Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 181 (ORI)

Nilambar Patel v. State of Orissa

2017-02-17

S.N.PRASAD, SANJU PANDA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Sanju Panda, J. 1. The instant Criminal Appeal is against the judgment dtd. 23.07.1994 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in S.T. Case No. 226 of 1993 whereby and where under the sole appellant has been convicted for the offences U/s. 302, 307, 325 of the Indian Penal Code and accordingly sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for his conviction U/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 4 years rigorous imprisonment for his conviction U/s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years for his conviction U/s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code with a direction that the sentences are to run concurrently. 2. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties in detail and gone through the materials available on record. 3. The brief history of the case is that on 26.07.1993 at about 10.30 A.M. Somnath Sahoo, P.W. 3 went to Rajgangpur Court from his residence at Jampali to attend his duty as he was working as Assistant Court Sub-Inspector of Police in the Rajgangpur judicial Court. His wife Sachibati kalo, P.W. 2 also left her house in order to attend her duties as she was working as a teacher in Jampali U.P. School. P.W. 2 had one daughter aged about 2 years, namely, Rasmita Sahoo and she left her at the residence under the care of her brother-in-law who has been examined as P.W. 1. P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 were residing in a rented house belonging to one Bhika Kispatta. The accused Nilmbar Patel, appellant herein, was working then as a teacher in Sargipali Primary School. He was very often coming to the house of P.W. 2 and also was taking food in her house, thus, the accused-appellant, had acquaintance with the family of P.W. 2, Smt. Sachibati Kalo. On the date of occurrence, at about 10.30 A.M. to 11 A.M., the appellant came to the house of the informant, took his niece and the informant followed him behind, thereafter the appellant hold both the legs of the deceased, the niece of P.W. 1 and dashed her head against the wall of the dwelling house, as a result the niece of the informant lost her sense and then the appellant threw her on the ground and went away. The informant gave water to her niece, but she died. The informant gave water to her niece, but she died. The informant informed the matter to the villagers, the villagers came and the informant left her niece in the custody of one Kalo and went to the School to inform the matter to P.W. 2. P.W. 1 found that P.W. 2 was lying on the ground unconscious and then he was informed about the assault made by the appellant to P.W. 2. He lodged oral information at the police station, which was reduced in writing by the police, subsequently treated as F.I.R. having been registered for the offence U/s. 307, 452 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code. Police has taken up investigation and in course thereof the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station submitted charge-sheet U/s. 302, 307, 325 of the Indian Penal Code and U/s. 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 4. Prosecution in order to substantiate the charges has examined 14 witnesses, out of which P.W. 1 is the informant who was very much present at the time when the appellant dashed head of the deceased on the wall making her senseless and thereafter threw her on the ground. He proved the F.I.R. marked as Ext. 1 and his signature marked as Ext. 1/1. He has supported the prosecution story. He was cross-examined at length by the defence lawyer but nothing substantial has been brought out to discredit his evidence. P.W. 2, Sachibati Kalo, the mother of the deceased, who was working as a School teacher at Jampali U.P. School, deposed that the deceased was her daughter and on her going to school to attend her duties, she left her daughter in the custody of P.W. 1. Her husband had also gone to attend his duties in the judicial court of Rajgangpur. She has also deposed that while she along with some other members of the village were discussing how to solve the problem of shortage of accommodation for the students of Kanyashram, the appellant suddenly came to the school and gave a blow on her head with a Kathafalia (fire wood) bringing it from Class Room No. 1. The appellant also told that he had already killed her daughter and he would also kill her, saying so, the appellant wanted to give another blow which struck on her left hand. The appellant also told that he had already killed her daughter and he would also kill her, saying so, the appellant wanted to give another blow which struck on her left hand. Another Mistress of the School, examined as P.W. 4 also tried to check the blow of Kathafalia but she sustained fracture injury due to such blow. She has stated that P.W. 1 told her that the appellant dashed the head of her deceased daughter in a wall, as a result, she died. She was cross-examined but nothing substantial was brought out from her mouth so as to discredit her evidence. P.W. 3, namely Somnath Sahoo, the father of the deceased has stated that he was on his duty in the judicial court of Rajgangpur at the relevant time of occurrence and was informed by one Constable of Rajgangpur Police Station that a teacher of Jampali School has murdered his daughter and also assaulted his wife. Magrita Kujur, a Mistress at Jampali School, has been examined as P.W. 4, she has deposed that the appellant came to the school at 11.30 A.M. and went to Class Room No. I and brought out a kathafalia and suddenly assaulted on the head of P.W. 2 saying that he had already killed her daughter and that he would also kill her. When the appellant wanted to give another blow by means of that kathafalia to P.W. 2, both P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 raised their left hands to ward of the blows, as a result of which both P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 sustained injuries on their person. P.W. 4 sustained fracture injury. One Gamhei Lekra was examined as P.W. 5 who is a post-occurrence witness, who came to the school along with one Harman, proves seizure of blood stained earth and sample earth vide seizure list Ext. 2. P.W. 6 is one of the teachers in Kanyashram School of Jampali who proves the assault by the appellant on the head of P.W. 2. 