JUDGMENT : The petitioner by filing this application seeks quashment of the office order of the opp. party no.1 communicated under Annexure-13 by opp. party no. 3 in so far as it relates to the decision of the probation period as at clause-0.1; the office order communicated by opp. party no. 3 under Annexure-16 seeking explanation from the petitioner as regards the deliberate absence as also gross dereliction of duty and indiscipline; the office order communicated by opp. party no. 3 calling upon the petitioner to further explain as regards the absence and the final office order communicated to the petitioner by opp. party no. 3 as regards the decision of opp. party no. 1 not to continue with the employment of the petitioner, an Asst. Professor on probation in the school of Biotechnology of the University-the opposite party no.1 beyond the period of probation scheduled to be ending with effect from 23.11.2014 A.N. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Asst. Professor in the school of Biotechnology under University-opp. party no.1 vide appointment letter dated 29.5.2010 and pursuant to the same, he joined. As per the terms of the appointment, the petitioner was to continue as probationer for a period of one year and it was the requirement for being regularized as based on his performance and upon successful completion of the probationary period. It is alleged that the petitioner after his joining, found the non-cooperation of the management in several matters of developmental activities and other objectionable practices prevailing therein. It is stated that in order to satisfy the Vice Chancellor of the University, though he had also sought for some documents, those were not so provided. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner received the letter dated 20.6.2011 stating that his services are no longer required by opp. party no. 1. It is stated that the management being vindictive did so. This order was challenged by filing a writ application i.e. W.P.(C) No. 17171 of 2011 further attacking the same to be a non-reasoned one; passed without initiation of any disciplinary proceeding and that too without compliance of the principles of natural justice affording due opportunity to the petitioner and thus to have been done behind his back. It was stated therein that by such termination the petitioner not only became jobless but also a stigma got attached affecting his future career. It was stated therein that by such termination the petitioner not only became jobless but also a stigma got attached affecting his future career. That writ application was contested firstly on the ground that the opp. party no. 1 was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. Next it has been stated that since as per the condition of appointment, only on successful completion of his probationary period based on the assessment of performance the service of the petitioner was to be regularized, the decision not to extend the probationary period and to say that the petitioner’s service no longer required by opp. party no. 1 had been rightly taken. 3. This Court on that occasion first of all held as under:- “Thus while answering the point no. i in affirmative, I declare that the opposite party no. 1 university being a creature of a statute and since performing public duty comes well within the meaning of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and its important organ the Teaching Staffs as a part of such public duty as such their grievances can be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 4. In view of above, the writ application having been found to be maintainable, the court next addressed the petitioner’s contention on merit. Going to the challenge advanced by the petitioner against the decision of opp. party no. 1 not to extend the period of probation, the followings are the discussion and conclusion at para-25 of the judgment:- “25. Now, coming to answer on point no.ii, facts, as borne out demonstrate that the university initiated an in-house enquiry against the petitioner and the said in-house committee admittedly holding an enquiry behind the back of the petitioner appears to have arrived against the petitioner, vide Annexure-C/1 recommended the authority not to extend the petitioner’s probation and KIIT authority claims that it is only depending on such recommendation the authority passed order dismissing the petitioner from his services vide order under Annexure-4. Since enquiry ended with a stigma and the impugned order of dismissal was passed going away from the recommendation of the in-house committee and considering the fact that petitioner was a probationer compliance of natural justice was the minimum requirement. Since enquiry ended with a stigma and the impugned order of dismissal was passed going away from the recommendation of the in-house committee and considering the fact that petitioner was a probationer compliance of natural justice was the minimum requirement. Law is well settled vide AIR 1999 S.C. 983 , AIR 2000 S.C. 1080 , (2010) 8 S.C.C. 220 and the two decisions of our own High Court referred to in paras N and O holding that termination in case of a probationer also requires compliance of principle of natural justice and the same having not been followed the order of termination vide Annexure-4 cannot be sustained. There is gross violation of rights under Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India. In (2010) 8 SCC 220 in para-43, the Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that finding against a probationer arrived at behind him which found to be the basis of discharge order such discharge order can only be passed after following principle of natural justice. A similar view is also taken by the Honble Apex Court as reported in AIR 1989 S.C. 1431 at para-4 of the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court held that there cannot be a termination before the reason for termination is being communicated to the concerned employee. In a land mark judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in AIR 1978 S.C. 597 in Paras 56 and 57 observed as follows:- “The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied”. “The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of Natural Justice.” Under the above facts, rulings and in view of settled law that there cannot be a termination/dismissal order in absence of non-compliance of principle of natural justice. Thus, point no. “The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of Natural Justice.” Under the above facts, rulings and in view of settled law that there cannot be a termination/dismissal order in absence of non-compliance of principle of natural justice. Thus, point no. ii is also answered against the opposite party University holding the action of the University in terminating the services of the petitioner in absence of compliance of Natural Justice as bad and unsustainable.” At para-26 taking up the matter as to if the order of termination attached any stigma affecting the career of the petitioner, it has been held in favour of the petitioner. For better appreciation, para-26 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:- “26. Now coming to answer on point no.iii, I find that the services of the petitioner was terminated by order dated 20.06.2011 as