JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mehta, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Sharma, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In present petition the petitioner has challenged order dated 19.2.2007 passed by learned Labour Court in Recovery Application No. 126 of 2001 whereby learned Labour Court directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 50,539.50 to the claimant with interest @ 6% from the date of application. 3. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and submissions of learned advocates for the petitioner and respondent that the respondent herein was employee of the petitioner i.e. Gujarat Mineral and Development Corporation Limited ('Corporation' for short). While the respondent was in service with the corporation, the corporation had introduced Voluntary Retirement Scheme ('VRS' for short). The respondent herein opted for VRS and tendered his resignation and sought benefit of said scheme. The resignation tendered by the respondent in response to VRS was accepted by the corporation and he was granted benefit under VRS. Sometime after he was relieved from service upon finalization and implementation of VRS qua respondent, he raised demand against the corporation on the ground that the corporation had not calculated amount payable under VRS in accordance with terms of VRS and consequently corporation paid less amount to him than what was payable as per terms of VRS. On such basis the claimant demanded balance amount from the corporation. The corporation declined to pay any other amount to the claimant on the ground that amount payable in accordance with terms of the VRS is already paid and any other amount is not payable under the terms of VRS. In this background the respondent herein filed Recovery Application under Section 33(C-2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "I.D. Act") wherein he contended that according to terms of VRS the corporation should have paid Rs. 2,03,806.50 whereas corporation paid Rs. 1,46,067/- and that therefore he is entitled to receive further amount payable in accordance with terms of VRS. With such allegations and on the said premise the respondent herein claimed Rs. 57,739.50. The respondent filed said Recovery Application somewhere in October 2001. 2,03,806.50 whereas corporation paid Rs. 1,46,067/- and that therefore he is entitled to receive further amount payable in accordance with terms of VRS. With such allegations and on the said premise the respondent herein claimed Rs. 57,739.50. The respondent filed said Recovery Application somewhere in October 2001. 3.1 The corporation opposed the application on various grounds including the ground that the recovery application is not maintainable and that the application is barred by limitation and therefore application does not deserve to entertained and that the claimant has not disclosed correct and complete facts and therefore, application is not maintainable. The corporation also contended that the claimant accepted VRS and that therefore employer - employee relationship does not exist between the parties and consequently the claimant is not entitled to file recovery application under Section 33(C-2) of I.D. Act and that therefore the application is not maintainable. 3.2 Learned Labour Court considered rival submissions and material on record and after detailed and proper consideration learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the application is maintainable and the claimant is entitled to receive Rs. 50,539.50 and that therefore learned Labour Court passed award with abovementioned directions. 4. Mr. Mehta, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation submitted that the impugned order is unjust and arbitrary and contrary to evidence on record and impugned order therefore, deserves to be set aside. He further submitted that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the claimant had suppressed material facts and that therefore application should not have been entertained. Mr. Mehta, learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the claimant had filed application after about 5 years and in view of said delay the application was barred and therefore not maintainable and learned Labour Court should have rejected the application on said ground. He submitted that since the claimant had opted for VRS and tendered resignation and relationship of employer - employee did not survive at the time when the claimant filed application and therefore the application could not have been entertained by the learned Labour Court. He further submitted that the amount payable to the claimant in accordance with terms of VRS was paid and that therefore also the application should not have been entertained. He further submitted that the amount payable to the claimant in accordance with terms of VRS was paid and that therefore also the application should not have been entertained. According to learned advocate for the petitioner the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the contentions and committed error in entertaining and allowing application and that therefore the petition may be allowed and order may be set aside. 