JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—Defendants appellants have filed present appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Banda, dated 4th October, 1976, in Original Suit No. 12 of 1967. The decree, under challenge, provides as under : “The suit of the plaintiffs is, therefore, decreed and the following scheme for the management of the temple is drawn up. The plaintiffs are appointed ad hoc trustees to act as such and manage the properties of the temple and to look to the worship of the temple till properly selected committee consisting of five members known as President, Secretary, Treasurer and two as members is constituted under the scheme to look after the management of the temple. This committee of five persons will be regarded as the sole trustees appointed under the deed and will have full powers to carry out the worship and Puja of the deity according to the tenants of the donor. The committee will maintain and prepare a list of voters in accordance with the electoral roll for U.P. Assembly. All persons entered in the Electoral Roll for the time being who are shown as Hindus will have a right of vote in the General Meeting. In particular full respect will be given to the wishes of the donor and the faith to which she belonged the committee will be elected by adult franchise of the Hindus residing in the ward of the city of Banda in which the temple in question is situated each adult male and female Hindu will have a right of vote and five persons elected by the general Hindu public will act as given above to realise income of the properties attached to the temple and to look after the worship of the deity. This committee will be elected for one year. Annual meeting to be held in the temple on every Janmashtami day will elect the office bearers for the next year. Any office bearer will have a right to seek re-election and will be liable to be unseated for his acts or omission by a simple majority of total voters on the list and at least 2/3rd majority of the persons present and voting in the meeting. Any office bearer will have a right to seek re-election and will be liable to be unseated for his acts or omission by a simple majority of total voters on the list and at least 2/3rd majority of the persons present and voting in the meeting. The ad hoc committee consisting of the plaintiffs will have a right to take possession from the defendants and the defendants 1 to 6 will be liable to render accounts of the temple’s properties from the year 1962 as prayed. Costs of the suit will be borne by the parties.” 2. Plaintiffs respondents instituted Original Suit No. 12 of 1967 under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the permission of the Advocate General, contending that there exists a temple situated in Mohalla Sadar Naka, District Banda, wherein is installed an Idol of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji, and is popularly known as ‘Sonaron Ka Mandir’. Maker of this temple was one Smt. Sudharia widow of Lachhman Sunar. It was alleged that the temple and property dedicated to it are religious and charitable in nature, and that temple is a public temple in which Hindus of all castes have a right of worship, and that Puja is performed by Hindus of all castes, particularly members of Sunar Community. Smt. Sudharia dedicated property mentioned in item No. 1 of Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint by way of registered gift deed dated 9.11.1899 to Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji. This gift deed is on record as Exhibit-9. As per the deed dated 9.11.1899, property in the shape of a shop with two rooms, situated at Sadar, District Banda belongs to Smt. Sudharia, and that she is its owner in possession. It records that on the first floor of the shop, a temple of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji has been constructed, and that as the donor is an aged lady, and none of her nephews or daughters’ son are with her, as such the property is being gifted to Thakur Ji Maharaj. It was provided that so long as donor is alive, she would look after the temple and its property, whereafter one Ram Bharose son of Parmanand, who was the tenant in the dedicated shop will manage the affairs of the temple, and would be assisted by one Durga son of Binda Sunar. Right to receive rent etc., accordingly, was also assigned. Right to receive rent etc., accordingly, was also assigned. It was clarified in the gift deed that Smt. Sudharia would have no right left in the property, nor any of her relatives including daughters’ son would have any right over it. Smt. Sudharia died in 1962 Samwat or 1905 A.D., and the property as per the plaint averments was managed by the persons authorized by deed dated 9.11.1899. It was also alleged that after the death of Smt. Sudharia, it was the deity who continued in possession over the dedicated property and matured right by adverse possession. After death of Ram Bharose, the property was managed by his son Rai Saheb Phoolchand Jain. It is also alleged that out of the fund raised from the temple and its property, a house was purchased, which is mentioned in Item No. 2 of Schedule ‘A’ at the foot of the plaint. This property was also given on rent and its income was that of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji. After some time Phoolchand is stated to have grown indifferent towards the management of the temple and a meeting of the members of Hindu community was held on 9.12.1935 at the instance of President of Hindu Devasthan Prabandh Karini Sabha, Banda, to chalk out a scheme for the management of the aforesaid temple and the affairs of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji and its property. The committee was accordingly formed consisting of Durga Prasad as President, Ganesh Prasad plaintiff No. 1 as Vice President, Hari Charan as Secretary and Sitaram and Bachcha Lal as Joint Secretary and Treasurer respectively to manage the property of the temple. The trustees were also authorized in the meeting to demand accounts of the property of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji and the temple from Phoolchand. A notice was accordingly given by Ganesh Prasad and Durga Prasad to Phoolchand on 5.12.1935 to render accounts and deliver management of the temple and of the property of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji. Ultimately, on 1.2.1938 Phoolchand executed an ‘Intqal Nama’ of the property of the trust of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji in favour of the Hindu Devasthan Prabandha Karini Sabha Banda (registered institution) through its Secretary Mahadeo Prasad, Pleader. Since then the management of the properties of the temple was conducted by the said Sabha till 24th November, 1961. Ultimately, on 1.2.1938 Phoolchand executed an ‘Intqal Nama’ of the property of the trust of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji in favour of the Hindu Devasthan Prabandha Karini Sabha Banda (registered institution) through