2. P.W. 6 is one of the teachers in Kanyashram School of Jampali who proves the assault by the appellant on the head of P.W. 2. P.W. 7 is Gajendra Majhi who happens to be the Chairman of Jampali School, he deposed that while the Managing Committee of Kanyashram School was sitting to discuss about the accommodation problem of the students, the appellant suddenly appeared, they requested him to sit and after sitting for a minute or so, he went away to Class Room No. I, brought out one Kathafalia and told P.W. 2 that he had already killed her baby and that he would also kill her, so saying, the appellant gave a kathafalia blow on the head of P.W. 2 and while the appellant was attempting to give another blow, it was warded of by P.W. 4, as a result, P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 sustained injuries on their person. He identified the kathafalia marked M.O.I. He proves seizure of some broken bangles, blood stained earth and wearing apparels of appellant under seizure list marked as Ext. 3 and also proves the inquest report marked as Ext. 4. P.W. 8, Tapanidhi Naik who happens to be the headmaster of Jampali school, proved the assault on P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 with a kathafalia by the appellant and he snatched away the kathafalia from the hands of the appellant and thereafter he and others removed the injured to the hospital where he saw the dead body of the child of P.W. 2. 5. The trial court, on close scrutiny of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of the appellant recorded U/s. 313 Cr.P.C., has found the guilt proved against the appellant without any reasonable doubt. The trial court has disbelieved the defence plea that at the time of occurrence the appellant was in the stage of insanity. The judgment passed by the trial court is before us for its scrutiny. We, after going through the record as also the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and other materials available, have considered the case of the prosecution, plea of the defence and the finding given by the trial court. The judgment passed by the trial court is before us for its scrutiny. We, after going through the record as also the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and other materials available, have considered the case of the prosecution, plea of the defence and the finding given by the trial court. We have gone through the deposition of P.W. 1 who is the eye witness to the occurrence regarding death of Rasmita Sahoo, the daughter of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, he has supported the case in his examination-in-chief, he has been cross-examined at length but nothing substantial has come out to discredit his statement which he has given in his examination-in-chief. We have gone through the deposition of P.W. 2, who is mother of the deceased, a two years child, who supported the prosecution version by corroborating it with the deposition of P.W. 1. We have also gone through the deposition of P.W. 4 who is a Mistress in the same school where P.W. 2 is a teacher, she has also stated in her deposition regarding the allegation of assault made by the appellant upon P.W. 2 and while in course of defending P.W. 2, P.W. 4 has also sustained serious injuries. We have found from the record that P.W. 4 is an independent witness to the occurrence taken place in the school. P.W. 6 is one of the teachers in Kanyashram School, Jampali, who has also proved the assault by the appellant on the head of P.W. 2 and heard the noise of the appellant who had said that he had already killed her baby and that he would also kill her. This version has also been supported by P.W. 8 who happens to be the headmaster of the Jampali Primary School and proves the assault on P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 with a kathafalia by the appellant. He also stated that he had snatched away the kathafalia from the hands of the appellant and thereafter he and others removed the injured to the hospital. 6. He also stated that he had snatched away the kathafalia from the hands of the appellant and thereafter he and others removed the injured to the hospital. 6. The appellant has taken the plea of insanity in course of trial and to that effect his wife has been examined as P.W. 13, who has stated that the mental condition of her husband was not good during the period of his stay with her and for that she has also consulted with a doctor since he was behaving abnormally at that time and the doctor had advised her to get her husband treated by a Psychiatrist. We, before examining the defence version regarding insanity of the appellant, have thought it proper to discuss the provisions as contained in Section 105 of the Evidence Act, which reads as follows: "When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." A bare reading of section 105 of the Evidence Act stipulates that whenever a plea of General Exception, such as, insanity, is raised, the burden of proving the plea would lie on the accused. This striking feature of Section 105, however, lies in the words, "the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." The effect of raising 'presumption', as envisaged by Section 105, is that when an accused takes the plea of insanity, the Court shall presume that he was sane and not insane. The law requires prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The standard of proof, in criminal cases, is, therefore, proof beyond reasonable doubt. This principle is an off shoot of the principle that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. It is, therefore, not, ordinarily, open to the prosecution to prove its case to a certain point and, thereafter, urge the Court to presume the circumstances, which raise an inference about the guilt of the accused. Section 105 gives to an accused opportunity to discharge the burden, placed on him by Section 105, to the extent of rebutting the presumption only. Section 105 gives to an accused opportunity to discharge the burden, placed on him by Section 105, to the extent of rebutting the presumption only. Undoubtedly, rebutting of presumption is lighter, or easier, than proving a case beyond reasonable doubt, in this respect reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijayee Singh and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 190 wherein their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 