JUDGMENT ORDER K.S. Jhaveri, J. - By way of this appeal, the appellant has assailed the judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant-assessee. 2. This Court while admitting the matter framed the following questions of law :- "(i) Whether demand for Central Excise duty for non-manufacturing period i.e. closure of factory is justified under section 3A of the Act when it is contrary and ultra vires to Article 265 read with entry 84 of the Union List to the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether Tribunal is justified in denying substantial right of assessee over and above procedural lapse of delayed intimation of closure of factory when it was due to unforeseen circumstances beyond control and under immunity of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 and covered by ratio of judgment in the case of Mangalore Chemicals vs. Deputy Commissioner" 3. Counsel for the appellant Mr. Counsel for the appellant Mr. Jain has taken us to the view taken by the Tribunal and mainly contended that Rule 96ZO(2) which reads as under :- "Where a manufacturer does not produce the ingots and billets of non-alloy steel during any continuous period of not less than seven days and wishes to claim abatement under sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the abatement will be allowed by an order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise of such amount as may be specified in such order, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions viz.: (a) the manufacturer shall inform in writing about the closure to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, either prior to the date of closure or on the date of closure; (b) the manufacturer shall intimate the reading of the electricity meter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, immediately after the production in his factory is stopped along with the closing balance of stock of the ingots and billets of non-alloy steel; (c) the manufacturer, when he starts production again, shall inform in writing about the starting of production to the Assistant Commissioner of C.E., with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, either prior to the date of starting production or on the date of starting production; (d) the manufacturer shall on start of production again along with the closing balance of stock on restarting the factory, intimate the reading of the electricity meter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise; (e) the manufacturer shall while sending intimation under clause (c), declare that his factory remained closed for a continuous period starting from ... hours on ... (date) to ... hours on ... (date)." 4. He contended that in view of the various judgments right from Supreme Court in case of Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner reported in 1991 (55) E.L.T. 437 (S.C.) , it has been held as under :- "11. We have given our careful consideration to these submissions. We are afraid the stand of the Revenue suffers from certain basic fallacies, besides being wholly technical. We have given our careful consideration to these submissions. We are afraid the stand of the Revenue suffers from certain basic fallacies, besides being wholly technical. In Kedarnath''s case, the question for consideration was whether the requirement of the declaration under the proviso to Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales-tax) Act, 1941, could be established by evidence aliunde. The court said that the intention of the Legislature was to grant exemption only upon the satisfaction of the substantive condition of the provision and the condition in the proviso was held to be of substance embodying considerations of policy. Shri Narasimha Murthy would say the position in the present case was no different. He says that the notification of 11th August, 1975 was statutory in character and the condition as to ''prior-permission'' for adjustment stipulated therein must also be held to be statutory. Such a condition must, says Counsel, be equated with the requirement of production of the declaration form in Kedarnath''s case and thus understood the same consequences should ensue for the non-compliance. Shri Narasimhamurthy says that there was no way out of this situation and no adjustment was permissible, whatever be the other remedies of the appellant. There is a fallacy in the emphasis of this argument. The consequence which Shri Narasimha Murthy suggests should flow from the non-compliance would, indeed, be the result if the condition was a substantive one and one fundamental to the policy underlying the exemption. Its stringency and mandatory nature must be justified by the purpose intended to be served. The mere fact that it is statutory does not matter one way or the other. There are conditions and conditions. Some may be substantive, mandatory and based on considerations of policy and some others may merely belong to the area of procedure. It will be erroneous to attach equal importance to the non-observance of all conditions irrespective of the purposes they were intended to serve. In Kedarnath''s case itself this Court pointed but that the stringency of the provisions and the mandatory character imparted to them were matters of important policy. The Court observed : ...The object of Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and the rules made thereunder is selfevident. In Kedarnath''s case itself this Court pointed but that the stringency of the provisions and the mandatory character imparted to them were matters of important policy. The Court observed : ...The object of Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and the rules made thereunder is selfevident. While they are obviously intended to give exemption to a dealer in respect of sales to registered dealers of specified classes of goods, it seeks also to prevent fraud and collusion in an attempt to evade tax. In the nature of things, in view of innumerable transactions that may be entered into between dealers, it will well nigh be impossible