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Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1872 (GUJ)

Keshavlal Bechardas Patel v. State of Gujarat

2017-12-05

B.N.KARIA

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition has been preferred by the petitioners/original accused under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity “CrPC”) praying to quash and set aside the complaint, being C.R. No. I-8/2009 registered with Sector 7 Police Station, Gandhinagar for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 423 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner no.1 purchased agricultural land, bearing Survey No. 640/1 situated at Village: Bhoyan-Rathod District Gandhinagar comprising 3884 sqr. meters from the land owners viz., Gordhanbhai Manordas and others for a consideration of Rs. 1,25,000/- and the petitioner no.1 made payment thereof of Rs. 1,00,000/- by way of cheque, bearing no. 452032 dated 09.02.2007 and the rest of Rs. 25,000/- was paid in cash. A sale deed was executed by said Arunbhai Manordas on his behalf as well as power of attorney of co-owners. That, in the land in question, one Jijaji Maganji Thakore was a tenant having possession for some time, and therefore, consent of the said person was also required to complete the sale transaction between the petitioners and the original land owners. In this view of the matter, in the sale deed executed, as referred to hereinabove, the said Jijaji was shown as a party confirming the sale deed, through his power of attorney, being petitioner no.2. That, after the execution of sale deed and transfer of land in favour of the petitioner no.1, amended entry no. 2450 was mutated on 22.07.2007 in revenue records being village form no. 6. But, the said entry was objected by the respondent no.2-complainant before the Mamlatdar, Gandhinagar vide objection dated 03.12.2007 claiming that the land in question was sold to the respondent no.2 on 16.01.2007. Thereafter, the petitioner no.1 purchased other parcels of land at the said village i.e., Survey no. 654, 655/3, 637, 656, 638/1 from the respective land owners. However, the respondent no.2-complainant also claimed ownership in respect of the said parcels of land purportedly on the basis of got up power of attorney and sale deed of the land owners. The petitioner no.1 has initiated civil proceedings by filing civil suit for declaring the sale deed of respondent no.2 as null and void, one of the suits being Special Civil Suit No. 45/2008 is pending in the court of learned 6th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gandhinagar. The petitioner no.1 has initiated civil proceedings by filing civil suit for declaring the sale deed of respondent no.2 as null and void, one of the suits being Special Civil Suit No. 45/2008 is pending in the court of learned 6th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gandhinagar. It is also required to be noted that like wise, the respondent no.2 has also initiated civil proceedings against the petitioner no.1 for declaring the sale deed of the petitioner no.1 as null and void. However, the respondent no.2 has filed complaint alleging that the petitioner no.1 purchased the land from the original land owners without verifying the ownership of the respondent no.2-complainant in respect of the said land. The petitioner no.2, being son of the petitioner no.1 has been arraigned as an accused alleging that he sold the land in question to the petitioner no.1, having sold the same to the respondent no.2. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Tejas A Barot appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Hardik A Dave appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2 and learned APP Mr. KL Pandya appearing on behalf of the respondent no.1. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas A Barot appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have not committed alleged offence and the present complaint is a sheer abuse of process of law as well as false, bogus and concocted. That, the alleged offence had taken place in the year 2007 and the complaint thereof is lodged in the month of January 2009. That, the dispute is purely of civil nature and is given cloak of criminality to exert undue pressure on the petitioners. That, the complaint does not contain any specific allegations which are required to be made against the accused persons. As per settled law, for want of specific allegations in the complaint, the accused cannot be prosecuted. The complaint is devoid of averments as regards offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 423 of the Indian Penal code are concerned, the only allegation made is that the petitioner no.1 purchased the land in question from the original land owners without verifying prior ownership of the respondent no.2 complainant. That, there is gross delay in filing the complaint. The complaint is devoid of averments as regards offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 423 of the Indian Penal code are concerned, the only allegation made is that the petitioner no.1 purchased the land in question from the original land owners without verifying prior ownership of the respondent no.2 complainant. That, there is gross delay in filing the complaint. That, the allegations made against the petitioner no.2 are also ex facie, unsustainable, false and unwarranted, as the petitioner no.2 has not played any role in selling the land in question to the respondent no.2, and therefore, the said allegation is baseless and does not merit any consideration. That, the complainant has even averred in the complainant that he has objected to the entry made pursuant to the sale