its Secretary Mahadeo Prasad, Pleader. Since then the management of the properties of the temple was conducted by the said Sabha till 24th November, 1961. This Sabha recognized the interest of the Sunar community in the said temple and its property. The management was actually transferred to Sunars and for last sometime Sitaram was managing the temple and its property as representative of the Sunar community. He also used to maintain accounts which the plaintiffs have filed in this case. The plaintiffs claimed that they were representatives of the Sunar community and Sitaram left the management of the temple after Aghan Badi 2 Sambat 2018. The defendant Nos. 1 to 4 who used to pay the rent of the accommodation let out to them on behalf of Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji by the Sabha stopped paying rent to Sitaram or to the Sabha in collusion with defendant Nos. 5 and 6 namely Balbhadra Prasad and Badri Prasad. Plaintiffs alleged that the representatives of Sunar community they have right to worship in the temple and by virtue of authority drived from Hindu Devasthan Praband karini Sabha have acquired a cause of action to file suit. Various amount towards rent was alleged to be due till filing of the suit. Prayer was accordingly made for the plaintiffs to be appointed as trustees of the temple and the property of Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ ‘B’ & ‘C’ with right to realize the profit of assets of the temple and to dispense the same in the management of the temple and to appoint Pujari. Prayer was further made to prepare a scheme of management of the trust and its property and that defendant Nos. 1 to 4, 5 and 6 be ordered to render accounts of the profits of the property of temple to the plaintiffs w.e.f. 25.11.1961. A prayer was also made for delivery of the property mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ or its value to the trustees. 1 to 4, 5 and 6 be ordered to render accounts of the profits of the property of temple to the plaintiffs w.e.f. 25.11.1961. A prayer was also made for delivery of the property mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ or its value to the trustees. The plaintiffs after obtaining permission from the Advocate General dated 6.2.1964 (Ex.-1) filed the suit originally in the Court of Munsif, Banda but when the plaint was returned to them, they filed it in the Court of District Judge on 26.7.1967. 3. A joint written statement on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 6 was filed. While denying the plaint allegations it was asserted that Seth Phoolchand gave up management of the temple and possession of the property sometime in the year 1928 in favour of defendant No. 5, father of defendant No. 6 and Sri Gangoley in accordance with the agreement entered into between them. It was claimed that out of wedlock of Lachhman and Smt. Sudharia, three daughters were borne namely Smt. Jasodia, Smt. Janki and Smt. Lachhmania. Smt. Lachhmania was the youngest of three daughters, who died last in 1926. The three daughters have left behind sons namely Ram Charan and Sadali from the first daughter, Nilkanth and Vishunath from the second daughter and Gulab from the third daughter. It was contended that Smt. Sudharia had limited interest in the property as she had inherited the property from her husband Lachhman, and after her death, the property opened to the next male reversioners of Lachhman in 1926. It was claimed that the endowment deed created on 9.11.1899 was revoked by the reversioners of Sri Lachhman in the year 1926, vide series of deeds dated 14.4.1928, 9.8.1928 and 16.9.1928, specifically cancelling the gift deed. These reversioners are stated to have donated the shop and temple to defendant No. 5, Sri Gayadin, father of defendant No. 6 and Sri Gangoley. The deed of endowment was alleged to have became void upon the death of Smt. Sudharia. The defendants also resisted the claim setup in the plaint that property was a public trust, and the temple was claimed to be a private temple, and consequently, provisions of Section 92 CPC would not apply. The deed of endowment was alleged to have became void upon the death of Smt. Sudharia. The defendants also resisted the claim setup in the plaint that property was a public trust, and the temple was claimed to be a private temple, and consequently, provisions of Section 92 CPC would not apply. It is also claimed that Seth Phoolchand was declared insolvent sometime in 1935, as such in order to extract money from the donees i.e. defendants, and to bring pressure on them, a gift deed was executed in favour of defendant No. 7 in collusion with the office bearers, with whom he was on family terms. Ultimately, as per the defendants, a compromise was worked out wherein Phoolchand was paid Rs. 526/10/6. It was disputed that defendant No. 7 was ever a trustee of the alleged endowment nor the rights of Sunar Community was recognized over it. It was alleged that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 took shop in suit on rent from the donees and their heirs and have been throughout paying rent. The defendants, accordingly, claimed to be exclusively entitled to manage private temple being the donees from the heirs of Lachhman and Smt. Sudharia. Claim put forth in the plaint was accordingly resisted. A replication was also filed disputing the averments set out in the written statement. The claim of defendants of possession as donees pursuant to deeds dated 14.4.1928, 9.8.1928 and 16.9.1928 was disputed and it was denied that they ever came in possession of the property of the temple or the temple etc. Plea of adverse possession of deity was also set up. The property was claimed to be that of Smt. Sudharia. An additional written statement was also filed. On the basis of respective pleas put forth by the parties, the Court below proceeded to frame following 19 issues for consideration : “1. Did the property detailed at item No. 1 of Schedule ‘A’ given below the relief para of the plaint belong to Ram Gopal father of Smt. Sudharia as alleged by the plaintiffs or it belonged to Laxmi, husband of Smt. Sudharia as alleged by the defendants? 2. Did Smt. Sudharia construct the temple known as Sonaron Ka Mandir, situated in Mohalla Mardan Naka in the city of Banda as alleged by the plaintiffs? 3. 2. Did Smt. Sudharia construct the temple known as Sonaron Ka Mandir, situated in Mohalla Mardan Naka in the city of Banda as alleged by the plaintiffs? 3. Did Smt. Sudharia dedicate property at item No. 1 of Schedule ‘A’ given below the relief para of the plaint to Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji Birajman Sonaron Ka Mandir as alleged by the plaintiffs? It so, its effect? 4. Did Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji remain in possession of the dedicated property after the death of Smt. Sudharia and mature title with respect to the said property by adverse possession as alleged in para 8(a) of the plaint ? If so, its effect? 