ORDER : This petition is filed for issuing a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the proceedings of the first respondent CIN:U65110TN1921PLC001908, dated 08.12.2016, and the order of the second respondent in Pro.Ref.No.HO.Disp.999.Pon.Cor.09/2016-17, dated 2.11.2016, and consequentially, to direct the respondents to re-instate the petitioner as Assistant Manager in the respondent Bank with arrears of salary from the date of dismissal till reinstatement with all monetary and attendant benefits within the time stipulated by this Court. 2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The petitioner while working as Assistant Manager in the respondents Bank was removed from service by the impugned order, dated 08.12.2016. The petitioner was originally issued a charge memo for certain misconduct and during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was placed under suspension. An enquiry officer was appointed and after completing the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted a report on 27.07.2016. The enquiry officer has found the petitioner guilty of misconduct as per the charge memo. After giving second show cause notice and getting the explanation from the petitioner to the second show cause notice, the second respondent passed an order on 02.11.2016, dismissing the petitioner from service. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an Appeal before the first respondent and the first respondent also confirmed the order of the second respondent, by proceedings, dated 08.12.2016. Thus, as against the order of termination which was also confirmed by the Appellate Authority, the above petition is filed. 4. The respondents are the administrative officers of a scheduled Bank. Hence, the Office raised an objection as to the maintainability of the Writ petition. Thereafter, as per the direction of this Court, the matter was posted before this Court “for maintainability”. The only question that is required to be decided in this case, is whether the Writ petition is maintainable as against the respondents which is only a scheduled Bank. 5. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sukhdev Singh Vs. Bhagatram, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 421 , to show that the respondent Bank is also a State within the meaning of Article 12 and that it is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Bhagatram, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 421 , to show that the respondent Bank is also a State within the meaning of Article 12 and that it is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, the learned Senior counsel relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 . The factors which are relevant for the determination of the issue, whether a particular establishment or organization is a state was discussed in the above Judgment. 6. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, then, relied upon the Judgment in the case of Andi Mukta S.S.M.V.S.S.J.M.S. Trust Vs. V.R. Rudani, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 , wherein it is held as follows:- “20. The term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” 7. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, thereafter, relied upon the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Marappan, K. Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal, reported in 2006 (4) CTC 689 , and for convenience, the same is also extracted as follows:- “21. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, thereafter, relied upon the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Marappan, K. Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal, reported in 2006 (4) CTC 689 , and for convenience, the same is also extracted as follows:- “21. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge: (i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterised as a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be 'an authority' within the meaning and for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation, an order passed by a society in violation of the bye-laws can be corrected by way of Writ petition; (ii) Applying the tests in Ajay Hasia it is held that a co-operative society carrying on banking business cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; (iii) Even if a society cannot be characterised as a 'State' within the meaning of Aricle 12 of the Constitution, a Writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty cast upon the society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a 'person' or 'an authority' within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution and what is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. Although it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. (iv) A society, which is not a 'State' would not normally be amenable to the Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, but in certain circumstances, a Writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutory provisions which need to be complied with by all concerned including societies. If they violate such statutory provisions a writ would be issued for compliance of those provisions. If they violate such statutory provisions a writ would be issued for compliance of those provisions. (v) Where a Special Officer is appointed in respect of a co-operative society which cannot be characterised as a 'State' a writ would lie when the case falls under Clauses (iii) and (iv) above. (vi) The bye-laws made by a co-operative society registered under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, do not have the force of law. Hence, where a society cannot be characterised as a 'State', the service conditions of its employees governed by its byelaws cannot be enforced through a Writ petition. (vii) In the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not ordinarily exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the Act provides for an alternative remedy. (viii) The decision in M. Thanikkachalam Vs. Madhuranthagam Agricultural Co-operative Society, 2000 (4) CTC 556 , is no longer good law, in view of the decision of the Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case and the other decisions referred to here before. The Reference is answered accordingly, Registry is directed to place the paper before the appropriate Bench for its disposal.” 8. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas, reported in (2003) 10 SCC 733 , has held as follows:- “32. Merely because Reserve bank of India lays the banking policy in the interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth having due regard to the interests of the depositors etc., as provided under Section 5(c)(a) of the Banking Regulation Act does not mean that the private companies carrying on the business or commercial activity of banking, discharge any public function or public duty. These are all regulatory measures applicable to those carrying on commercial activity in banking and these companies are to act according to these provisions failing which certain consequences follow as indicated in the Act itself. As to the provision regarding acquisition of a banking company by the Government, it may be pointed out that any private property can be acquired by the Government in public interest. It is now a judicially accepted norm that private interest has to give way to the public interest. As to the provision regarding acquisition of a banking company by the Government, it may be pointed out that any private property can be acquired by the Government in public interest. It is now a judicially accepted norm that private interest has to give way to the public interest. If a private property is acquired in public interest it does not mean that the party whose property is acquired is performing or discharging any function or duty of public character though it would be so for the acquiring authority. 33. For the discussion held above, in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don't find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondent's service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank. That being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed.” 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case, considered the issue whether the Federal Bank is a private body or falls within the definition of the State or local or other authorities under the control of the Government. After analysing all the facts and relevant circumstances and considering the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act and the Banking Regulation Act and other statutes, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the scheduled Bank is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 10. After analysing all the facts and relevant circumstances and considering the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act and the Banking Regulation Act and other statutes, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the scheduled Bank is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 10. The main contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the whole enquiry proceedings are vitiated, as the enquiry officer appointed by the respondent Bank was one of the Panel Advocate who was appearing for the respondents in several litigations. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.2954 of 2002, dated 25.08.2010, in the case of R. Pattabhi (Died) Vs. The Tamil Nadu Minerals Limited, wherein, it has been held as follows:- “18. From the fact that Standing Counsel was appointed as Enquiry Officer, it cannot be said that Enquiry Officer had taken a biased and partisan view and that he was partial towards the Management of the Company. In 2009 (4) LLN 91 (Biecco Lawrie Limited and another Vs. State of West Bengal and another), the Company lawyer was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Holding that Enquiry Officer being a Company lawyer cannot be considered as “biased and partisan” and that he was partial towards the Management of the Company, the Supreme Court held as under:- '12. ... Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action. In other words principle of natural justice is attracted where there is some right which is likely to be affected by any act of the administration including a legitimate expectation (See: Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (Private) Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others, JT 2007 (1) SC 125). The procedure to be followed is not a matter of secondary importance and in the broadest sense natural justice simply indicates the sense of what is right and wrong (Voinet Vs. barrett, (1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its technical sense it is now often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it comprises of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that a man may not be a judge of his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard.' 19. barrett, (1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its technical sense it is now often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it comprises of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that a man may not be a judge of his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard.' 19. The instant case might appear to be a case of departmental bias as it is persistently stated by the 1st appellant that the Enquiry Officer was biased being a Standing Counsel and had favoured the TAMIN in causing miscarriage of justice. Departmental bias arises when the functions of a Judge and the prosecutor are combined in the same department as it is not uncommon to find that the same department which initiates the matter also decides it, therefore, at times, department fraternity and loyalty militates against the concept of fair hearing. In Hari Khemu Gawali Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, AIR 1956 SC 559 an externment order was challenged on the ground that since the police department which heard and decided the case was the same, the element of departmental bias vitiated administrative action and the Court rejected the challenge on the ground that so long as two functions (initiation and decision) were discharged by two separate officers, though they were affiliated to the same department, there was no bias.” 12. Thus, the only ground on which the petitioner filed this petition also has no merits. In view of the categorical pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas, reported in (2003) 10 SCC 733 , this petition is not maintainable as against the scheduled Bank. The petitioner has an alternative remedy to challenge the order of punishment either by approaching the authorities of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 or by filing a petition under Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the appropriate authorities constituted by the Central Government. 13. In view of the conclusion made above, the petition is dismissed as not maintainable.