JUDGMENT : Kh. Nobin Singh, J. Heard Shri Ajoy Pebam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Shri M. Hemchandra, the learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Th. Roson, the learned counsels for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 and Ms. Joan N. Kipgen, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri S. Rupachandra, the learned ASG for the private respondent. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ to quash and set aside the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 and the Work Order dated 15-04-2017 issued by the respondent No. 2 in respect of the Package No. MNO 555 of PMGSY Phase-X. 3.1 According to the petitioner, he is the Proprietor of a registered firm called M/S Manikchand & Co., Kwakeithel Mayaikoibi, Imphal and he is also an approved Special Class Contractor. With a view to redress the situation as regards the connectivity of roads, the Government of India launched a scheme called the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana to provide all weather access to unconnected habitations. For the effective and purposeful implementation of the said scheme, the Manipur State Rural Roads Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Development Agency") is assigned the task of supervising the implementation of the said scheme as a Nodal/Implementing Agency. 3.2 The Chief Engineer (MSRRDA), Government of Manipur issued 1st NIT dated 20-10-2014 inviting item rate tender through e-procurement for PMGSY Phase-X from amongst the eligible contractors for various contract works including Package No. MNO 555 with its tender estimated cost of Rs. 3,05,33,569/- (Rupees three crore five lakh thirty three thousand five hundred and sixty nine) and in response thereto, two contractors participated and when the technical bid was opened, only one contractor was found to be eligible for financial bid which necessitated the Chief Engineer (MSRRDA), Govt. of Manipur to issue 2nd NIT dated 27-12-2014 inviting item rate tender from eligible contractors. This time, three contractors participated in the tender process and after the financial bid being opened, the following contractors were found to be ranked as under:- Sl. No. Bidders Name Amount (Rs.) Bid Rank 1 Md. Nashir Shah 2,16,77,437.83 L1 2 Chingakham Rajen Singh 2,23,20,901.62 L2 3 M/S N. Kumar Meitei 3,05,33,569.25 L3 When their bid amounts were converted into percentage, the following rates/percentage were obtained by the bidders:- Sl. No. Bidders Name Amount (Rs.) Bid Rank 1 Md. Nashir Shah 2,16,77,437.83 L1 2 Chingakham Rajen Singh 2,23,20,901.62 L2 3 M/S N. Kumar Meitei 3,05,33,569.25 L3 When their bid amounts were converted into percentage, the following rates/percentage were obtained by the bidders:- Sl. No. Bidders Name Bid Rank 1 Md. Nashir Shah -29.01% 2 Chingakham Rajen Singh -26.90% 3 M/S N. Kumar Meitei 0.00% 3.3 The Tender Committee fixed the maximum bench mark/cut-off percentage for the 2nd NIT date 27-12-2014 as -30% for Stage-I which is meant for the new construction and -25% for Stage-II which is meant for the up-gradation of work. On seeing the outcome of the financial bid that the bids of the contractors were beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage, the Chief Engineer (MSRRDA), Government of Manipur cancelled the tender process in respect of Package No. MNO 555 and accordingly, he issued 3rd NIT dated 18-01-2016 as the 2nd re-tender inviting item rate tender from eligible contractors in respect of the said package. The petitioner being eligible for the tender, participated in the said 3rd NIT dated 18-01-2016 for the said package. After the financial bid being opened, the petitioner was found to be ranked at L4 while the private respondent at L1. After their bids having been converted into percentage, the following rates/percentage were found to be obtained by the bidders:- Sl. No. Bidders Name Amount (Rs.) (a) Th. Nodiachand Singh -25.043% (L1) (b) Okram Ibotomba Singh -25.000% (L2) (c) Md. Nashir Shah -25.000% (L3) (d) M/S Manikchand and Co. -20.956% (L4) (e) Ashing Kabui -19.999% (L5) (f) L. Tarpon -19.400% (L6) It may be noted that in respect of the Stage-II of the 3rd NIT as the 2nd re-tender, the Tender Committee fixed the parameters/cut-off percentage at -23% for awarding the contract work. The bid percentage of the petitioner being at -20% which is within the limit of -23%, the petitioner was the most eligible and realistically workable bidder in respect of the said package No. MNO 555. However, since it is learned from the reliable sources that the official respondents intended to go ahead with the process for awarding the said Tender to the private respondent, he submitted a representation dated 14-11-2016 requesting the respondent No. 2 to accept his bid. However, since it is learned from the reliable sources that the official respondents intended to go ahead with the process for awarding the said Tender to the private respondent, he submitted a representation dated 14-11-2016 requesting the respondent No. 2 to accept his bid. But the respondent No. 2 failed to consider his representation and consequently, the petitioner was compelled to issue a legal notice dated 13-12-2016 requesting him to consider his representation. On receipt of the said legal notice, the respondent No. 2 issued a back dated Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 in favour of the private respondent which the petitioner came to know only on 15-12-2016. As per the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016, the private respondent was required to furnish Performance Security and Additional Performance Security within a period of 10 days therefrom. Since the private respondent failed to do that within 10 days, the petitioner submitted another representation requesting the respondent No. 2 to cancel the said Letter of Acceptance and to take necessary steps for awarding the contract work to him. The private respondent could furnish his Performance Security and Additional Performance Security only on 17-01-2017 which is after a lapse of 58 days. 3.4 Since the respondent No.2 failed to consider his representation dated 04-01-2017, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble High Court by way of a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 272 of 2017 praying for disposal of his aforesaid representation. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the petitioner through his staff filed an application dated 28-03-2017 under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 for seeking certain information as regards the bench mark/cut-off percentage fixed by the authority. The respondent No.2 issued a work order dated 15-04-2017 by back dating it in collusion with the concerned authority and overriding the decision of the Tender Committee. Since the Work Order had been issued during the pendency of the said writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 272 of 2017, the petitioner withdrew the same with a liberty to file a fresh petition and accordingly, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. Since the Work Order had been issued during the pendency of the said writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 272 of 2017, the petitioner withdrew the same with a liberty to file a fresh petition and accordingly, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3, it has been stated that although the work package No. MNO 555 falls under the Stage-II/up-gradation, the nature of work is that of a Stage-I i.e., earthwork embankments/filling of the earth, the Tender Committee decided to award the contract as that of a Stage-I, the maximum limit of which is -27% and accordingly, the work was awarded to the private respondent whose rate is -25% which is below qualifying rate fixed by the Tender Committee. The Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 was issued to the private respondent with the direction to furnish Performance Security and Additional Performance Security with 10 days, which was furnished by him on 17-01-2017 for which a letter dated 31-01-2017 was submitted stating that it was due to de-monetisation and therefore, there is nothing wrong in the Letter of Acceptance and the Work Order dated 15-04-2017. The private respondent filed his affidavit taking a similar stand as that of the respondent Nos.2 & 3. It has been stated in his affidavit that the question of awarding contract to the 2nd or 3rd bidder does not arise and there is no provision for cancellation of award, if the Performance Security and Additional Performance Security is not furnished within 10 days. Moreover, the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 was received by him only on 21-12-2016 and the Performance Security and Additional Performance Security were furnished by him on 17-01-2017 within 45 days time. There is no question of having collusion with the government officials. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner, it has been stated that the 2nd NIT was cancelled because the bid percentage of two contractors were -29% and -26% respectively which were beyond the maximum limit and the bid of one of the bidders was very high. In the re-tender, the bid percentage of the private respondent was -25% which is beyond the maximum limit and in terms of the letter dated 22-07-2015 of the Director (RC), Government of India, the bids of the private respondent ought to have been rejected. In the re-tender, the bid percentage of the private respondent was -25% which is beyond the maximum limit and in terms of the letter dated 22-07-2015 of the Director (RC), Government of India, the bids of the private respondent ought to have been rejected. It is an admitted fact that the private respondent failed to furnish the Performance Security and the Additional Performance Security within time which is in violation of the provisions of Clause 32 of the ITB and that too, without any leave being submitted along with them. It has further been submitted that at any point of time during the tender process, the official respondents never informed that the nature of the work which is Stage-II, be treated as that of a Stage-I and therefore, the favouritism and nepotism while awarding the contract in favour of the private respondent is crystal clear. 5. It has been submitted by Shri Ajay Pebam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 15-04-2017 is a back dated one which was issued in collusion with the concerned authority and that the award of contract in favour of the private respondent is discriminatory, unreasonable and arbitrary. In order to substantiate his contention, he has relied upon and emphasised the following circumstances:- Firstly, the 1st NIT was issued by the Chief Engineer on 20-10-2014 in respect of the package No. MNO 555 and although two contractors participated in the tender process, only one was found to be eligible for financial bid when the technical bid was opened. The tender had been cancelled because of only one contractor being qualified for financial bid; Secondly, 2nd NIT was issued on 27-12-2014 by the Chief Engineer and three contractors participated in the tender process. The Tender Committee fixed the maximum limit i.e., bench mark/cut-off percentage as -30% for Stage-I/New connectivity and -25% for Stage-II/Up-gradation work. The tender had been cancelled because of only one contractor being qualified for financial bid; Secondly, 2nd NIT was issued on 27-12-2014 by