for the taxing authorities to ascertain in each case whether a dealer has sold the specified goods to another for the purposes mentioned in the section. Therefore, presumably to achieve the two fold object, namely, prevention of fraud and facilitating administrative efficiency, the exemption given is made subject to a condition that the person claiming the exemption shall furnish a declaration form in the manner prescribed under the section. The liberal construction suggested will facilitate the commission of fraud and introduce administrative inconveniences, both of which the provisions of the said clause seek to avoid. (Emphasis Supplied) (See : [1965] 3 SCR 626) Such is not the scope or intendment of the provisions concerned here. The main exemption is under the 1969 notification. The subsequent notification which contain condition of prior-permission clearly envisages a procedure to give effect to the exemption. A distinction between the provisions of statute which are of substantive character and were built-in with certain specific objectives of policy on the one hand and those which are merely procedural and technical in their nature on the other must be kept clearly distinguished. What we have here is a pure technicality. Clause 3 of the notification leaves no discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to refuse the permission if the conditions are satisfied. The words are that he "will grant". There is no dispute that appellant had satisfied these conditions. Yet the permission was withheld - not for any valid and substantial reason but owing to certain extraneous things concerning some inter-departmental issues. Appellant had nothing to do with those issues. Appellant is now told "we are sorry. We should have given you the permission. But now that the period is over, nothing can be done". Yet the permission was withheld - not for any valid and substantial reason but owing to certain extraneous things concerning some inter-departmental issues. Appellant had nothing to do with those issues. Appellant is now told "we are sorry. We should have given you the permission. But now that the period is over, nothing can be done". The answer to this is in the words of Lord Denning: "Now I know that a public authority cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, but I do think it can be estopped from relying on a technicality and this is a technicality" (See Wells vs. Minister of Housing and Local Government - [1967] 1 WLR 1000. 12. Shri Narasimhamurthy again relied on certain observations in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I and Anr. vs. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. - [1990] 183 ITR 624 (SC) in support of strict construction of a provision concerning exemptions. ''There is support of judicial opinion to the view that exemptions from taxation have a tendency to increase the burden on the other unexampled class of taxpayers and should be construed against the subject in case of ambiguity. It is an equally well-known principle that a person who claims an exemption has to establish his case. Indeed, in the very case of M/s. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. relied upon by Sri Narasimhamurthy, it was observed : While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed. It must, however, be borne in mind that absurd results of construction should be avoided. The choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the Legislature manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to resort to any interpretative process arises only where the meaning is not manifest on the plain words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there is no need for any interpretation. It appears to us the true rule of construction of a provision as to exemption is the one stated by this Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Wood Papers Ltd. and Ors. - JT [1991] (1) 151 . ...Truly, speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. It appears to us the true rule of construction of a provision as to exemption is the one stated by this Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Wood Papers Ltd. and Ors. - JT [1991] (1) 151 . ...Truly, speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction" .... (Emphasis supplied)" 4.1 He has also relied upon another decision of Supreme Court in case of Indian Aluminium Company Ltd. vs. Thane Municipal Corporation reported in 1991 (55) E.L.T. 454 (S.C.) wherein it has been held as under :- "3. The amended Rules came into force in 1970. Rule 4(2) provides for payment octroi at a lower rate by certain industrial undertakings in respect of the goods mentioned in Part IA of Schedule II to the Rules. Aluminium is at Entry No. 77. Part I-A reads thus : PART I-A List of goods on which octroi shall be payable at a lower rate by certain industrial undertakings. (1) All goods specified in Entries 6(c), 35, 40, 64, 65, 71, 77 and 86 in Schedule I, and khobra mentioned in Entry 25, raw rubber and latex mentioned in Entry 70 in that Schedule, when imported by an industrial undertaking for use as raw material for processing within that undertaking and when declaration in respect thereof is issued by the undertaking in Form 14, shall be subject to octroi by any Council at a rate not exceeding 1.25 per cent and not less than 0.25 per cent. x x x It can be seen from the above rule that to avail the concession, a declaration in Form 14 has to be made in respect of the raw material imported. Form 14 is as under : FORM 14 (Parts I-A and II of Schedule II) Declaration to be made by an importer importing dutiable goods as raw material for his industrial undertaking. Form 14 is as under : FORM 14 (Parts I-A and II of Schedule II) Declaration to be made by an importer importing dutiable goods as raw material for his industrial undertaking. I...do hereby declare that the goods in respect of which I have separately given a declaration under Rule 14 have been imported by me as raw material to be used in the manufacture of... in my industrial