JUDGMENT : C.L. SONI, J. This appeal is filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’) against the judgment and order dated 12.3.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar in Sessions Case No. 68 of 2011, whereby the appellant is convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (‘the Penal Code’) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and with further imprisonment of three months on failure to deposit the amount of fine. 2. 10,000/- and with further imprisonment of three months on failure to deposit the amount of fine. 2. As per the case of the prosecution, complainant Premilaben, wife of Gopalsinh Natvarsinh Parmar, lodged complaint on 25.2.2011 with Himmatnagar Town Police Station stating that she has one son and two daughters, out of which Sanjaysinh is eldest, aged 12 years, Artiben, aged 9 years and youngest Parvatiben, aged 6 years; that her son Sanjaybhai and daughter Artiben go to school walking through the field; that on 25.2.2011, her son Sanjay and daughter Artiben and other children left for school in the morning at 7 O'clock and her husband left for his job to Sabar Dairy at 8 O'clock and she alone was at home and doing household work; that at about 12.30 noon, his son Sanjaysinh and children of her elder brother-in-law (Jeth Surajmalsinh) came home from school and therefore, she asked Sanjaysinh as to why Arti did not come, to which Sanjaysinh said that Arti was coming behind with daughter of Ramsinh Becharsinh Thakor but thereafter, since Arti did not come home, she went for search of her daughter Arti and on the way, she found her daughter Arti lying at the corner of the field without any cloth on her body and on seeing blood on her private part, legs and palms of the hands, she shouted and thereafter her brother-in-law Divansinh Natvarsinh Parmar came rushing and they took Arti home, where other family members came and her daughter said that when she was coming back from school, one person, who was sitting on road came behind her and suddenly closed her mouth, lifted her and took her in the field of Castor plants (Erenda) and removed her cloths; at that time, she shouted Grandpa Grandpa (Dada Dada) but nobody came and he committed sinful act and left the place; that her daughter was then taken to Himmatnagar Harsh Hospital from where she was taken to Civil Hospital at Himmatnagar as per the advise of doctor. Such complaint given to the police station was registered as C.R No. 41 of 2011 for offence under Section 376 of the Penal Code and after charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court, the Sessions Court framed charge on 21.11.2011 at Exh.8 under Section 376 of the Penal Code against the appellant. Such complaint given to the police station was registered as C.R No. 41 of 2011 for offence under Section 376 of the Penal Code and after charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court, the Sessions Court framed charge on 21.11.2011 at Exh.8 under Section 376 of the Penal Code against the appellant. The appellant since did not plead guilty, was put to trial. 3. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses, including complainant Premilaben, victim Artiben, Medical Officers, Mamlatdar - the Executive Magistrate who conducted Test Identification parade, the investigating officer, and produced documentary evidence, concerning medical examination of the victim, medical examination of the accused, test identification parade of the accused, opinion of Forensic Science laboratory with serological report etc. After evidence of the prosecution was over, statement of the appellant under Section 313 was recorded. Learned Session Judge on appreciation of the evidence has recorded finding that the prosecution has remained successful in proving the charge against the appellant and that considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it becomes clear that the appellant is involved in the offence of rape and passed impugned order for conviction and sentence. 4. Learned advocate Mr. N.K Majmudar appearing for the appellant submitted that as per the complaint and the evidence of the complainant, victim Arti was left behind and therefore it was not possible either for her brother Sanjay or other children to see who was the person responsible for committing rape on the victim. Mr. Majmudar submitted that without any basis, the appellant was subjected to test identification parade and on mere suspicion, he was involved in the offence of rape. He submitted that as per the evidence of uncle of Sanjay, Sanjay pointed out finger at the appellant while he was with his uncle, however, the prosecution has conveniently not examined Sanjay and there is no other independent evidence for involving the appellant in the offence. Mr. Majmudar submitted that neither the complainant nor the victim has stated in their evidence that Sanjay could find out the accused of crime. He submitted that the test identification parade was not legally held. Six persons who were called to stand with the appellant, were not examined and panchas did not support the holding of TI parade. Mr. Mr. Majmudar submitted that neither the complainant nor the victim has stated in their evidence that Sanjay could find out the accused of crime. He submitted that the test identification parade was not legally held. Six persons who were called to stand with the appellant, were not examined and panchas did not support the holding of TI parade. Mr. Majmudar submitted that as per the testimony of the complainant and the victim herself, the victim was in hospital for 15 days, whereas the test identification parade was carried out within the period of 15 days and therefore it clearly appears