5. Is the house, detailed at item No. 2 of Schedule ‘A’ given below the relief para of the plaint, property dedicated to Shri Thakur Radha Krishna Ji Birajman Sonaron Ka Mandir, as alleged by the plaintiffs? It so, its effect? 6. Did Sri Phool Chand execute Intqalnama dated 1.2.1938 in favour of defendant No. 7 as alleged by the plaintiffs? If so, its effect? 7. Did inheritance with respect to the disputed property open in the year 1926 upon the death of Smt. Laxmania wife of Kanhaiya as alleged by the defendants? If so, its effect? 8. Did the four daughter’s sons of Sri Laxman execute deeds dated 14.4.1928, 9.2.1928 and 16.9.1928 cancelling the endowment deed dated 9.1.1899 and donate the disputed shops and the temple to defendant No. 5, Gayadin, and Gangoley as alleged by the defendants in para 13 of the written statement ? If so, its effect? 9. Was the property at item No. 2 of Schedule ‘A’ given below the relief para of the plaint purchased by the de facto trustees from the usufruct of the trust property in the year 1922 as alleged in para 31 of the written statement? If so, its effect? 10. Did Phoolchand hand over possession of the disputed property together with the temple in question to the three donees mentioned in para 30 of the W.S. As alleged in para 32 of the W.S.? If so, its effect? 11. Is the trust in question a public trust? If so, its effect? 12. Are defendant Nos. 1 to 6 liable to render accounts to the plaintiffs? If so, how do the accounts stands amongst the parties? 13. If so, its effect? 11. Is the trust in question a public trust? If so, its effect? 12. Are defendant Nos. 1 to 6 liable to render accounts to the plaintiffs? If so, how do the accounts stands amongst the parties? 13. Should any scheme of management be chalked out by the Court and the plaintiffs be appointed trustees as alleged by the plaintiffs? If so, what could be the details of that scheme? 14. Have defendant Nos. 5 and 6 become owners of the property in dispute by adverse possession as alleged by them? 15. Is plaintiffs’ claim within time? 16. Is the Court fee paid sufficient? 17. Are defendant Nos. 1 to 4 not necessary and proper parties as alleged? 18. Are plaintiffs not fit persons to be appointed trustees? 19. To what relief, if any, and against which of the defendants or the plaintiffs entitled?” 4. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 were decided relying upon the gift deed duly exhibited as Ex.-9. The recital of fact therein that Smt. Sudharia had constructed the temple and the shops had been gifted to the deity was given due weight. The counter version of the defendants that constructions of shops and temple were made by Lachhman, based upon khasra entry, as well as deeds executed by male reversioners was discarded holding that khasra entry since is made to facilitate collection of rent by the State, as such would not be determinative of the fact that construction got raised by Lachhman. The averments in the deeds of reversioners were also discarded as issues of their right over the property had already arisen by then and recital of facts in that regard may have been influenced by legal advice. On issue No. 3, it was observed on the basis of endowment deed that suit property had been dedicated to the deity. Issue Nos. 6 and 9 were decided by relying upon contents of the sale-deed dated 26.5.1921, which clearly records that house was sold to Thakur Radha Krishna Ji. On issue No. 6, the trial Court relied upon averments of the deed of Intqalnama i.e. Ex.12 dated 1.2.1938 to hold that only right of management was transferred to Hindu Devasthan Prabandh Karini Sabha, Banda, and that no right existed in Seth Phoolchand to transfer the properties. Issue No. 1 was as to whether trust in question is a public trust or not? Issue No. 1 was as to whether trust in question is a public trust or not? On this aspect apart from averments made in the gift deed of 1899, the oral evidence of plaintiffs’ witnesses have been relied upon to hold that temple was open to Hindus in general and its entry was not restricted to any family or community. The statement of defendant No. 1 was also relied upon. Ex. A-1 i.e. khasra for the year 1905 was also taken note of, which records the temple in the name of general Hindu public. Various decision have been relied upon to hold that in view of evidence adduced, the suit property belonged to deity and is a public trust. In view of the finding given on issue No. 11, the trial Court proceeded to decide issue Nos. 4, 7 and 8 in favour of the plaintiffs by holding that acquisition of title would not arise in the male reversioners due to adverse possession. On issue No. 14, the Court below held that as the gift deed executed by Smt. Sudharia (Ex.9) excludes the daughters’ sons from the ownership over property and no evidence otherwise existed on record to show that daughters’ sons ever asserted their claim within 12 years from the date of death of Smt. Sudharia, as such, the deeds executed by male reversioners did not convey any right. Issue Nos. 15, 17, 18 and 19 have also been decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ suit has been decreed accordingly. 5. Thus aggrieved, the defendants appellants challenge the decree of the Court below essentially on following grounds : 1. It is contended that suit property belonged to Lachhman, and upon his death, devolved upon Smt. Sudharia, who could inherit the property as a limited owner. Relying upon paras 130 and 168(4) of Mulla: Hindu Law, it is argued that such limited estate in the property inherited by Smt. Sudharia passes to the next male reversioners upon her death. It is also submitted that the deed relied upon of 1899 would otherwise be invalid as Smt. Sudharia had no absolute right to alienate the property being a limited owner. 2. Decree of the Court below is also assailed on the ground that the temple was not a public trust and that finding on issue No. 11 is perverse and contrary to the weight of evidence available on record. 2. Decree of the Court below is also assailed on the ground that the temple was not a public trust and that finding on issue No. 11 is perverse and contrary to the weight of evidence available on record. It is also contended that claim in respect of a private trust could not have been espoused under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. It is submitted that gift deed executed in favour of defendants by male reversioners could not be discarded. 6. On the basis of arguments advanced on behalf of appellants, following points arise for determination in this appeal : “(i) Whether Smt. Sudharia had acquired right over property in question by inheritance from her husband, or was it her stridhana, so as to determine whether she had limited interest in the property or was she the absolute owner entitled to gift it? Based upon it, the next issue arises as to whether male reversioners had the right to cancel the endowment vide deeds executed in 1928? (ii) Whether the temple and its properties were public trust, so as to attract Section 92 of the Code?” 7. Learned counsel for the parties have relied upon passages from Mulla’s Commentary on Hindu Law as well as authorities in support of their respective contention. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that Smt. Sudharia had succeeded the property in question from her husband Lachhman, who had pre-deceased her. As per them it was Lachhman who had constructed a private temple over the roof of the shop and thereafter being his widow Smt. Sudharia had only limited rights over the temple as well as properties left out by Lachhman. Reliance is placed upon para 130 of Hindu Law by Mulla (19th Edition), relevant extract of which reads as under : “130. PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY INHERITANCE (1) A woman may inherit the ordinary property of a male such as her husband, father, son and the rest. She may also inherit the stridhana of a female such as her mother, daughter and the rest. (2) According to Dayabhaga school, as well as the Benares, Mithila, and Madras schools, property inherited by a woman whether from a male or a female, does not become her stridhana. She may also inherit the stridhana of a female such as her mother, daughter and the rest. (2) According to Dayabhaga school, as well as the Benares, Mithila, and Madras schools, property inherited by a woman whether from a male or a female, does not become her stridhana. She takes only a limited interest in the property (Paras 177-80), and on her death, the property passes not to her heirs, but to the next heir of the person from whom she inherited it (paras 168-69). If the property is inherited from a male, it will pass to his sapindas, sakulyas and samanodakas, if the parties are governed by Dayabhaga law (paras 88-90), and to his sapindas, samanodakas and bandbus if the parties are governed by Mitakshara law (paras 43-50). Moreover, if the property is inherited from a female, it will pass to the next stridhana heirs of such female (paras 145-57). “ 8. Reliance is also placed upon para 168 (4) of the same book for the purpose, which is also reproduced : “168. PROPERTY INHERITED BY FEMALES FROM MALES IN TERRITORIES OTHER THAN BOMBAY STATE (4) According to the Bengal, Benares, Mithila and Madras schools, every female, whether she be a widow, daughter, mother, father’s mother, or father’s father’s mother, who succeeds as heir to the property of a male, takes only a limited estate in the property inherited by her, and on her death the property passes not to her heir, but to the next heir of the male from whom she inherited it (as to Bombay school, see para 170). The son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, and sister, who are expressly mentioned as heirs in the Hindu law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929, also take a limited estate, according to these schools, in the property inherited by them from the last male owner.” 9. The appellants contend that provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which recognized absolute right of a female Hindu over the property acquired before or after the commencement of the Act of 1956 would have no applicability. Section 14 of the Act of 1956 reads as under : “14. The appellants contend that provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which recognized absolute right of a female Hindu over the property acquired before or after the commencement of the Act of 1956 would have no applicability. Section 14 of the Act of 1956 reads as under : “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.— (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” 10. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Apex Court in Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and others, (1991) 3 SCC 410 , for the purpose. Para 11 to 14 of the report deals with the subject and is extracted hereinafter : “11. Thus on plain reading of the section, and its interpretation by this Court in various decisions a female Hindu possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force could become absolute owner only if she was a limited owner. This being the legal position it may now be seen if a Hindu widow could transfer or alienate widow’s estate by way of gift prior to 1956 and if so to what extent. And in such alienation what right or interest was created in the alienee. Did she become a limited owner so as to become a full owner under Section 14 of the Act? And in such alienation what right or interest was created in the alienee. Did she become a limited owner so as to become a full owner under Section 14 of the Act? A Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow of predeceased son, held limited interest known as Hindu women’s estate, prior to coming into force of 1956 Act, under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose the holder of the estate was known as limited owner. The expression ‘’limited owner’ thus could not be understood, except as it was interpreted and understood in Hindu law. Could the same be said of a female donee or alienee? The Delhi High Court assumed that a female donee was a limited owner, consequently, if she was possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force and her possession was not ‘’without title’, she became an absolute owner. Basis for the decision was construction of the word ‘’possessed’ by this Court in Gummalapura Taggina case [1959 Supp 1 SCR 968 : AIR 1959 SC 577 ] wherein it was held that the word was used in widest connotation so that a widow, even if in constructive possession, was entitled to absolute ownership under Section 14 of the Act. Support was also drawn from converse case of Eramma [ (1966) 2 SCR 626 : AIR 1966 SC 1879 ] as this Court negatived the claim of widow under Section 14 as her possession on the date the Act came into force was not legal but that of a trespasser. What the High Court lost sight of was that the claim of widow in Gummalapura Taggina case [1959 Supp 1 SCR 968 : AIR 1959 SC 577 ] was upheld because the adoption made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to be in constructive possession on the date the Act came into force. And Eramma case [ (1966) 2 SCR 626 : AIR 1966 SC 1879 ] was concerned with a widow, who claimed to have inherited through son in State of Hyderabad where Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act did not apply on the date the son died. And Eramma case [ (1966) 2 SCR 626 : AIR 1966 SC 1879 ] was concerned with a widow, who claimed to have inherited through son in State of Hyderabad where Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act did not apply on the date the son died. Consequently, it was held that: (SCR p. 631) “[T]he provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property.” The High Court overlooked the vital observation made in earlier part of the judgment to the effect : (SCR p. 630) “In other words, Section 14(1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who, in absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section.” 