5. Mr. Sharma, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error and the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. He submitted that the corporation did not pay the amount payable in accordance with terms of the VRS and that therefore the corporation was obliged and bound to pay shortfall in the amount payable to the claimant. He submitted that according to terms and conditions of the VRS the claimant should have been paid Rs. 2,03,806.50 however Corporation paid only Rs. 1,46,067/- and that therefore there was shortfall of Rs. 57,739.50/- which the corporation was obliged and bound to pay in view of the terms of VRS. He submitted that the learned Labour Court, considered terms of VRS and the length of service of the claimant and the last drawn salary of the claimant and after taking into account provision under VRS, learned Labour Court calculated the amount which would be payable to the claimant in accordance with terms of VRS and after learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the corporation had not paid full amount which would be payable according to terms of VRS and that therefore learned Labour Court passed direction to pay the amount of shortfall and the objection by the petitioner against said direction are baseless and unjustified. He submitted that the petition may be rejected. 6. I have considered rival submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner and respondent. I have also considered material available on record as well as impugned order. 6.1 So far as the contention on ground of delay is concerned it is necessary to note that I.D. Act and more particularly Section 33 (C-2) of the I.D. Act does not prescribe period of limitation for filing application under the said provision. I have also considered material available on record as well as impugned order. 6.1 So far as the contention on ground of delay is concerned it is necessary to note that I.D. Act and more particularly Section 33 (C-2) of the I.D. Act does not prescribe period of limitation for filing application under the said provision. Any period of limitation is not prescribed under the Act and that therefore it cannot be said that the application was hit by limitation and was barred on ground of delay and it could not have been entertained by the learned Labour Court. The scheme of VRS was introduced by the corporation during period between March 1995 to June 1995 and the claimant's case for VRS was accepted by the corporation w.e.f. 31.12.1995. The claimant, thereafter, filed recovery application in 2001 i.e. after about 5 years. Learned Labour Court considered said aspect and also took into account the fact that neither special provision i.e. Section 33 (C-2) of the I.D. Act or Industrial Disputes Act prescribe any period of limitation and that therefore it cannot be held that the application was barred by limitation and could not have been entertained by the learned Labour Court. In light of the facts of present case, the delay caused in filing the application is not fatal or it did not render the claim "dead or stale claim". 7. Having considered said aspect learned Labour Court entertained the application and decided the application on merits. In that view of the matter and in absence of any provision prescribing limitation for filing recovery application, objection by the petitioner cannot be sustained. 8. The petitioner corporation has assailed impugned award and it had opposed the application on the ground that the claimant had suppressed material facts. 8.1 When the Court inquired from learned advocate for the petitioner as to the details of so called "material facts" which were allegedly suppressed by the claimant, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the claimant suppressed that the corporation had paid Rs. 1,41,600/- as payment under VRS however claimant had suppressed the said fact. 8.1 When the Court inquired from learned advocate for the petitioner as to the details of so called "material facts" which were allegedly suppressed by the claimant, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the claimant suppressed that the corporation had paid Rs. 1,41,600/- as payment under VRS however claimant had suppressed the said fact. 8.2 If the claimant had actually suppressed "material facts" i.e. the fact about the payment made by the corporation or if he had intention to suppress the fact about the payment received by him then he would have demanded entire amount payable under VRS and he will not have demanded only shortfall. 8.3 The said contention by the petitioner overlooks factual aspect emerging from the award as well as from plain reading of the recovery application. Actually claimant based its recovery application on the premise that the amount paid to claimant was less than the amount which should have been paid in accordance with terms of VRS. The claimant contended that actually, the corporation should have paid Rs. 2,03,806.50 however corporation had paid Rs. 1,46,067/- and thereby he is entitled for the shortfall. 8.4 On plain reading of memo of recovery application it comes out that the claimant had actually mentioned all details about payment made by corporation and the amount which he was actually entitled for. Thus, it cannot be said that the claimant suppressed material fact more particularly the fact related to the payment which was already made to the claimant. 9. Under the circumstances, the contention/objection against application on ground of alleged suppression of material facts is not sustainable and deserves to be rejected. Consequently, said contention/objection is rejected. 