that the identification parade was got-up and could not have been relied on. Mr. Majmudar submitted that the conviction is based solely on the statement of the victim and identification parade and there is no other evidence corroborating the identification parade. Mr. Majmudar submitted that in absence of any independent evidence, it could not be said that the prosecution has proved the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Majmudar submitted that on the day of incident the victim was aged 8 years and without deciding whether she understood sanctity of Court proceeding, her evidence was recorded in the Court, which could not have been considered to record conviction against the appellant. Mr. Majmudar submitted that there is contradiction between history before the doctor and the say of the complainant and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant was not trustworthy. Mr. Majmudar submitted that from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the charge of rape against appellant and since the appellant is involved only on the basis of suspicion without any direct evidence, the appellant was required to be given benefit of doubt and was required to be acquitted. Mr. Majmudar submitted that learned Sessions Judge also committed an error in imposing rigorous imprisonment of 10 years as amendment brought in section 376 of the Penal Code will not apply to the case of the appellant. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. L.B Dabhi submitted that the complainant gave her evidence in a natural way and there is no contradiction between the history recorded by the doctor and in her evidence. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. L.B Dabhi submitted that the complainant gave her evidence in a natural way and there is no contradiction between the history recorded by the doctor and in her evidence. He submitted that the victim in her evidence has stated that she fell down at the corner of the field and thereafter her mother came, took her home, gave her water and then took her to the hospital. Such evidence of the victim would show that though she tried to reach home but she fell down at the corner of the field, which fact the mother has stated in her evidence. Mr. Dabhi submitted that the appellant is not involved in the offence simply on suspicion but since the appellant was suspected to be involved in the offence, the police called him on different occasions and ultimately decided to have IT parade, and in the TI parade, the victim could clearly identify the appellant. Mr. Dabhi submitted that there is no reason to doubt either holding of TI parade or drawing of the panchnama of TI parade as the same is supported by the evidence of Executive Magistrate who held the TI parade as also by evidence of the investigating officer. Mr. Dabhi submitted that it is not correct to say that the conviction is based only on TI parade and on the statement of the victim. Mr. Dabhi submitted that the evidence to corroborate the TI parade was led by the prosecution and on appreciating the evidence, learned Sessions Judge has recorded the finding as regards the involvement of the appellant in the offence of rape. Mr. Dabhi submitted that when the victim's evidence was recorded, she was aged 10 years and before she was examined, learned Sessions Judge held the preliminary inquiry to satisfy himself that the victim was competent enough to understand all the questions and give evidence in the case. Mr. Dabhi submitted that when the Court examined the mental level of the victim - child to give evidence in the Court, the evidence of victim - child cannot be brushed aside, especially when she could withstand the cross examination done on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Mr. Dabhi submitted that when the Court examined the mental level of the victim - child to give evidence in the Court, the evidence of victim - child cannot be brushed aside, especially when she could withstand the cross examination done on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Dabhi submitted that the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution has proved the factum as regards the sexual intercourse with the victim and FSL with serological report are strong evidence in corroboration of the TI parade to prove that the appellant has committed offence of rape on the victim. Mr. Dabhi has taken the Court to the medical evidence, FSL report and serological report, panchnama of the TI parade with the evidence of the victim to submit that there is no escape to reach to the conclusion that the appellant has committed the offence of rape. 6. The Court having heard learned advocates and having gone through the evidence on record finds that the prosecution examined the medical officers, namely Dr. Darshana Kantilal Tabadiya-PW1 who first medically examined the victim and Dr. Hetal Manubhai Vasava-Gynecologist, P.W.3 who was called in the Civil Hospital for medical examination of the victim, District Registrar. Dr. Hetal Vasava, found that the victim suffered recent intercourse, her hymen was torn, she was bleeding from wound and injuries and there were blood stains on thigh and around private part of her body. As per the evidence of the complainant-PW 5, she found her daughter lying at the corner of the field with no cloth on her body except one trouser (Lengy) and blood was found on her private part and on palm of the hand and her daughter stated that one unknown person had committed sinful act on her. The victim in her evidence (PW 6) has also given out the facts of committing rape on her by unknown person and of bleeding from her private part and about her falling down at the corner of the