JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.02.2013 rendered by 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun in Rent Control Appeal No.27 of 2011. 2. The key facts necessary for adjudication to this petition are that respondent No.1/landlord filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 for eviction of the tenant/petitioner. According to the averments made in the plaint, respondent No.1/landlord had only one shop in his possession. This shop is very small. He required the property for settling his son. Landlord/respondent No.1 also pleaded that the tenant has two other shops situated in 617 Dakara Cantt and Godown and also residential accommodation comprising of 6-7 rooms. Petitioner filed his objections to the release application. Petitioner/tenant pleaded that he was carrying his own business in the suit property and landlord/respondent No.1 has also property in Dakara Cantt. including a big commercial property in Garhi Cantt. Landlord had also established a Soda and Cold Drinks factory and he himself is running the business in the close vicinity of the suit property. Before the Prescribed Authority, both the parties led their evidence in the matter. Learned Prescribed authority/Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Dehradun dismissed the release application vide order dated 25.02.2011. Aggrieved by the said order, landlord/respondent No.1 preferred an appeal before learned 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun being R.C.A. No.27 of 2011 which was allowed vide order dated 25.02.2013. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that the suit property is commercial-cum-residential and landlord/respondent No.1 has also other properties in his possession. Learned 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun has not taken into consideration the comparative hardship faced by the tenant. Landlord has sufficient alternative property in his possession, requirement of the landlord is not bonafide. Learned counsel for the tenant/petitioner supported the order passed by Prescribed Authority/ Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Dehradun. 4. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the landlord/respondent No.1 has supported the judgment passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Dehradun. Suit property was let out for the commercial purpose by the landlord and now the landlord wants to settle his son in the suit property. Petitioner/tenant had not made any effort to find out the alternative accommodation after institution of rent petition. 5. Suit property was let out for the commercial purpose by the landlord and now the landlord wants to settle his son in the suit property. Petitioner/tenant had not made any effort to find out the alternative accommodation after institution of rent petition. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment/order passed by the courts below carefully. 6. In all the receipts including money orders sent by the petitioner/tenant to the landlord, the description of suit property has been shown as a shop. The Court has seen the receipts. According to the affidavit filed by landlord, the suit property was commercial not residential. The landlord wanted to settle his son in separate business in the suit property. 7. The landlord has every right to settle his family members. The need of the landlord is bonafide. It is the fact that landlord was running a shop in the close vicinity, but his requirement seems to be bonafide. Landlord’s son has also appeared as witness and he has stated that he wanted to start his separate business in the suit property. Each and every member of the landlords’ family is entitled to start separate independent business. Petitioner/tenant has not made any effort to find out the alternative accommodation after institution of rent petition for release of the suit property. Learned Appellate Court, after going through the record, categorically found that the comparative hardship faced by the landlord would be more. The suit property is required by the landlord for settling his son. 8. Learned Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the parties. Petitioner has never denied that the son of landlord was not unemployed. 9. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 532 in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others Vs. Mustaqim and others have held that educated and unemployed son was in need of settling himself independently in business. Simply because he was assisting his father in family business does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. Relief of eviction cannot be denied merely because other shops are available to him. Their Lordships have held as under :- 3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Relief of eviction cannot be denied merely because other shops are available to him. Their Lordships have held as under :- 3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that Plaintiff 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. Plaintiff 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because Plaintiff 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial court too, that the husband of Plaintiff 4 i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons. 4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need of Plaintiff 2. The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the business of Plaintiff 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and unutilized. Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective assessment by the court of facts then choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy. The court cannot thrust its own choice upon the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodations which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to Plaintiff 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The court cannot thrust its own choice upon the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodations which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to Plaintiff 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The approach of the High Court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of Plaintiff 2, who too is an educated unemployed, should be diverted or can be considered as a relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of Plaintiff 1, another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant, cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one of them. 5. We find it difficult to sustain the observation of the High Court that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiffs falls short of felt need and is merely a desire. The judgment of the trial court is a detailed and exhaustive judgment which has taken into consideration each and every available piece of evidence and relevant circumstances, assessed with objectivity, consistently with the relevant principles of law and hence the finding is one which could not have been upset by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the manner in which the High Court has proceeded to form an opinion at variance with the findings of the trial court is wholly unsustainable. 10. In the present case, though the landlord has alternative accommodation, however, the choice is only of the landlord to consider in which part of the property, he wants to carry out his business and in which part of property, he wants his son to do the business separately/independently. 11. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 780 in the case of Sushila Vs. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and others while considering Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972) have held that greater period of tenancy cannot be sole criterion for determining hardship. Their Lordships have held as under :- “8. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and others while considering Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972) have held that greater period of tenancy cannot be sole criterion for determining hardship. Their Lordships have held as under :- “8. Before considering the provisions contained in the abovenoted sub-rule, we may analyse the factual position. Both parties have large families. The father of the respondent Baij Nath had been running the kirana shop since long. The shop was purchased by the petitioner in the year 1977. Her husband had also purchased a shop at the same time which is adjacent to the shop in dispute. He is a goldsmith and also runs money lending business in his shop. The children of the petitioner have grown up in course of time and Prem Prakash meanwhile was married and has children. Prem Prakash is the eldest son. He is unemployed. He has two other brothers younger to him. So far as Baij Nath is concerned, initially his father had been running his shop in the accommodation in dispute. Baij Nath was running his shop separately in Gursahai Road. Thus his business and shop were separate from his father Mool Chand. But on the death of Mool Chand he started his business in the shop in question and established his son in the shop which was being run by him in Gursahai Road. He also has a shop in Chowk Bazar which fact is well established by the sale deed executed in his favour by his vendor. From the evidence on record it also transpires that there are other shops also around the area. Therefore, it cannot be said that he cannot run his shop in that area as found by the prescribed authority. As a matter of fact, in one of the rejoinder-affidavits it is indicated that in some of the shops in Chowk Bazar he is also running a tailoring school. Be that as it may, the fact remains that at least one shop other than the one in tenancy is available to the tenant which fact he initially tried to suppress. As a matter of fact, in one of the rejoinder-affidavits it is indicated that in some of the shops in Chowk Bazar he is also running a tailoring school. Be that as it may, the fact remains that at least one shop other than the one in tenancy is available to the tenant which fact he initially tried to suppress. As a matter of fact, he himself was initially settled in his own separate business in another shop in Gursahai Road and had shifted to the shop in question on the death of his father handing over the other shop in Gursahai Road to his son for his proper settlement and employment. He could very well shift his son in the shop which was purchased by him in Chowk Bazar or if he wanted to shift from Gursahai Road he could himself have shifted to that shop. Presently, he has two shops; one for himself, the other for his son and at least one more in Chowk Bazar. So far as the petitioner is concerned, she has no other shop where she can establish her married son who is unemployed. In such circumstances, the only fact that the shop in question is in possession of the tenant since long will have no material bearing in deciding the question of comparative hardship. To say that the son of the petitioner landlady may remain unemployed but the shop in question must continue to remain in occupancy of the tenant to whom yet another shop is available in Chowk Bazar would not withstand the guidelines and tests laid down in sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1972. 10. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the prescribed authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of the father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of the father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed earlier it is clear that the length of the period of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us. 11. It may be mentioned that we are not taking into account clause (d) of sub-rule (2) Rule 16 of the Rules; where yet another factor is to be borne in mind, in favour of releasing the shop, if the person has some technical education to his credit but is not employed in any government service and wants to engage in self-employment. The petitioner had shown that her son Prem Prakash had undergone a training course in household electrical wiring and had obtained a certificate from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. He did not get any government job and wanted to be self-employed by starting a shop of electrical goods and utensils. The prescribed authority considered this factor but we find that the appellate court expressed doubt on the fact that the certificate related to Prem Prakash being led by the fact that his residence was shown as Village Lukhtara, undisputedly that village also falls in the district of Banda. It was also observed by the appellate court that it could not be shown as to what government job Prem Prakash could get by virtue of the certificate he had obtained from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. The whole approach to the point was misdirected. It was also observed by the appellate court that it could not be shown as to what government job Prem Prakash could get by virtue of the certificate he had obtained from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. The whole approach to the point was misdirected. Be that as it may, we make it clear that even by excluding the factor of Prem Prakash being technically educated, otherwise as well we find that the need and requirement of the landlady is bona fide even after considering the same in the light of Rule 16 of the Rules and in the background of comparative hardship which we find would be more to the landlady, in the event of disallowing the application for eviction. 12. In the present case, landlord has shown his bonafide need that his son wanted to start his business separately. 13. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2003 (2) SCC 236 in the case Precision Steel & Engg. Works and another Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal have held that question of construction and determining the purpose of letting may pose difficulty when the premises are let for mixed, composite or dual purposes, i.e. where the entire premises are allowed to be used for an overlapping purpose or the premises forming subject matter of one tenancy are allowed to be used for purposes more than one. In such a case, it cannot be said that the premises would cease to be of either category, i.e. they would be neither residential nor non-residential. Rather it would be necessary to find out what is the main and dominant purpose of letting as distinguished from “subsidiary, ancillary or incidental purpose”. 14. Learned Single Judge in 1978 Allahabad Rent Cases, 62 in the case of Dr. Bashir Uddin Vs. District Judge, Bulandshahar and others has held that the dominant purpose for which an accommodation is being used must be discovered for the purpose of determining whether the accommodation is being used for residential purpose or otherwise. Learned Single Judge has also held as under :- “The word ‘business’ has not been defined in the Act and is not a word of art. It is a capable of being construed in a comprehensive as well as a restricted sense, depending on the context in which it occurs. Learned Single Judge has also held as under :- “The word ‘business’ has not been defined in the Act and is not a word of art. It is a capable of being construed in a comprehensive as well as a restricted sense, depending on the context in which it occurs. According to Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, ‘business’ mean employment ; occupation ; profession; calling vocation ; means of livelihood ; that which occupies the time, attention and labour of men, for the purpose of profit or improvement. ‘According to the same Dictionary, the word ‘may also’ mean ‘commerce or trade in general’. In Corpus Juris Second Volume 12 page 762, the word ‘business’ in its broader sense is defined as follows :- “In its broad, its broader, or in its broadest, sense, in its more general or common use, in its primary meaning, or when used colloquially, the word ‘business’ carries with it a very broad meaning ; and it has been said that it denotes not only all gainful occupations, but all occupation or duties in which men engage …….has common and general application to all sorts of enterprises which engage people’s attention and energies ; and includes nearly all the affairs in which either an individual or a corporation can be actors ; and is a word in common use to described every occupation in which men engage….the word is commonly employed in connection with an occupation for livelihood or profit but it is not limited to such pursuits, for it has been said that the definition of ‘business’ by the lexicographers is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace every employment or occupation………..” According to Aiyar’s Law Lexicon of Britisa India (1940 Edition) page 164, the word ‘business’ in its larger sense has been stated to mean ‘an affair requiring attention and care ; that which business and occupies one’s time, attention, and labour as his chief concern’. In the same passage the word ‘business’ is mentioned as conveying in the narrower sense, ‘mercantile pursuits ; that which one does for a livelihood ; occupation ; employment ; as, the business of a merchant ; the business of agriculture’. It is a well established rule of interpretation that in order to find out the true import of enacted words one must look both at the words as well as the object of the legislation. It is a well established rule of interpretation that in order to find out the true import of enacted words one must look both at the words as well as the object of the legislation. Words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated and detached manner disassociated from the context in which they occur. In the present case, the broader question as to whether the word ‘business’ within the meaning of clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 is limited to profit-making activities alone or not does not really arise since it is obvious that the petitioner needs the premises in dispute for carrying on gainful employment as a Dental Surgeon. To our mind there is intrinsic evidence in the Act itself to justify the conclusion that the word ‘business’ within the meaning of clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 of the Act including within its scope ‘professions’ as well as ‘callings’. According to Section 3(1) ‘building’ means residential or non-residential roofed structure…….’ It is not difficult to understand as to what a residential building is. These words can have no relation to the nature of the structure because human need is capable of converting and using any building for the purpose of residence. A residential building must consequently be a building which at the moment is being utilized primarily for the purpose of residence. Non-residential buildings would be buildings which are used for any purpose other than residence. We have to bear in mind that we are living in a welfare State and the basic and primary need of a citizen is shelter and this need must take procedure over the requirements of other activities, commercial or otherwise. This, in our opinion, is the objective that clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 seeks to achieve. The object of the provision plainly seems to be to put a curb on the tendency of landlords to reader tenants homeless and to divert premises under use for residential purposes to other purposes. This, in our opinion, is the objective that clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 seeks to achieve. The object of the provision plainly seems to be to put a curb on the tendency of landlords to reader tenants homeless and to divert premises under use for residential purposes to other purposes. Section 21(a)(1) enables a landlord to apply for eviction to a tenant from a building bona fide required either interest in its existing form or after demolition and reconstruction for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling………..’ This provision divides the needs of a landlord into two distinct classes. The need may be for ‘residential purposes’ or for non-residential purposes like carrying on a ‘profession, trade or calling’. The Third Proviso of the section lays down that ‘no application under clause (a) shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes’. In our opinion, the proviso debars a landlord from applying for the eviction of a tenant from buildings under use a residence for the other purposes mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21 (1) that is to say for the purposes of profession, trade or calling. The right of a landlord to apply for the eviction of a tenant from a residential buildings remains intact provided he needs it for the purposes of his own residence or residence of any other member of his family of any other person for whose benefit it is held by him but the clause under consideration acts as an impediment to the landlord converting a residential buildings into a non-residential building. That in our judgment, is the intention of the legislature. Instead of repeating the words ‘for purposes of any profession, trade or calling occurring in clause (a) of Section 21 (1), the legislature has used the compendious expression ‘business purposes’. We are firmly of the view that the words ‘business purposes’ within the meaning of clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 covers within the range ‘purposes of any profession, trade or calling’, occurring in Section 21(i) clause (a). We are firmly of the view that the words ‘business purposes’ within the meaning of clause (ii) of the Third Proviso to Section 21 covers within the range ‘purposes of any profession, trade or calling’, occurring in Section 21(i) clause (a). We are fortified in the view taken by us by the definition of the word ‘business’ in Rule 2 (b) of the Rules framed under the Act, according to which it means ‘any profession, trade of calling’. The Rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 41 of the Act. Section 42 of the Act requires that ‘all rules made under this Act shall, as soon as may be after they are issued or made, be laid before each House of the State Legislature, while it is in session, for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in its one session or in two or more successive sessions and shall, unless some later date is appointed, take effect from the date of their publication in the Gazette subject to such modification or annulment as the two Houses of the Legislature may during the said period agree to make, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder. This procedure evidently must have been followed before the publication of the Rules in the Gazette. It is thus not unreasonable to hold that the definition of the word ‘business’, as it is to be found in the Rules, found legislative approval. According to Craies on ‘Statute Law’ (Seventh Edition) page 157 where the language of an Act is ambiguous and difficult to construe the Court may for assistance in its construction refer to this rules made under the provisions of the Act, especially where such rules are by the statute authorising them directed to be read as part of the Act’. In the instant case there is no provision in the Act to the effect that the Rules framed thereunder shall be read as part of the Act as already stated the Act does provide for the rules being placed before the legislature which has the power to approve or disapprove them.” 15. The landlord has given only shop to the tenant. The dominant purpose was commercial in nature. His need was bonafide. The landlord has given only shop to the tenant. The dominant purpose was commercial in nature. His need was bonafide. He has proved bonafide requirement to settle his son in the shop. The difficulty of the landlord is more vis-à-vis the tenant. 16. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Petitioner/tenant is directed to handover the possession of the suit property to the landlord/respondent No.1 within a period of three months from today. Petitioner/tenant shall pay use and occupation charges to the landlord with arrears, if any, till the vacation of the suit property.