12. Limited owner commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights. In relation to property absolute, complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to possess, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying, right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc. Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership. For instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation. Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument. The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu law arose as a matter of law. A Hindu widow, according to different schools, Banaras, Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only. Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami [(1916) 43 IA 207 : AIR 1916 PC 117 : 18 Bom LR 856] to be: (IA p. 209) “Her right is of the nature of a right to property; ... Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami [(1916) 43 IA 207 : AIR 1916 PC 117 : 18 Bom LR 856] to be: (IA p. 209) “Her right is of the nature of a right to property; ... her powers in that character are limited.” In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey [ (1962) 2 SCR 558 : AIR 1962 SC 83 ], it was observed by this Court that: (SCR p. 564) “When a widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in the properties, both legal and beneficial, vests in her.” And the restriction on her power to alienate except for legal necessity is imposed, “not ... for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of estate”. Thus a Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband. Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity. In Kamala Devi v. Bachu Lal Gupta [ 1957 SCR 452 : AIR 1957 SC 434 ], this Court after reviewing various authorities extended this principle to female donee. A gift made within reasonable limits, in favour of daughter even two years after the marriage but in pursuance of promise made at time of the marriage was upheld and the reversioners’ claim was repelled on permissible alienation under Hindu law. But what right or title is acquired by the alienee if transfer is against legal necessity or contrary to law? The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but viodable could be avoided by reversioners including Government taking by escheat (Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narainapah [(1861) 8 MIA 529]). But the widow was held bound by the transfer. 13. The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but viodable could be avoided by reversioners including Government taking by escheat (Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narainapah [(1861) 8 MIA 529]). But the widow was held bound by the transfer. 13. In Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai [ AIR 1954 SC 61 : 1954 SCR 339 : 56 Bom LR 447] the Court held as under : (AIR p. 68) “The Hindu law certainly does not countenance the idea of a widow alienating her property without any necessity, merely as a mode of enjoyment as was suggested before us by Mr Ayyangar. If such a transfer is made by a Hindu widow, it is not correct to say that the transferee acquires necessarily and in law an interest commensurate with the period of the natural life of the widow or at any rate with the period of her widowhood. Such transfer is invalid in Hindu law, but the widow being the grantor herself, cannot derogate from the grant and the transfer cannot also be impeached so long as a person does not come into existence who can claim a present right to possession of the property.” 14. Thus if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow’s estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under Section 14. And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner’s interest. Her possession may be good against the world, her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor or transferor. It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor. It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor. So far as the male alienees from limited owners, that is female Hindu prior to 1956, are concerned, it was held by this Court in Radhey Krishan Singh v. Shiv Shankar Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 472 ] that, the alienation could be challenged by the reversioner as there was nothing in the Hindu Succession Act which has taken away such a right. A female alienee did not enjoy better or different status as the Hindu law applied universally and uniformly both to male and female alienees. She did not become limited owner or holder of a limited estate as understood in Hindu law. And the alienation without legal necessity could be assailed by the reversioner. No change was brought about in this regard by the Act. If the alienation was valid i.e., it was for legal necessity or permitted by law then the donee became an owner of it and the right and title in the property vested in her. But if it was contrary to law, as in this case the gift being of entire widow’s estate, then it did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow. And the appellant cannot claim to have acquired title to the property under the gift deed. Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force. In fact such possession was not backed by any title as against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration.” 11. It is also argued that being a limited owner, the widow could make alienation only for religious or charitable purposes (para 181A) of Hindu Law by Mulla and for other purposes amounting to legal necessity (para 181B). The extent of power of alienation for religious or charitable purposes, as set out in para 181A is enumerated : “181A. ALIENATION BY WIDOW FOR RELIGIOUS OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES (1) Extent of power of alienation.—A widow or other female heir may alienate the estate for certain religious or charitable purposes. The extent of power of alienation for religious or charitable purposes, as set out in para 181A is enumerated : “181A. ALIENATION BY WIDOW FOR RELIGIOUS OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES (1) Extent of power of alienation.—A widow or other female heir may alienate the estate for certain religious or charitable purposes. These may be divided into two classes, namely: (a) the performance of the obsequial ceremonies of the deceased owner mentioned in cl (i) below, and the payment of his debts mentioned in cl (iv) below; (b) the performance of religious ceremonies of persons other than the deceased owner mentioned in cl (ii) below, and religious or charitable acts which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the deceased owner mentioned in cl (iii) below.” 