undertaking, viz. (here give full name and address of the undertaking)... and I .shall not use them for any other purpose for sale or otherwise dispose them of to any other party for any other purpose, except, having previously paid the difference between the octroi due on such goods at ordinary rates and the octroi paid on concessional rates under Schedule II to the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1968. Date...Signature of the Importer. The declaration contemplated in Form 14 is to the effect that the goods imported shall not be used for any other purpose for sale or otherwise etc. It can thus be seen that an incentive is sought to be given to such entrepreneurs by such concession if the raw material which is imported is also utilised in the industrial undertaking without selling or disposing of otherwise. That being the object a verification at the relevant time by the octroi authorities becomes very much necessary before a concession can be given. In the absence of filing such a declaration in the required Form 14, there is no opportunity for the authorities to verify. Therefore, the petitioner-company has definitely failed to fulfil an important obligation under the law though procedural. The Learned Counsel, however, submitted that even now the authorities can verify the necessary records which are audited and submitted to the authorities and find out whether the material was used in its own undertaking or not. We do not think we can accede to this contention. Having failed to file the necessary declaration he cannot now turnaround and ask the authorities to make a verification of some records. The verification at the time when the raw material was still there is entirely different from a verification at a belated stage after it has seized to be there. May be that the raw material was used in the industrial undertaking as claimed by the petitioner-company or it may not be. The verification at the time when the raw material was still there is entirely different from a verification at a belated stage after it has seized to be there. May be that the raw material was used in the industrial undertaking as claimed by the petitioner-company or it may not be. In any event the failure to file the necessary declaration has necessarily prevented the authorities to have a proper verification. 7. In Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta - [1965] 3 SCR 626 the appellant which was a public limited Company, sought exemption under the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 in respect of certain sales but did not produce before the Officer the declaration forms from the purchaser dealers required to be produced under the proviso to that subclause granting exemption. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that proviso to sub-clause was only directory and the dealer is not precluded where the proviso is not strictly complied with from producing other relevant evidence to prove that the sales were for the purposes mentioned in the said sub-clause. The contention on behalf of the respondent was that the dealer can claim exemption under the sub-clause but he must comply strictly with the conditions under which the exemption can be granted. Rejecting the appellant''s contention, this Court held that at p. 14 of AIR : Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act in effect exempts a specified turnover of a dealer from sales tax. The provision prescribing the exemption shall, therefore, be strictly construed. The substantive clause gives the exemption and the proviso qualifies the substantive clause. In effect the proviso says that part of the turnover of the selling dealer covered by the terms of sub-clause (ii) will be exempted provided a declaration in the form prescribed is furnished. To put it in other words, a dealer cannot get the exemption unless he furnishes the declaration in the prescribed form. It was further held as under at p. 14 of AIR : There is an understandable reason for the stringency of the provisions. The object of Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and the rules made thereunder is self-evident. To put it in other words, a dealer cannot get the exemption unless he furnishes the declaration in the prescribed form. It was further held as under at p. 14 of AIR : There is an understandable reason for the stringency of the provisions. The object of Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and the rules made thereunder is self-evident. While they are obviously intended to give exemption to a dealer in respect of sales to registered dealers of specified classes of goods, it seeks also to prevent fraud and collusion in an attempt to evade tax. In the nature of things, in view of innumerable transactions that may be entered into between dealers, it will well nigh be impossible for the taxing authorities to ascertain in each case whether a dealer has sold the specified goods to another for the purposes mentioned in the section. Therefore, presumably to achieve the twofold object, namely, prevention of fraud and facilitating administrative efficiency, the exemption given is made subject to a condition that the person claiming the exemption shall furnish a declaration form in the manner prescribed under the section. The liberal construction suggested will facilitate the commission of fraud and introduce administrative inconveniences, both of which the provisions of the said clause seek to avoid. It can thus be seen that the submission namely that the dealer, even without filing a declaration, can later prove his case by producing other evidence, is also rejected. This ratio applies on all fours to the case before us. As already mentioned the concession can be granted only if the raw material is used in the industrial undertaking seeking such concession. For that a verification was necessary and that is why in the rule itself it is mentioned that a declaration has to be filed in Form 14 facilitating verification. Failure to file the same would automatically disentitle the Company from claiming any such concession." 