33 have been pleased to hold that the general burden of establishing the guilt of accused is always on the prosecution and it never shifts. Even in respect of the cases covered by Section 105 the prosecution is not absolved of its duty of discharging the burden. The accused may raise a plea of exception either by pleading the same specifically or by relying on the probabilities and circumstances obtaining in the case. He may adduce the evidence in support of his plea directly or rely on the prosecution case itself or, as stated above, he can indirectly introduce such circumstances by way of cross-examination and also rely on the probabilities and the other circumstances. Then the initial presumption against the accused regarding non-existence of the circumstances in favour of his plea gets displaced and on an examination of the material if a reasonable doubt arises the benefit of it should go to the accused. The accused can also discharge the burden under section 105 by preponderance of probabilities in favour of his plea. In case of general exceptions, special exceptions, proviso contained in the Penal Code or in any law defining the offence, the court, after due consideration of the evidence in the light of the above principles, if satisfied, would state, in the first instance, as to which exception the accused is entitled to, then see whether he would be entitled for a complete acquittal of the offence charged or would be liable for a lesser offence and convict him accordingly. The provision as contained in Section 105 of the Evidence Act thus speaks of burden of an accused to prove the fact that he is coming under the exception and only then the benefit of exception from the general principle can be awarded in favour of the accused. 7. The provision as contained in Section 105 of the Evidence Act thus speaks of burden of an accused to prove the fact that he is coming under the exception and only then the benefit of exception from the general principle can be awarded in favour of the accused. 7. We have examined the defence version regarding insanity of the appellant and gone through the depositions as well as the relevant records and from its close scrutiny, we have found that the plea of insanity has never been taken in course of investigation, rather it has been taken for the first time in course of trial and to that effect the evidence has also been led by examining the wife of the appellant as P.W. 13. Her statement has closely been scrutinized by the trial court in the judgment, disbelieving it for the reason that merely by saying about the mental status of a person without any document to substantiate the same cannot be said to be proved for the purpose of accepting the plea of insanity to take this ground that whatever occurrence has been committed by the appellant, he was not in the sound state of mental condition, but it is settled that the oral statement must be supported by documentary evidence, what we have gathered from the record that no such document has ever been produced by the defence in support of his plea, moreover, the defence witness has also been examined and he has also not stated regarding the mental status of the appellant. Even in the statement recorded U/s. 313 of the Cr.P.C. the appellant has answered all the questions with all sincerity and with due application of mind. We have also gathered that the appellant was all along present in the trial and no such plea has ever been taken by the defence so that court can also examine the mental status of the appellant. We have also gathered that the appellant was all along present in the trial and no such plea has ever been taken by the defence so that court can also examine the mental status of the appellant. The trial court has never witnessed anything wrong in the mental status of the accused - appellant, reason being that no such plea has ever been taken and in course of trial this plea has been taken which has been disbelieved by the trial court by rejecting the statement made by P.W. 13, the wife of the appellant by saying that P.W. 13 herself has stated in her deposition that she was not staying with her husband at the time of occurrence as she was serving as a teacher. It has further been observed that even the investigating officer, P.W. 12 has not stated anything about the mental condition of the appellant. The trial court has recorded the evidence of P.W. 14, namely Hrusikesh Panigrahi, the Inspector-in-Charge of Rajgangpur Police Station who has written the F.I.R., read over the contents to the informant, who admitted the same to be correct and gave his signature, Ext. 1 is the F.I.R., Ext. 1/1 is the signature of P.W. 1 and Ext. 1/2 is the endorsement of the Inspector-in-Charge of Rajgangpur Police Station. The trial court has also disbelieved the plea of insanity on the ground that the appellant has taken this plead but no question has been put to the doctor about the mental condition of the appellant and the doctor opines that the accused - appellant was not in normal condition because of multiple injuries sustained by him, but certainly not on insanity. We have examined the plea of insanity which has been taken in the instance case and have found that the appellant has not been able to prove the plea of insanity at the time of occurrence, even the P.W. 13 who is the wife of the appellant, although has stated regarding the mental status of the appellant, but in her deposition she has admitted that at the time of occurrence she was not residing with her husband and as such on her deposition it cannot be derived that at the time of occurrence, the appellant was in the unsoundness of his mental status. 8. 8. The trial court, after taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, has disbelieved the plea of insanity having been taken by the appellant in course of trial. We have gathered from the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 who have supported the prosecution case without any contradiction in their statements, even minor, as such we are also in agreement with the finding recorded by the trial court regarding proof of guilt which led the trial court to convict the appellant for the offences U/s. 302, 307, 325 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, we found no reason to interfere with the judgment impugned. In the result the instant appeal is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed