JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Heard Sri Dilip Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Vinod Kant, the learned Additional Advocate General who appears for the respondent No. 1. 2. This application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) seeks to question the correctness of an order dated 24 July 2017 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge during the course of a trial relating to Sessions Trial No. 11 of 2014 and prays for its consequential quashing invoking the inherent powers of this Court. By means of the said order an application moved on behalf of the accused for production of a video compact disc [C.D.] regarding an alleged video recording of the statement of the prosecutrix has come to be rejected. The trial Court has noted that despite repeated requests, the CD was not produced. It has also noted the statement of PW-8, who is stated to have submitted that the said CD is neither available in the police station concerned nor is it available in the “malkhana”. In view thereof the Court below has proceeded to record that the CD is not available with the police and consequently noted the impossibility of granting the prayers made in the application moved by the applicant-accused. 3. Sri Dilip Kumar, learned counsel appearing in support of this application, has taken the Court through the statement of the prosecutrix as well as of PW-8 to highlight a position of contradictions which appears and come to the fore in light of the fact while at one stage it is asserted that the statement of the prosecutrix was videographed during the course of which she is alleged to have named four persons who committed the offence upon on her, at a subsequent stage the prosecutrix proceeds to take the position that she took no such names. On the other hand he refers to the statement of PW-8 who asserts that a video recording of her statement was made and thereafter proceeds to state that the prosecutrix had submitted that she was not raped by the accused. It is in this backdrop, in the submission of Sri Kumar, that the video recording of the statement of the prosecutrix assumes significance. It is in this backdrop, in the submission of Sri Kumar, that the video recording of the statement of the prosecutrix assumes significance. It was his submission that the failure on the part of the prosecution to produce the same has caused prejudice to the accused and it is apparent that crucial evidence has been withheld as a consequence of which the provisions of Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, 1872 (1872 Act) would stand attracted. Sri Kumar also referred to the provisions of Section 65-B of the 1872 Act to submit that the production of the C.D. alongwith a certificate is an issue which would have arisen only after its production in Court. 4. The learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that the order in question is clearly interlocutory in character and causes no prejudice to the accused. It was his submission that the Court below in light of the stand taken by the prosecution that the video C.D. was not available was left with no option but to reject the application. In his submission the impact of non-production of the C.D., if any, is something which would fall for consideration and deliberation at the time of final hearing and in the course of trial. In view thereof it was his submission that the challenge is misconceived and the application is liable to be dismissed. 5. At the very outset let be noted that the impugned order although described by Sri Kumar as being one which may be termed as “intermediate”, does not rule upon the merits of the issues which stand raised or which may be raised during the course of the trial. It is these “non substantive” orders in respect of which the Supreme Court on more than one occasion has held that the power of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not liable to be invoked or exercised so as to circumvent the prohibition placed by Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. Evidently the order impugned is clearly interlocutory in character and does not decide any matter of moment. It also cannot be characterised as one which causes gross injustice or amounts to an abuse of process. It also cannot be characterised as one which causes gross injustice or amounts to an abuse of process. As the decisions of the Supreme Court bid us to bear in mind, the inherent powers of the Court conferred by Section 482 are liable to invoked in extremely rare cases where the Court finds that grave injustice has been perpetuated. The present foray clearly does not fall within the exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court in this respect. In order to highlight that such applications questioning orders which are purely interim in character and whose impact upon the trial is an issue which can be clearly agitated at the time of final hearing or even in appeal are clearly misconceived, the Court deems it apposite to reproduce the following observations as they appear in a recent decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., 2017 SCC Online 766, Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of 2017, decided on 13 July, 2017. Three learned Judges of the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire body of precedent on the above issue held : “34.This leads us to another facet of the submission made by learned counsel that even the avenue of proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is barred as far as the appellants are concerned. As held in Amar Nath and with which conclusion we agree, if an interlocutory order is not revisable due to the prohibition contained in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. that cannot be circumvented by resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. There can hardly be any serious dispute on this proposition. 35. What then is the utility of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.? This was considered and explained in Madhu Limaye which noticed the prohibition in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and at the same time the expansive text of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and posed the question: In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? This Court then proceeded to answer the question in the following manner: “In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? This Court then proceeded to answer the question in the following manner: “In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly.” 36. The expanse of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was also discussed in great detail in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal12 in the context of quashing a first information report or a complaint. After giving several illustrations, this Court cautioned that the power available under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be exercised in the “rarest of rare” cases. It was said: “We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 6. The Supreme Court then proceeded to identify by way of example, orders which would clearly fall within the category of a “non substantive nature” and observed : “38. Proceeding on this basis, what is the nature of cases that we are presently dealing with? While in some appeals the order summoning the appellant or the order for framing charges is in question (we have already dealt with these issues), in other appeals the grievance is in respect of: admission and denial of documents under Section 294 of the Cr.P.C. [SLP (Crl) No. 6912 of 2016 - Ashok Daga v. CBI and SLP (Crl) No. 7477 of 2016 - Mukesh Gupta v. CBI]; alteration of charge under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. [SLP (Crl) No. 8391 of 2016 - Mukesh Gupta v. CBI]; joint or single trial under Sections 219 and 220 of the Cr.P.C. [SLP (Crl) No. 8703 of 2016 - Manoj K. Jayaswal v. CBI]; summoning additional accused persons [SLP (Crl) No. 1441 of 2017 - Devendra Darda v. CBI]. A challenge to orders of this non-substantive nature that can be agitated in a regular appeal is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Quite apart from the above and even on merits the Court notes that the trial Court was left with no option but to dismiss the application of the accused in light of the unequivocal stand taken by the prosecution that the video CD was not available. What ultimate impact the non-production of this article would have is something which would clearly not call for a determination by this Court nor does it merit any authoritative pronouncement at this stage especially since the trial Court is still in seisin of the proceedings. This and all other connected issues would fall for determination by the trial Court at the time of final hearing and during the course of the trial proceedings. Accordingly and in light of the above, this Court finds no ground warranting exercise of its inherent powers to interfere with the order impugned. 8. The application is consequently dismissed.