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2017 DIGILAW 1817 (GUJ)

Arvindkumar Vijaykrushna Mahajan v. State of Gujarat

2017-11-29

BIREN VAISHNAV, M.R.SHAH

body2017
JUDGMENT : M.R. SHAH, J Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 12.01.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.16424 of 2016 (Arvindkumar Vijaykmar Mahajan V. State of Gujarat) by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said petition preferred by the appellant herein – original petitioner, the original petitioner – employee has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. The facts leading to the present Letters Patent Appeals in nutshell are as under: 2.1. That the appellant herein – original petitioner who at the relevant time was serving as Assistant Engineer was placed under suspension by order dated 30.07.2009 which was followed by a criminal case lodged against him under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as “P.C. Act”). A complaint came to be lodged against him under the PC Act with ACB Police Station and therefore, he was placed under suspension by order dated 30.07.2009. It appears that thereafter the review of the decision of suspension of the petitioner was done by the authorities and by order dated 04.04.2013, the original petitioner came to be reinstated in service. That thereafter by judgment and order dated 30.07.2014, the original petitioner came to be acquitted in ACB Case No.1 of 2010. Against the said order of acquittal the State has preferred appeal which is pending. It appears that thereafter the appellant herein – original petitioner submitted the application to regularize the period of suspension for the period between 20.05.2009 to 30.04.2013 by submitting that as he has been acquitted by the competent Court, the said period of suspension is required to be regularized. The aforesaid came to be rejected by the authority by observing and stating that what is required to be considered is that at the time of suspension whether he was rightly put under suspension or not. It was also stated that as the appeal against the acquittal is pending before the High Court, on that ground also the period of suspension is not required to be regularized. 2.2. It was also stated that as the appeal against the acquittal is pending before the High Court, on that ground also the period of suspension is not required to be regularized. 2.2. Therefore, the appellant herein – original petitioner preferred the present Special Civil Application before the learned Single Judge for an appropriate order to quash and set aside the order dated 30.07.2016 to the extend the period of suspension i.e. the period between 20.05.2009 to 30.04.2013 was ordered to be adjusted against the admissible leave. That relying upon and considering Rule 70 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Joining Time on Foreign Service etc.) Rules, 2002 and considering the fact that appeal against the order of acquittal is pending before the High Court, by impugned order, has dismissed the aforesaid petition, which has given rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 3. Shri N.K. Majmudar, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant. 3.1. It is vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case more particularly when subsequently the appellant came to be acquitted in the criminal case the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the petition and ought to have directed the respondent authority to regularize the period of suspension from 20.05.2009 to 30.04.2013 and ought to have quashed and set aside the decision of the Department in adjusting the period of suspension from 20.05.2009 to 30.04.2013 against the admissible leave. 3.2. It is further submitted by Shri Majmudar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge has materially erred in not granting the relief as prayed for on the ground that the appeal against the order of acquittal is pending. It is submitted that pendency of appeal against the order of acquittal cannot be a ground not to treat the period of suspension as regularized. 3.3. It is further submitted by Shri Majmudar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivnarayan Chhedilal Gupta vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 3.3. It is further submitted by Shri Majmudar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivnarayan Chhedilal Gupta vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1527 of 2011 (decided on 28-10-2015) that if the contention on behalf of the Department is accepted that what is required to be considered is, whether at the time when the order of suspension was passed, the same was wholly justified or not, in that case, in case where the employee has been exonerated and/or acquitted, the period of suspension will be regularized. Making above submissions and relying upon above decision and relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Rajagopal vs. The Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal and Ors. rendered in Writ Petition No.18949 of 2014, it is requested to admit/allow the present Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Heard Shri Majmudar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Rohan Yagnik, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent State at length. 4.1. At the outset it is required to be noted that as such the prayer of the petitioner to treat the period of suspension for the period between 20.05.2009 to 30.04.2013 as on duty has been rejected by the authority and the same has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge. 4.2. It is the case on behalf of the appellant herein – original petitioner that subsequently as he has been acquitted by the competent Court, the period of suspension is required to be regularized and the same is to be regularized as on duty. It is also the case on behalf of the appellant that pendency of criminal appeal against the order of acquittal cannot be a ground for denying the regularization of period of suspension as on duty. 5. Having heard learned Advocates appearing for respective parties and even considering the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Rajagopal (Supra), mere pendency of an appeal against the order of acquittal cannot be a ground to deny regularization of the period of suspension as on duty. 5. Having heard learned Advocates appearing for respective parties and even considering the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Rajagopal (Supra), mere pendency of an appeal against the order of acquittal cannot be a ground to deny regularization of the period of suspension as on duty. However, at the same time considering Rule 70 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Joining Time on Foreign Service etc.) Rules, 2002 what is required to be considered is whether at the time of suspension the order of suspension was wholly justified or not. Therefore, on fair reading of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 70, where the authority mentioned in sub-Rule (1) is of the opinion that the government employee has been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension that it was wholly unjustified, in that case also the government employee shall be given full pay and allowance to which he would not have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended as the case may be. Therefore, what is required to be considered is whether at the time of suspension the order of suspension was wholly unjustified or not. In case it is found that there was valid reason to suspend the concerned employee and that the order of suspension was justifiable/justified, in that case the period of suspension cannot be treated as on duty and the same is not required to be regularized as on duty. In the present case as at the relevant time the appellant herein – original petitioner employee was facing the criminal proceedings of serious offences under the PC Act and therefore, he was suspended, it cannot be said that the order of suspension was wholly unjustified. Even that does not appear to be the case on behalf of the appellant herein – original petitioner that at the relevant time when the order of suspension was passed, the same can be said to be wholly unjustified. However, the only submission on behalf of the appellant herein – original petitioner that as he has been subsequently acquitted the period of suspension is required to be treated as on duty and the same is required to be regularized accordingly. However, considering sub-Rule (2) of Rule 70 discussed hereinabove, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. However, the only submission on behalf of the appellant herein – original petitioner that as he has been subsequently acquitted the period of suspension is required to be treated as on duty and the same is required to be regularized accordingly. However, considering sub-Rule (2) of Rule 70 discussed hereinabove, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. Only in a case where the order of suspension is found to be wholly unjustified, in that case only the government employee shall be given the full pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended. 5.1. Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivnarayan Chhedilal Gupta (Supra) is concerned, we are of the opinion that the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the case before the Division Bench, the concerned employee was faced with departmental inquiry as well as criminal proceedings also and in both he came to be exonerated. Considering the judgment as a whole it appears that the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that at the time of order of suspension, the suspension was wholly unjustified. It is required to be noted that in para 7, the Division Bench has specifically observed that they are not in disagreement with the proposition of law and the arguments canvassed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader about power conferred upon the competent authority to consider the suspension of deliquent, whether wholly justified or not, when the order of regularizing the period of suspension to be passed. Under the circumstances, the aforesaid decision on facts shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 5.2. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances more particularly Rule 70 and the fact that at the relevant time when the appellant was put under suspension as at the relevant time he was facing the criminal proceedings for the serious offences under the PC Act, it cannot be said that the order of suspension was wholly unjustified. 5.2. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances more particularly Rule 70 and the fact that at the relevant time when the appellant was put under suspension as at the relevant time he was facing the criminal proceedings for the serious offences under the PC Act, it cannot be said that the order of suspension was wholly unjustified. Under the circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition and has rightly confirmed the order passed by the authority to adjust the period of suspension against permissible leave and not accepting the case of the petitioner that the period of suspension is required to be regularized as on duty. 6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present Letters Patent Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.