JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition challenges an order passed by School Tribunal, Amravati on an appeal filed by the petitioner herein challenging the termination of his employment with the respondent society. 3. On 1st December, 1998, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher in the school run by the respondent society. In February, 2009, he was promoted as Headmaster of the school. While he worked as Headmaster, an order of suspension was issued against him by the Vice President of the first respondent society purportedly under a resolution passed by the managing committee of the society for a disciplinary action against him. On 12th April, 2011, respondent No. 4, in his capacity as Secretary of respondent No. 1 society, issued a charge-sheet and statement of allegations to the petitioner, calling for his explanation. The petitioner objected to the disciplinary enquiry on the ground that the enquiry was neither initiated by the President of the society nor was the President called for conducting the enquiry and accordingly, the enquiry was not in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as “MEPS Act” for brevity) and the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner, accordingly, submitted a communication to the Enquiry Committee. The petitioner, in the meantime, challenged his suspension order by filing a petition before this Court, being Writ Petition No. 552 of 2011. On 11th April, 2011, that petition was withdrawn. Thereafter the petitioner filed another petition, being Writ Petition No. 2664 of 2011, seeking inter alia a declaration that initiation of departmental enquiry against him by respondent No. 4 was illegal and the petitioner be allowed to resume in the post of Headmaster. Even this writ petition was withdrawn by him later. The enquiry against the petitioner thereafter proceeded, and resulted into the dismissal order passed against him. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal, being Appeal No. 18 of 2013, before the school Tribunal at Amravati. The School Tribunal, by a detailed order and judgment, rejected the petitioner’s appeal. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 4. The enquiry against the petitioner thereafter proceeded, and resulted into the dismissal order passed against him. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal, being Appeal No. 18 of 2013, before the school Tribunal at Amravati. The School Tribunal, by a detailed order and judgment, rejected the petitioner’s appeal. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 4. One of the principal contentions of the petitioner urged before the School Tribunal, and also pressed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the initiation of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was vitiated due to violation of the provisions of the MEPS Act and the Rules. Learned counsel submits that since the petitioner was the Headmaster of the school, disciplinary proceedings against him could have been initiated only by the President of the trust and not by either respondent No. 3 (the then Vice-President who passed the initial suspension order) or respondent No. 4 (the Secretary who purportedly issued the charge-sheet and statement of allegations, calling for the petitioner’s explanation and proposing the disciplinary enquiry). Learned counsel submits that the President alone is not only empowered to initiate the enquiry, but is also required to be part of the enquiry committee in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Act and the Rules. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner is merely a victim of the internal fight between two groups in the management, respondent No. 2 who was the President of the Trust being on one side and the other committee members including respondent Nos. 3 and 4 being on the other. The School Tribunal, in its impugned order, has noted that it was an admitted fact that on 6th February, 2011, i.e. before the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were initiated by service of the charge-sheet, there were elections to the managing committee of the trust, in which respondent No. 3 was elected as President in place of the earlier President, i.e. respondent No. 2, and respondent No. 4 was appointed as Secretary. The petitioner did not dispute the factum of the elections. It was indeed not his case that after the expiry of the term of management of the earlier management headed by respondent No. 2, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 took over the management without conducting elections. The petitioner did not dispute the factum of the elections. It was indeed not his case that after the expiry of the term of management of the earlier management headed by respondent No. 2, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 took over the management without conducting elections. The main thrust of the petitioner’s arguments before the School Tribunal was that the validity of the elections and appointment of respondent Nos. 3 and 4, respectively, in the posts of the President and the Secretary, was the subject-matter of a pending enquiry before the Charity Commissioner and pending acceptance of the change report in that behalf, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were not entitled to conduct the management or issue, in particular, any show cause notice or disciplinary action against the petitioner. The School Tribunal, relying on the judgment of our Court in the case of Vijay K. Mehta vs. Charu K. Mehta, reported in 2008(5) ALL MR 366, held that pendency of the change report in respect of the existing management of the trust would not in any way help the petitioner in resisting the enquiry. It is not really in dispute that the term of the old management under the Presidentship of respondent No. 2 had come to an end by February, 2011 and that elections to the managing committee were held on 6th February, 2011. In these elections, respondent No. 3 was elected as President in place of respondent No. 2. Though the change report in that behalf was pending before the Charity Commissioner, that is to say, there was no order of acceptance of the change under section 22(3) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, there is no restriction in law insofar as management of the trust by the newly elected management is concerned. The changes effected by the trust in its management are in pursuance of the elections of 6th February, 2011 and take effect immediately. Acceptance of change report by the Charity Commissioner merely gives finality to the change already effected by the trust. It is not that the act of making of such change comes into effect from the date of acceptance of the change report. Acceptance of change report by the Charity Commissioner merely gives finality to the change already effected by the trust. It is not that the act of making of such change comes into effect from the date of acceptance of the change report. This was laid down by a learned single Judge of our Court in the case of Chembur Trombay Education vs. D.K. Marathe, 2002(3) BCR 161 and endorsed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ganesh vs. C.H.M. Edu. Society, reported in 2007(6) Mh.L.J. 589 . It is this law which was reiterated by our Court when it decided the case of Vijay K. Mehta (supra). The School Tribunal correctly applied this law to the facts of the present case and held that a mere dispute between the management or a pending contest concerning a change in management or acceptance of the change effected by the trust in its management did not in any way prohibit the new management from managing the trust and in particular, as part of that management, from taking disciplinary action against the employees of the school including the petitioner herein. The School Tribunal rightly observed that the petitioner was an employee of the school; he was not expected to get into the dispute between the trustees; as an employee he had to face the inquiry as per the procedure. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nand Deo Pande vs. Committees of Management and other, reported in AIR 1991 SC 413 . That was a case where the enquiry was instituted against the head of the school and the argument before the Court was that the enquiry was not initiated by a validly constituted managing committee. The Court held that the delinquent employee was entitled to urge that the committee initiating action against him was not validly constituted or had ceased to be validly constituted. The Supreme Court in that case noticed that the issue of validity of the committee was being decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Deputy Director of Education. The Court held that the delinquent employee was entitled to urge that the committee initiating action against him was not validly constituted or had ceased to be validly constituted. The Supreme Court in that case noticed that the issue of validity of the committee was being decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Deputy Director of Education. The SDM/DDE was directed to proceed with the enquiry and complete the same within one month and thereafter the committee held to be properly constituted would be at liberty to continue with the proceedings of the enquiry against the petitioner and, in the meantime, the enquiry initiated by the present committee of management would stand stayed. It is pertinent to note that in the case before the Supreme Court, the District Inspector acting under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 had already found that the managing committee of the school had ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections and it was this dispute, which was pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under the provisions of the Societies Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960. In fact, in the light of this position, the District Inspector had declined to grant approval to the suspension order passed by the School Management against the petitioner. Similar enquiry was also pending before the Deputy Director of Education under the U.P. Education Act. The directions of the Supreme Court referred to above were passed in the light of these facts. These facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of our case, where the elections to the managing committee were actually held and respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were, respectively, elected as President and Secretary of the trust in place of the earlier incumbents. What was pending before the Charity Authorities was a change report in respect of these changes, which were contested by the earlier incumbents including respondent No. 2 herein. The facts of our case are clearly covered by the decisions of our Court referred to above. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that there is no compliance with the provisions of the MEPS Act and the Rules insofar as the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry in the present case is concerned. The facts of our case are clearly covered by the decisions of our Court referred to above. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that there is no compliance with the provisions of the MEPS Act and the Rules insofar as the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry in the present case is concerned. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was merely given a charge-sheet and not a statement of allegations as is mandatory under the provisions of the MEPS Act and the Rules. There is no merit even in this contention. As observed by the School Tribunal, though the provisions of the Rules do indicate that charge-sheet and statement of allegations communicated to the delinquent are separate documents, in the facts of the present case, there might not be much difference between the nature of the two documents. If whatever submitted to the petitioner as part of the charge-sheet is not merely charges per se but also allegations on the basis of which these charges were proposed, it more or less substantially meets the requirement of law. Our Court in the case of Sulochana Daulatrao Thakare vs. Sangam Shikshan Sanstha and other, reported in 2004(4) Bom.C.R. 488 , has held that mere technical objection such as some variation in the schedule will not avail the delinquent against whom disciplinary action has been duly taken. What we have to see in all these cases is whether the principles of natural justice have been substantially complied with before the delinquent is punished. One has to see whether he had a reasonable and adequate opportunity to meet the charges and to defend himself in the enquiry. If we have regard to the facts of our case, the petitioner cannot be said to have been in any way prejudiced by non-communication of charges and statement of allegations separately. In fact, the petitioner never participated in the enquiry. He doggedly refused to participate on the ground that the enquiry committee itself was not properly constituted. If that was his case and not that he was denied any opportunity to show cause as such, the fact that the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations were not separately communicated to him, would scarcely make any difference. Whether these were submitted separately or together, he never meant to show cause to the charges or allegations purportedly on the ground indicated above. Whether these were submitted separately or together, he never meant to show cause to the charges or allegations purportedly on the ground indicated above. Indeed, in keeping with this approach of his, both his appeal before the School Tribunal and his petition to this Court are silent on this particular aspect. There is no whisper either in the appeal or in the petition that the petitioner was denied any effective opportunity to show cause either by reason of non-supply of the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations separately or otherwise for any reason at all. This particular objection is raised for the first time across the bar at the hearing of the petition and as noted above, it merits no countenance. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that during the petitioner’s suspension pending enquiry, no subsistence allowance was paid to him. If no subsistence allowance was paid, that would, at the highest, give rise to a monetary claim. It would not vitiate the disciplinary enquiry as such, unless of course it can be shown that the petitioner was prejudiced in the matter of conduct of his defence due to such non-payment of subsistence allowance. 8. In the premises, there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.