JUDGMENT : N. Seshasayee, J. The appellant before this court is the first defendant in O.S.No.167 of 1990 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif Court, Kumbakonam. The suit is laid for redemption of mortgage of which the first defendant is the mortgagee. 2.1 A preludial outline may be useful to in shrinking the narrative of the pleadings as the question ultimately required to be resolved is pegged on short legal frame. It is as below: The suit property has an extent of 1,500 sq. feet along with a house and it originally belonged to one Gangammal. Gangammal was married to one Lakshmana Iyer. In fact Lakshmana Iyer was married twice and his first wife was Nagamani Ammal and Gangammal was his second wife. Nagamani Ammal had two sons Ramamoorthy and Krishnasamy. Turning to Gangammal Branch, she had a son namely Paramasivam and he was married to Kamalam. Paramasivam had no issue and it is alleged that the suit property originally owned by Gangammal and her son Paramasivam and upon the demise of Paramasivam and Kamalam, Gangammal succeeded to the property and she has become its absolute owner. The suit property was under a tenancy with one Govindaraman. Be that as if may, on 29.09.1982 Gangammal had executed a mortgage deed in favour of her tenant Govindaraman for a sum of Rs. 8,000/-. This mortgage deed is marked as Ex.A1. On the same day, Gangammal had also adopted his nephew Suresh Babu, the present appellant under a registered adoption deed. This is available on record as Ex.B-8. 2.2 After the demise of Gangammal, three suits happen to be filed: The tenant Govindaraman had filed the first suit in O.S.No.429 of 1980 against his landlord Suresh Babu, (to repeat, the appellant herein) that the former should not be evicted from the property except in accordance with law. The appellant himself has filed O.S.No.1079 of 1991 against the tenant for eviction after duly terminating the lease. In between, the respondents 1 and 2 had preferred O.S.No.169 of 1990 for redemption of mortgage. They are Gangammal's husband's first wife's sons. 3.1 While the appellant was arrayed as a defendant in the redemption suit filed by the respondents 1 and 2, latter were not parties to the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against his tenant Govindaraman. In between, the respondents 1 and 2 had preferred O.S.No.169 of 1990 for redemption of mortgage. They are Gangammal's husband's first wife's sons. 3.1 While the appellant was arrayed as a defendant in the redemption suit filed by the respondents 1 and 2, latter were not parties to the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against his tenant Govindaraman. While the suits stood thus, the trial Court opted to consolidate all the three suits, framed common issues and tried them. Evidence was recorded in the redemption suit. 3.2 In the context of the present case, the issues 1 and 2 framed by the trial court are significant. They seek a finding on (a) who were the heirs of Gangammal and (b) Whether the present appellant is the adopted son of Gangammal. To state it differently, these issues seek an answer in the validity of Ext.B-8 adoption deed. 3.3 During the trial, Ext.B-8 adoption deed was proved through DW2 Thulasiram, who was the biological father of the appellant and an attestor to Ext.B-8. After evaluating the evidence, the trial court entered a finding in favour of the appellant and upheld the validity and genuineness of the adoption deed. Appellant's status as the adopted son having been resolved, the trial court proceeded to dismiss the suit for redemption, dismissed the suit filed by the tenant for injunction and decreed the appellant's suit for eviction of the tenant. 4. The plaintiffs in the redemption suit have preferred a single appeal against the decree of dismissal that they suffered in their suit O.S.No.169 of 2000. This appeal is A.S.66/ 1988, and the First Appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial court on the issue of adoption and has held that the plaintiffs (respondents 1 and 2 here) are the successors-in-interest of the suit property under Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Its reasoning is two fold: In Hindu Law, a widow can adopt only for her husband and under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, there is an embargo for a woman to adopt a son if she already has a son. Its reasoning is two fold: In Hindu Law, a widow can adopt only for her husband and under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, there is an embargo for a woman to adopt a son if she already has a son. Now, inasmuch as Gangammal's husband had sons through his first wife, (the plaintiffs in the redemption suit), she cannot adopt, or rather need not adopt for her husband and the existence of these two sons of her husband that found in Section 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (henceforth HA & M Act) and consequently, Gagammal cannot adopt for her husband, and hence her adoption of the appellant was anti-statute and incompetent. Second, both Ext.B-8 adoption deed as well as Ex.A-1 mortgage deed were executed on the same day. D.W.2 Tulasiram, the attestor to Ext.B-8, had deposed that Gangammal had executed only one document on that date and this document could only be Ext.A-1 mortgage deed, and consequently Ext.B-8 is fraudulent. 5. When the appeal was admitted, the following substantial question of law has been framed: "Are the respondents bound by the decree and judgment granted to the appellant in O.S. No.1079 of 1991 on principles of res judicata when no appeal against the said decree was filed by them?" 