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2017 DIGILAW 1903 (JHR)

Renuka Sahani v. State Of Jharkhand

2017-11-07

ANANDA SEN, H.C.MISHRA

body2017
JUDGMENT H.C. Mishra, J. – Heard learned counsel for the informant-appellant and learned counsel for the respondent-State. 2. The informant-appellant has challenged the Judgment of acquittal dated 16.2.2016, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Bermo at Tenughat, in Sessions Case No. 293 of 2012, whereby the sole accused respondent No. 2, Sunder Lal Yadav, who had faced the trial for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, has been acquitted by the Trial Court. 3. Since this appeal is preferred after inordinate delay of 222 days, I.A. No. 5393 of 2017 has been filed for condonation of this inordinate delay, stating that the appellant had no means to engage the lawyer, for preferring this appeal and this appeal has been filed upon getting the legal aid from the Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Ranchi, and accordingly, prayer has been made for condonation of this inordinate delay. I.A. No. 2740 of 2017 has also been filed, seeking leave to appeal against the Judgment of acquittal. 4. According to the prosecution case, the appellant is a married lady, married about 14-15 years ago, prior to lodging of the F.I.R., and her husband was contractor by profession. The accused respondent No. 2, Sunder Lal Yadav had joined the business affairs of her husband and he was in visiting terms with the appellant. It is alleged that the accused-respondent No. 2 was a drunkard and he also made her husband a drunkard and once under intoxication, he committed rape upon the appellant, and thereafter, he started visiting her house regularly and they started physical relationship on the pretext that the accused shall marry the appellant. Some documents for marriage were also prepared in the Civil Court, Bermo at Tenughat, but the accused did not marry the appellant, hence the F.I.R. was lodged. From the impugned Judgment, it is apparent that the accused respondent No. 2 is also a married person and this fact was also known to the appellant. It is further apparent from the impugned Judgment that the appellant is the mother of 3 daughters, in the age group of 10-15 years. 5. From the impugned Judgment, it is apparent that the accused respondent No. 2 is also a married person and this fact was also known to the appellant. It is further apparent from the impugned Judgment that the appellant is the mother of 3 daughters, in the age group of 10-15 years. 5. The discussion of the prosecution evidence on record, as made by the Trial Court below, shows that the statement of the victim-informant was also recorded under section 164 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 before the S.D.J.M., Bermo at Tenughat, on 15.2.2012, wherein she had specifically narrated that the accused, on the false pretext of marrying her had made sexual intercourse with her and when she made pressure to marry her, he refused to marry her, hence she reached to the Police Station concerned and lodged the present case against him. The Court below has also found from the statement of the victim herself, recorded under section 164 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 that the victim herself willingly and on her sweet will and desire, joined the accused. The Court below has discussed the evidence of the appellant, the husband of the appellant and of her daughter and has come to the conclusion that the first occasion of rape, as it has come in the evidence of the victim herself, was in the month of December, 2011, whereas the evidence of her husband showed that it had occurred in the year 2012. The victim herself, in her cross-examination stated that she could not remember the exact date of the first occurrence of rape. The daughter of the victim informant in her evidence had stated in the Court that the first occurrence of rape was not disclosed to her. The Court below, accordingly, held that it was difficult to find out the date of first occurrence of rape and the exact date of the first occurrence had not been established, even though it had come in the evidence of the appellant herself that she had reported all the matters to her husband. It was also found that the F.I.R. was lodged after an inordinate delay and there was no plausible explanation for the same. It was also found that the F.I.R. was lodged after an inordinate delay and there was no plausible explanation for the same. The Court below has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 475 , wherein it was held that where the accused had assured the prosecutrix that he would marry her and had sexual affair, which was repeated on several occasions as well, but he did not marry and further where there was delay of eight months in filing the complaint, the accused was entitled to be given the benefit of doubt. The Court below has also found that in the present case, the prosecutrix herself, being a married lady and the mother of three daughters, willingly had the affair with the accused, who was already a married man, and as such, the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubts, and accordingly, giving him the benefit of doubt, acquitted the accused respondent No. 2 Sunder Lal Yadav. 6. In the facts of the case, we do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgment of acquittal, warranting any interference by this Court. Since, we do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgment, there is no question of granting leave to appeal against the Judgment of acquittal. In the facts of the case, we are also not inclined to condone the inordinate delay of 222 days in filing this appeal, simply because of the fact that this appeal has been filed by the appellant, upon getting the legal aid through Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Ranchi. Accordingly, both the interlocutory applications, filed for condonation of delay as also for granting leave to appeal against the Judgment of acquittal, are hereby, dismissed. 7. Consequently, this acquittal appeal is also dismissed, being hopelessly barred by limitation and also being bereft of any merit.