deed in favour of the petitioner no.1 before the revenue authority which shows that the dispute is of purely civil in nature. That, the factum of filing complaint before Pethapur Police Station in respect of the land in question which came to be filed considering the civil nature of the dispute, has also been suppressed. That, even if the complaint is taken at its face value, the same does not make out a case for commission of offence, as alleged. In the present case, the dispute between the parties, which is purely of civil nature, is going on for quite a long time and the same cannot be termed as an act of criminal nature, warranting the petitioners to be prosecuted for the offence which they have not committed. That, the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC are not satisfied. That, it is settled legal position that complaint/proceeding is required to be quashed when criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 5. It is further argued that abundantly clear that the criminal proceeding is initiated against the petitioners with ulterior motives and malafide intention on account of civil disputes between the parties. In support of his arguments, learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance upon judgments rendered in the case of Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal & Anr., reported in 2007(7) SCC 373 , Dalip Kaur & Ors. In support of his arguments, learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance upon judgments rendered in the case of Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal & Anr., reported in 2007(7) SCC 373 , Dalip Kaur & Ors. v. Jagnar Singh & Anr., reported in 2009(14) SCC 696 and Arvindbhai Maganlal Master & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 2015 (1) GLH 149 . Ultimately, it was requested by him to allow this petition and quash the impugned complaint, being C.R. No. I-8/2009 registered with Sector 7 Police Station, Gandhinagar for an offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 423 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Hardik A. Dave appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2 has strongly opposed the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioners to urge that a prima facie case, as per the complaint, is made out against the present petitioners. He has tried to explain the delay, which has been projected by the petitioners and submitted that the delay, on the contrary, is attributable to the accused and when the documents in question is produced in the civil proceedings, the complaint came to be filed immediately upon noticing the same. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that this offence which has been alleged is a continuous offence, and therefore, as soon as that cause has arisen, immediately a complaint came to be lodged. It is further submitted that this is not the stage where extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised. That, the issue requires detailed examination and as the offence is serious in nature, no interference be called for. He has further submitted that there are series of decisions, wherein, it has been propounded that the High Court should loath in interfering in investigation to be undertaken by an executive, and therefore, simply because the civil suit is pending, it cannot be said that criminal complaint may be quashed. 7. He has further submitted that there are series of decisions, wherein, it has been propounded that the High Court should loath in interfering in investigation to be undertaken by an executive, and therefore, simply because the civil suit is pending, it cannot be said that criminal complaint may be quashed. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 further submitted that civil suit is based upon a controversy in which a specific prayer of a different nature is asked for by the plaintiff, whereas, the complaint in nature is related to a serious offence of forgery as well as offence under Sections 406, 420, 423 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, and therefore, simply because the disputed deed is part of record of the civil suit, it cannot be presumed that no offence is made out. It is further submitted that allegations, which are made in the complaint are serious in nature, prima facie reflecting an offence being made out, and therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, investigation cannot be hampered or throttled by exercising inherent jurisdiction. That, the present petitioners and other co-accused are in collision with co-owners of the land in question. That, the second sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner no.1 shows that confirming party i.e., the petitioner no.2, who is son of the petitioner no.1. That, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- was paid to the petitioner no.2 by his father i.e., petitioner no.1 on 18.04.2006. That, all the co-accused are conspirators of the land deal, which requires detailed investigation, as they are total seven in number. That, power of attorney is also arraigned as an accused in the offence, who has signed in both the sale deeds on behalf of the owners. After lodging complaint by the respondent no.2, this petition was filed. That, objections were raised by the respondent no.2 on 03.12.2007 before the Mamlatdar in connection with revenue entry. That, the revenue dispute is pending before the Collector. That, there is no question to harass the present petitioners by lodging the complaint. That, the recent trend on exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC is clearly defined by the Apex Court, in which it is held that such power should be exercised sparingly