appearing at Annexure-4. Though the said order did not attach any stigma but, while answering to the pleadings of the petitioner the opposite party nos. 1 to 4 in their counter affidavit submitted that before the order of termination vide Annexure-1 was passed the case of the petitioner was being examined by an in-house Enquiry Committee, who have an unanimous opinion that the conduct of Dr.Uttam Kumar Samanta, the petitioner has not been satisfactory and is highly unbecoming of a responsible faulty member of the university as clearly appearing at Annexure-C/1. It is based on such report his service was terminated vide Annexure 4. Thus, in my considered opinion even though the order of termination did not attach any stigma yet in view of finding of the Enquiry Committee as appearing at Annexure-C/1 with the strengthening of Right to Information Act and transparency in the actions the future of the petitioner is very much likely to be jeopardized. As such after coming to the above finding which finding was arrived at by an internal enquiry committee held behind the back of the petitioner, law minimum requires compliance of natural justice by at least affording an opportunity to the petitioner before issuing the terminal order vide Annexure-4 for this the termination order vide Annexure-4 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. My such view also gets the support of Hon’ble Apex Court decision vide AIR 2000 S.C. 1080 where in para-7 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that order of termination attaching stigma needs compulsory compliance of principle of Natural Justice. Under the circumstances, I answer point no. iii also in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite parties.” 5. Finally the order of termination of the service of the petitioner under Annexure-4 was set aside so also the consequential orders and the petitioner was declared to be continuing in service for the period with further direction for payment of 60% back wages. While parting, it has however been observed that:- “However, this judgment shall not preclude opposite party no. 1 University to restart the proceeding against the petitioner but to conclude lawfully. I also make it clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merit on allegations against the petitioner.” The petitioner thereafter joined. 6. This order was not challenged. So when the petitioner joined thereafter, the following office order under Annexure-13 was made:- “OFFICE ORDER (Dated 16-10-2014) The report of rejoining dated 9th October, 2014 submitted by Dr. Uttamkumar Samanta after delivery of the judgment dated 29.09. 2014 by the Hon’ble Odisha High Court in W.P.(C) No. 17171 of 2011 filed by him against the KIIT University and others challenging termination of his employment, is accepted with effect from this date [i.e. 16.10.2014], in pursuance of the said judgment. Acceptance of the joining report is subject to the following: 1. The probation of Dr. U.K. Samanta had been disrupted by the intervention period from 20.06.2011 till this date and so one month and seven days out of the probation period of one year is still left out to be completed. 2. The rejoining of Dr. U.K. Samanta would be accordingly on probation to be completed after one month and seven days i.e. 23.11.2014. 3. The University reserves the right to initiate disciplinary proceeding against Dr. U.K. Samanta on the previous allegations as per the observation in the judgment.” 7. The above order was objected as to be not in compliance of the judgment of this Court and also by not taking all the relevant aspects into consideration. After that there come out the office order dated 3.11.2014 under Annexure-16 which reads as under:- “OFFICE ORDER Dr. The above order was objected as to be not in compliance of the judgment of this Court and also by not taking all the relevant aspects into consideration. After that there come out the office order dated 3.11.2014 under Annexure-16 which reads as under:- “OFFICE ORDER Dr. U.K. Samanta had filed W.P.(C) No. 17171 of 2011 in the Hon’ble Odisha High Court challenging his termination from his employment as Asst. Professor (on probation) in the School of Biotechnology, KIIT University, vide letter of termination dated 20.06. 2011. The Hon’ble High Court vide their judgment dated 29.09. 2014 has allowed the writ petition, setting aside the letter of termination and further mentioning that since he has not worked for all these period he may be paid 60% back wages. Dr. U.K. Samanta submitted a report of rejoining in the office of the Registrar of the University on 09.10.2014 his employment is in the School of Biotechnology. However, the Registrar accepted his joining report vide Office Order KIIT/HR/1527/14 dated 16.10..2014 categorically mentioning that the period of probation of Dr. Samanta having been disrupted b the intervening period, it would be completed on 23.11.2014 i.e. one month and seven days after the said order dated 16.10.2014 and that the University reserves the right to initiate disciplinary proceeding against Dr. U.K. Samanta on the previous allegations as per the observation in the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court. A copy of the order was sent to Dr. Samanta also through his e-mail id and he has received it. It has come to the notice of the University that Dr. Samanta has not been going to the School of Biotechnology or reporting for duty before the Director of the School and taking instructions regarding his duties from the Director, right from day one i.e. since 09.10.2014 when he submitted his report of rejoining or at least since 16.10.2014 when the order of the said date was passed by the Registrar accepting his rejoining report. Such deliberate absence from duty by Dr. U.K. Samanta, indicates (i) abandonment by Dr. U.K. Samanta of his employment in the School of Biotechnology, KIIT University, Bhubaneswar and (ii) gross dereliction of duty and indiscipline. Dr. Such deliberate absence from duty by Dr. U.K. Samanta, indicates (i) abandonment by Dr. U.K. Samanta of his employment in the School of Biotechnology, KIIT University, Bhubaneswar and (ii) gross dereliction of duty and indiscipline. Dr. U.K. Samanta is therefore called upon to explain within one week as to why such deliberate absence from duty by him shall not be treated as (i) abandonment by him of his employment in the School of Biotechnology, KIIT University and (ii) gross dereliction of duty and indiscipline, failing which it shall be deemed that he has no explanation to furnish in the matter.” Few correspondences being made thereafter, finally when the order dated 22.11.2014 under Annexure-25 stating that on appraisal of the performance, the petitioner’s service is not required beyond the period of probation, being served, this writ application has come to be filed advancing the prayers as already stated in the first paragraph. 