field and taking her to home and then to the hospital by her mother. Such evidence of the mother with victim and the medical evidence prove that the rape was committed on the victim. Mr. Majmudar could not dispute that the rape was committed on the victim, however his argument is that the appellant is wrongly involved in the offence of rape. 7. Mr. Such evidence of the mother with victim and the medical evidence prove that the rape was committed on the victim. Mr. Majmudar could not dispute that the rape was committed on the victim, however his argument is that the appellant is wrongly involved in the offence of rape. 7. Mr. Majmudar strenuously contended that just because brother of the victim - Sanjay was stated to have shown finger at the appellant while going on the motorbike with his uncle, as per the evidence of his uncle, the appellant could not have been brought for T.I parade. It is true that Sanjay is not examined as witness but, Divansinh Natvarsinh-PW 13 stated in his evidence that his nephew Sanjay had identified one person who was the appellant later on identified by the victim in the TI parade and also in the Court. In the cross-examination of the investigating officer - Subhashchandra Kirtilal Trivedi-PW 16, the investigating officer has referred to the statement of Sanjaysinh recorded by him, stating that when he went with his uncle Divansinh, he showed one person to his uncle and his uncle called him and asked his name, to which he stated that his name was Harkesh Ranger-the appellant. P.W 16 has further stated in his evidence that the appellant was called for interrogation on different dates from 27.2.2011 onwards. PW-13 Divansinh has stated in his evidence that on his nephew pointing finger to the appellant, he gave information to the police on 27.2.2011 about the appellant. Thus, from the evidence of the investigating officer and of PW-13, it appears that the appellant was called for interrogation by the police, after the information of the appellant was given to the police on 27.2.2011 The appellant was not involved in the offence just on information but was frequently called at Police Station and then he was put to TI parade. The panchnama drawn for TI parade is produced in evidence at Exh.23 It is stated in this panchnama that six persons, whose names are given in the panchnama, were called for TI parade of the appellant. They were asked to stand in line as per their choice and the appellant stood between No. 3 and No. 4. The victim identified the appellant from amongst the persons stood in the line. They were asked to stand in line as per their choice and the appellant stood between No. 3 and No. 4. The victim identified the appellant from amongst the persons stood in the line. Thereafter, the victim was sent outside and the room was closed and the appellant was asked to again select his place amongst those six persons who were called from outside and stood in the line. Again, the victim was called and was asked to identify the accused in presence of the panchas. The victim again identified the appellant. However, the panchas, named Bhat Laljibhai Chelaji-PW 12 and Soni Bhadreshkumar Chimanlal PW-11 turned hostile and have not supported the panchnama in their evidence. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar submitted that when six persons who were called from outside for TI parade, are not examined and when panchas have not supported the panchnama and were declared hostile, it cannot be said that the TI parade was legally held and such TI parade cannot be the basis of conviction of the appellant. The Court finds that though the above panchas have turned hostile, the Executive Magistrate who held the TI parade - Bharatkumar Shankabhai Prajapati PW4, has given his evidence to prove that the TI parade was held on 9.3.2011 and the panchnama was drawn of such TI parade. He has stated in his evidence that he received Yadi from Himmatnagar Town Police Station on 8.3.2011 for holding TI parade and he endorsed on such Yadi for holding the TI parade on 9.3.2011 at 5.30 pm. He has further stated that six persons from outside were called in his chamber for TI parade and the appellant was asked to stand at the place of his choice amongst those six persons and the appellant stood between Nos. 3 and 4 and thereafter, again the appellant was asked to stand at different place of his choice amongst six persons and the appellant then stood at No. 1 from North side. It is further stated by him in his evidence that in both the rounds, in his presence, as also in presence of panchas, the victim identified the appellant. 3 and 4 and thereafter, again the appellant was asked to stand at different place of his choice amongst six persons and the appellant then stood at No. 1 from North side. It is further stated by him in his evidence that in both the rounds, in his presence, as also in presence of panchas, the victim identified the appellant. Though in his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not know as to how the police could bring the appellant upto his chamber, that he has not mentioned in the panchnama that the appellant was brought with face covered (Burkho), that in the panchanma the signatures of dummy persons (six persons) are not taken to show their presence, however, investigating officer PW 16 has stated in his chief-examination that he has given Yadi to the Mamlatdar-Executive Magistrate for doing TI parade of the appellant and as per the time fixed by the Mamlatdar, the appellant was called at the police station and the complainant was made to understand to come with victim to the Mamlatdar office with woman police; that the appellant was brought in Government vehicle by covering his face with black cloth and after presenting him to the chamber of Mamlatdar, he went out and after he received TI parade panchnama from the Mamlatdar, he took the appellant to the police station and since the victim identified the appellant, the panchnama of the body of the appellant was made for making his arrest and thereafter, by calling two panchas, the cloths worn by the appellant at the time of incident, were taken in custody. There was no cross-examination of the Investigating Officer on what he said in his chief-examination concerning TI parade. 8. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. v. Sunil Kumar, reported in (2015) 8 SCC 478 , TI parade is not rule of law but rule of prudence. However, if the conviction is based on TI parade without any other substantive evidence to support the TI parade, the doubt raised against the TI parade may require consideration. But in the present case, the Court does not find that the conviction is based only on TI parade. However, if the conviction is based on TI parade without any other substantive evidence to support the TI parade, the doubt raised against the TI parade may require consideration. But in the present case, the Court does not find that the conviction is based only on TI parade. The victim in her evidence, Exhibit 26 has stated that she was called by the Executive Magistrate and she identified one person standing with six persons and by pointing finger at the accused sitting in the Court, she stated that he was the same person, who was identified by her. Thus, holding of the identification parade by the Executive Magistrate and identifying the appellant in such identification parade is supported by the evidence of the victim. The identification of the appellant by the victim in the Court while giving evidence as witness, is substantive evidence on record which will be in the very nature of the offence could be completely relied on for holding the appellant guilty for the offence of rape. 9. In the case of S. v. Sunil Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-11 to 13 as under: 11. It has consistently been held by this Court that what is substantive evidence is the identification of an accused in court by a witness and that the prior identification in a test identification parade is used only to corroborate the identification in court. Holding of test identification parade is not the rule of law but rule of prudence. Normally identification of the accused in a test identification parade lends assurance so that the subsequent identification in court during trial could be safely relied upon. However, even in the absence of such test identification parade, the identification in court can in given circumstances be relied upon, if the witness is otherwise trustworthy and reliable. The law on the point is well-settled and succinctly laid down in Ashok Debbarma. 12 In the present case the Appellant was subjected to sexual intercourse during broad day light. The fact that she was so subjected at the time and in the manner stated by her, stands proved. Three witnesses had immediately come on the scene of occurrence and found that she was raped. The immediate reporting and the consequential medical examination further support her testimony. The fact that she was so subjected at the time and in the manner stated by her, stands proved. Three witnesses had immediately come on the scene of occurrence and found that she was raped. The immediate reporting and the consequential medical examination further support her testimony. By very nature of the offence, the close proximity with the offender would have certainly afforded sufficient time to imprint upon her mind the identity of the offender. 13. In Malkhansingh v. State of M.P. in a similar situation where identification by prosecutrix for the first time in court was a matter in issue, this Court had observed: “She also had a reason to remember their faces as they had committed a heinous offence and put her to shame. She had, therefore, abundant opportunity to notice their features In fact on account of her traumatic and tragic experience, the faces of the appellants must have got imprinted in her memory, and there was no chance of her making a mistake about their identity.” 10. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar, however, submitted that the victim was minor, aged 10 years when her evidence was recorded and without making her understand sanctity of the Court proceeding, her evidence could not have been recorded and could not have been relied on by the Court for recording the conviction against the appellant. 11. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar relied on the judgment in the case of Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1952 SC 54 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-5 to 9 and para-11 to 13 as under: 5. The first point taken before us related to the admissibility of the evidence of the girl herself. Her age was stated to be seven or eight years at the time of the examination by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge who recorded her testimony. He certified that she did not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her. He did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. 6. He certified that she did not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her. He did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. 