and therefore, there is no embargo under Section 482 CrPC simply because a civil suit is pending, the criminal law may not be allowed to operate. That, the recent trend on exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC is clearly defined by the Apex Court, in which it is held that such power should be exercised sparingly and therefore, there is no embargo under Section 482 CrPC simply because a civil suit is pending, the criminal law may not be allowed to operate. That, a contradictory stand has been taken, as compared to the averments made in the civil suit, and therefore, this being a case based upon highly disputed facts, no such detailed examination be undertaken under Section 482 proceedings. Ultimately, it was requested by learned advocate Mr. Hardik A. Dave for the respondent No.2 that at this stage of the proceedings, not to interfere with the complaint. 8. Mr. K.L. Pandya, learned APP for the respondent no.1 has supported the arguments made by learned advocate for the respondent no.2 to contend that an offence is committed by the present petitioners. It was further argued that investigation cannot be hampered in such a background of alleged serious offence and submitted that the complaint is at the initial stage of investigation, and therefore, it should not be intercepted in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Learned APP also submitted that the petitioners have appropriate remedy at an appropriate stage, if aggrieved after investigation and therefore, since the petitioners are left with other remedies at an appropriate stage, this is not the stage where the Court may hamper the process of investigation, and therefore, he ultimately submitted not to interfere with the present proceedings and thereby dismiss the same by vacating interim relief forthwith. 9. Having heard learned advocates appearing of the respective parties and having considered the record of the case, before dealing with facts of the case, this Court would like to discuss the law on the subject; as it appears that the disputed document for which the complaint came to be filed is subject-matter of a Civil suit, which is pending before the competent Court. 10. In Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 1 , the Court reiterated the scope and ambit of power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code in the following words: “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the could would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases 25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP, 1964 AC 1254 Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” c. In yet another decision in the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Mahrashtra and Another reported in (2014) 16 SCC 1 , where also the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered in a similar way and found that the proceedings are required to be quashed from being misused and in Paragraph 30 it was held as under :- “30. Putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of course. To settle the scores between the parties which are more in the nature of a civil dispute, the parties cannot be permitted to put the criminal law into motion and courts cannot be a mere spectator to it. Before a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance with the statutory requirements. The superior courts should maintain purity in the court. Before a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance with the statutory requirements. The superior courts should maintain purity in the court. The High Court ought to have quashed the complaint against the appellant which is nothing but a pure abuse of process of law.” d. In another decision in the case of D.P. Gulati, Manager Accounts, Jetking Infotrain Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in 2015 11 SCC 730 , the Apex Court while dealing with the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has propounded that this exercise of power is aimed at to prevent the abuse of process of law and the duty under Section 482 of the code of Criminal Procedure is to see and secure the ends of justice and also that no proceedings are abused. The relevant paragraph of the said decision is worth to be taken note of and hence, reproduced hereinafter :- “7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions made before us. From a bare perusal of Section 482 of the Code, it is clear that the object of exercise of power under the section is to prevent abuse of process of law, and to secure ends of justice. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, this Court has enumerated the steps required to be followed before invoking inherent jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code as under :- “30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC : 30.1. Step one : whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two : whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. 