8. Mr. Jayant Das, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner raises the following points:- (A) That the petitioner’s service is deemed to have been confirmed at the end of one year of probation in view of the order of reinstatement passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 17171 of 2011 by which he has been deemed to be in service. As per the stipulation in clause-2 of the appointment letter under Annexure-2 read with Regulation 11.0 of UGC (Minimum qualifications for appointment of Teachers and other Academics Staff in Universities and Colleges and measures for maintenance of standards in Higher Education) Regulation, 2010 (hereinafter called as the UGC Regulation, 2010) specifically providing the original period of one year of probation, the petitioner’s service must be deemed to have been confirmed and regularized at the end of one year of probation pursuant to the order of this Court in the earlier writ application even though no express statement has come out as regards confirmation. (B) That the disruption of the probation of the petitioner leaving 01 month and 07 days for full completion as alleged by opp. party no. 1 in the impugned office order is not correct. The disruption being due to the fault of opp. party no. 1, the performance of successful completion of probation on the part of the petitioner would have to be taken and accepted as such and the opp. party no. party no. 1 in the impugned office order is not correct. The disruption being due to the fault of opp. party no. 1, the performance of successful completion of probation on the part of the petitioner would have to be taken and accepted as such and the opp. party no. 1 in such situation lacks the power to issue order of confirmation anymore and further in law that is not required as the opp.party no. 1 had illegally and arbitrarily prevented the petitioner to perform his duty and complete the probation successfully. (C) That in above view of the matter, the impugned decision of opp.party no.1 not to continue with the employment of the petitioner again treating him as a probationer on the allegations made in the office orders dtd. 3.11.2014 and 15.11.2014 which describe the acts of misconduct without enquiry is undoubtedly punitive in nature and therefore the way and manner in which the order has been passed is unsustainable in the eye of law. (D) That even assuming for a moment that the petitioner was still a probationer, the impugned order on the allegations made in the office orders are in violation of the principles of natural justice particularly in opposition to the Article 14 and 311 of the Constitution as its foundation is alleged misconduct and the petitioner is visited with stigma affecting his future career to be pursued. 9. Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of opp. party no. 1 contends that:- (A-1) That once the termination and dismissal of the petitioner’s employment then on probation was held by this Court as bad in law, the natural consequence is that the petitioner stood relegated to the stage where he was at the time of the termination and that he got placed on probation again for the residue period as it stood then. The petitioner having been terminated from employment, while he was on probation and in terms of the appointment, no confirmation or regularization having been issued upon reinstatement, he would have to complete the period of probation. Therefore, in this case, the period of probation being over, he has not been given further extension as he was not found to have satisfactorily completed the period of service as a probationer. Therefore, in this case, the period of probation being over, he has not been given further extension as he was not found to have satisfactorily completed the period of service as a probationer. (B-1) That in this case there has been no enquiry nor any finding of guilt has been recorded against the petitioner which is in clear difference to the earlier case under consideration and facts situation when the petitioner was terminated on the last occasion that this Court held to be stigmatic and without any opportunity to meet the allegation. Therefore, the petitioner’s performance having been found to be not satisfactory, there has been the right order in not further extending the employment of the petitioner and regularizing the same. 10. In order to address the first submission the undeniable facts to be taken note of are that the petitioner joined in service on 28.7.2010 and the probation as per the order of appointment under Annexure-2 was to continue till 27.7.2011. The stipulation of the said letter of appointment being relevant, for proper appreciation may be stated hereunder:- “You will be on probation for a period of one year. Based on your performance and on successful completion of your probationary period, your services will be regularized.” In view of that when on 20.6.2011 termination of service of the petitioner was passed under Annexure-6, this Court has quashed the same in W.P.(C) No. 17171 of 2011 by order dated 29.9.2014. At the cost of repeatation, the relevant part of the order runs is stated as under:- “xx xx xx xx xx xx I further declare that the petitioner whose services has been taken away by order under Annexure-4 be deemed to be continuing in service for the entire period but, since he has not worked for all these periods he may be paid 60% back wages. xxxx xx xx xxxx xx xx However, this judgment shall not preclude opp. party no.1-University to restart the proceeding against the petitioner but to conclude lawfully. xxxx xx xx xxxx xx xx However, this judgment shall not preclude opp. party no.1-University to restart the proceeding against the petitioner but to conclude lawfully. I also make it clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merit on allegations against the petitioner.” So the question now arises that when by this order the petitioner has been declared as deemed to be continuing in service, whether the period of probation would get covered therein or the service of the petitioner would relegate back to the same stage where he was prior to the passing of earlier order of dismissal or termination. In other words to be more specific, if the balance period of probation has to be reckoned from the date of his joining pursuant to the order of this Court or the order of deemed continuance of this Court would go to mean that the petitioner has to be deemed to have completed the period of probation during this intervening period despite the condition in the order of appointment that there shall be probation period of one year and the services would stand to be regularized based on performance and successful completion of the probationary period.(emphasis supplied) The direction is undoubtedly to deem the petitioner to be continuing in service which obviously means that the petitioner is reinstated in service as he was enjoining on the date of termination/dismissal which had been held to be bad in law. When we look at the factum satisfactory performance during the probation period as mandated in the order of appointment, it undeniably goes to say that there has to be actual performance and discharge of duty as ordained and those cannot thus also be deemed to have been so done or performed which certainly requires some assessment so as to arrive at a satisfaction. Thus in my considered view, the petitioner would go back to the same stage where he was prior to the order of termination and the balance period is to commence and run from that rejoining after the order. 11. In this connection, it is pertinent to take note of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.E.D.) and others: (2013) 10 SCC 324 as has been discussed at para-21 and 22:- “21. 