6. The proviso to S. 5, Indian Oaths Act, 1873 prescribes that: “Provided that where the witness is a child under twelve years of age, and the Court or person having authority to examine such witness is of opinion that though he understands the duty of speaking the truth he does not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation, the foregoing provisions of this section and the provisions of S. 6 shall not apply to such witness, but in any such case the absence of an oath or affirmation shall not render inadmissible any evidence given by such witness nor affect the obligation of the witness to state the truth.” The question is whether the opinion referred to must be formally recorded or whether it can be inferred from the circumstances in which the deposition was taken. 7. The proviso quoted above must be read along with S. 118, Evidence Act and S. 13, Oaths Act. In my opinion, an omission to administer an oath, even to an adult, goes only to the credibility of the witness and not his competency. The question of competency is dealt with in S. 118. Every witness is competent unless the Court considers he is prevented from understanding the questions put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. It will be observed that there is always competency in fact unless the Court considers otherwise. No other ground of incompetency is given, therefore, unless the Oaths Act adds additional grounds of incompetency it is evident that S. 118 must prevail. 8. Now the Oaths Act does not deal with competency. Its main object is to render persons who give false evidence liable to prosecution. It is true a subsidiary object is to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, but in view of S. 118 these matters only touch credibility and not admissibility. In my opinion, S. 13, Others Act places this beyond doubt. It is true a subsidiary object is to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, but in view of S. 118 these matters only touch credibility and not admissibility. In my opinion, S. 13, Others Act places this beyond doubt. It states: “No omission to take any oath or make any affirmation ……….and no irregularity whatever, in the form in which any one of them is administered, shall invalidate any proceeding or render inadmissible any evidence whatever….” 9. Section 5 is the main provision regarding the administration of oaths. The proviso only sets out the cases in which the oath is not to be administered. If, therefore, an omission to take the oath does not affect the admissibility of the evidence, it follows that an irregularity of the kind we are considering which arises out of the proviso cannot affect the admissibility either. Section 118 remains and unless the Judge considers otherwise the witness is competent. 10. xxx xxx xxx 11. I would add however that it is desirable that Judges and magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that, otherwise the credibility of the witness may be seriously affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether the Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate. In the present case, it is plain that the learned Judge had the proviso in mind because he certified that the witness does not understand the nature of an oath and so did not administer one but despite that went on to take her evidence. It is also an important fact that the accused, who was represented by counsel, did not object. Had he raised the point the Judge would doubtless have made good the omission. I am of opinion that Mt. Purni was a competent witness and that her evidence is admissible. It is also an important fact that the accused, who was represented by counsel, did not object. Had he raised the point the Judge would doubtless have made good the omission. I am of opinion that Mt. Purni was a competent witness and that her evidence is admissible. In the Privy Council case which I have just cited, their Lordships said -“It is not to be supposed that any Judge would accept as a witness a person who he considered was incapable not only of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessity of speaking the truth when examined as a witness.” 12. That is the very point here. One can presume that the learned Judge had that in mind from the fact that he examined the child after referring to a fact which arises out of the proviso. 13. As regards her credibility, the learned trial Judge, who recorded her evidence and saw her in the box, has believed her, so has the High Court; and it is important to note that the learned Sessions Judge who acquitted the accused has not disbelieved her. On the contrary he says he is morally convinced. All he says is that in the absence of corroboration it will be unsafe to convict because the Privy Council and other cases advise corroboration as a matter of prudence. 12. However, the Court finds from the evidence of the victim that before learned Judge started recording the evidence of the victim, he was satisfied that the victim understood importance of giving evidence in the Court and she was administered the oath to give evidence. In her chief-examination, the victim has given out full account of gruesome incident happened with her and she withstood searching cross-examination including on the aspect of TI parade. Thus, she was though aged 10 years, her deposition before the Court would reveal that she understood sanctity of the Court proceeding and was able to give evidence before the Court. When the evidence of minor inspires confidence, there is no reason to discard it from consideration. Thus, learned Sessions Judge has committed no error in relying on evidence of the victim with other evidence for recording conviction against the appellant. 13. In the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh reported in AIR 2016 SC 5160 , relied on by Mr. Thus, learned Sessions Judge has committed no error in relying on evidence of the victim with other evidence for recording conviction against the appellant. 