The table thereunder prescribes the components of infrastructure amenities provided/proposed to be provided by the acquirer of the land, and details of the infrastructural amenities provided by the acquirer of the land. A reasonably habitable and planned settlement is required to have, as a minimum, the following facilities and resources as are appropriate. The table thereunder prescribes the components of infrastructure amenities provided/proposed to be provided by the acquirer of the land, and details of the infrastructural amenities provided by the acquirer of the land. The components of infrastructure amenities, prescribed under the Third Schedule, are: (i) roads within the resettled villages and an all-weather road linked to the nearest pucca road, passages and easement rights for all the resettled families to be adequately arranged; (ii) proper drainage as well as sanitation plans executed before physical resettlement; (iii) one or more assured sources of safe drinking water for each family as per the norms prescribed by the Government of India; (iv) provision of drinking water for cattle; (v) grazing land as per the proportion acceptable in the State; (vi) a reasonable number of fair price shops; (vii) Panchayat Ghars, as appropriate; (viii) village level post-offices, as appropriate, with facilities for opening saving accounts; (ix) appropriate seed-cum-fertilizer storage facility if needed; (x) efforts to be made to provide basic irrigation facilities to the agricultural land allocated to the resettled families, if not from the irrigation project, then by developing a cooperative or under some Government scheme or special assistance; (xi) all new villages, established for resettlement of the displaced persons, shall be provided with suitable transport facility which must include public transport facilities through local bus services with the nearby growth centres/urban localities; (xii) burial or cremation ground, depending on the caste-communities at the site, and their practices; (xiii) facilities for sanitation, including individual toilet points; (xiv) individual single electric connections (or connection through non-conventional sources of energy like solar energy), for each household and for public lighting; (xv) anganwadis providing child and mother supplemental nutritional services; (xvi) school as per the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009; (xvii) sub- health centre within two kilometres range; (xviii) primary health centre as prescribed by the Government of India; (xix) play ground for children; (xx) one community centre for every hundred families; (xxi) places of worship and chowpal/tree platform for every fifty families for community assembly, of numbers and dimensions consonant with the affected area; (xxii) separate land to be earmarked for traditional tribal institutions; (xxiii) forest dweller families to be provided, where possible, with their forest rights on non-timber forest produce and common property resources, if available close to the new place of settlement and, in case any such family can continue their access or entry to such forest or common property in the area close to the place of eviction, they must continue to enjoy their earlier rights to the aforesaid sources of livelihood; (xxiv) appropriate security arrangements to be provided for the settlement, if needed; and (xxv) veterinary service centre as per norms. 95. The aforesaid provisions of the 2013 Act prescribe a detailed procedure for identification of persons, other than land owners, who are required to be rehabilitated and resettled in other areas, and for individual rehabilitation and resettlement awards to be passed in their favour. Adequate safeguards are stipulated under the 2013 Act to ensure that all those, who are entitled for rehabilitation and resettlement, are not denied their statutory benefits under the 2013 Act. These rights of rehabilitation and resettlement, conferred on the landless poor, artisans etc who, though not land owners, are dependent on the land for their survival, can be easily denied if the entire land, required for the purpose of irrigation projects which would result in displacement of these deprived Sections, were to be purchased by the State Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. As the said G.O is said to provide a far more attractive financial package, than what land owners would be entitled to receive under the 2013 Act, these land owners may well be ready and willing to part with their lands, without any concern for those who are dependent on such lands for their survival. In such circumstances the affected families (other than land owners) would be denied their statutory rights, and their due entitlement, under the 2013 Act. 96. The Learned Advocate General, for the State of Telangana, would submit that the obligation to frame a policy under Section 108(2), providing for rehabilitation and resettlement, would arise only if land is compulsorily acquired, and not to cases where the State voluntarily purchase land from willing land owners. If G.O. Ms. No. 190 and 191 dated 10.08.2016 and 15.08.2016 respectively, (which are meant to provide rehabilitation and resettlement monetary benefits for those dependent on the land purchased under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015), are referable to Section 108(2) of the 2013 Act, it is only if the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions made thereunder are more beneficial, than what is provided under the 2013 Act, can the affected person or his family opt to avail the more beneficial rehabilitation and resettlement measures. If, on the other hand, G.O. Ms. Nos. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015), are referable to Section 108(2) of the 2013 Act, it is only if the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions made thereunder are more beneficial, than what is provided under the 2013 Act, can the affected person or his family opt to avail the more beneficial rehabilitation and resettlement measures. If, on the other hand, G.O. Ms. Nos. 190 and 191 dated 10.08.2016 and 15.08.2016 respectively, which seek to make provision for rehabilitation and resettlement, are construed not to be a policy of the State Government, under Section 108(2) of the 2013 Act, the State Government, by resorting to voluntary purchase of lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, cannot deny the benefits prescribed in, and the protection extended by, the 2013 Act on affected persons (other than the land owners). The rights conferred under the 2013 Act, in favour of the affected families (other than land owners), such as village artisans, agricultural labourers, forest dwellers, scheduled tribes, assignees of Government land etc would be easily defeated, and the statutory obligations of the State under the 2013 Act readily avoided, if the State is held to have been discharged of its statutory obligations under the 2013 Act, to provide for the rehabilitation and resettlement of these categories of persons, merely be voluntarily acquiring land under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. 97. The questions which necessitate examination are whether G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016 and G.O. Ms. No. 191 dated 15.08.2016 offer more rehabilitation and resettlement benefits than those provided under the 2013 Act; and, if not, whether the State Government, in the exercise of its executive power under Articles 162 and 298 of the Constitution of India and in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, can avoid extending the rehabilitation and resettlement benefits prescribed under the 2013 Act to affected families (other than land owners), or violate the procedural safeguards prescribed under the 2013 Act, by issuing the aforesaid G.Os? 98. The State Government professes its intention to provide rehabilitation and resettlement benefits to all affected families, other than land owners, and claims that the rehabilitation and resettlement measures, under G.O. Ms. No. 190 and 191, adequately safeguard the interests of the affected families. 98. The State Government professes its intention to provide rehabilitation and resettlement benefits to all affected families, other than land owners, and claims that the rehabilitation and resettlement measures, under G.O. Ms. No. 190 and 191, adequately safeguard the interests of the affected families. In his affidavit dated 11.08.2016, the Special Chief Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department, submits that the State of Telangana and its officers would provide welfare measures to protect the interest of such persons in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016, which measures are either equal to or better than the benefits listed in the II Schedule to Act 30 of 2013. In his additional affidavit dated 12.11.2016, the Special Chief Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, would submit that the Government has also decided to provide welfare measures to these families i.e., agriculture labourers, artisans etc., whose livelihood is being affected due to the procurement of lands in terms of G.OMs. No. 123; accordingly, the Government issued G.O. Ms. Nos. 190 and 191 dated 10.08.2016 and 15.08.2016 respectively; and the welfare measures specified in the said G.Os are as follows: The annuities mentioned in the above will be with appropriate indexation to the consumer price index 3 A total Rs. 40,000/- will be paid per family as a subsistence grant for one year. 4 Rs. 60,000/- as a one-time grant will be paid for the affected family belonging to SC and ST in the Scheduled Areas 5 Rs. 60,000/- as a one-time transport grant will be paid to each affected family in case of displacement and if re-location is required 6 Rs. 30,000/- as a one-time grant will be paid to artisans and those involved in traditional occupations and other self-employed persons. 7 Rs. 60,000/- will be paid to each affected family as one-time resettlement assistance. 8 An option will be given in case a family with all members living together as referred in para-2 decides to set up a self-financed scheme or any enterprise based on their own choice or for any other income generating activity. Such a family will be paid a lump sum amount of Rs. 7.5 lakhs towards financial assistance in lieu of the specified benefits listed in items 2-7 above. 9 Fishing rights for the affected families, if storage tanks are created and fishing is feasible. Such a family will be paid a lump sum amount of Rs. 7.5 lakhs towards financial assistance in lieu of the specified benefits listed in items 2-7 above. 9 Fishing rights for the affected families, if storage tanks are created and fishing is feasible. 10 In case of projects that may create jobs in future the guidelines of State Industrial Policy, 2014, which emphasizes job creation, will apply. 99. In his additional affidavit dated 12.11.2016, the Special Chief Secretary further submits that Rs. 5.04 lakhs, as specified in item No. 1 of the table, would be paid to the displaced family in lieu of providing a house with specifications under the Indira Awas Yojana, and amenities and other facilities in the resettlement area in case of submergence of the land which is procured under G.O. Ms. No. 123; the said amount of Rs. 5.05 lakhs is higher than the value of the house constructed, with specifications, under the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme; if the displaced families are not inclined to opt for the welfare measures specified in G.O. Ms. Nos. 190 and 191, the authorities would take recourse to the provisions of Act 30 of 2013; the aforesaid welfare measures, as specified in G.O. Ms. Nos. 190 and 191, are more beneficial and convenient in all respects; and the material substance and contents of G.O. Ms. No. 123, 190 and 191 may be read as part and parcel of his affidavit. 