11. In this connection, it is pertinent to take note of the decision of the Apex Court in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.E.D.) and others: (2013) 10 SCC 324 as has been discussed at para-21 and 22:- “21. The word “reinstatement” has not been defined in the Act and the Rules. As per Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.2, 3rd Edn. The word “reinstate” means to reinstall or re-establish (a person or thing in a place, station, condition, etc.; to restore to its proper or original state; to reinstate afresh and the word “reinstatement” means the action of reinstating; re-establishment. As per Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., the word “reinstate” means to reinstall; to reestablish; to place again in a former state, condition or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed and the word “reinstatement” means establishing in former condition, position or authority (as) reinstatement of a deposed prince. As per Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the word “reinstate” means to place again (as in possession or in a former position), to restore to a previous effective state. As per Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., “reinstatement” means: “To reinstall, to re-establish, to place again in a former state, condition, or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed.” 22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quashi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employer or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” 12. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of regulation 11.0 of UGC Regulation 2010 which is applicable to the present case since opp. party no. 1 is a creature under the provisions of UGC Act, 1956 as has been said in the earlier writ application, had the period of probation of the petitioner not been illegally and arbitrarily disrupted by opp. party no. 1 which has been quashed by this Court for the fault of the opp. party no. 1-University and since the petitioner thus has not been allowed to perform his duty and complete his period of probation successfully; he should not be made to suffer again as a probationer to further complete the balance period of probation. It is submitted that had the petitioner not been restrained from performing his duty and on the contrary would have been allowed to perform his duty, he would have successfully completed the said period of one year of probation. Therefore, it is contended that the service of the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed. It is submitted that had the petitioner not been restrained from performing his duty and on the contrary would have been allowed to perform his duty, he would have successfully completed the said period of one year of probation. Therefore, it is contended that the service of the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed. Careful reading being given to the regulation 11.0 of UGC Regulation 2010, it is seen that by the same, minimum period of probation has been prescribed to be one year extendable by maximum period of one year more in case of unsatisfactory performance and that the confirmation at the end of the one year shall be automatic unless extended for another year by specific order, before expiry of the first year. That is thus clear that the probation period of one year can only be extended by one more year i.e. the maximum period of probation is two years. However, in case of extension, order to that effect is to be passed before expiry of first year otherwise the confirmation would be automatic. 13. Learned Senior Counsel for opp. party no. 1 submits that the petitioner as per the appointment order has to be on probation for a period of one year. In the appointment order said sentence does not end there nor there remains any embargo with regard to further extension of probation and on the other hand it is having a sentence as rider that the service would be regularized based on performance and upon successful completion of said probationary period. Thus as it provides for a particular period for probation and also simultaneously for order of confirmation or regularization, the performance and successful completion of service of period of probation when further stand as the requirement, the confirmation cannot be deemed thereof without actual performance and discharge of duty which in that event leaves no scope for their assessment. It is also contended that such deemed confirmation concept does not at all come in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and if it is so taken, the said sentence in the order of appointment would be otiose, making no sense and of no practical significance as intended thereby, though it has been accepted by the petitioner with eyes wide open and without any demur. 14. 14. The order of appointment in the instant case does not prescribe the maximum period of probation for the court to make an exception and say that there would be deemed confirmation. Reliance for the purpose may be placed on the decision in case of Satya Narayan Athya vs. High Court of M.P., 1996 (1) SCC 560 . In the case even though the rules prescribed for the probationary period not to exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order having been issued within the extended period of probation, the same has been upheld. It has also been authoritatively held in case of Wasim Beg vs. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 3 SCC 321 that:- “15. Whether an employee at the end of probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court had held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (1968 [3] SCR 1), M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank & Ors. (1987) Supp. SCC 643), Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow & Ors. (1986 Supp. SCC 95), State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargav & Ors. (1987 [4] SCC 482). 16. However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (1974 [2] SCC 831) which was the decision of a Bench of seven judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, this Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (1991 [3] SCC 325). In Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (1996 [1] SCC 560), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld. 17. The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act, on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. In this line of cases one can put Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1963 [1] SCR 416), State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Al i Khan (1 966 [3] SCR 821), Shri Kedar Nath Bahl v. The State of Punjab & Ors. (1974 [3] SCC 21), Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1985 [2] SCC 5) and Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India and Ors. (1997 [9] SCC 243), Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (supra) and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla (1996 [9] SCC190). In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. and Anr. (1974 [3] SCC 21), Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1985 [2] SCC 5) and Tarsem Lal Verma v. Union of India and Ors. (1997 [9] SCC 243), Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra (supra) and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla (1996 [9] SCC190). In the recent case of Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. and Anr. ( AIR 1997 SC 3269 ) (to which one of us was a party) all these cases have been analysed and it has been held that where the Rules provide that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of the maximum probationary period unless there is anything to the contrary in the Rules.” In that case there was no time limit of the period up to which probation can be extended. The appointing authority was required to issue certificate of the appellant having satisfactorily completed the period of probation. Thus it has been held therein that the provision of deemed confirmation would come into effect on his satisfactorily completing probationary period. 