4.2 He has also relied upon the decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur vs. Ram Shree Steels Pvt. Ltd. Reported in 2011 (274) E.L.T. 30 (All.) wherein it has been held as under :- "3. The Tribunal has relied upon several decisions for abatement of the claims on the ground that substantial benefits could not be denied on procedural delay. The abatement was claimed from 28-5-1998 to 29-8-1998. The Tribunal has relied upon several decisions for abatement of the claims on the ground that substantial benefits could not be denied on procedural delay. The abatement was claimed from 28-5-1998 to 29-8-1998. The intimations required under Rule 96ZO(2) read with Section 3A(3) regarding closure, and the condition (c) to the said rule regarding start of production again as well as condition (d) in respect of the balance and stock is given. The company manufactured M.S. ingots. It could not intimate the reading of the electricity meter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise as required under sub-rule (B) for the reason that in the meter room there was lock and key of the electricity department, and that the new meter was replaced in their factory on 29-8-1998 which is evident from the sealing certificate dated 29-8-1998 given by the Electricity Department and was accepted by the Tribunal. 4. There is nothing to show that under Rule 96ZO(2) all the five conditions have to be satisfied for claiming abatement. The procedural requirement of the rules may be dispensed with, if there is sufficient explanation and that is believed by the adjudicating authority. The words subject to fulfilment of the conditions cannot be read as subject to fulfilment of all the conditions. The Tribunal has rightly relied upon INDAL vs. Thane Municipal Corporation - 1991 (55) E.L.T. 454 (S.C.) and held that non-observance of a procedural condition can be condoned if it is not likely to facilitate commission of fraud and introduce administrative inconvenience." 4.3 He has also relied upon three decisions of the Tribunal which were finalized and department has not challenged the same. Firstly, in case of D.C. Steel (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex., Chandigarh reported in 2002 (139) E.L.T. 291 (Tri.-Del.) wherein it has been held as under :- "4. I have examined the submissions. It is not in dispute that the appellants'' induction furnace was closed during the interval between 24-3-2000 (6.30 P.M.) and 1-4-2000. The jurisdictional Range Supdt. who visited the premises on 27-32000 pursuant to the party''s intimation of closure of furnace certified that the electric meter reading and stock position of final products declared by them as on 24-3-2000 at 6.30 P.M. were correct. Relevant extract of RG-1 containing the Supdt.''s remarks certifying as above is available on record and the same has been examined today. who visited the premises on 27-32000 pursuant to the party''s intimation of closure of furnace certified that the electric meter reading and stock position of final products declared by them as on 24-3-2000 at 6.30 P.M. were correct. Relevant extract of RG-1 containing the Supdt.''s remarks certifying as above is available on record and the same has been examined today. I find that this certification by the Range Supdt. amounted to conceding that the induction furnace was closed on 24-3-2000 at 6.30 P.M. It appears from the impugned order that the Commissioner has not properly appreciated this evidence. The furnace was closed down on the eve of a Saturday (25-3-2000) followed by a Sunday (26-3-2000), both being holidays for the Central Excise Offices. There is nothing on record to show that the closure was pre-planned or pre-scheduled. In the circumstance, it ought to have occurred to the Commissioner that it was humanly impossible for the assessee to give the intimation required under Clause (a) of Rule 96ZO(2) to the Assistant Commissioner or the Supdt. on 24-3-2000 itself. The Trade Notice, today relied on by Ld. DR. does not appear to offer any remedy to such a situation inasmuch as the Trade Notice only purports to cover the contingency of closure scheduled for Saturdays, Sundays and other holidays, in which event telegraphic intimation of closure is required to be given to the Range Officer, Divisional A.C. and the Commissioner. In the instant case, the closure has not been found to be a prescheduled one and, further, it occurred on a working day (24-3-2000/Friday). Hence the Trade Notice was not applicable. The assessee did what was possible for them. They gave intimation to the proper officers on 27-3-2000. Pursuant to such intimation, the Range Supdt. visited the appellants'' premises and satisfied himself about the bona fides of the declared particulars (electric meter reading and stock position of final products) as relatable to 24-3-2000. The assessee could, thus, prove the date of closure as 24-3-2000. They gave intimation to the proper officers on 27-3-2000. Pursuant to such intimation, the Range Supdt. visited the appellants'' premises and satisfied himself about the bona fides of the declared particulars (electric meter reading and stock position of final products) as relatable to 24-3-2000. The assessee could, thus, prove the date of closure as 24-3-2000. Having accepted the declared date of restart, the Commissioner ought to have cleared the abatement claim for seven days (25-3-2000 to 31-3-2000) in favour of the assessee, instead of rejecting it on the basis of a hyper-technical construction of Clause (a) of Rule 96ZO(2) to the detriment of the assessee''s substantive right to abatement of duty under the Rule." 4.4 He has also relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in case of J.R. Alloys Castings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex., Jaipur reported in 2003 (160) E.L.T. 451 (Tri.