12. Reliance is also placed upon decision in Naresh Kumari (Smt.) (Dead) By Lrs. v. Shakshi Lal (Dead) By Lrs. and others, (1999) 2 SCC 656 . Para 11 of the judgment is relied upon and is reproduced : “11. Within the sphere of this legal principle, now we revert to the facts of the present case. It is not in dispute that in the first leg of litigation between the parties, when Smt Kesri, widow of Radhakishan was alive and was a party, the respondents, the reversioners of Radhakishan, succeeded in their suit by getting declaration of this disputed house, that the sale-deed by Smt Kesri to Smt Naresh Kumari was without legal necessity and hence void. The appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed which became final. The present issue has arisen when the respondent-reversioners filed their second suit for possession over the same property about which they got the decree as aforesaid. The question on these facts is, whether still the appellants can claim to fall under sub-section (1) of Section 14. There could be no doubt that before a benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14, even by the widow (Smt Kesri), could be conferred, she has to show that she is possessed of this property in dispute in lieu of her limited right of maintenance. The question is whether she was possessed of this property, to claim full right under sub-section (1) which she acquired before the 1956 Act came into force. The admitted fact is, she transferred all her right to the appellants through the said sale-deed before the 1956 Act came into force. The question is whether she was possessed of this property, to claim full right under sub-section (1) which she acquired before the 1956 Act came into force. The admitted fact is, she transferred all her right to the appellants through the said sale-deed before the 1956 Act came into force. Thus, she could not be said to be possessed of this property. Thus, by her own conduct, she herself relinquished all her right and even lost possession in it through the said transfer. Thus, she could not be said to be possessed of this property before the coming into force of the 1956 Act. Then how can she get the benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14? It may be examined from another angle. It is not in dispute that any female Hindu could only alienate her limited right in an estate prior to the coming into force of the 1956 Act, which is in her possession, only for a legal necessity. If alienation is without any legal necessity or is contrary to the law, the alienee would only get a transitory limited right to enjoy the property during the lifetime of the widow which is the only residuary right she possessed which could be deemed to have been transferred. Thus, after the widow’s death, such property even from the alienee would revert back to the reversioners of her husband. In Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai [ (1991) 3 SCC 410 ] this Court held: (SCC Headnote) “A Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband. Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity. But if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow’s estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under Section 14. And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner’s interest. And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner’s interest. The alienee’s possession may be good against the world, his right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but his interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of his donor or transferor. It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor.” 13. Per contra, on behalf of the impleaded respondents it is contended that Smt. Sudharia was the absolute owner of the property, it being her stridhana and the principles relied upon by the appellants do not apply on the facts of the case. It is contended that Court below has correctly analyzed the evidence brought on record on the issue to hold that Smt. Sudharia was not having limited interest in the property. Reliance has been placed upon para 140 of Hindu Law by Mulla to contend that there is no presumption in law that estate of a widow is inherited from her husband or that her right in the property is limited. Para 140 is also reproduced : “140. Presumption as to property found in widow’s possession. Where a widow is found in possession of property, of the acquisition of which no account is given, then the mere fact that her husband died possessed of considerable property raises no presumption that the property found in her possession was originally that of her husband (g). Nor is there any presumption that the money with which a widow in possession of her husband’s estate makes a purchase of property came out of the savings from her husband’s estate (h). Generally where a woman has been in possession of property, there is no presumption that she had only a limited estate in it (i).” 14. From the respective submissions advanced by the parties on the first question, this Court is required to firstly examine as to what was the mode of acquisition of property in question in Smt. Sudharia. In order to ascertain it the evidence available on record would have to be analyzed. Primarily following documents throw light on the issue. From the respective submissions advanced by the parties on the first question, this Court is required to firstly examine as to what was the mode of acquisition of property in question in Smt. Sudharia. In order to ascertain it the evidence available on record would have to be analyzed. Primarily following documents throw light on the issue. (i) The gift deed dated 9.11.1899 (Ex.-9); (ii) Paper No. 169C to 173C i.e. copy of mortgage deed dated 1.3.1887, sale-deed dated 22.7.1889, sale-deed dated 12.3.1901 and sale-deed dated 28.7.1905 (Ex.-A59 to A63) and (ii) Paper No. 58C/1 i.e. khasra of 1905 (Ex.-A-1). The subsequent deeds of 1928 executed by male reversioners as well as deeds of 1938 although have been referred to for the purpose but can conveniently be ignored as they have come into existence much later in point of time and had otherwise taken birth after dispute had arisen. The khasra i.e. Ex. A1 pertains to fasli 1312-1313 which corresponds to the year 1905. It is a document of possession, which describes the property as being situated within the limits of municipal board, Banda, and is reflected in column No. 4 as ‘edku iq[rk e; f’kokyk oDQ vgy fgUnw’. In column No. 14 (kaifiyat) i.e. nature, it is mentioned as ‘f’kokyk iq[rk rehj dqfuUnk y{e.k lqukj f’kokyk nqdku oDQ f’kokyk’. This document by its very nature is not a document of title but is merely a document of possession. From this document it is apparent that a temple existed at the site meant for Hindus as a whole. In late 19th Century or even subsequently it was common to describe property with reference to the leading male member of the family. There is no evidence on record to show that Lachhman Sunar had died by then. It was therefore but obvious for a petty revenue official to have referred to the name of husband particularly as the document was not intended to be a document of title. Similarly, the documents in the second set i.e. Ex.A59 to A63 are all deeds of mortgage and sale executed by others in which while describing the boundary of adjoining properties the property in question is shown to be belonging