15. In case of Dayaram Dayal vs. State of M.P., (1997) 7 SCC 443 analysing all the earlier decisions covering the field and especially the subject, it has been held that:- “Where the Rules provide that the period of probation cannot be extended beyond the maximum period there will be a deemed confirmation at the end of maximum probationary period unless there is anything to the contrary in the Rules.” It has again been held in Mohd. Salman vs. Committee of Management and others, (2011) 12 SCC 308 that:- “17. In Kedar Nath Bahl Vs. The State of Punjab and Others reported in 1974 (3) SCC 21 , this Court clearly laid down the proposition of law that where a person is appointed as a probationer in any post and a period of probation is specified, it does not follow that at the end of the said specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed on that behalf. It was also held in that decision that unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or that there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. It was also held in that decision that unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or that there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. This Court went on to hold that at the end of the period of probation an order confirming the officer is required to be passed and if no such order is passed and if he is not reverted to his substantive post, the result merely is that he continues in his post as a probationer.” It has also been said at para-18:- “18. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is also clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, in the appointment letter issued to the appellant, it was specifically mentioned that his service would be regularised only when his performance during the probation period is found to be good/satisfactory. In view of the aforesaid stipulation, so long an order is not passed holding that the service of the appellant is good and satisfactory, it could not have been held that his service could be regularised automatically by a deeming provision.” 16. In case of Headmaster, Lawrence School, Lovedale vs. Jayanthi Raghu and another, (2012) 4 SCC 793 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said that the status of confirmation in the circumstances has to be earned and conferred. Considering the relevant rule applicable in that case it has been further said that had there been the concept of automatic confirmation as intended, the relevant rule would have been couched in a different language. No wider interpretation on the rules to infer that the probationer gets the status of a deemed confirmed employee after expiry of three years of probationary period as that would defeat the basic purpose and intent of the rule which clearly postulates “if confirmed” A confirmation as is demonstrable from the language employed in the rule, does not occur with efflux of time. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the employer. So saying it was said that the order of confirmation stands as the requirement. 17. In case of State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 the position has been expressed as under:- “3. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the employer. So saying it was said that the order of confirmation stands as the requirement. 17. In case of State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 the position has been expressed as under:- “3. This Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. In, such a case, an express order-of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post, and from the mere fact that he., is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified, period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should deemed to have been confirmed. This view was taken in Sukhbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1963 (1) SCR 416 at pp. 424-426 : AIR 1962 SC 1711 at pp. 1714-1715, G. S. Ramaswamy v. The Inspector-General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore, (1964) 6 SCR 279 at pp. 288-289 : AIR 1966 SC 175 at pp. 179-180, Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior v. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar. Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1962, D/-23-1-1964 (SC). D.A. Lyall v Chief Conservator of. Forests, U.P. Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1963, D/-24-2-1965 (SC) and State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali, (1966) 3 SCR 821 at pp.825-826 : AIR 1966 SC 1842 at p. 1845. The reason for this conclusion is that where on the completion of the specified period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules, is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implication. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period. 4. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period. 4. xxx xxx xxx xxx 5. In the present case, Rule 6(3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. With the above in the facts and circumstances of that case where rule was forbidding extension of probationary period beyond three years fixing certain period of time beyond which probationary period cannot be extended, when the employee appointed or promoted to a post of promotion is allowed to continue in that post after completion of maximum period of probation without an expressed of confirmation. He cannot be deemed to be continuing tat post as probationer by implication. The reason being that such an implication indicate the certain rules forbidding extension of probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it and in that situation it has been held as permissible to draw the inference that to be allowed to continue completion of maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. 18. The facts and circumstances of the case being tested in the touchstone of the above settled position of law and in the light of what already discussed, the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that here in this case the confirmation of the service of the petitioner at the end of the period of probation as per the appointment order i.e. on 28.7.2011 has been automatic is not acceptable. 19. 