the Chief Engineer and three contractors participated in the tender process. The Tender Committee fixed the maximum limit i.e., bench mark/cut-off percentage as -30% for Stage-I/New connectivity and -25% for Stage-II/Up-gradation work. Bids of two contractors were found to be beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage i.e. -29.005% and -26.897% of L-1 & L-2 respectively whereas the bid of the third contractor whose bid rate was 0.000%, was very high and due to this reason, the NIT was cancelled; Thirdly, 3rd NIT as 2nd re-tender was issued on 18-01-2016 by the Chief Engineer in respect of which six contractors participated in the tender process and when the technical bid was opened, all of them were found to be qualified for the financial bid. After the financial bid being opened, the private respondent was found to be the L-1 with his percentage at -25.043% while that of the petitioner at -20.956%. Fourthly, in respect of 3rd NIT, the Tender Committee fixed the bench mark/cut-off percentage as -23% for Stage-II and -27% for Stage-I. Although the bid rate of the private respondent is beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage, the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 was issued in his favour; Fifthly, the performance security and the Additional Performance Security were furnished by the private respondent after the expiry of ten days as prescribed in Clause 32.1 of the ITB and that too, after the representation dated 04-01-2017 being submitted by the petitioner for cancellation of the Letter of Acceptance; Sixthly, the impugned work order dated 15-04-2017 was issued by overriding the decision of the Sanctioning Authority, i.e., National Rural Road Development Agency, New Delhi which has sanctioned the cost for Stage-II of the package. Seventhly, no information about the stage of the tender process was received even after validity of the tender i.e., 90 days and therefore, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 14-11-2016 requesting the respondent No. 2 to accept his bid. But since the respondent No. 2 failed to consider his representation, he was compelled to issue a legal notice dated 13-12-2016 requesting him to consider his representation. But since the respondent No. 2 failed to consider his representation, he was compelled to issue a legal notice dated 13-12-2016 requesting him to consider his representation. On receipt of the said legal notice, the respondent No. 2 issued a back dated Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 in favour of the private respondent which the petitioner came to know only on 15-12-2016; Eighthly, in respect of a similar package No. 552, the contract was awarded to Shri Ashing Kabui whose rate/percentage was -20.00%, by rejecting the rate percentage at -25.15% of Shri Okram Megha Singh which is beyond the bench mark. 6. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in matters relating to award of contract is no longer res-integra and one of the earliest cases in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered its decision is the case in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 wherein two main issues - one, relating to the scope of judicial review and two, relating to selection being vitiated by arbitrariness, which are relevant for this case also, were considered and decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In matters relating to contracts wherein one of the parties is the public authority, the question to be asked is, have the guidelines been laid down, if so laid down, have they been observed? The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, summarised the principles which are the broad grounds subject to addition of further grounds in course of time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender: 1. It must be unconditional. 2. Must be made at the proper place. 3. Must conform to the terms of obligation. 4. Must be made at the proper time. 5. Must be made in the proper form. 6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. 7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection. 8. Tender must be made to the proper person. 9. It must be of full amount. 70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. 71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. 88. We may now look at some of the pronouncements of this Court including the authorities cited by Mr. Ashoke Sen, Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan was a case in which the Court was concerned with the award of a contract for show of sponsored TV serial. At p. 92 in paragraphs 5 and 6 it was held thus: "It is well settled that there should be fair play in action in a situation like the present one, as was observed by this Court in Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana. It is also well settled that the authorities like Doordarshan should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and transaction should be without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism or nepotism. See the observations of this Court in Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corpn. It is also well settled that the authorities like Doordarshan should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and transaction should be without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism or nepotism. See the observations of this Court in Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corpn. While, as mentioned hereinbefore, fair play in action in matters like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however, 'free play in the joints' is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. Judged from that standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of precedence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will." 94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure." In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 wherein it has been held that the law relating to award of a contract has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the relevant para 7 of which is as under: "7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Tata Cellular v. Union of India, Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." In B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal services Ltd. & ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 548 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "66. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." In B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal services Ltd. & ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 548 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "66. We are also not shutting our eyes towards the new principles of judicial review which are being developed; but the law as it stands now having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions may be summarised as under: (i) if there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered to; (ii) if there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the same shall not be exercised and the principle of strict compliance would be applied where it is possible for all the parties to comply with all such conditions fully; (iii) if, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the parties in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again a power of relaxation may be held to be existing; (iv) the parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in relation to compliance with another part of tender contract, particularly when he was also not in a position to comply with all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court otherwise finds relaxation of a condition which being essential in nature could not be relaxed and thus the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction; (v) when a decision is taken by the appropriate authority upon due consideration of the tender document submitted by all the tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately found that successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the purport and object for which essential conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with; (vi) the contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same, their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest would be given priority; (vii) where a decision has been taken purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint." In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the decision in Tata Cellular case (supra) was referred to and relied upon with the following observations: "This Court also noted that there are inherent limitations in the exercise of power of judicial review of contractual powers. This Court also observed that the duty to act fairly will vary in extent, depending upon the nature of cases, to which the said principle is sought to be applied. This Court held that the State has the right to refuse the lowest or any other tender, provided it tries to get the best person or the best quotation, and the power to choose is not exercised for any collateral purpose or in infringement of Article 14". In Maa Binda Express Carrier v. North-East Frontier Railway, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 760 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the submission of tender is no more than making an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept and the bidders in the tender cannot insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the highest or the lowest. It has further been held that the only enforceable right that a bidder has, is to examine by the court whether the aggrieved party has been treated unfairly or discriminated against to the detriment of the public interest. In Rishi Kiran Logistics Private Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Ttrust & anr., reported in (2015) 13 SCC 233 , the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular Case (supra), has been followed with the observation that a lucid enunciation on the scope of judicial review of administrative action, that too, in tender matters can be found therein. 7. Having kept the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in matters relating to award of contract in mind, this court proposes to consider the circumstances as narrated hereinabove. 7. Having kept the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in matters relating to award of contract in mind, this court proposes to consider the circumstances as narrated hereinabove. The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna (PMGSY) is a flagship programme launched by the Union of India for providing connectivity to target unconnected habitations in the country and in this programme, 100% funds for construction of good all weather roads are provided to the State Governments. Accordingly, PMGSY programme guidelines have been issued providing for invitation of tenders by the Development Agency through e-tendering process and the well established procedure for tendering through competitive bidding, is required to be followed by the Development Agency for all projects. The Development Agency being a government institution is expected to act fairly and reasonably and in other words, it has to act in accordance with law. Failing to do so will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While selecting the bidders through the tender process, it does not make any difference to the Development Agency whether the work is executed by