JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1, 2 & 3 and Mr. A. Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4. 2. This is an appeal by the noticee under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act from the judgment and award dated 29.06.2015 delivered in Title Suit (MAC) No.54 of 2014 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, No.4, West Tripura, Agartala. By the said award, the tribunal has determined the compensation to the extent of Rs.53,99,470/- (Rupees Fifty Three lacs Ninety Nine thousand Four hundred Seventy). The noticee, the appellant herein, has been directed to make payment of the awarded sum within a period of 2(two) months with interest @8% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition, failing which interest at the rate of 9% per annum shall be paid by the said insurance company till the payment is made. 3. There is no controversy that the appellant was not a party but they were notice. Even though the noticee filed an application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act for being impleaded as the party in the proceeding and for raising all defences as available to the owner, but the said application was not allowed by the tribunal. As a result, the status of the appellant remained as that of the notice. In view of the decision of the apex court in United India Insurance Company vs. Shila Datta and others, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 509 , the notice does not have any right to raise, except as provided by the statute. In Shila Datta (supra), the apex court has observed as under: “27. We may next consider the cases where the insurer is only a noticee under section 149(2) and has not been impleaded as a party to the claim proceedings. The basic premises in Nicolletta Rohtagi : (2002) 7 SCC 456 , is that the insurer can contest a motor-accident claim for compensation only on the grounds mentioned in section 149(2) of the Act. The basic premises in Nicolletta Rohtagi : (2002) 7 SCC 456 , is that the insurer can contest a motor-accident claim for compensation only on the grounds mentioned in section 149(2) of the Act. The contention of Insurance Companies is that an Insurer can deny liability under the policy only on the grounds mentioned in section 149(2) of the Act (even though several other grounds may be available under the terms of the policy); and where it does not deny liability or avoid liability under policy of insurance, it can certainly assist the Tribunal in arriving at the just compensation, by contesting any unjust or illegal or erroneous claim by the claimants.” 4. In Shila Datta (supra) the decision of the apex court rendered in Chinnama George vs. N.K. Raju : (2000) 4 SCC 130 has been approved. In Chinnama George (supra), it was enunciated as under: “6. Section 163-A makes special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis and is extracted below: “163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.? * * * 10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death, by the dependant family members) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete Code in itself. It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete Code in itself. We may in this context refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the Tribunals and determination of compensation by Tribunals: (i) A proceedings for award of compensation in regard to a motor accident before the Tribunal can be initiated either on an application for compensation made by the persons aggrieved (claimants) under section 166(1) or section 163A of the Act or suo moto by the Tribunal, by treating any report of accident (forwarded to the tribunal under section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation under section 166 (4) of the Act. (ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo moto initiated by the Tribunal. (iii) In a proceedings initiated suo moto by the tribunal, the owner and driver are the respondents. The insurer is not a respondent, but a noticee under section 149(2) of the Act. Where a claim petition is filed by the injured or by the legal representatives of a person dying in a motor accident, the driver and owner have to be impleaded as respondents. The claimants need not in plead the insurer as a party. But they have the choice of impleading the insurer also as a party respondent. When it is not impleaded as a party, the Tribunal is required to issue a notice under section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is impleaded as a party, it is issued as a regular notice of the proceedings. (iv) The words ‘receipt of an application for compensation' in section 168 refer not only to an application filed by the claimants claiming compensation but also to a suo motu registration of an application for compensation under section 166(4) of the Act on the basis of a report of an accident under section 158(6) of the Act. (v) Though the tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. (v) Though the tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. On receipt of an application (either from the applicant or suo motu registration), the Tribunal gives notice to the insurer under section 149(2) of the Act, gives an opportunity of being heard to the parties to the claim petition as also the insurer, holds an inquiry into the claim and makes an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. (Vide Section 168 of the Act). (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to the assist it in holding the enquiry (vide section 169 of the Act). (vii) The award of the Tribunal should specify the person/s to whom compensation should be paid. It should also specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them. (Vide section 168 of the Act). (viii) The Tribunal should deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within 15 days from the date of the award. (Vide section 168 (2) of the Act). We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.” [Emphasis added] 5. In Chinnama George (supra), it was observed as under: “There is no dispute with the proposition so laid by this apex court. But the insurer cannot maintain a joint appeal along with the owner or the driver if defence on any ground under Section 149(2) is not available to it. In that situation joint appeal will be incompetent. It is not enough if the insurer is struck out from the array of the appellants. The appellate court must also be satisfied that a defence which is permitted to be taken by the insurer under the Act was taken in the pleadings and was pressed before the Tribunal. In that situation joint appeal will be incompetent. It is not enough if the insurer is struck out from the array of the appellants. The appellate court must also be satisfied that a defence which is permitted to be taken by the insurer under the Act was taken in the pleadings and was pressed before the Tribunal. On the appellate court being so satisfied the appeal may be entertained for examination of the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the Tribunal on the question arising from/relating to such defence taken by the insurer If the appellate court is not satisfied that any such question was raised by the insurer in the pleadings and/or was pressed before the Tribunal, the appeal filed by the insurer has to be dismissed as not maintainable.” [Emphasis added] 6. In this case also, no defence has been projected by the appellant under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and as such, this appeal is not maintainable by the notice as they have not permitted to raise other available defences and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Before parting with the records, this court is constrained to observe that the penal interest as imposed by the tribunal @9% for default of making the awarded sum in terms of the impugned judgment and award is unsustainable as the scope of Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not authorize the tribunal to impose such penal interest retrospectively. Accordingly, the said part of the award is interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution for removing the jurisdictional failure. Send down the LCRs forthwith.