19. Now coming to the next submission, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioner in this case having joined after the order of this Court and as held to be on probation, the opp. party no. 1 has passed the order stating that the matter of satisfactory completion of the service on probation by the petitioner having been assessed by an independent appraisal committee, the University does not want to continue with the employment of the petitioner on probation in the School of Biotechnology of the University, the opp. party no. 1 beyond the period of probation as scheduled on expiry of 23.11.2014. Pertinent, it is to mention here that there has been no enquiry nor any finding of guilt has been recorded against the petitioner. This is specifically in difference to the earlier order quashed. When the petitioner had questioned his termination this Court held that there was a finding in any enquiry which is stigmatic for which the petitioner has not been given the opportunity to meet the allegation and thus there has been violation of principles of natural justice. The fact situation of all the cited cases are also not akin to the case in hand where the period of probation has undergone disruption and thus without the performance and discharge of duty as such by the petitioner during then. This has been very much taken into account on that occasion by this Court that while holding the continuance of service, the direction on that score is for payment of 60% of back wages. The petitioner has surrendered to it without demur. 20. In this connection, reference need be made to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 609 . It has been held therein:- “27. If there was any difficulty as to what was 'motive' or 'foundation' even after Shamsher Singh's case, the said doubts, is our opinion, where removed in Gujarat Steel Tubes vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sangh, 1980 (2) SCC 593 again by Krishna Iyer, J. No doubt it is a Labour matter but the distinction so far as what is 'motive' or 'foundation' is common to Labour cases and cases of employees in government or public sector. The learned Judge again referred to the criticism by Shri Tripathi in this branch of law as to what was 'motive' or what was 'foundation', a criticism to which reference was made in Samsher Singh's case. The clarification given by the learned Judge is, in our opinion, very instructive, It reads as follows (at page 616-617 (of SCR: (at p.1911 of AIR): "Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put if slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceedings from the formal order does not detract from is nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-inqurious terminology is used. On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive pecuniary cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge. We need not chase other hypothetical situations here. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive pecuniary cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge. We need not chase other hypothetical situations here. 28. In other words, it will be a case of motive if the master, after gathering some prima facie facts, does not really wise to go into their truth out besides merely not to continue a dubious employee. The master does not want to decide or to direct a decision about the truth of the allegations, but if he conducts an inquiry only for purpose proving the misconduct and the employee is not heard, it is a case where the inquiry is the foundation and the termination will be bad. 29. Subsequent to the above cases, there have been a number of other cases where the above principles have been applied. We shall refer to a few of them where some more principles have been discussed. In State of U.P. vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi, 1997 (1) SCR 462 the employee's service were terminated as he allowed some other employee to impersonate him in an examination. The order was innocuous put the case was preceded by an inquiry and it was held that the petitioner in his pleadings had not made out a case for calling for departmental records to examine if it was a case of punishment. That was how this case was explained by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in State of Maharashtra vs. S.R. Saboji [1971 (4) SCC 466]. In Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India [ 1984 (2) SCC 369 ] it was held while quashing the order of termination, that it was open to the Court to go behind the order and find out if the report/recommendation of the superior authority was a camouflage and if that was the basis or foundation for the order the report/recommendation, then it should be read along with the order for the purpose of determining the true character of termination. If on a reading of the two together, the Court reached the conclusion that the alleged finding of misconduct was the cause or basis of the order, and that but for the report containing such a finding, the order would not and could not have been passed, the termination order would have to fall to the ground as having been passed without the officer being afforded a reasonable opportunity. It was also held that it was wrong to presume that an order would be punitive only if a regular inquiry was conducted exparte or behind the back of the officer. Even if it was not a regular inquiry, any other inquiry where evidence was taken and findings were arrived behind the back of the officer, would make the subsequent termination bad. Vankataramiah, J. (as he then was) pointed out in the above case the shift in the law as brought about by Samsher Singh's case ( AIR 1974 SC 2192 ). 30. So far as Triveni Shankar Saxena vs. State of U.P. [1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 524] and State of U.P. vs. Prem Lata Motors, [ 1994 (4) SCC 189 ], relied upon by the High Court are concerned, in the former case, the termination order was a simple order which did not cast any stigma and there were several adverse entries in his confidential reports. The termination was as per rules. In the latter case the employee's superiors complained that the employee was not regular in her work, and was in the habit of leaving office during office hours. A simple order of termination appointment. There was no prior inquiry. In both these cases, the termination orders were upheld. 31. We shall now refer to a different type of cases where a departmental inquiry was started, then dropped and a simple order of termination was passed. In State of Punjab vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur [ 1968 (3) SCR 234 ], the charge memo was served, reply given and at that stage itself, the proceedings were dropped and a termination order was passed. The High Court felt that the 'object of departmental inquiry, being to punish the employee, the order of termination must be treated as punitive. In State of Punjab vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur [ 1968 (3) SCR 234 ], the charge memo was served, reply given and at that stage itself, the proceedings were dropped and a termination order was passed. The High Court felt that the 'object of departmental inquiry, being to punish the employee, the order of termination must be treated as punitive. This was not accepted by a three Judge Bench consisting of Justice Shah (as he then was) who had laid down in Madan Gopal's case ( AIR 1963 SC 531 ) the principle of 'object of the inquiry'. This court reversed the High Court Judgment and held that neither Madan Gopal's case nor Jagdish Mitter's case ( AIR 1964 SC 449 ) applied. This was because in the case before them the inquiry did not go beyond the stage of the explanation. No findings were given and no inquiry report was submitted as in the above two cases. In that case (i.e. Sukh Raj Bahadur) this Court felt that the decision in A.G. Benjamin vs. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. (341 of 1966 dated 13.12.1966) (SC) was more direct. In Benjamin's case, a charge memo was issued, explanation was received and an Enquiry Officer was also appointed but before the inquiry could be completed, the proceedings were dropped stating that: 'departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the formalities, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves." There also, the order was held not to be punitive. Following the above case, this court in Sukh Raj Bahadur's case stated that the position before them was similar to what happened in Benjamin's case and concluded as follows: "the departmental inquiry did not proceed beyond the stage of submission of a chargesheet followed by the respondent's explanation thereto. The inquiry was not preceded with, there were no sittings of any inquiry officer, no evidence recorded and no conclusion arrived at in the inquiry." 32. The underlined words are very important and demarcate the line of distinction. If the inquiry officer held no sittings, did not take evidence nor record any conclusions and if at that stage the inquiry was dropped and a simple order of termination was, passed, the same would not be punitive. 33. The underlined words are very important and demarcate the line of distinction. If the inquiry officer held no sittings, did not take evidence nor record any conclusions and if at that stage the inquiry was dropped and a simple order of termination was, passed, the same would not be punitive. 33. In Nepali Singh vs. State of U.P. ( 1988 (3) SCC 370 ) a three Judge Bench held the order to be punitive as it was passed after issuing a charge memo, a reply received, even though no evidence was adduced and no findings were given. But in a latter three Judge Bench case in State of U.P. vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, [ 1991 (1) SCC 691 ], Nepali Singh's case was not followed as being a judgment rendered per incuriam as it did not consider Champak Lal's case ( AIR 1964 SC 1854 ). Of course, the above case, i.e. Kaushal Kishore Shukla's case was one where there was an adverse entry and only a preliminary report and then a simple order of termination was issued. That order was upheld. Similarly, in Commission of Food & Civil Supply vs. P.C. Saxena [ 1994 (5) SCC 177 ]. the facts were that the departmental inquiry was started and dropped and this Court held the order not to be punitive. 34. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the Officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das's case. It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary inquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental inquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal's case. The position is not different even if a preliminary inquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental inquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal's case. The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the Officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental inquiry is started, a charge memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry Officer is appointed -if at that point of time, the inquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, thee same will not be punitive because the enquiry Officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur's case and in Benjamin's case. In the latter case, the departmental inquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the quilt of the employee. In all these cases the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case, the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the employer, by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive.” 21. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive.” 21. Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that since the facts and circumstances alleging misconduct on the part of the petitioner have been indicated to him under Annexure-16 and 21, those are required to be enquired into in regular disciplinary proceeding to be followed with necessary finding in that regard and without that merely on the basis of the assessment made by the independent appraisal committee, the order of termination of service of the petitioner is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice which offends Articles 14 and 311 of the Constitution. Plethora of decisions have been cited by him in support of the said contention and those be first gone through to find out how far those come to the aid of the case of the petitioner. 22. In case of “Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and another” (1984) 2 SCC 369 cited by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner, the narration of facts was found to be leaving no doubt that the alleged misconduct on a particular day was the real foundation for the action taken. The other instances stated in counter affidavit were found to be mere allegations put forward for purposes of strengthening the defence which was otherwise found to be very weak. So the termination was found to be by way of punishment calling for an enquiry which having not been done, the order had been quashed. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others, (1999) 3 SCC 60 found the allegations to be the foundation and not mere motive for his termination. The positions have been discussed that:- “25. In the matter of “stigma”, this Court has held that the effect which an order of termination may have on a person’s future prospects of employment is a matter of relevant consideration. In the seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab Ray, C.J. observed that if a simple order of termination was passed, that would enable the officer to “make good in other walks of life without a stigma”. In the seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab Ray, C.J. observed that if a simple order of termination was passed, that would enable the officer to “make good in other walks of life without a stigma”. It was also stated in Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana that if the order contained a stigma, the termination would be bad for “the individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of reputation which may affect his future prospects. 26. There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a “stigma”. The other issue in the case before us is whether even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination.” In the circumstances of that case the allegations were not found to be merely the motive but as the foundation of the order of termination. So the same was refused to be held as a simple order of termination. It was also held that said order in view of the word used therein contains ‘stigma’. 