10. So far as contention by the petitioner on the ground that after the claimant opted for VRS relationship of employer-employee did not exit and therefore claimant cannot be considered workman and consequently application would not have maintainable is concerned, it is relevant to take into account Section 33-C and Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. 10. So far as contention by the petitioner on the ground that after the claimant opted for VRS relationship of employer-employee did not exit and therefore claimant cannot be considered workman and consequently application would not have maintainable is concerned, it is relevant to take into account Section 33-C and Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. The said provisions read thus:- "Section 33-C Recovery of money due from an employer- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter VA or Chapter VB], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months:] 2 Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] "2(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.]" 11. On plain reading of said definition of the term Section 2(s) it comes out that even a person who is dismissed or discharged or retrenched from service is also included within the definition of the terms 'workman' and that therefore the said contention cannot be sustained. On plain reading of said definition of the term Section 2(s) it comes out that even a person who is dismissed or discharged or retrenched from service is also included within the definition of the terms 'workman' and that therefore the said contention cannot be sustained. 11.1 On the other hand Section 33-C employs the term "any workman" and the said Section further provides that if "is entitled to receive from employer any money", then such amount can be claimed under Section 33-C. Section 33-C91) goes a step further and provides, inter alia, that such amount can be claimed by him or "any other person authorized by him". 11.2 Meaning thereby an application under said provision would be maintainable for claiming any amount due and payable in respect of the period during which the claimant worked as "workman" with the opponent who-during said period was his employer and the claim amount became payable during the period when the claimant and the opponent (in the application) were engaged in "employer - and - employee" relationship for such claim/amount. 12. When Section 33-C of the Act is examined it becomes clear that the said section provides remedy for recovery of the amount payable by the employer to the workman. Subs-section (1) of Section 33-C employs expression "any workman" and provides that when the workman is entitled to receive "any money" from the employer then such amount can be claimed under said provision. 12.1 From the language of said provision it becomes clear that the scope of the provision is not restricted to the claim by a person who continue to be and is still in the employment with the opponent employer. 12.2 It is necessary to keep in focus that the said summary procedure for recovery of dues of workman is provided for so that after having succeeded in reference proceedings and/or despite having existing and crystallized right and claim against employer the workman may not have to take recourse to ordinary civil proceeding (other civil remedy available under Civil Law). The legislature has, with said object, after having included discharged or dismissed or retrenched employees within purview of Section 2(s) of the Act, not restricted the remedy under Section 33-C of the Act for the workman who continue to be in employment. The legislature has, with said object, after having included discharged or dismissed or retrenched employees within purview of Section 2(s) of the Act, not restricted the remedy under Section 33-C of the Act for the workman who continue to be in employment. There is nothing in the section which indicates that only those employees who are in service can avail the remedy. The expression "any money" which is employed in the section widens the scope of the provision and includes and takes in its fold entire crystallized claim (based on existing right) of the workman for amount which was payable while he was in employment and/or which became payable on his termination and/or which, though payable while he was in service, remained unpaid until his employment came to end. The expression "any workman" would take in its fold both ex-workman as well as present workman. If the contention of the petitioner corporation is accepted and entertained, then it would encourage unscrupulous employer to withhold payment of amounts due and payable to the workman till the time when his service comes to end either on retirement or dismissal or retrenchment. Illustratively, unscrupulous employer may withhold the payment of wages during last 5-6 months of petitioner's service before he retires on superannuation and then oppose the application under Section 33-C of the Act on the ground that the said remedy cannot be invoked by the applicant who is not in the employment and the applicant should avail ordinary civil remedy for enforcing the recovery of unpaid wages. Such contention militates against the object of the provision and would frustrate the purpose of the provision. Apparently that is not object of the provision. Actually, to avoid such difficulty for the workman, the said provision is introduced. In this view of the matter the petitioner's contention deserves to be rejected. 