-Del.) wherein it has been held as under :- "4. I have carefully examined the submissions, the provisions of Rule 96ZO(2), and the Trade Notice and case law cited by the Counsel. I find that the 16th and 17th of May, 1998 were, admittedly, holidays for the Range and Divisional offices of the department. The induction furnace was closed around 10.00 P.M. on the 15th (Friday) and intimation thereof was admittedly given to the Range Officer on the 18th (Monday). No procedural guidelines were in force during those days, governing such intimation. The Trade Notice cited by the Counsel was in place only in August, 1999. Clause (a) of Rule 96ZO(2) stipulated that closure of the factory should be intimated to the Range Supdt. as well as the Divisional Assistant Commissioner on the date of closure itself, if not on the previous day. In the instant case, it is claimed by the appellants that the closure of the furnace was not by design but on account of break-down. Apparently, this claim has not been rebutted by the Commissioner. This being the position, the earliest time at which intimation of closure could have been given by the party to the departmental authorities was the first working day after the continuous holidays of 16th and 17th May, 1998. They have given the intimation accordingly. Apparently, this claim has not been rebutted by the Commissioner. This being the position, the earliest time at which intimation of closure could have been given by the party to the departmental authorities was the first working day after the continuous holidays of 16th and 17th May, 1998. They have given the intimation accordingly. In the absence of departmental circular or Trade Notice laying down specific procedure for intimation of closure in such "holiday situations" for the material period, it has to be held that the intimation of closure given by the party to the Range Officer on the 18th May, 1998 was in substantial compliance with Clause (a) of Rule 96ZO(2). The case law cited by the Counsel is squarely on a question identical to the one involved in this case. I follow the cited decision and hold that the appellants are entitled to abatement of duty for the 16th and 17th of May, 1998. The same ratio will apply to the 15th and 16th August, 1998. In the result, abatement claim is allowed for the four days and, to this extent, the impugned order is set aside." 4.5 He has also relied upon another decision of Tribunal in case of Mahavir Ispat vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad reported in 2002 (150) E.L.T. 1071 (Tri.-Bang.) wherein it has been held as under :- "2. Issue relates to determination of annual capacity production in terms of Rule 96ZO(3) of Central Excise Rules, 1944. Shri K.S. Ravishankar, Advocate appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants have claimed abatement for the periods factory was closed but the claim has been rejected by the authorities on the ground that there was a delay in filing the intimation of closure. He said that in Appeal No. 24/01, the factory was closed for the period 7-9-1998 to 15-9-1998 and 16-10-1998 to 26-10-1998 and similarly in Appeal No. E 23/01 the factory was closed for the period 17-10-1999 to 1-11-1999. He said that there was only one day delay in respect of period 7-9-1998 to 15-9-1998 and there is a delay of four days for the period 16-10-1998 to 26-10-1998, but the appellants could not intimate well in time due to Saturday and Sunday added to Ayudha Puja and Vijaya Dasami. He said that same position even in respect of 17-10-1998 to 1-11-1999 as there were intervening gazetted holidays. He said that same position even in respect of 17-10-1998 to 1-11-1999 as there were intervening gazetted holidays. He said that delay due to intervening holidays was condonable and it was held by the Tribunal in the case of D.C. Steel (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Chandigarh. In that case it was held that abatement was permissible since it was humanly impossible to give notice on Friday evening itself with Saturday and Sunday being holidays." 5. He further contended that looking to the details which are furnished by the appellant at page 19 in case No. 1 & 2 which are a part of appeal memo also it is very clear that as per page 3, the intimation was given immediately on the next working day and in other cases the registered post was made on 14th February, 1998 but it was received on 18th February, 1998 at the office and not immediately on the next working day and in other case, the office was closed and manufacturing was stopped on 20th March 1998 and post was made on 21st March, 1998 but was received on 24th March, 1998. 6. On the other side, Mr. Anuroop Singhi appearing for the department contended that there is no error committed by the Tribunal therefore, no interference is called for. 7. Mr. Singhi has relied upon the decision in case of Maharshi Commerce Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs & C. Ex. reported in 2016 (338) E.L.T. 413 (A.P.) wherein it has been held as under :- "3. The Learned Counsel, Sri V. Gopalakrishna Gokhaley, for the respondent-department submitted that the original authority as well as the appellate authority have rightly considering the terms of condition (e) under sub-rule (2) of Rule 96ZO dismissed the claim of the appellant and therefore, no interference of this Court is required. The Learned Counsel, Sri V. Gopalakrishna Gokhaley, for the respondent-department submitted that the original authority as well as the appellate authority have rightly considering the terms of condition (e) under sub-rule (2) of Rule 96ZO dismissed the claim of the appellant and therefore, no interference of this Court is required. Rule 96ZO(2) refers to : "Where a manufacturer does not produce the ingots and billets of non-alloy steel during any continuous period of not less than seven days and wishes to claim abatement under sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the abatement will be allowed by an order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise of such amount as may be specified in such order, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions viz.: (a) the manufacturer shall inform