24. In case of Union of India vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi, (2020) 8 SCC 220, the order of discharge of the respondent therein upon analysis of the facts and circumstances was found to be punitive character and motivated by consideration not reflected in the said order. So the finding against the probationer being arrived at behind his back on the basis of an enquiry conducted into the allegations made against him and when that has been found to have formed the foundation order of charge, it was set aside as to have been passed without giving the probationer as chance of hearing. In case of “Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere vs. Union of India and others” (1989) 3 SCC 311 , the termination was no doubt for unsatisfactory performance. However, in that case from time to time orders were made by continuing the appellant’s services and she had also earned increments during the period. In case of “Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere vs. Union of India and others” (1989) 3 SCC 311 , the termination was no doubt for unsatisfactory performance. However, in that case from time to time orders were made by continuing the appellant’s services and she had also earned increments during the period. In that case when respondent took the stand that they were not satisfied with the performance of the appellant when also at no point of time she was informed about her deficiency, the termination order was found to have come to her like a thunder blow from the blue. So it was set aside. In the other case of Pradip Kumar vs. Union of India and others, (2012) 13 SCC 182 , the order of discharge on analysis of facts and circumstances of the case and all the documents was clearly found to be stigmatic and therefore it has been held that the same could not have been passed giving opportunity of hearing and thus the order of discharge was found to be bad with oblique motive and accordingly, was set aside. 25. In case of V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab and others, AIR 2000 SC 1080 , although the order terminating the services was on the ground of unsatisfactory work yet it was found to be stigmatic when it has been said therein that he failed to perform his duty administratively and technically. 26. In the light above settled position of law as we find with the ratio of the decisions referred to and discussed as above, in the instant case, it is seen that on rejoining of the petitioner he has been specifically appraised of the fact that he has to perform and discharge his duties for the residue period of probation being indicated therein, satisfactorily. This was by office order dated 16.10.2014. By further order dated 03.11.2014 the petitioner has been informed about his absence from duty and non adherence to the standing orders in the matter and having nexus with the maintenance of general discipline in the institution. Though explanation to that effect has been sought for, no further action based on that has been taken. It is thus seen to have remained at that stage of informing the petitioner to take care of those aspects and further act accordingly. Though explanation to that effect has been sought for, no further action based on that has been taken. It is thus seen to have remained at that stage of informing the petitioner to take care of those aspects and further act accordingly. The final order of termination that has been made on 22.11.2014 run as under:- “OFFICE ORDER. The period of probation of Dr. U.K. Samanta, appointed as Assistant Professor on probation in the School of Biotechnology, KIIT University, is due to end on 23.11.2014. The question of satisfactory completion of probation by Dr. U.K. Samanta has been assessed through an independent Appraisal Committee. The University decides not to continue employment of Dr. U.K. Samanta, Assistant Professor on probation in the School of Biotechnology, beyond the period of probation scheduled to end on 23.11.2014. As a result his employment under the KIIT University comes to an end with effect from the afternoon of 23.11.2014.” The above order appears to have been passed in relation to and keeping confined to the satisfactory completion of service of the petitioner as probationer which is said to have been assessed by the Independent Appraisal Committee as ultimately also coming to be accepted by the opposite party no.1 without setting any different tone. There remains no such hint to the objectionable or blameworthy conduct. Undoubtedly, no enquiry at any given point of time has been conducted specifically with regard to the facts stated under Annexures 16 and 21, i.e. the office orders dated 03.11.2014 and 15.11.2014 respectively. The narrations in those office orders touching the duty of the petitioner are said to be having their foundation and facts as available on official record coming to be maintained in regular course. The tone and tenor of lengthy response of the petitioner to the above office orders, being cumulatively viewed go to indicate that it is the petitioner who instead of keeping the matter confined to the very subject has rather stated such other matters also in raising issues unrelated to those narrations in the orders. The opposite party no.1 having sought for the explanation has not further proceeded in those matters by initiating any proceeding and in causing enquiry for recording any finding on those scores. The opposite party no.1 having sought for the explanation has not further proceeded in those matters by initiating any proceeding and in causing enquiry for recording any finding on those scores. So, here the ground for the termination now is found to have been based on the performance of the petitioner during the period having no such punitive flavour in cause or consequence. Thus the present case falls short of the tests as laid down with approval in Radhashyam Gupta’s case (supra). There remains no material to indicate that the same is based on satisfaction of any such misconduct. The opposite party no.1 in any event has not adopted the course of holding an enquiry and has also not proceeded to terminate by recording the ground from any other proceeding. It thus does not appear to be a case based on misconduct being attached to the petitioner having live nexus with the termination. Merely because this order of termination under Annexure-25 has come out sometime after rejoining of the petitioner being successful in the writ application filed by him and by virtue of the order of this Court which in the facts and circumstances and earlier finding is obvious and not avoidable in view of order of appointment stating for confirmation and regularization, no such inference can be drawn that the present order of termination is founded upon those allegations which rather have been left at that stage without further investigation touching the question of guilt or otherwise of the petitioner. Further, this order of termination is found to have recorded no such injurious reasons, so as to say that the petitioner has consequentially been visited with any stigma getting so attached to the rest of his career so as to lead this Court to hold the order to be punitive. In view of above discussion and reasons, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order being based on those allegations and relating to the misconduct on the part of the petitioner squarely portraying him as blameworthy and as such stigmatic is not acceptable. 27. In the wake of aforesaid, the writ application stands dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to cost.