JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. This bunch of five appeals U/s 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, having arisen out of the same cause of action but preferred against separate judgments, were heard together and are now being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The common facts relevant for disposal in the appeals are not in dispute. On 20.8.2002, when members of Escort Party belonging to 7th Bn, TSR of the Tripura State, comprising of Ajit Kumar Debbarma, Anjoy Karta Malsom, Uttam Debnath and Khagendra Reang along with some 22 TSR personnel were performing escort duty in one toner Truck bearing registration No. TR-01-B-1003 for immediate shifting of two sick TSR personnel, namely, Sudip Sangma and Ajit Debbarma to Bishramganj PHC, they were suddenly attacked and indiscriminately fired upon by a group of ATTF extremists with their sophisticated weapons from both sides of the bamboo jungle at Hirapur Muslim para near Baluari School along Amarendranagar-Bishramganj Road and instantaneously caused the death of the said Sudip Sangma, Ajit Kumar Debbarma, Anjoy Karta Malsom, Uttam Debnath and Khagendra Reang while their vehicle was completely damaged by a grenade blast. Post mortem examinations were conducted on their dead bodies at Takerjala Hospital. A regular case being Takerjala Police Station Case No. 13 of 2002 U/s 148/149/396/397 IPC & S. 25(1)(a)/27 Arms Act was also registered over the incident. 3. T.S. (MAC) No. 371 of 2012 was filed by Rajendra Sangma, who is the father of the deceased Sudip Sangma for claiming a sum of Rs. 58,30,000/- as compensation. T.S. (MAC) No. 334 of 2012 was filed by Smt. Phakhidhan Malsom and Shri Baitha Kr. Malsom, who are the mother and father of the deceased Anjoy Karta Masom respectively to claim a compensation of Rs. 58,30,000/-. T.S. (MAC) No. 335 of 2012 was filed by the father and mother of the deceased Khagendra Reang for claiming a compensation of Rs. 58,30,000/-. TS (MAC) No. 336 of 2012 was filed by the mother of the deceased Uttam Debnath, to claim a compensation of Rs. 58,30,000/-. TS (MAC) No. 370 of 2012 was filed by the wife, children and parents of the deceased Ajit Kumar Debbarma for claiming a compensation of Rs. 60,30,000/-. 58,30,000/-. TS (MAC) No. 336 of 2012 was filed by the mother of the deceased Uttam Debnath, to claim a compensation of Rs. 58,30,000/-. TS (MAC) No. 370 of 2012 was filed by the wife, children and parents of the deceased Ajit Kumar Debbarma for claiming a compensation of Rs. 60,30,000/-. By separate judgments, the Tribunal relying on the decision of this Court in MAC Appeal No. 26 of 2001 (Smt. Basu Mati Debbarma vs. Smt. Anita Debbarma and Others) and 10 other MAC Appeals dismissed all the claim petitions on the ground that no accident took place out of the use of a motor vehicle. The observations quoted and relied on by the Tribunal are in the following terms: “The House of Lords maintained the Chief Adjudication Officer’s finding as regards ‘the accident’ that the Chief Adjudication Officer vs. Faulds, (2000) 2 All ER 961, was entitled to hold that, that was not accident not only because that was foreseeable but there was no room for contemplating the possibility of such event inasmuch as the employees on work deputed for doing the hazardous work, where risk and peril visit oftentimes. The same principle may be applied in these appeals as well. The security persons who were deputed for providing security of the movement of the vehicles and passengers in the extremist infested areas could foresee that their such deployment may invite the peril. This being the part of their engagement that cannot be termed as an accident not merely for that the peril is foreseeable and considering such peril and risk to their life they were given engagement of protecting life of the ordinary civilian, but such suddenness in the turn of events cannot be brought with the construct of accident arising from the use of the motor vehicle. But the State should set up scheme for adequate compensation and rehabilitation of their dependents. This Court, therefore, is constraint to hold that the appeals filed by the dependents/legal heirs of the deceased security personnel who died in the extremist violence must fail. As such, the impugned judgment and order as passed by the Tribunal has to be maintained. But the State should set up scheme for adequate compensation and rehabilitation of their dependents. This Court, therefore, is constraint to hold that the appeals filed by the dependents/legal heirs of the deceased security personnel who died in the extremist violence must fail. As such, the impugned judgment and order as passed by the Tribunal has to be maintained. However, MAC Appeal No. 84 of 2003 is allowed.” I am in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge in holding that the tragedy in question did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 165, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. A desperate attempt is, however, made by Mr. Shankar Deb, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, to distinguish the instant case from Chief Adjudication Officer (supra) by contending that the House of Lords therein allowed the appeal on the grounds stated therein and that judgments of Courts are not to be read like Euclid’s theorem and this Court in Smt. Basu Mati Debbarma and Others (supra) had failed to appreciate the distinction in the fact situations of those cases qua the fact situation in Chief Adjudication Officer (supra). He further submits that this Court has failed to appreciate therein that the claim petitions in these cases were made under Section 166, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and has in the process arrived at wrong conclusions. Mr. S. Chakraborty, the learned Addl. Government Advocate, however, supports the impugned judgments and submits that the facts and circumstances proved in the instant case cannot possibly support the submissions of the learned senior counsel that the incident in question was an accident arising out of the use of the truck bearing registration number TR-01-B-1003 so as to entitle the appellants compensations. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the rival parties. I am unable to agree with the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellants. 4. It may not be out of place to mention here that in these appeals, unlike civilians, the wives of the deceased were paid death-cum-retirement benefits, wherever admissible, while the mothers and fathers of the deceased were paid a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs as ex-gratia payment. In other words, if the deceased left behind a wife, she was paid a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs as insurance coverage. 3 lakhs as ex-gratia payment. In other words, if the deceased left behind a wife, she was paid a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs as insurance coverage. The Department also paid financial assistance amounting to Rs. 50,000/- to the wife of the deceased, if he had a wife, instead of providing her compassionate appointment, she is paid extra-ordinary pension of Rs. 2,194/-. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the ex gratia payments, etc. extended to them were quite considerable in the year 2002-03 when payments were made. It is because of the hazardous nature of their employment that these financial benefits were made available to the legal heirs of the deceased by the State-respondents; such benefits are not at all made available to civilians. At this stage, I am tempted to quote from the observations made by LORD CLYDE in the same judgment (page 978 of the same report), which, I think, completely answers the submissions of the learned senior counsel, and same read thus: “In considering the position of the victim one should also take into account the occupation in which he was engaged. In illustrating the various ways in which the word ‘accident’ can be used Earl Loreburn in the Trim case (1914) AC 667 at 681 observed: Again, the same thing, when occurring to a man in one kind of employment, would not be called accident, but would be so described if it occurred to another not similarly employed. A soldier shot in battle is not killed by accident in common parlance. An inhabitant trying to escape from the field might be shot by accident. It makes all the difference that the occupation of the two was different.” Though the afore-quoted paragraph was not rendered in the context of motor accident case, I have no doubt in mind that the underlying principle is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The five impugned judgments in the five appeals do not suffer from any infirmity calling for the interference of this Court. 5. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in any of these appeals. MAC Appeals Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 of 2013 are hereby dismissed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the cases, I pass no order as to cost.