in writing about the closure to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, either prior to the date of closure or on the date of closure; (b) the manufacturer shall intimate the reading of the electricity meter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, immediately after the production in his factory is stopped along with the closing balance of stock of the ingots and billets of non-alloy steel; (c) the manufacturer, when he starts production again, shall inform in writing about the starting of production to the Assistant Commissioner of C.E., with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise, either prior to the date of starting production or on the date of starting production; (d) the manufacturer shall on start of production again along with the closing balance of stock on restarting the factory, intimate the reading of the electricity meter to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, with a copy to the Superintendent of Central Excise; (e) the manufacturer shall while sending intimation under clause (c), declare that his factory remained closed for a continuous period starting from ... hours on ... (date) to ... hours on ....... (date)." 4. From the above, it is clear that to claim the abatement under sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the manufacturer suppose not to produce during any continuous period of not less than seven days. 5. hours on ... (date) to ... hours on ....... (date)." 4. From the above, it is clear that to claim the abatement under sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the manufacturer suppose not to produce during any continuous period of not less than seven days. 5. As could be seen from the impugned order it is clear that the appellant''s furnace had functioned upto 12 hours on 22-10-1999 and from 12.30 hours to 24 hours on 29-10-1999. Therefore, the original authority had rightly excluded both the dates as the furnace had functioned on those days. Excluding those days, it was found that the furnace was not shut down for a continuous period of seven days and therefore, the appellant does not fall within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944." 8. We have heard Counsel for both the sides. 9. The first question which has been posed for consideration, in our considered opinion is that the appeal which was preferred under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act which reads as under :- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) The Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall be - (a) filed within one hundred and eighty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party; (b) accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees where such appeal is filed by the other party; (c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating therein the substantial question of law involved. (2A) The High Court may admit an appeal after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the same within that period. (3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated, and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. (5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit. (6) The High Court may determine any issue which -(a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or (b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in sub-section (1). (7) When an appeal has been filed before the High Court, it shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court, and shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of such Judges or of the majority, if any, of such Judges. (8) Where there is no such majority, the Judges shall state the point of law upon which they differ and the case shall, then, be heard upon that point only by one or more of the other Judges of the High Court and such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard the case including those who first heard it. (9) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this Section." 10. (9) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this Section." 10. Taking into consideration that no basis was laid even before first authority or the Tribunal and when the act and provisions are made it is not to be presumed ultra vires unless it has been quashed and set aside by the High Court or any High Court or the Supreme Court, in writ jurisdiction. 11. In our considered opinion, regarding Section 35G it will not be appropriate to hold any provision to be unconstitutional because power under Section 35G is only to be exercised in substantial question of law arising out of the Central Excise Act and not on any constitutional point. 12. In that view of the matter, the first question is required to be answered against the assessee in favour of the department. On the second issue which is posed for our consideration is Section 10 of the General Clauses Act and the judgment of Mangalore Chemicals (supra). 13. In our considered opinion, when considering the rule there are five conditions which are required to be fulfilled since the assessee is claiming exemption. If one is to claim exemption and non-payment of tax, interpretation of such exemption should be construed and it is in aid to rule. Once the interpretation is found to be proved one has to go by the rule. 14. In our considered opinion, the rule even if it is construed liberally cannot travel beyond the next working day of the closure either it is Saturday, Sunday and public holiday or any other circumstances where the movement of a person is not possible to reach the office of the Central Government or the respondent namely in a case of curfew or any other exigency, the time can be extended and all documents on record do not show that on the date of intimation of there was curfew in the area which is to be proved by the assessee and not by the department. 15. In that view of the matter, the issue is answered accordingly. 16. The assessee will be entitled only for the benefit of the next working day not beyond that. 17. The appeal stands disposed of.