30.3. Step three : whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer is all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 8. In Rishipal Singh v. State of U.P., explaining the law in the similar circumstances, as in the present case, this Court observed, in para 17, as under :- “17. It is no doubt true that the courts have to be careful while exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC. At the same time we should not allow a litigant to file vexatious complaint to otherwise settle their scores by setting the criminal law into motion, which is pure abuse of process of law and it has to be interdicted at the threshold.” In this very decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also analyzed the general grounds on which the petition for quashing can be viewed while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, even in the recent pronouncement also there is no straight- jacket formula that when a criminal complaint is filed, it is to be put to a logical end if a bare reading of the complaint indicates that if no offence is made out, the High Court can certainly exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to curb the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice. 11. Having considered the facts of the case, submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties as well as learned APP for the respondent no.1-State, it is undisputed fact that land in question was purchased by the respondent no.2 by a registered sale deed vide Sr. 11. Having considered the facts of the case, submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties as well as learned APP for the respondent no.1-State, it is undisputed fact that land in question was purchased by the respondent no.2 by a registered sale deed vide Sr. No. 433 dated 10.01.2007 for a sale consideration of Rs. 78,000/- from the original owners, who are accused in the impugned complaint through their power of attorney Suthar Arunbhai Manordas, who is also one of the accused. The said sale deed was registered in accordance with law before the office of Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar on 10th January 2007. As per the averments made in the sale deed, particularly in para 5, peaceful and vacant physical possession of the land in question was handed over to the purchaser-respondent no.2, which was received by him. It was further averred that title of the land was clear and marketable, as previously the land was not transferred to any one. From the averments made in the sale deed produced on record, it appears that respondent no.2 was a purchaser, first in time i.e. on 10th January 2007. Thereafter, it appears that the same land i.e., hectare aare sqr meter 0-38-44 of survey No. 640/1 at village Bhoyan Rathod, Sub District: Gandhinagar, District: Gandhinagar was sold to petitioner No.1-Keshavlal Bechardas Patel at the consideration of Rs. 1,25,000/-. The same sale deed was registered in favour of the purchaser i.e., petitioner no. 1 on 13th February 2007, which was registered at Sr. No. 1819 with the office of Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar. In the said sale deed also, on 13th February 2007, it is averred that title of land was clear and marketable as well as transferable and the land in question was never transferred or mortgaged or sold or gifted by in any way. It is also averred in the sale deed produced on record that peaceful and vacant possession of the land in question was handed over to the petitioner no.1-purchaser. It appears from the second sale deed executed on 13th February 2007 by one Jijaji Manganji Thakor, who is shown as a party confirming of the sale deed that the petitioner no.2-Bhaveshkumar Keshavlal Patel, as a power of attorney of the confirming party namely Jijaji Mangaji Thakor and put his signature in the said second sale deed, as a power of attorney. The petitioner No.2 is son of the petitioner no.1, who has received Rs. 25,000/- as per the sale deed, on behalf of the confirming party-Jijaji Magnaji Thakor and consented to hand over possession to the petitioner No.1, who is alleged to be the purchaser. However, the earlier sale deed which was duly registered in favour of complainant/respondent no. 2 was on 10th January 2007, the second sale deed was executed by the same sellers of the same land in question in favour of the petitioner No.1, wherein the petitioner no.2 is shown as a confirming party, being power of attorney of one Shri Jijaji Mangaji Thakor, which appears to be doubtful. Of course, in Village Form No. 6 of the revenue record, entry of the petitioner No.1 was carried out showing the transaction of the sale on 22nd July 2007, which was strongly objected by the respondent no.2 before the Mamlatdar by raising a grievance on 3rd December 2007. It is also admitted fact that revenue dispute is pending between the parties and both the parties have filed Civil Suits and they are pending before the court of learned Senior Civil Judge at Gandhinagar for cancelling the registered sale deed. As per the first sale deed in favour of the respondent no.2-complainant, vacant and peaceful possession of the land in question was handed over to him, another sale deed relating to the same land was executed by the sellers, who all are accused in the impugned complaint. The petitioner No.1 can never be said to be bonafide purchaser, as argued by the learned advocate for the petitioners. Particularly, the petitioner No.2 is son of the petitioner No.1 and is a confirming party, in handing over possession of the land in question to his father i.e., petitioner No.1. Looking to the facts of this case, documents and evidence produced on the record, it cannot be said that investigation is no more required as a Civil Suit is filed and pending before the Court below. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioner has relied a decision in the case of Arvindbhai Maganlal Master & Anr. Looking to the facts of this case, documents and evidence produced on the record, it cannot be said that investigation is no more required as a Civil Suit is filed and pending before the Court below. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioner has relied a decision in the case of Arvindbhai Maganlal Master & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., complaint was lodged under Sections 406, 420, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code alleging that although the complainant had paid entire amount by way of sale consideration at the time of agreement to sell, the owners through their power of attorney holder, failed to execute the sale deed and despite pendency of suit for specific performance, transferred property fraudulently in favour of the third party, who are other co-accused. Considering the facts of the case, it was found that a civil dispute relating to the alleged breach of contract into criminal proceedings was made out by the complainant, and therefore, FIR was quashed. Here, the facts of the present case are quite different than the facts of the cited case. Here, the first sale deed was in existence, executed by the same owners and other co-accused arraigned in the complaint, second sale deed of the same land is executed, and therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners would not helpful to the petitioners. 13. In case of Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal & Anr., reported in 2007(7) SCC 373 , cheques issued by accused towards payment regarding purchase of welding rods were dishonoured. On demand of said money, accused allegedly stating that he had issued fabricated cheques knowingly with an intention to cheat the complainant and grab his money. Complaint was filed alleging commission of offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. It was held that nonpayment or underpayment of price of goods by itself does not amount to commission of offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust. It was essentially a civil dispute. Merely because the accused issued cheques, which got dishonoured, the same by itself would not mean that he cheated the complainant. The complaint was quashed. Here also, facts are different from the facts of the present cited judgment. It was essentially a civil dispute. Merely because the accused issued cheques, which got dishonoured, the same by itself would not mean that he cheated the complainant. The complaint was quashed. Here also, facts are different from the facts of the present cited judgment. As discussed above, as the same owners have sold the same land to the present petitioner no.1, who was earlier sold to the respondent no.2, wherein Petitioner No.2 is the consenting party, being a son of his father petitioner No.1. 14. In case of Dalip Kaur & Ors. v. Jagnar Singh & Anr., reported in 2009 (14) SCC 696 , there was a question of non refunding of amount of advance, which resulted in breach of contract, and therefore, it was held that it would not be considered cheating or criminal breach of trust. Here, there is no question of simply a breach of contract, which would not considered as an offence of cheating. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there is a clear deception by petitioners, who dishonestly, induced the owners of the land to deliver vacant possession of the land in question to him, wherein the petitioner No.2, who happens to be a son of the petitioner No.1 has confirmed the sale deed by putting his signature. Possession of the land in question was handed over to the respondent no.2 by a registered sale deed prior to the sale deed in favour of the petitioner no.1, therefore, it can never be handed over to him on the basis of a second sale deed executed in his favour and he cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser of the land in question. It can be said that by executing second sale deed by the petitioner No.1, he has dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use the land in question, or dishonestly tried to use of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribed the mode in which, such trust is to be discharged, express or implied. 15. It can be said that by executing second sale deed by the petitioner No.1, he has dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use the land in question, or dishonestly tried to use of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribed the mode in which, such trust is to be discharged, express or implied. 15. Under the circumstances, this Court would not like to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings/complaint and in particular, First Information Report, as the petitioner No.1 is not a bonafide purchaser of the land in question because the petitioner No.2, who is son of the petitioner No.1, is a confirming party and handed over of the possession to his father by receiving money of Rs. 25,000/- on behalf of one Jijaji Maganji Thakore in the year 2006 back from his father. 16. Resultantly, this petition requires dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. Ad interim relief granted earlier; if any, stands vacated. No costs. FURTHER ORDER 17. Learned advocate Mr. Tejas A Barot appearing on behalf of the petitioners requested to extend interim relief granted by this Court vide order dated 4th February 2009 with a view to approach the Apex Court. Learned advocate Mr. Hardik A Dave for the respondent no.2 objected extension of interim relief. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. L.B. Dabhi for the respondent no.1-State has also objected grant of further extension of interim relief. 18. Considering the fact that by an order dated 4th February 2009, this Court had granted ad interim relief in terms of para 10(B). This court, after considering the material available on record and submissions made by learned advocates for the respective parties, has been pleased to dismiss the writ petition today ie., on 5th December 2017. As the petitioners desire to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging this order, an opportunity is required to be given to them. Hence, the order passed today shall remain suspended upto 31st January 2018. Petition dismissed.