JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents in both these writ applications. 2. The petitioner in both these writ applications is aggrieved by the order dated 28.03.2016 passed by the Jharkhand State Consumer Redressal Commission, Ranchi, (herein after referred to as the 'State Commission'), in F.A. No. 311 of 2006 and three analogous appeals, whereby all the four appeals were disposed of by the State Commission by a common order. The said order passed by the State Commission is final in nature. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that these writ applications are maintainable against the order passed by the State Commission. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that Sections 19 and 21 of the Consumer Protection Act (herein after referred to as the 'Act'), deal with the jurisdiction of National Commission under the Act, and according to these Sections, only the National Commission under the Act has the jurisdiction to entertain the appeals / revisions against the orders passed by the State Commission. According to learned counsel, in view of the alternative remedy available under the Act, the writ applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, are not maintainable. 5. In Nivedita Sharma Vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors., reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, the same question was under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, i.e., whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petitions filed by respondent against the order passed by the State Commission. The question was decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court holding that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and the miscellaneous petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, laying down the law as follows :- "11. -------. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation — L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation — L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India. However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation." (Emphasis supplied). However, liberty was given to the respondent to challenge the order of the State Commission by availing the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, and in the facts of that case, it was further directed that if the appeal was filed within a period of 60 days from the date of Judgement of the Apex Court, the same shall be entertained by the National Commission and the appeal shall be decided on merits. 6. Against the impugned order passed by the State Commission, either appeal or revision shall lie before the National Commission under the Act. As such we are not inclined to entertain these writ applications in view of the availability of the alternative remedy to the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly prayed for same relief as granted by the Apex Court in Nivedita Sharma's case (supra), submitting that some time may be given to the petitioner for approaching the National Commission for availing the alternative remedy. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly prayed for same relief as granted by the Apex Court in Nivedita Sharma's case (supra), submitting that some time may be given to the petitioner for approaching the National Commission for availing the alternative remedy. 8. We are afraid that we cannot entertain the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as filing of appeal / revision in the National Commission under the Act, is subject to the limitation prescribed in the Act itself, which vests a legal right in the rival party. We, would however, only like to observe that if the petitioner approaches the National Commission, the period spent by the petitioner in this Court shall be accounted for while calculating the period of limitation. 9. Both these writ applications are accordingly, dismissed, with the observation as above.