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued: Ext. B-8 is a registered deed of adoption and the same is also proved through one of its attestor Thulasiram. The boy adopted was Thulasiram's and was born to him through his marriage to the sister of Gangammal's daughter-in-law Kamalam. So far as the genuineness of Ext.B-8 goes, since it is a registered document there is a presumption as to its genuineness. And, if it were to be disbelieved then there ought to be adequate pleadings as contemplated under Order 6, Rule 4 CPC. In none of the three suits that were tried jointly, anyone who could have taken exception to adoption half pleaded anything to suspect the genuineness of the adoption deed. The first appellate court therefore slipped into a conceptual error in entering a finding on a non-issue. Secondly, the respondents having been put on notice through the written statement that the appellant is the adopted son of Gangammal, they have not chosen to challenge the adoption of the appellant independently within three years of they acquiring knowledge of appellant's claim of adoption. Secondly, the respondents having been put on notice through the written statement that the appellant is the adopted son of Gangammal, they have not chosen to challenge the adoption of the appellant independently within three years of they acquiring knowledge of appellant's claim of adoption. Reliance was on M. Vaithilingam Pillai (died) and another v. Minor Maruganantham represented by his adopted mother and guardian Ponnurangathammal 1994-1-LW 296 Thirdly, when three suits are filed and tried on common questions that are material for deciding all the three suits, the plaintiffs in the redemption suit have not preferred any appeal challenging the decree passed in O.S.1079/1991 which the appellant had filed for evicting his tenant. It operates as re judicata and if it were not, then an anomalous situation would be created where there would be two different title holders for two different suits but both of which involve a common question. Reliance was placed on K. Viswanathan & another v. R. Appavoo Chettiar & Others 2010(3) CTC 799 . 7. On the side of the respondents, notice have been served and have been received and none appeared. 8. First on the point of res judicata. There were three suits: One filed by the appellant's tenant for prohibitory injunction, another by appellant himself for recovery of possession from his tenant in O.S.1079/1991 and the third one is the present suit for redemption filed by the respondents. As already stated the trial court has framed common issues for all the three suits, of which the issue on Gangammal's heir is common both to the suit for recovery of possession that the appellant had filed and in the suit for redemption. While the respondents preferred an appeal against the decree passed in the redemption suit, they chose not file any against the decree in the suit for recovery of possession. The point now to be investigated is whether the respondents' failure to file an appeal against the decree in the suit for recovery of property filed by the appellant would operate as res judicata. 9. Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the doctrine of res judicata to operate, following conditions are a pre-requisite: That there shall be more than one suit. That the suit are between the same parties or by one claiming under the parties to the other suit. Parties must claim under the same title. 9. Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the doctrine of res judicata to operate, following conditions are a pre-requisite: That there shall be more than one suit. That the suit are between the same parties or by one claiming under the parties to the other suit. Parties must claim under the same title. The issue must be directly and substantially in dispute; The finding thereon has become final. 10. So far as the present suit is concerned, the only common aspect is the issue 'who is the heir of Gangammal', can be said to be directly and substantially in issue in both the suits, but the respondents are not parties to the suit for recovery of property filed by the present appellant against his lessee. Secondly, title to both the suits are different. The authority in K. Viswanathan & another v. R. Appavoo Chettiar & Others [ 2010(3) CTC 799 (DB)] which the appellant has cited may not be applicable to the situation at hand since the plaintiffs and the first defendant in the above said authority have filed suits against each other and were seen litigating on the same title involving common issue. 11. Incidentally there is another aspect to the matter which neither can be ignored nor can be sulked: It is about comprehending the inter-connect between Section 8 and Section 11 of the Act and understand its impact on the validity of adoption of the appellant. To remind, this arose out of what this Court considers as a misconception in law entertained by the firs appellate court in holding the adoption of the appellant by Gangammal as the adoption for her husband. 12. As per the classical Hindu law texts prevalent prior to the advent of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, a Hindu widow cannot adopt a son for herself, and her power to adopt is limited by one that can be made only for her husband. Section 8 however, altered this fundamental premise and replaced it with provisions securing gender equality when it granted to both Hindu male and female identical power to adopt a child for himself or herself, as the case may be. While Section 7 deals with right of adoption of a Hindu male, Section 8 deals with that of a Hindu female. Section 8 however, altered this fundamental premise and replaced it with provisions securing gender equality when it granted to both Hindu male and female identical power to adopt a child for himself or herself, as the case may be. While Section 7 deals with right of adoption of a Hindu male, Section 8 deals