JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J. 1. The defendant has taken out this application for recalling of a decree dated 14 August, 2015 which was passed when the suit appeared under the heading undefended suit. The defendant contends that there was sufficient cause for the defendant not to appear on the date when the decree was passed and hence, the decree should be recalled and the defendant should be given an opportunity to contest the suit. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are that the suit was filed on or about 24 February, 2015. In the suit the plaintiff claimed a money decree for Rs. 1,01,57,095.87 along with interim interest and interest on judgment. The writ of summons was served on the defendant on 5 May, 2015. The defendant was required to enter appearance by 15 May, 2015 and was required to file written statement by 26 May, 2015. The defendant did not enter appearance nor filed written statement. Accordingly, the plaintiff caused the suit to appear in the list as 'undefended suit' on 13 July, 2015. The plaintiff's witness was examined in part and the suit was adjourned till 7 August, 2015. The suit thereafter appeared in the list on 10 August, 2015 but could not be taken up for hearing. Upon the matter being mentioned on behalf of the plaintiff, the suit was directed to appear in the list on 14 August, 2015. On the adjourned dated i.e. 14 August, 2015 the examination of the plaintiff's witness was completed and upon being satisfied that the plaintiff had proved its claim, this court decreed the suit. 3. The defendant contends that the key personnel of the defendant company is one Mr. Tarakeswar Singh who is also a director of the company. He was personally involved in the entire transaction with the plaintiff. All necessary facts and information germane to the suit were known to him and all documents pertaining to the transactions between the parties were in his custody. However, he suffered a major hip fracture on April 30, 2015 and was confined to bed. Hence, it was not possible for him to take any steps to defend the suit. As a result, the defendant failed to enter appearance and could not file written statement within the period prescribed. 4. However, he suffered a major hip fracture on April 30, 2015 and was confined to bed. Hence, it was not possible for him to take any steps to defend the suit. As a result, the defendant failed to enter appearance and could not file written statement within the period prescribed. 4. The defendant further contends that on 7 August, 2015 it took out a master summons for leave to enter appearance in the suit and for extension of time to file written statement. The summons was made returnable on 12 August, 2015. On 10 August, 2015 the defendant's advocate went to Bar Association, Room No. 16 to serve copy of the master summons along with application on the plaintiff's advocate on record Mrs. Sujata Mitra but could not find her. On 11 August, 2015 the defendant's Learned Advocate again went to the Bar Association and this time they could find the plaintiff's advocate on record but the latter refused to accept service. Thereafter on the same date the defendant's advocate on record sent a copy of the master summons and the affidavit in support thereof to the plaintiff's advocate on record by speed post with A/D card which was received by the plaintiff's advocate on record on 12 August, 2015. By reason of delay in service of the master summons caused by the refusal of the plaintiff's advocate on record to receive the same, the defendant was constrained to take out a fresh master summons on 12 August, 2015 which was made returnable on 18 August, 2015. However, the suit was decreed on 14 August, 2015. 5. The defendant further contends that when the suit was not taken up for hearing on 10 August, 2015 (Monday), it reasonable expected that the suit would be taken up once again on 17 August, 2015 (following Monday) in view of the note in the cause list that 'undefended suits will have priority on every Monday and thereafter suits appearing under the heading for hearing will be taken up'. 6. Learned Counsel for the defendant relied on the following decisions: (i) Vijay Kumar Madan vs. R.N. Gupta Technical Education Society, (2002) 5 SCC 30 (ii) Tea Auction Ltd. vs. Grace Hill Tea Industry, (2006) 12 SCC 104 (iii) Bhagmal vs. Kunwar Lal, (2010) 12 SCC 159 (iv) Premier Thermatic P. Ltd. vs. Indian Sulphacid Industries Ltd., (1985) 57 Comp Case 816 7. Mr. Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently opposed the application. Firstly, he submitted that once the decree is drawn up, completed and perfected, the court passing the decree loses jurisdiction in the matter and no application for recalling of the decree would lie before that Court. In this connection, he relied on two decisions in the cases of Sarupchand Hukumchand vs. Madhoram Raghumall, 28 CWN 755 and In the matter of the Steel Construction Company Ltd., 39 CWN 1259. However, this proposition does not appear to be good law any more in view of the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Firdous Omer (D) By L.Rs vs. Bankim Chandra Daw (D) By L.Rs., AIR 2006 SC 2759 . 8. Mr. Mazumder then submitted that no sufficient cause preventing the defendant from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing has been made out. In fact, the defendant did not have any right to appear since it had failed to enter appearance. He further submitted that no copy of any master summons was received by the plaintiff or its advocate on record prior to the decree being passed on 14 August, 2015. He strongly denied that the plaintiff's advocate on record refused to accept service of the master summons for leave to enter appearance and extension of time to file written statement. He also referred to Rules 15 to 18 and 25 of Chapter VIII of the Original Side Rules of this Court and also to Rules 2 and 3 of Chapter IX of the Original Side Rules. 