13. Learned advocate for the petitioner also contended that the claimant could have taken out proceedings under Section 10 of the Act and the claim could not have entertained under Section 33(C-2) of the Act. 14. Even the said contention is misconstrued and unsustainable. In present case the claimant had existing right in view of VRS which was introduced by the employer. The VRS is a special contract/agreement entered into by the employer - employee. 14. Even the said contention is misconstrued and unsustainable. In present case the claimant had existing right in view of VRS which was introduced by the employer. The VRS is a special contract/agreement entered into by the employer - employee. By virtue of the said contract/agreement the employer was obliged to pay amount in accordance with terms and conditions of said VRS and that therefore, in the event the workman who offered resignation by opting for VRS, the employer was obliged to pay full and complete amount in accordance with terms of VRS. 14.1 If there is shortfall in payment then it would amount to breach of terms of VRS which would give rise to right and claim in favour of the workman to claim such shortfall in amount payable as per claim (i.e. contract/agreement). This would amount to existing right and crystallized claim, if such amount is not paid by the employer. 15. In such cases only question which would arise before learned Labour Court would be to calculate amount payable in accordance with the scheme and to compare the amount actually paid to claimant with the said amount i.e. with the amount payable in accordance with terms of VRS. The learned Labour Court would not be required to decide any lis or any dispute between the parties and/or learned Labour Court would not be required to adjudicate any dispute or right between the parties. The only process which would be involved in deciding the application would be calculation of the amount payable to the applicant as against the amount actually paid to the claimant. Differently put, only arithmetic calculation would be required for deciding recovery application and that therefore the contention on the ground that the claimant should have raised dispute under Section 10 of the Act for enforcing his claim for the shortfall or the difference between the amount paid to him and what was actually payable, is not sustainable and deserves to be rejected. 16. Foregoing discussion leaves last contention by the petitioner i.e. that the claimant was not entitled for any other amount than what was paid to the claimant. 17. 16. Foregoing discussion leaves last contention by the petitioner i.e. that the claimant was not entitled for any other amount than what was paid to the claimant. 17. In this context it is relevant to note that the learned Labour Court took into account the terms and conditions of VRS and learned Labour Court also took into account total length of service of the claimant and the last salary which was paid to the claimant and the learned Labour Court, having regard to the terms of VRS, also took account the length of service which was still to be completed i.e. which was still in balance before the claimant attained age of superannuation in normal course. Differently put, learned Labour Court took into account all relevant factors which were required to be taken into account for determining quantum of amount payable under VRS. After taking into account said factors and relevant details learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the corporation had paid less amount to the claimant and therefore learned Labour Court directed the corporation to pay Rs. 50,539.50 which, according to the findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court was short-paid to the claimant. 18. When the discussion by learned Labour Court on this count is taken into account in light of the provision under VRS, it comes out that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in calculating the amount which would be payable in accordance with the terms of VRS and/or in determining the amount which was short-paid by the corporation to the claimant. 18.1 The finding of fact and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court do not suffer from any error or infirmity. The process of calculation undertaken by the learned Labour Court is in consonance with the terms of the VRS and the final result i.e. quantum of the amount payable to the claimant which is determined by the learned Labour Court does not warrant any interference. 19. Learned advocate for the petitioner failed to point out any error in the calculation. Actually it is not the case even of the corporation that the Court misconstrued the terms of VRS and/or that the Court committed error in application of the terms and in calculating the amount according to the terms of VRS. 20. Under the circumstances, there is no justification to disturb the order passed by learned Labour Court. Actually it is not the case even of the corporation that the Court misconstrued the terms of VRS and/or that the Court committed error in application of the terms and in calculating the amount according to the terms of VRS. 20. Under the circumstances, there is no justification to disturb the order passed by learned Labour Court. The learned advocate for the petitioner failed to make out any ground in support of his contention that the learned Labour Court committed error in passing impugned order. Therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected. Accordingly the petition is hereby rejected. Rule is discharged. Orders accordingly