with that of a Hindu female. Section 8 reads: "Capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption: Any female Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption: Provided that, if she has a husband living, she shall not adopt a son or daughter except with the consent of her husband unless the husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind". The provision opens with 'any woman' and it manifests the legislative intent and anxiety to empower a Hindu woman in preference to treat her as an appendage to man's existence. The proviso does not take away her right to adopt but only introduces a pre-condition, with its application intended only for those women having their husbands living, where it requires her to obtain the consent of her husband while she opts to adopt for herself. But not a widow. Similar restriction also finds expression in the proviso to Section 7. The precondition insisting that a Hindu male or female having his/her spouse living should obtain the consent of such spouse to the intended adoption except where such other spouse has renounced either the religion or the world, is aimed at preserving familial bliss free of spousal differences. It is essential both for the adoptive parents as well as for the child adopted. After all a child is not a chattel and it must be welcomed into an ambience of love and peace. Therefore, the requirement prescribed in the proviso to Section 7 or 8 of the Act, cannot be construed as a limitation on the power to adopt but only as a regulation imposed while exercising the power of adoption. 13.1 In Section 11, Act imposes certain conditions for a valid adoption of which Sub Section (i) is relevant for the current purpose. 13.1 In Section 11, Act imposes certain conditions for a valid adoption of which Sub Section (i) is relevant for the current purpose. It reads: "Other conditions for a valid adoption: In every adoption the following condition must be complied with: (i) If the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption." 13.2 Can a widow's husband's sons through his first wife be considered as heirs of the widow as to deny her the right to adopt for herself? Will such sons be termed as legitimate son born of legitimate blood relationship to the widow? If it is so considered then it destroys the Parliamentary positivism in granting a Hindu female with a right to adopt for herself. Where then to limit it? It must be understood that the concept of adoption post-Constitution is not just limited to performing obsequies for the dead or offering pinda but extends to include the secular purposes behind adoption, since the son adopted would have the status of a natural born son under Section 12 of the Act. He then would have all the rights, duties and obligations that are attached to a natural born son. If so viewed, it is difficult to subscribe to any interpretation of Section 11 of the Act that operates as an injunction on a widow's right of adoption. Contextually, any interpretation that a widow's husband's sons through another woman, though legitimate from his point, must be treated as her own sons, does take away a Hindu widow's power of adopting a child for herself. It needs to be reminded that the engravings of the classical Hindu law on the power of adoption vested in a Hindu women are now reduced to relics in the museum of legal studies, whose contemporary relevance is limited to understanding the status of Hindu woman then and now. Sections 4 and 5 of HA & M Act have foreclosed any temptation of peeping through the window of classical Hindu law texts to understand the statute on adoption. The first appellate Court has faltered in this space and allowed it to be consumed by conceptual misunderstanding. Sections 4 and 5 of HA & M Act have foreclosed any temptation of peeping through the window of classical Hindu law texts to understand the statute on adoption. The first appellate Court has faltered in this space and allowed it to be consumed by conceptual misunderstanding. This Court therefore, has no hesitation in holding that Gangammal, the Hindu widow and a prime character walking through the records of this case, had her independent right to adopt for herself well preserved, and it was not affected by the existence of her husbands sons through latter's first wife. Gangammal had every right to decide who she wanted to care, whose care she required and to who her properties should go, besides who should offer pinda to her. 13.3 Now comes the validity of Ext.B-8 adoption deed. First, as correctly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, there was no denial in the pleadings of the respondent or for that matter by anyone who were in a position to challenge it. Second, the fact that it is a registered deed of adoption carries with it a presumption as to its genuineness. Now the first appellate Court has relied on the testimony of D.W.2, Tulasiraman, to disbelieve the genuineness of a registered document merely because his memory did not serve him during cross examination to testify before Court that two documents were executed on the same day. To let a parole evidence founded on lapses of memory for negating the effect of a registered document is strange piece of reasoning incompatible with principles governing it and is plainly flawed. The natural consequence is Ext.B-8 genuine and valid. 14. When once the adoption is held valid, the decision to follow is a foregone conclusion. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed the judgment and decree passed in A.S. No. 86 of 1998, dated 19.12.2000, by the Additional Subordinate Court, Kumbakonam, is reversed and the judgment and decree passed by the First Additional District Munsif, Kumbakonam in O.S.No.169 of 1990, dated 16.06.1998 is restored. No costs.