9. Mr. Mazumder then submitted that there was no scope for any miss-conception on the part of the defendant that undefended suits would be taken up only on Mondays because the note in the cause list does not say so. It only says that priority will be given to undefended suits on Mondays. He submitted that this is not a bona fide application. 10. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. 11. The short question that falls for determination is whether or not the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was heard ex parte and decreed. It is not in dispute that the summons of the suit was duly served on the defendant. 10. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. 11. The short question that falls for determination is whether or not the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was heard ex parte and decreed. It is not in dispute that the summons of the suit was duly served on the defendant. Hence, the only ground available to the defendant for pressing for recalling of the decree is that it was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was decreed ex parte. 12. The defendant has to establish that it was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing before the Court on 14 August, 2015 when the suit was decreed ex parte. Admittedly, the defendant was aware of the fact that the suit was appearing as 'undefended suit' in the cause list of 10 August, 2015. The defendant contends that when the suit was not taken up for hearing on 10 August, 2015, it reasonably expected that the suit would be taken up next on 17 August, 2015. That is the reason the defendant was absent on 14 August, 2015 when the suit was decreed. It further contends that the reason for it reasonably expecting that the suit would once again be taken up on 17 August, 2015 was a note in the cause list that undefended suits will have priority on every Monday. I do not find this explanation to be satisfactory. Firstly, according to the defendant, it had briefed lawyers to look after the case and Learned Advocates had appeared on 13 July, 2015 when the plaintiff's witness was examined in part. Thus, the defendant's lawyers were in charge of the case on behalf of the defendant. Hence, the statement that the defendant expected the matter to be taken up again on 17 August, 2015 does not cut much ice. Secondly, I am unable to accept and it is also not the case of the defendant that its lawyers were misled by any note in the cause list. The note in the cause list was quite clear. It was to the effect that on Mondays undefended suits will have priority. Nowhere it was stated that undefended suits would be taken up only on Mondays. Further, note No. 4 in the cause list clearly stated that the indications made at item Nos. The note in the cause list was quite clear. It was to the effect that on Mondays undefended suits will have priority. Nowhere it was stated that undefended suits would be taken up only on Mondays. Further, note No. 4 in the cause list clearly stated that the indications made at item Nos. 2 and 3 (item No. 2 related to undefended suits) are subject to other directions as may be made by the Court from time to time. Hence, there was no scope for being misled as urged by the defendant. 13. In any event, a misconception of the defendant or its learned Advocates that the matter would be taken up only on Mondays when there was no plausible reason for such misconception, in my view, cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of O. 9 R. 13 of the CPC. A self-induced and self-serving alleged misconception cannot be accepted as a sufficient cause which prevented the defendant from appearing when the suit was decreed ex parte. I am unable to accept that the learned lawyers of the defendant being legally trained people did not understand the true meaning of the note published in the cause list. Further, there is no affidavit from any of the learned lawyers who are looking after the defendant's case that they were misled by the note in the cause list. 14. It has become a trend to put the blame on the learned lawyers when a default is committed by a party. In some cases, it may be that the concerned learned lawyer is responsible for the default but in my limited experience I find that in the vast majority of the cases it is only a ploy adopted by the party to get the sympathy of the Court by urging that the party engaged a lawyer and legitimately entrusted him with the conduct of the case and the party should not suffer because of laches or default on the part of the learned lawyer. This practice deserves to be deprecated. In the present case, the defendant is a public limited company having annual turn-over of a sum in excess of Rs. 8 crores as would appear from a copy of the balance-sheet produced in Court for the year ended 31 March, 2016. Presumably, the defendant company is run by a Board of Directors who are educated people. In the present case, the defendant is a public limited company having annual turn-over of a sum in excess of Rs. 8 crores as would appear from a copy of the balance-sheet produced in Court for the year ended 31 March, 2016. Presumably, the defendant company is run by a Board of Directors who are educated people. The defendant is not a little old lady or a rustic ignorant person who can be given the benefit of doubt. 