13. In the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh reported in AIR 2016 SC 5160 , relied on by Mr. Majmudar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-22, 23 and 29 as under: 22. It is well-settled that the evidence of a child witness must find adequate corroboration, before it is relied upon as the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law. (See Prakash v. State of M.P, (1992) 4 SCC 225 ; Baby Kandayanathi v. State of Kerala, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 287 ; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341 ; State of U.P v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70 ; Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129 ). 23. However, it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is a found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. [Vide Panchhi v. State of U.P, (1998) 7 SCC 177 ]. 29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. 14. As held in the above judgment in the case of Yojesh Singh (supra), it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that the evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, if the evidence of the child witness found reliable and inspires confidence of the Court simply because such witness is a child is no ground not to rely on his or her evidence. As stated above, the evidence of the victim is reliable and inspires confidence of the Court and there is no reason to doubt her testimony. 15. Over-and-above, the TI parade and identification of the appellant in the Court by the victim, there is also corroborative evidence in the form of FSL report and serological report. As per the FSL report, on the cloths of the victim, presence of blood stain and semen were found and on the cloths i.e. old dirty black colour pant (trouser) of the appellant, presence of semen was found. Similarly, on the inner wear (undergarment) of the appellant, the presence of semen was found. The serological analysis supports the existence of the semen on the cloths of the victim that of the appellant. However, Mr. Majmudar submitted that there is no clarity in the serological report as to whether the semen found on the cloths of the victim would link the same to the accused. However, such arguments of Mr. Majmudar will not carry further in view of the clear evidence of the victim involving the appellant in the offence of rape. 16. In the case of Ravindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2015) 4 SCC 491 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-3, 4, 13 and 14 as under: 3. The findings of the lower Court, as stated in the impugned judgment were that at the time of occurrence the prosecutrix (PW-1) was above 16 years of age. The findings of the lower Court, as stated in the impugned judgment were that at the time of occurrence the prosecutrix (PW-1) was above 16 years of age. PW1 in her statement very categorically made allegation against the present appellant that when she was alone in the agricultural field of the appellant/accused, he came and forcefully caught hold of both her hands, and thereafter removed her clothes and committed rape. Dr. Smt. Vandana Sarkanungo (PW3) did not find any injury on the internal and external part of the prosecutrix (PW1) and opined that prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. In respect of the false implication on the appellant, it has come on record in the statement of Nand Kishore (PW2), who is father of the prosecutrix, that a sum of Rs. 500/- was taken on loan by him from the appellant. But PW1 and PW2 have not deposed that due to the aforesaid reason there was previous enmity between them. The finding on this aspect of the High Court in the impugned judgment was that if there was any enmity, the appellant/accused could not have come to the house of the prosecutrix for inviting her to work in his agricultural field. The appellant/accused was examined by the doctor who found him capable of performing sexual intercourse. Semen was found in the undergarments of the prosecutrix, from the exhibit. 4. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the High Court was of the view that it is well settled that the woman who is a victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime. Her evidence cannot be tested with suspicion as that of an accomplice. As a matter of fact her evidence is similar to the evidence of an injured complainant or witness. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if found reliable by itself may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. Secondly, in prosecution of rape, the law does not require corroboration. The evidence of the prosecutrix may sustain a conviction. It is only by way of abundant caution that Court may look for some corroboration so as to satisfy its conscience and rule out any false accusations. Thus, the High Court was of the view that the Trial Court had not committed any error in convicting the appellant under Section 376 of IPC. It is only by way of abundant caution that Court may look for some corroboration so as to satisfy its conscience and rule out any false accusations. Thus, the High Court was of the view that the Trial Court had not committed any error in convicting the appellant under Section 376 of IPC. The statement of the prosecutrix was reliable. Prompt FIR was lodged by her and no further corroboration of her statement was required. 