JUDGMENT : B. KEMAL PASHA, J. 1. Challenging the concurrent findings entered by the Munsiff's Court, Thalassery in O.S. No. 301 of 2000, followed by the Subordinate Judge's Court, Thalassery in A.S. No. 61 of 2006, the plaintiffs in the suit have come up with this second appeal. 2. The suit is one for recovery of an amount of Rs. 10,000/- allegedly collected by the defendant, from the District Court, Thalassery, from the Advocate Clerks' Welfare Fund Scheme, on the death of one Radhakrishnan, who was the husband of the defendant. Radhakrishnan died on 19.11.1995. According to the plaintiffs, Radhakrishnan had executed Exhibit-A1 unregistered Will on 31.10.1995 and as per Exhibit-A1 Will, Radhakrishnan had bequeathed his entire assets, both movables and immovables, including the amount to be disbursed from the Advocate Clerks' Welfare Fund Scheme also, to the plaintiffs. It is their case that the defendant had unauthorisedly and illegally collected the amount of Rs. 10,000/- disbursed on account of the death of Radhakrishnan from the Advocate Clerks' Welfare Fund Scheme. 3. The defendant strongly denied the execution of the Will. She contended that the Will is an out come of forgery and that deceased Radhakrishnan had never executed such a Will. She had disputed the handwriting in the Will as well as the signature in the Will. According to her, Radhakrishnan had no occasion to execute such a Will and the signatures and the handwriting in the Will are not that of Radhakrishnan. According to her, Radhakrishnan was suffering from AIDS and finally, he succumbed to the said disease. When the plaintiffs were claiming that Exhibit-A1 Will was executed in their favour by Radhakrishnan in the year 1995 itself, they could have claimed the amount from the said Scheme in the year 1995 itself. The defendant was not, in fact, made known about the actual disease of Radhakrishnan for long. The plaintiffs had prevented the attempt of the defendant to live along with the deceased Radhakrishnan. According to the defendant, when she had forwarded a demand for partition and separate possession of the property jointly owned by the plaintiffs and Radhakrishnan, Exhibit-A1 forged Will was created by the plaintiffs for forwarding unnecessary claims in respect of the properties of the deceased. 4. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court had disbelieved Exhibit-A1. According to the defendant, when she had forwarded a demand for partition and separate possession of the property jointly owned by the plaintiffs and Radhakrishnan, Exhibit-A1 forged Will was created by the plaintiffs for forwarding unnecessary claims in respect of the properties of the deceased. 4. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court had disbelieved Exhibit-A1. It is trite law that it is the propounder of the Will to dispel all the suspicious circumstances in the execution of the Will. It has been pointed out that just as a test dose, the present suit was filed by seeking the recovery of the amount of Rs. 10,000/- disbursed to the defendant from the District Court, Thalassery from the Advocate Clerks' Welfare Fund Scheme, on account of the death of Radhakrishnan, who was an Advocate Clerk. Even when the Will has been strongly challenged, no further reliefs have been incorporated in the suit. 5. This court has perused the contents of Exhibit-A1 as well as Exhibit-A4(a). Exhibit-A4(a) was a complaint allegedly preferred by deceased Radhakrishnan against his father-in-law, his wife and her other relatives. According to the plaintiffs, Exhibit-A4 was in the handwriting of the deceased. At the same time, PW3, who was cited and examined to prove the handwriting and the signature of the deceased, has deposed that the last paragraph and also the writings at the side of the paper in Exhibit- A4(a) are not in the handwriting of the deceased. According to him, the other portions of Exhibit-A4(a) are in the handwriting of the deceased. On a comparison of the handwriting in Exhibit-A1 with Exhibit-A4(a), it is evident that there is an ocean of difference between the handwriting in Exhibit-A4(a) and the handwriting in Exhibit-A1. 6. At the same time, it is evident that the handwriting in Exhibit-A1 and the handwriting in the last paragraph of Exhibit-A4(a) and also the handwriting of a sentence shown at the side of page No. 2 of Exhibit-A4(a) are almost the same. That itself is sufficient to conclude that Exhibit-A1 is not in the handwriting of the deceased. Apart from the above, the contents of Exhibit-A1 Will are also to be considered. Nothing has been stated in the Will in order to exclude the only legal heir of the executant in Exhibit-A1. Exhibit-A1 is seen executed and signed in four different inks. That itself is sufficient to conclude that Exhibit-A1 is not in the handwriting of the deceased. Apart from the above, the contents of Exhibit-A1 Will are also to be considered. Nothing has been stated in the Will in order to exclude the only legal heir of the executant in Exhibit-A1. Exhibit-A1 is seen executed and signed in four different inks. Body of almost all the portions of Exhibit-A1 is executed in one ink. At the same time, the last sentence that "pen was changed for affixing signature" is in a different ink. The term "witness" and the name M.M. Radhakrishnan and signature with date are in another ink. The name and signature of PW-2 attester is in another ink. Strangely enough, the name and signature of the 1st attester Chandran is also in a different ink. 7. PW-2 alone was examined as one of the attesters to prove the Will, in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. It seems that in strict sense, PW-2 has literally proved the execution. At the same time, as noted earlier, the plaintiffs have to dispel all the suspicious circumstances exist in the execution of the will. 8. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. Thimmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 , the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court held: "The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. S.67 and S.68, Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under S.67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under S.45 and S.47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. S.68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. S.68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law." 9. It was further held that in case of the existence of any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, the Court naturally expects that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before that document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus on the propounder very heavy; and, unless it is specifically discharged, the Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last Will of the testator. It was also held that in case of a caveat alleging undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the Will propounded, is raised, it is for the caveator to prove such pleas; but, even without such pleas, circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting on his own free will in executing the Will and in such circumstances, it would be the initial onus on the part of the propounder to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 10. In the decision noted supra it was further held in paragraph 22 as follows: "It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the Will has to prove the due and valid execution of the Will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence." 11. Relying on the decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's Case (supra), another three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur, 1977 KHC 447 : 1977 (1) SCC 369 : AIR 1977 SC 74 : 1977 (1) SCR 925 summarised the propositions laid down in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's Case (supra) as follows: "1. Relying on the decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's Case (supra), another three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur, 1977 KHC 447 : 1977 (1) SCC 369 : AIR 1977 SC 74 : 1977 (1) SCR 925 summarised the propositions laid down in H. Venkatachala Iyengar's Case (supra) as follows: "1. Stated generally, a Will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of Wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since S.63 of the Succession Act required a Will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by S.68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the Will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the Will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity, in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last Will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the Will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the Will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the Will. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the Will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the Will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the Will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the Will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the Will excite the suspicion of the Court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with Wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last Will of the testator, the Court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the Court has to be satisfied fully that the Will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 12. This Court had occasion to consider these questions in Vadakkayil Gopalan and Others vs. Vadakkayil Paru and Others, 2013 (3) KLT 69 . 13. Even though, during the stage of evidence, the plaintiffs had switched on to a case that Radhakrishnan died of Cancer, the same was not pleaded in the plaint. This Court had occasion to consider these questions in Vadakkayil Gopalan and Others vs. Vadakkayil Paru and Others, 2013 (3) KLT 69 . 13. Even though, during the stage of evidence, the plaintiffs had switched on to a case that Radhakrishnan died of Cancer, the same was not pleaded in the plaint. The pleadings in the plaint regarding the illness of Radhakrishnan clearly coincides with the contention of the defendant regarding the decease of Radhakrishnan. When the only legal heir of the executant has been excluded, cogent reasons ought to have shown in Exhibit-A1 itself for such exclusion. On considering the totality of the circumstances and preponderance of broad probabilities, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to dispel the suspicious circumstances exist in the execution of Exhibit-A1. 14. When other documents were available to prove the handwriting and signature of the deceased, the plaintiffs have not cared to produce those documents to show the handwriting and signature of the deceased. The suit is devoid of merits and the trial court as well as the lower appellate court have correctly decided the suit. There is absolutely nothing to interfere with the concurrent findings entered by both the courts below. In fact, no questions of law emerge from this matter and therefore, the second appeal is devoid of merits and is only to be dismissed and, I do so. In the result, this second appeal stands dismissed. In the nature of this appeal, the parties shall bear their respective costs.