100. By G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016, the Government of Telangana decided to provide welfare measures to families, whose livelihood is being affected due to land procurement under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 i.e., agriculture labourers, artisans and, more particularly, people from the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Backward Classes working as labourers who do not own any lands in the said village, and have been residing in the area for the last three years. The G.O. details the welfare measures which would be provided by the State Government, and are those referred to in the table mentioned in the additional affidavit, of the Special Chief Secretary to the Government of Telangana, dated 12.11.2016. G.O. Ms. The G.O. details the welfare measures which would be provided by the State Government, and are those referred to in the table mentioned in the additional affidavit, of the Special Chief Secretary to the Government of Telangana, dated 12.11.2016. G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016 requires District Collectors, and the appropriate authority, to verify the eligibility of the claims based on a notification to be issued to fix the cut-off date for reckoning of three years; the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration was directed to issue necessary guidelines from time to time; and the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Telangana State/District Collectors were directed to take action in the matter. 101. G.O. Ms. No. 191 dated 15.08.2016 was issued amending G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016. While clause 2(a) to (c), referred to in the additional affidavit of the Special Chief Secretary, Revenue dated 12.11.2016, are those referred to in G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016, clause 2(d) is as inserted by G.O. Ms. No. 191, and refers to those annuities which are mentioned in the table after Clause 2(a) to (c). The words "joint family", as referred in G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016, has been replaced with the words "family with all members living together" which is reflected in clause 10 of the table in the additional affidavit of the Special Chief Secretary dated 12.11.2016. 102. G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016 does not prescribe a satisfactory procedure, much less a procedure which is more beneficial than what is provided under the 2013 Act, to identify those who are entitled to, and to provide them, the rehabilitation and resettlement benefits stipulated under the 2013 Act. While the benefits mentioned in these G.Os, and which are detailed in the counter-affidavit of the Special Chief Secretary dated 12.11.2016, appear to provide for monetary compensation equivalent to several of the benefits stipulated in the Second Schedule, the obligation placed on the State by the Second Schedule, of giving an option to the affected families of creating jobs in their favour after providing them reasonable training and skill development in the related field, and to make provision for employment with wages not lower than the minimum wages to atleast one member of each affected family in the project, or to arrange for a job in such other projects as may be required, is not being fulfilled under G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016. The said G.Os do not also obligate the State to provide the infrastructural facilities prescribed in the Third Schedule to the 2013 Act. 103. While purchasing lands from willing land owners under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, the rights of these deprived sections who, though not owners of the land, are dependent upon it for their survival, cannot be violated by the State. While these under-privileged sections may, in view of their abject poverty, be persuaded to accept the financial package provided in G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 10.08.2016, the fact remains that the financial incentives provided in G.O. Ms. No. 190 dated 30.07.2015 do not cover all the statutory entitlements of the non-land owners affected families under the Second and Third Schedules to the 2013 Act. As these rehabilitation and resettlement provisions of the 2013 Act are made in the larger public interest of minimising the trauma of displacement, and in providing an adequate means of livelihood to those would suffer the most as a result of the displacement caused because of submergence of villages on construction of these irrigation projects, these statutory entitlements cannot be waived by them. A right can be waived by a party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions have been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. {Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre (2004) 8 SCC 229 . Waiver cannot, however, defeat statutory provisions made in larger public interest. (Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur (2005) 1 SCC 31; Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70 and Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeb Dutta (1993) 1 SCC 629 ). While waiver is the abandonment of a right, and signifies nothing more than an intention not to insist upon the right, an agreement to waive an illegality is void on grounds of public policy and would be unenforceable. (Woman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 ). As the 2013 Act inextricably links rehabilitation and resettlement with land acquisition, the State Government cannot resort to voluntary purchase of lands under G.O. Ms. (Woman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 ). As the 2013 Act inextricably links rehabilitation and resettlement with land acquisition, the State Government cannot resort to voluntary purchase of lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 violating the statutory rights of the affected families (other than the land owners), to be extended all the monetary benefits and infrastructural facilities they are entitled to under the provisions of the 2013 Act, and the Second and Third Schedules thereto. VIII. DO THE CONTRACTS MADE BY THE STATE, UNDER G.O. Ms. No. 123 DATED 30.07.2015, VIOLATE SECTION 23 OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT? 104. It is contended, on behalf of the petitioners, that the contracts being made by the State, under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, are void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, as these contracts defeat the provisions of the 2013 Act; and the Government cannot be allowed to execute void contracts which, apart from violation of the rights of the petitioners, would also cause huge loss to the public exchequer. On the other hand, the Learned Advocate- General for the State of Telangana would submit that the State Government is also a legal entity like a natural or artificial person; and it can also enter into a contract under the Indian Contract Act, and purchase property exercising power under Article 298 of the Constitution. 105. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act stipulates that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. Section 23 further stipulates that, in each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful, and every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. 106. Any Government is a Government of laws and not of men. As the activity of the Government has a public element, it should be fair. (Patel Engg. Ltd. 17). The constitutional power of the State, under Article 298 of the Constitution of India, inheres in it a duty towards the public whose money is being invested. 106. Any Government is a Government of laws and not of men. As the activity of the Government has a public element, it should be fair. (Patel Engg. Ltd. 17). The constitutional power of the State, under Article 298 of the Constitution of India, inheres in it a duty towards the public whose money is being invested. Article 298 of the Constitution of India confers a prerogative upon the State and, while exercising its prerogative to make contracts, the State must fulfil its constitutional obligations. It must oversee protection and preservation of the rights adumbrated in Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. (Kapila Hingorani (I) v. State of Bihar (2003) 6 SCC 1 . The State or the public authority, which holds the property for the public or which has been assigned the duty of grant of largesse etc, acts as a trustee and should act fairly and reasonably. All powers so vested are meant to be exercised for the public good, and for promoting the public interest. (NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA (2011) 6 SCC 508 . Any unjust condition, thrust upon any person by the State, would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. {Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156 ; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 ; Hindustan Times (Supra)). 107. All constitutional powers, including Article 298, carry corresponding obligations with them. This is the rule of law which regulates the operation of organs of Government functioning under a Constitution. {Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra)). The bargaining power of the State and the citizen is unequal. Any unjust condition thrust upon the petitioners by the State in such matters, would attract the wrath of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Equity and good conscience should be at the core of all governmental functions. Every executive action, which operates to the prejudice of any person, must have the sanction of law. The executive cannot interfere with the rights of any person unless the legality thereof is supportable in any court of law. (Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra); D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (supra); Hindustan Times (supra)). 108. The contracts being made by the State Government, under G.O. Ms. The executive cannot interfere with the rights of any person unless the legality thereof is supportable in any court of law. (Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra); D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (supra); Hindustan Times (supra)). 108. The contracts being made by the State Government, under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 (i.e., sale deeds executed in its favour by land owners), violate the statutory rights of affected families, other than land owners, which are protected by the provisions of the 2013 Act. These contracts are of a nature which, if permitted to be continued to made, would defeat the provision of the 2013 Act. Contracts entered into by the State under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, prima-facie, violate Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. While the question, whether such of these contracts which are already made are void ab-initio, can only be answered on the Writ Petitions being finally heard, we are satisfied that the State Government should not be permitted, hereinafter, to enter into contracts under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, to purchase lands for construction of irrigation projects, without complying with the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions of the 2013 Act, more particularly those stipulated under the Second and Third Schedules thereto. IX. CONCLUSION: In the light of what we have held hereinabove, G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015, issued in the exercise of executive power of the State Government under Article 298 of the Constitution of India, can be applied for voluntary purchase of land by the State from willing land owners. However, as the 2013 Act confers certain rights and extends several benefits to the affected families (other than land owners also), clause (b) of the proviso to Article 298 of the Constitution disables the State Government from applying G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 to voluntarily purchase lands for irrigation projects as it would deny the marginalized sections of society, who are dependent upon these lands of the land owners for their survival, of the rights conferred on them by the 2013 Act, more particularly those under Schedules II and III thereof. Pending disposal of these Writ Petitions, the State Government shall, henceforth, not purchase lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 for the public purpose of construction of irrigation projects. Pending disposal of these Writ Petitions, the State Government shall, henceforth, not purchase lands under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015 for the public purpose of construction of irrigation projects. It is made clear that this Order shall not preclude the respondents from acquiring lands under the 2013 Ad: on complying with the conditions stipulated therein for rehabilitation and resettlement of all the affected families, other than those land owners whose lands have already been purchased by the State Government under G.O. Ms. No. 123 dated 30.07.2015. All these W.P.M. Ps. are, accordingly, disposed of. Disposed off