to Lachhman Sunar. As in respect of the khasra the document of second set is again not a document of title for the property in question. As in respect of the khasra the document of second set is again not a document of title for the property in question. It is only to define the limits of the property sold, with reference to its boundaries, and for such purposes it is the common knowledge which is invoked. In late 19th Century when concept of karta khandan was prevalent the description of property with reference to the name of male member of the family was the norm. It would therefore not be safe to rely upon such evidence so as to hold that the shop and temple belonged to Lachhman and it devolved upon Smt. Sudharia by way of inheritance. There is no other evidence on record to show that Lachhman had purchased this property or that it was inherited by him from his forefathers. There is further no evidence on record to ascertain the date of death of Lachhman. It is in this context that the last document i.e. gift deed would have to be analyzed. The gift deed is a registered document transferring the property in question to the deity. The deed has been duly exhibited and pertains to the year 1899. Admittedly, this deed was given effect to and the property in question continued to remain managed by the persons made trustees by it. This deed has never been challenged. It categorically records that Smt. Sudharia is its owner. It is also interesting to note that in this deed Smt. Sudharia is not described as widow but is described as the wife of Lachhman. The deed uses expression ‘tkSts’, which is used to describe wife in Urdu, whereas a widow is usually described as ‘csok’. In absence of any evidence that Lachhman had died before execution of the gift deed it would certainly lend credence to the view that Lachhman was alive at the time of execution of the gift deed and the theory of inheritance would be dented on that count as well. The Court below after analyzing the evidence brought on record has found it appropriate to rely upon the assertion made in the gift deed dated 9.11.1899 to hold that property belonged to Smt. Sudharia and that she was its absolute owner. In view of the evidence brought on record, and in light of its analysis, aforesaid, I have no reasons to take a different view. 15. In view of the evidence brought on record, and in light of its analysis, aforesaid, I have no reasons to take a different view. 15. I am persuaded to have such view also on account of para 140 of Hindu Law by Mulla, which categorically provides that there shall be no presumption that the property found in widow’s possession is from her husband or that she has only a limited estate in it. In Mst. Balo v. Mst. Parbati, AIR 1940 All 385, this Court held that the fact that widow had a limited estate would have to be established, thereby providing that there is no presumption in law that a lady found in possession of a property had only a limited estate. 16. In Baikunth Nath and others v. Jai Kishun, AIR 1929 All 449, this Court had observed as under in para 18 : “18. We find it very difficult to assume that Rs. 600 remained in the hands of the lady after the lapse of 18 years, and that it is with that amount that she must have purchased this house. This circumstance must accordingly be ignored. There is therefore no evidence either way The learned Subordinate Judge has held that it was for the defendant to prove that the money did not come out of the income of the husband’s estate No authority has been cited before us in support of the contention that there is any pre sumption that the money in the hands of the lady is presumed to come out of the savings of her husband’s estate. Cases have been cited which show that where it is known that property was purchased out of the savings, it would be treated as accretion to the estate, if it had not been disposed of before the widow died. Those cases are distinguishable. The only case which is at all applicable is the case of Dakhina Kali Debi v. Jagadishwar Bhuttacharjee [1898] 2 C.W.N. 197, and that is in favour of the defendant, and shows that there is no such presumption in law. The case of Diwan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Indarpal Singh [1899] 26 Cal. 871, also suggests that there is not any general presumption that the widow can own no property herself. The case of Diwan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Indarpal Singh [1899] 26 Cal. 871, also suggests that there is not any general presumption that the widow can own no property herself. We accordingly think that in the absence of any evidence to show the contrary, it must be held that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the said house was acquired out of the savings of the widow’s estate. Their claim as regards this house should accordingly be dismissed.” 17. Although learned counsel for the appellants is correct in contending that provision of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would not be attracted in the facts of the present case, yet, in view of the finding that Mst. Sudharia was the absolute owner of the property in question, it would have to be held that she had the right to execute the gift deed dated 9.11.1899. In view of the specific recital in the deed dated 9.11.1899 that Smt. Sudharia is the owner of property in question, even otherwise the onus was upon the defendants to prove that she had limited interest in the property, which they have failed to prove. In such view of the matter, the second part of the question is also answered by holding that male reversioners had no right to cancel the endowment created vide deed dated 9.11.1899. 18. Before I proceed to discuss the second question formulated for consideration in this appeal, it would be appropriate to observe that the cancellation deed by the male reversioners had otherwise not been given effect to as would be clear from para 33 of the written statement in which it is admitted that donees from the male reversioners had paid a sum of Rs. 526/10/6 to Seth Phoolchand after 1935. This clearly proves that Seth Phoolchand continued to be in possession and managed the temple and its properties till much after the gift was executed in favour of defendants by the male reversioners in 1928. The deed of 1928 in favour of defendants would, therefore, convey no right in them. 19. The next question raised is with regard to the nature of trust i.e. whether it was public or private? Court below has framed issue No. 11 specifically on this count. A finding has been returned that trust created by Smt. Sudharia was a public trust. 19. The next question raised is with regard to the nature of trust i.e. whether it was public or private? Court below has framed issue No. 11 specifically on this count. A finding has been returned that trust created by Smt. Sudharia was a public trust. This finding is challenged by the defendants in this appeal. 