any of the bidders and all that the Development Agency is concerned, is that the work be executed in accordance with the project estimate prepared by the engineer and in other words, all that the Development Agency has to do, is to keep always in mind the interest of the public while awarding the contract. All are equal in the eyes of law and therefore, the Development Agency ought to treat all the contractors equally. Coming to the facts of the present case and having examined and considered the circumstances as narrated hereinabove, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has substance and force. It is not in dispute that the bid percentage of the private respondent is beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage and the only justification given by the Development Agency is that the work of Stage-II is in the nature of Stage-I and therefore, the contract was awarded to the private respondent, although his bid percentage is beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage. Admittedly, the Tender Committee fixed the bench mark/cut-off percentage in terms of the guidelines laid down by the Ministry of Rural Development, Govt. of India and in particular, the letter dated 22-07-2015 of the Director (RC), Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development. Admittedly, the Tender Committee fixed the bench mark/cut-off percentage in terms of the guidelines laid down by the Ministry of Rural Development, Govt. of India and in particular, the letter dated 22-07-2015 of the Director (RC), Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development. The Development Agency has not brought to the notice of this court its power and authority to change the nature of the work after the same being approved by the Government of India and after the NIT being floated by it and moreover, the Development Agency has not notified to all concerned about its decision that the work be entrusted to a contractor by treating the work of Stage-II as that of Stage-I. It may be noted that in respect of the 2nd tender, the Development Agency had to cancel the tender on the ground that the bid percentage of the contractors were beyond the bench mark/cut-off percentage. The same principle ought to have been observed but the Development Agency failed to observe it in respect of this 3rd NIT as is evident from the similar packages and in particular, the package No.552 for which the contract was awarded to Shri Ashing Kabui whose rate/percentage was -20.00%, by rejecting the rate/percentage i.e., -25.15% of Shri Okram Megha Singh and therefore, the decision of the Development Agency, by treating the work of Stage-II as that of Stage-I, to award the contract to the private respondent appears to be unreasonable and arbitrary. The other circumstances as narrated hereinabove by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, will clearly show that the Development Authority was keen to seeing that the contract was awarded to the private respondent. As per the provisions of Clause 32.1, the private respondent was required to furnish the Performance Security and the Additional Performance Security within 10 days but the Development Agency accepted the same from the private respondent on 17-01-2017 after the expiry of the period of 10 days. The letter dated 31-01-2017 alleged to have been addressed to the Development Agency by the private respondent explaining the delay appears to be an afterthought only to show that the Development Agency accepted the Performance Security and Additional Performance Security after such request being made by him. The letter dated 31-01-2017 alleged to have been addressed to the Development Agency by the private respondent explaining the delay appears to be an afterthought only to show that the Development Agency accepted the Performance Security and Additional Performance Security after such request being made by him. One aspect to be noted is that the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 is a back dated one, appears to have some force for the reason that the same was received by the private respondent only on 21-12-2016 and that too, only after the legal notice dated 13-12-2016 being served upon it by the petitioner through his advocate. Normally, it does not take a month's time for such letter of acceptance to reach the contractors because they always keep in touch with the Development Agency. In view of the above circumstances, it is seen that the Development Agency has failed to observe the guidelines and in other words, it has failed to observe the guidelines uniformly in all the packages and has played hot and cold while observing the guidelines. Non-observance of the guidelines equally to all the contractors is unreasonable and arbitrary. Had this case been the only case, this court could have ignored some of these circumstances but the fact remains that this court has been approached by many persons, during the last few years, by way of various writ petitions, with allegations of unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the observance of the guidelines/principles, in respect of many packages which demonstrate the mode of operandi of the Development Agency. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down in Tata Cellular case (supra) and followed in many subsequent cases, the impugned Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 and the Work Order dated 15-04-2017 are not sustainable in law and are liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. For the reason stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed and consequently, the Letter of Acceptance dated 19-11-2016 and the Work Order dated 15-04-2017 are quashed and set aside with no order as to costs.