13. The second ground taken by the defence is that there is absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab of the victim and the Chemical Examination report found that the sample of semen found on the garments of the victim was insufficient to link the same with the accused. On the aspect of benefit of doubt, this Court has observed in Hem Raj v. State of Haryana (2014) 2 SCC 395 , that prosecution had brought on record FSL report which showed that human semen was detected on the salwar of the prosecutrix and on the underwear of the accused. However it was difficult to infer from this that the prosecutrix was raped by the accused. The appellant in that case was given benefit of doubt. 14. In the present case, the Chemical Examiner report found that the sample of semen was not sufficient to link the same to the accused, notwithstanding that absence of spermatozoa on the vaginal smear could not be allowed to tell against the version of the prosecutrix, as held in Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka (1994) 5 SCC 728 . 17. When there is promptness in giving the FIR, identification of the appellant was done in TI parade, there is substantive evidence for identification of the appellant in the Court, and when the evidence of the minor victim, inspires confidence of the Court with the evidence of the complainant, who is none other than the mother of the victim, the Court finds that the learned Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant has committed the offence of rape on the victim. 18. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar, however, submitted that the amended provision of Section 376 of the Penal Code shall not apply to the case of the appellant as alleged incident had taken place in the year 2011. 18. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar, however, submitted that the amended provision of Section 376 of the Penal Code shall not apply to the case of the appellant as alleged incident had taken place in the year 2011. The Court finds that even as per the unamended Section 376 of the Penal Code, minimum sentence of 7 years was to be imposed when the victim in the crime was below 12 years and it was permissible to impose punishment upto life or 10 years with fine. 19. In the case of Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2013) 7 SCC 77 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-14 to 19 and 25 to 27 as under: 14. Primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be imposed, regard being had to the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence has been committed. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based on the principle that the accused must realise that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social fabric. The purpose of just punishment is designed so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and again for such crimes. It serves as a deterrent. True it is, on certain occasions, opportunities may be granted to the convict for reforming himself but it is equally true that the principle of proportionality between an offence committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view. While carrying out this complex exercise, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to see the impact of the offence on the society as a whole and its ramifications on the immediate collective as well as its repercussions on the victim. 15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, wherein this Court, speaking about the concept of sentence, has laid down that it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. In this context, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh1, wherein this Court, speaking about the concept of sentence, has laid down that it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence.” 16. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, the Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 362, para-7) “7……Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.” 17. In State of M.P v. Babulal, two learned Judges, while delineating about the adequacy of sentence, have expressed thus:— “23. Punishment is the sanction imposed on the offender for the infringement of law committed by him. Once a person is tried for commission of an offence and found guilty by a competent court, it is the duty of the court to impose on him such sentence as is prescribed by law. The award of sentence is consequential on and incidental to conviction. The law does not envisage a person being convicted for an offence without a sentence being imposed therefor. 24. The object of punishment has been succinctly stated in Halsburys Laws of England, (4th Edition: Vol. II: para 482) thus: “482. Object of punishment. - The aims of punishment are now considered to be retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation and protection and modern sentencing policy reflects a combination of several or all of these aims. 24. The object of punishment has been succinctly stated in Halsburys Laws of England, (4th Edition: Vol. II: para 482) thus: “482. Object of punishment. - The aims of punishment are now considered to be retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation and protection and modern sentencing policy reflects a combination of several or all of these aims. The retributive element is intended to show public revulsion to the offence and to punish the offender for his wrong conduct. The concept of justice as an aim of punishment means both that the punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences should receive similar punishments. An increasingly important aspect of punishment is deterrence and sentences are aimed at deterring not only the actual offender from further offences but also potential offenders from breaking the law. The importance of reformation of the offender is shown by the growing emphasis laid upon it by much modern legislation, but judicial opinion towards this particular aim is varied and rehabilitation will not usually be accorded precedence over deterrence. The main aim of punishment in judicial thought, however, is still the protection of society and the other objects frequently receive only secondary consideration when sentences are being decided “. (Emphasis supplied)” 18. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, while dealing with the philosophy of just punishment which is the collective cry of the society, a two-Judge Bench has stated that just punishment would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a Court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors. 19. The aforesaid authorities deal with sentencing in general. As is seen, various concepts, namely, gravity of the offence, manner of its execution, impact on the society, repercussions on the victim and proportionality of punishment have been emphasized upon. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the justification of life imprisonment in a case of rape committed on an eight year old girl, helpless and vulnerable and, in a way, hapless. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the justification of life imprisonment in a case of rape committed on an eight year old girl, helpless and vulnerable and, in a way, hapless. The victim was both physically and psychologically vulnerable. It is worthy to note that any kind of sexual assault has always been viewed with seriousness and sensitivity by this Court. 25. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, the obtaining factual matrix, the brutality reflected in the commission of crime, the response expected from the courts by the society and the rampant uninhibited exposure of the bestial nature of pervert minds, we are required to address whether the rigorous punishment for life imposed on the appellant is excessive or deserves to be modified. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant has four children and if the sentence is maintained, not only his life but also the life of his children would be ruined. The other ground that is urged is the background of impecuniosity. In essence, leniency is sought on the base of aforesaid mitigating factors. 26. It is seemly to note that the legislature, while prescribing a minimum sentence for a term which shall not be less than ten years, has also provided that the sentence may be extended upto life. The legislature, in its wisdom, has left it to the discretion of the Court. Almost for the last three decades, this Court has been expressing its agony and distress pertaining to the increased rate of crimes against women. The eight years old girl, who was supposed to spend time in cheerfulness, was dealt with animal passion and her dignity and purity of physical frame was shattered. The plight of the child and the shock suffered by her can be well visualised. The torment on the child has the potentiality to corrode the poise and equanimity of any civilized society. The age old wise saying “child is a gift of the providence” enters into the realm of absurdity. The young girl, with efflux of time, would grow with traumatic experience, an unforgettable shame. She shall always be haunted by the memory replete with heavy crush of disaster constantly echoing the chill air of the past forcing her to a state of nightmarish melancholia. She may not be able to assert the honour of a woman for no fault of hers. She shall always be haunted by the memory replete with heavy crush of disaster constantly echoing the chill air of the past forcing her to a state of nightmarish melancholia. She may not be able to assert the honour of a woman for no fault of hers. 27. Respect for reputation of women in the society shows the basic civility of a civilised society. No member of society can afford to conceive the idea that he can create a hollow in the honour of a woman. Such thinking is not only lamentable but also deplorable. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the thought of sullying the physical frame of a woman is the demolition of the accepted civilized norm, i.e., “physical morality”. In such a sphere, impetuosity has no room. The youthful excitement has no place. It should be paramount in everyones mind that, on one hand, the society as a whole cannot preach from the pulpit about social, economic and political equality of the sexes and, on the other, some pervert members of the same society dehumanize the woman by attacking her body and ruining her chastity. It is an assault on the individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men. Rape is a monstrous burial of her dignity in the darkness. It is a crime against the holy body of a woman and the soul of the society and such a crime is aggravated by the manner in which it has been committed. We have emphasised on the manner because, in the present case, the victim is an eight years old girl who possibly would be deprived of the dreams of “Spring of Life” and might be psychologically compelled to remain in the “Torment of Winter”. When she suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is historically abhorred by the society. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court. 20. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court. 20. In light of the above and having considered the evidence on record, the Court finds that the judgment and order of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned Sessions Judge is required to be confirmed and the appeal is required to be dismissed. 21. The appeal is, thus, dismissed. The judgment and order dated 12.3.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar in Sessions Case No. 68 of 2011 is hereby confirmed. Office is directed to transmit back the record and proceedings to the concerned Court forthwith.