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2017 DIGILAW 1907 (RAJ)

RAJESH CHAND JAIN v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

2017-08-26

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2017
ORDER : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 against the order dated 18.06.2008 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road, District Sirohi in Criminal Revision No. 30/2007 whereby he has upheld the order dated 23.06.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Abu Road in Complaint Case No. 32/2005 whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioner for offence under Section 323 IPC. 2. The brief facts as noticed by this Court are that the petitioner was posted as Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer at the relevant time and he checked a truck No. RJ 19 G 531 at which time, the petitioner was obstructed in the performance of his official duties and he filed a FIR in relation to this obstruction in which a charge sheet has been filed against the respondent No. 2 Deepesh Mathur. When the obstruction was being made, at that time, the officers of the Police Station Abu Road Sadar came there and apprehended respondent and some of his employees under Section 151 Cr.P.C., 1973 The respondent No. 2 was produced before the Executive Magistrate but he did not make any complaint regarding any misbehaviour of beating having been taken place with him or anybody else but instead he filed a complaint before learned Judicial Magistrate, Abu Road on 30.06.2005 against as many as seven persons including the petitioner as well as Om Prakash Gautam, SHO Police Station, Abu Road Sadar. 3. The allegation made in the complaint are that the petrol pump of the complainant is situated at Wasada Mawal in the name and style of Ranisa Narayan Filling Station where it is alleged that on 28.06.2005, a jeep came in which five persons were sitting and the occupants of the jeep started checking truck No. RJ 191 G 9811. The Manager of the petrol pump namely Chena Ram instructed the accused persons No. 1 to 5 i.e. the petitioner and other employees of the Sales Tax Check Post, Mawal to check the truck in the presence of the driver. The accused persons collectively abused Chena Ram and started to beat him and when the other employees of the petrol pump intervened then both the parties started fighting with each other. 4. The accused persons collectively abused Chena Ram and started to beat him and when the other employees of the petrol pump intervened then both the parties started fighting with each other. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 16/2016 Satish Kumar v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., wherein the following order had been passed:- "1. The petitioner has preferred these misc. petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 against the order dated 29.10.2015 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Hanumangarh by which the learned Judge has upheld the order dated 05.08.2015 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh in criminal case No. 287/2009 & 252/2009 whereby the learned Magistrate has ordered to frame charges against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B of IPC and quash and set aside the same. 2. The brief facts as noticed by this Court are that the complainant lodged a complaint on 27.09.2006 regarding improper distribution of insecticides and pesticides to the farmers and after investigation, the charges were framed by the learned court below vide order dated 05.08.2015 and the revisionary court upheld the charges vide order dated 29.10.2015. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was not responsible for the distribution of insecticides and pesticides and the same was to be done by the Agricultural Supervisor as his role was only purchase and order for the same and specific order has been passed by him for purchase of insecticides and pesticides. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the departmental proceedings held him responsible for supervisory negligence and learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that further an order was passed by the Hon'ble Governor whereby the petitioner has been exonerated from the charges. It is also argued that the petitioner was discharging his duties with bona fide belief and even if there is any lacuna i.e. also then he was to be protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Amal Kumar Jha v. State of Chhatisgarh & Anr. It is also argued that the petitioner was discharging his duties with bona fide belief and even if there is any lacuna i.e. also then he was to be protected under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Amal Kumar Jha v. State of Chhatisgarh & Anr. reported in 2016 Cr.L.R. (SC) 441 whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the allegation of an act or omission in discharge of the official duty Prosecution sanction was necessary. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- "5. It is apparent from the facts of the instant case that the allegation against the Appellant is of omission in discharge of official duty in not providing Government vehicle for shifting the patient from Primary Health Centre to District Hospital, Raigad; whereas he himself travelled in the vehicle in question for attending the monthly official meeting at the District Headquarters. In our considered opinion, it was an act or omission in discharge of the official duty. The sanction to prosecute was necessary. In this case, the accused was acting in discharge of his official duty when he refused to provide the official vehicle. The refusal is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty, thus sanction is required for prosecution as provided Under section 197(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is not disputed that no ambulance was provided to the Primary Health Centre. The question arises whether omission to provide the official jeep which was not meant for patients, would constitute an omission in discharge of his duty. Though public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities in the course of his duty but the act in question had relation to discharge of official duty of the accused. It was clearly connected to the performance of his official duty. When such is the case, sanction is required. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay, 1955 (1) SCR 1177 has observed thus: "Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an officials duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The Section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is - when any public servant ..... is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty......" We have therefore first to concentrate on the word 'offence'. Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an "entrustment" and/or "dominion" second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was "in his capacity as a public servant" third, that there was a "disposal" and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest". Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it. The act of abetment alleged against him stands on the same footing, for his part in the abetment was to permit the disposal of the goods by the doing of an official act and thus "will fully suffer" another person to use them dishonestly: Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. In both cases, the "offence" in his case would be incomplete without proving the official act. We therefore hold that section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies and that sanction was necessary, and as there was none the trial is vitiated from the start. We therefore quash the proceedings against the second accused as also his conviction and sentence. This Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari 1955 (2) SCR 925 has also considered when sanction is necessary. This Court has laid down thus: "Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained? At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram's case and also in Sarjoo Prasad v. The King-Emperor (1945) F.C.R. 227. Sulaiman, J. says that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution. Varadachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding. But a careful perusal of the later parts of their judgments shows that they did not intent to lay down any such proposition. Varadachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding. But a careful perusal of the later parts of their judgments shows that they did not intent to lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J. refers (at page 179) to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the police report and he winds up the discussion in these words: "Of course, if the case as put forward fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground". The other learned Judge also states at page 185, "At this stage we have only to see whether the case alleged against the Appellant or sought to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to be done by him in the execution of his duty". It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." In Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh and Ors. 1981 (Supp.) SCC 12 this Court considered the grant of protection to an officer for official act done in good faith thus: "6. In view of the circumstances mentioned in the last paragraph, there is little room for doubt that the Customs party was not out to commit dacoity either in the jewellery shop or the chaubara, that they also committed no trespass into either of those places, but that the purpose of the raid was to find out if any illegal activity was being carried on therein. The presence of two licensed Gold-smiths in the chaubara speaks volumes in that behalf. The presence of two licensed Gold-smiths in the chaubara speaks volumes in that behalf. It may further be taken for granted that the Customs party was manhandled before they themselves resorted to violence, because there was no reason for them to open fire unless they were resisted in the carrying out of the raid peacefully. 7. Even though what we have just stated is a general prima facie impression that we have formed at this stage on the materials available to us at present, it may not be possible to come to a conclusive finding about the falsity or otherwise of the complaint. But then we think that it would amount to giving a go-by to Section 108 of the Gold (Control) Act, if cases of this type are allowed to be pursued to their logical conclusion, i.e., to that of conviction or acquittal. In this view of the matter we do not feel inclined to upset the impugned order, even though perhaps the matter may have required further evidence before quashing of the complaint could be held to be fully justified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed." In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, 1993 (3) SCC 339 , this Court has considered the meaning of the 'official act' thus: "6. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office. And official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 it was held: (SCC pp. 184-85, para 17) "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision." Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. In P. Arulswami v. State of Madras (1967) 1 SCR 201 this Court after reviewing the authorities right from the days of Federal Court and Privy Council held: "...It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution Under section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable." It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar Under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar Under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajog Dubey v. H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 thus: "The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty ... there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." (Emphasis supplied) If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed." In State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta 2004 (2) SCC 349 this Court in regard to official duty has laid down thus: "11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question is how should the expression, "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", be understood? What does it mean? "Official" according to the dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity." In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004 (8) SCC 40 this Court has laid down that protection Under Section 197 would be available only when the act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty. This Court has laid down thus: "7. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004 (8) SCC 40 this Court has laid down that protection Under Section 197 would be available only when the act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty. This Court has laid down thus: "7. The protection given Under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this Section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal Rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case." In K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP 2005 (4) SCC 512 this Court has observed that official duty implies that an act or omission must have been done by the public servant within the scope and range of his official duty for protection. This Court has laid down thus: "12. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. x x x x x 15. The question relating to the need of sanction Under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The question relating to the need of sanction Under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned, the effect of Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has also to be noted." In Manorama Tiwari and Ors. v. Surendra Nath Rai 2016(1) SCC 594 , it was held that the Appellants were discharging public duties while performing surgery in a Government hospital, hence prosecution was not maintainable without sanction from the State Government. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai and Ors. 2009 (8) SCC 617 , this Court has laid down thus: "59. For the purpose of attracting the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 it is not necessary that they must act in their official capacity but even where public servants purport to act in their official capacity, the same would attract the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was so held by this Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das (2006) 4 SCC 584 . The question came up for consideration before this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 wherein it was held: (AIR pp. 48-49, para 17) "17. Slightly differing tests have been laid down in the decided cases to ascertain the scope and the meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code; 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty'. But the difference is only in language and not in substance. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise Under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. No question of sanction can arise Under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. In Hori Ram Singh v. Crown 1939 FCR 159 Sulaiman, J. observes: 'The Section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act constituting the offence should be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction.' The interpretation that found favour with Varadachariar, J. in the same case is stated by him in these terms at p. 56: 'There must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it.' In affirming this view, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed in Gill case: AIR 1948 PC 128 (IA pp. 59- 60) 'A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. ... 59- 60) 'A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. ... The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office.' Hori Ram case 1939 FCR 159 is referred to with approval in the later case of Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley v. King Emperor 1944 FCR 262 but the test laid down that it must be established that the act complained of was an 'official' act appears to us unduly to narrow down the scope of the protection afforded by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as defined and understood in the earlier case. The decision in Albert West Meads v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 156 does not carry us any further; it adopts the reasoning in Gill case AIR 1948 PC 128 ." 60. The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 in the following terms: (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 17-18) "17. The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath v. State of M.P. AIR 1966 SC 220 : (AIR p. 227, para 16) '16. ...It is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 will be attracted.' 18. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this Section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him." (Emphasis in original) 6. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the omission complained of due to which offence is stated to have been committed, was intrinsically connected with discharge of official duty of the Appellant, as such the protection Under section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 from prosecution without sanction of the competent authority, is available to the Appellant. Thus, he could not have been prosecuted without sanction. It would be for the competent authority to consider the question of grant of sanction in accordance with law. In case sanction is granted only then the Appellant can be prosecuted and not otherwise. Resultantly, the impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is allowed." 6. Learned counsel for the respondent stated that the stage of the proceedings do not call for any interference as prima facie the learned courts below have found the case to be made out against the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment of Inspector of Police and another v. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another reported in 2015 AIR SCW 3282. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: "The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: "The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. Their official duty is not to fabricate records or permit evasion of payment of duty and cause loss to the Revenue. Unfortunately, the High Court missed these crucial aspects. The learned Magistrate has correctly taken the view that if at all the said view of sanction is to be considered, it could be done at the stage of trial only." 8. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case as well as precedent law cited at Bar, this Court is of the opinion that present petitioner was not having any role whatsoever in disbursement of the insecticides and pesticides. The present petitioner was having role as the Senior Officer only to order the insecticide and to procure the same for disbursement. The present petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental enquiry and all the way there is no allegation against him for direct disbursement which could be proved. The very genesis of the complaint is regarding insecticides and pesticides distribution which went wrong and the role of the present petitioner was not there in the distribution of insecticides and pesticides to the farmer. Thus, the petitioner has to be protected by section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 and is covered by the precedent law cited by counsel for the petitioner as there is no direct allegation upon him for cheating, fabrication or misappropriation while discharging the official duty. At the most, the petitioner would have suffered on account of supervisory negligence but the same is in the course of his official discharge of duties and thus, cannot come within the purview of justifying no sanction as perceived in section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 reads as follows :- "197. At the most, the petitioner would have suffered on account of supervisory negligence but the same is in the course of his official discharge of duties and thus, cannot come within the purview of justifying no sanction as perceived in section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 reads as follows :- "197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.- (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: 1 Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression" State Government" occurring therein, the expression" Central Government" were substituted. (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression" Central Government" occurring therein, the expression" State Government" were substituted. (3A) 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991 , receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.] (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held." 9. The precedent law has sufficiently discussed the purview of section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 and the act of the petitioner was directly connected with the discharge of his official duty and as such protection under section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 from prosecution without sanction of the competent authority is available to the petitioner. 10. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 29.10.2015 passed by learned Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Hanumangarh and order dated 05.08.2015 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh are hereby quashed and set aside. 11. The misc. petitions are accordingly allowed." 5. In light of the afore-quoted judgment, the present misc. 10. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 29.10.2015 passed by learned Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Hanumangarh and order dated 05.08.2015 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh are hereby quashed and set aside. 11. The misc. petitions are accordingly allowed." 5. In light of the afore-quoted judgment, the present misc. petition is allowed in the same terms and the orders dated 23.06.2007 and 18.06.2008 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Abu Road and learned Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road respectively are hereby quashed and set aside.