20. The tests to determine as to whether a trust is a public trust or is a private trust has been clearly laid in Kuldip Chand v. Advocate General to Government of H.P., (2003) 5 SCC 46 . In para 47, following tests have been construed as laying down sufficient guidelines for the purpose : “47. This Court laid down the following tests as sufficient guidelines to determine on the facts of each case whether an endowment is of a public or private nature: (1) Where the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained, the question whether the user of the temple by members of the public is as of right. (2) The fact that the control and management vests either in a large body of persons or in the members of the public and the founder does not retain any control over the management. Allied to this may be a circumstance where the evidence shows that there is provision for a scheme to be framed by associating the members of the public at large. (3) Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature. (4) Where the evidence shows that the founder of the endowment did not make any stipulation for offerings or contributions to be made by members of the public to the temple, this would be an important intrinsic circumstance to indicate the private nature of the endowment.” 21. In light of the tests laid down, evidence available on record would have to be scanned. The deed creating endowment puts no restriction upon right of worship for members of the family or any specific group of persons. In light of the tests laid down, evidence available on record would have to be scanned. The deed creating endowment puts no restriction upon right of worship for members of the family or any specific group of persons. It also clearly specifies that the donor would seize to have any right over the trust. There is a further clear stipulation that nephews or the daughters’ sons of Smt. Sudharia would have no right in the property. Only right of management was retained during her life time by Smt. Sudharia and upon her death trustees were named to manage the property who were to have complete control over right to receive rent etc. and to ensure proper performance of Puja etc. It is further admitted on record that Hindus as a whole and Sunars in particular have been offering Puja in the temple for the last more than 100 years without any obstruction. The khasra which has been relied upon by the defendants also clearly mentions that temple is for the general Hindu public. 22. Oral evidence has also been adduced on this issue. PW-1 who is aged about 61 years and is a resident of Banda has clearly stated that Hindu public in general worshiped the deity in the temple. PW-2 Ram Sewak also a resident of Banda has stated that it was a public temple and was commonly known as ‘Sunaron Ka Mandir’. He has stated that all Hindus residing in the vicinity used to offer worship to the deity. PW-3 has also given a similar statement. Laxmi Prasad who claims to be grandson of daughter of Smt. Sudharia has appeared as PW-4 and has stated that his father or forefathers were never in possession over the properties of the temple. Puran Lal PW-5 has also given a similar statement. Trial Court has observed that nothing could be shown from their cross-examination that access to the temple was restricted. DW-1 Balbhadra Prasad who was engaged in the profession of Panditai has also admitted in his cross-examination that all persons living in the vicinity used to go to temple for Darshan and worship without any obstruction or restriction. Trial Court has observed that nothing could be shown from their cross-examination that access to the temple was restricted. DW-1 Balbhadra Prasad who was engaged in the profession of Panditai has also admitted in his cross-examination that all persons living in the vicinity used to go to temple for Darshan and worship without any obstruction or restriction. The evidence of defendants is in the form of recital in the deed of cancellation executed by male reversioners in 1928, which cannot be relied upon as it has been brought into existence for the benefit of the defendants and has already been found to be without any authority of law. The evidence both oral and documentary clearly supports the finding of Court below on issue No. 11 that the properties of the temple is a public trust. As the temple continues to receive prayers and offerings of general Hindu community for the last more than 117 years without any restriction, and emotions of a community is otherwise attached, it would otherwise not be appropriate to treat it as a private trust. Based upon such evidence, it would have to be held that property in question is a public trust and the provisions of Section 92 CPC were available to be invoked. 23. No other point is pressed. 24. Appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed. However, as the original plaintiffs have already died and constitution of committee to manage temple and other suit properties in terms of the decree passed, would take sometime, provision would have to be made for management of the public trust in the interregnum period. As such it is provided that for a period of one year or till the constitution of Committee in terms of the decree, whichever is earlier, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the area concerned shall be the Receiver, who shall be responsible for the management of the temple and its properties. It shall be open for him to take assistance of any subordinate official, not below the rank of Tehsildar for discharge of its functions. An inventory of the properties of temple shall be got prepared within a month. All offerings to the temple and receipts from its properties shall be accounted for and be deposited in a separate account to be opened in the name of deity and shall be operated by the Receiver and later by the committee constituted. An inventory of the properties of temple shall be got prepared within a month. All offerings to the temple and receipts from its properties shall be accounted for and be deposited in a separate account to be opened in the name of deity and shall be operated by the Receiver and later by the committee constituted. None of the properties shall be transferred nor any charge shall be created over it. The expenses towards maintenance of the temple and its properties, including offering of Puja etc., would be met out of such corpus. The respondents to this appeal who deposit a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lac) or above in the corpus of the temple would have the right to assist the Receiver in managing the suit property. The Receiver shall also ensure constitution of committee in terms of the decree within a year. The defendants shall hand over possession of the suit property to the Receiver and those who are in possession as tenant shall pay rent to the receiver. The defendants shall also render accounts of the temple’s property in terms of the prayer made. A periodical report shall be submitted by the Receiver before the Court below after every three months, till the committee in terms of decree is formed.