15. Learned Counsel for the defendant relied on four decisions. In Vijay Kumar Madan (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering O. 9 R. 7 of the CPC which provides that where the court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. In that context, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that costs should be so assessed as would reasonably compensate the plaintiff for loss of time and convenience caused by relegating back the proceedings to an earlier stage. The court cannot exercise its power to put the defendant on such terms as may have the effect of pre-judging the controversy involved in the suit and virtually decreeing the suit though ex parte order has been set aside or to put the parties on such terms as may be too onerous. In Tea Auction Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that if the court is satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was decreed ex parte, the court may impose terms on the defendant for recalling of the decree. But such term should not be unreasonable and harshly excessive. In Bhagmal vs. Kunwar Lal (supra), there was a delay on the part of the defendant in approaching the court with an application under O. 9 R. 13 of the CPC. The Hon'ble Apex Court found that the question of delay was completely inter-linked with the merits of the matter. But such term should not be unreasonable and harshly excessive. In Bhagmal vs. Kunwar Lal (supra), there was a delay on the part of the defendant in approaching the court with an application under O. 9 R. 13 of the CPC. The Hon'ble Apex Court found that the question of delay was completely inter-linked with the merits of the matter. On facts it was held that the delay had been rightly condoned by the Lower Court since there was sufficient justification for the defendant in the facts of that case not to file the application for recalling of the decree earlier than when it was made. In Premier Thermatic P. Ltd. (supra), the affidavit filed as a part of the main petition was not in proper form. About 16 months later, the petitioner filed another affidavit in proper form. The Punjab and Haryana High Court permitted the petitioner to substitute the earlier defective affidavit with the subsequent affidavit in proper form and held that the petition would be deemed to have been filed on the day the substituted affidavit came on record. 16. In my considered view, none of the above decisions advances the case of the petitioner. The question of imposing costs or other terms on the defendant as a precondition for recalling an ex parte decree under O. 9 R. 13, would arise only if the Court is satisfied that the defendant has made out a sufficient cause which prevented the defendant from appearing on the day the suit was decreed ex parte. The first two decisions cited by the defendant no doubt lay down that such costs or other terms must not be too onerous and must be reasonable. However, since I am not satisfied for the reasons indicated above, that a sufficient cause has been made out by the defendant, I am not inclined to recall the ex parte decree and as such the question of imposing costs or other terms does not arise. 17. While I am conscious that the term 'sufficient cause' appearing in O. 9 R. 13 of the CPC should receive a liberal interpretation yet, an ex parte decree passed in favour of the plaintiff following the provisions of the Original Side Rules of this Court and the Code of Civil Procedure ought not to be recalled for the mere asking by the defendant. Self-created confusion in the mind of the defendant as regards the date of hearing of the suit cannot be a ground for recalling of the ex parte decree, particularly when learned lawyers were in charge of the defendant's case and there is no material before me showing that the learned lawyers were reasonably misled as regards the date of hearing of the suit. 18. As regards the point of suppression on the part of the plaintiff argued by the defendant, I am unable to accept such argument. There is nothing before me to establish that the plaintiff was aware prior to 14 August, 2015 that the defendant had taken out an application for leave to enter appearance and extension of time to file written statement. 19. I am aware that the merits of the defendant's defence are not strictly germane to an application under O. 9 R. 13 of the CPC. However, I am of the view, if the defendant has taken the point in the recalling application that it has a good defence or a higher counter-claim against the plaintiff, it is only proper that some particulars of such defence or counter-claim are indicated even if briefly. That may at times weigh with the court to hold in favour of the defendant. In the present case, the only bald statement in this regard is in paragraph 30 of the petition which is to the effect that "the defendant has a counter-claim against the plaintiff which is higher in amount than the decree sought by the plaintiff against the defendant". Such a delightfully vague statement cannot create any impression on the mind on the court. However, I repeat that my decision on the present application is not based on lack of particulars of the defendant's defence/counter-claim but on my finding that no sufficient cause has been made out in the application which prevented the defendant from appearing before the court when the suit was called on for hearing on 14 August, 2015. 20. For the reasons aforestated, this application fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 21. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.