JUDGMENT : B. Amit Sthalekar, J. Heard Sri Vinshnu Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.K. Shukla, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner in the writ petition is seeking quashing of the orders dated 18.11.2000 and 24.12.2002 passed in proceedings under section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (the Act, 1899). Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner purchased house property No. 19, area 189 sq. mtr., J.L. Nehru Road, Allahabad, through a registered sale deed dated 19.12.1989 for a consideration of Rs. 1,80,000/- on which stamp duty of Rs. 26,100/- was paid. On an allegation that there was deficiency of stamp duty, proceedings under Section 47A of the Act, 1899 were initiated against the petitioner. Petitioner participated in the proceedings. The Additional Collector (Land Revenue), Allahabad/stamp authority by his order dated 18.11.2000 assessed the deficiency of stamp duty of Rs. 17,400/-. Aggrieved the petitioner preferred a revision which has also been dismissed by the other impugned order dated 24.12.2002. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the sale deed was registered on 19.12.1989 whereas the proceedings under Section 47A were initiated in the year 2000 i.e. after almost 11 years and therefore, the proceedings were barred by limitation. His submission is that under Section 47A (3) of the Act, 1899, the limitation is four years from the date of registration of the instrument. 4. The learned Standing Counsel on the other hand submitted that the plea of limitation has not been taken by the petitioner before the stamp authority and therefore, he cannot be allowed to raise this question at this stage of the proceedings before the High Court. However, on facts, he could not dispute that the sale deed was registered on 19.12.1989 but the proceedings under Section 47A of the Act, 1899 were initiated in the year 2000 i.e. after about 11 years. 5. The plea of limitation is a question of law which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and therefore, the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel has to be necessarily rejected. 6. 5. The plea of limitation is a question of law which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and therefore, the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel has to be necessarily rejected. 6. Even otherwise the proposition of law is no longer res integra having been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava and another v. State of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1998 Allahabad 237 (Special Bench) wherein the Full Bench has held that the period of limitation will run from the date when the Collector takes cognizance of the matter and initiates proceedings. The submission of the report or presentation of the document by the Registrar or the Tehsildar or any other authority is not the starting point of limitation. The relevant paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of the Full Bench decision reads as under: "10. There is no dispute from either side that the starting point of limitation is the date of registration of the instrument and the period of limitation is four years. According to learned Chief Standing Counsel, if a reference from any Court or Commissioner of Stamps or Additional Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board of Revenue in that behalf is made within four years from the date of registration of the Instrument, whether any action is taken by the Collector or not, the proceedings would be within limitation. Shri Rajiv Joshi, learned counsel for the applicants has, on the other hand, contended that the limitation of four years is for the Collector to initiate action and the date on which a reference is made by a Court or authorities enumerated in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A is irrelevant. The question which arises for consideration is whether the period of four years qualifies the action of the Collector or the making of reference. Under sub-section (1) of Section 47A the registering officer is required to make a reference to the Collector before registering the instrument, while under subsection (2) a discretion has been given to him to register the Instrument and then make a reference to the Collector for determination of market value. Under sub-section (1) of Section 47A the registering officer is required to make a reference to the Collector before registering the instrument, while under subsection (2) a discretion has been given to him to register the Instrument and then make a reference to the Collector for determination of market value. In normal course of events this reference would be made immediately after registering the Instrument and, therefore, the enquiry under sub-section (3) is likely to commence soon as the person in whose favour the instrument has been executed would forthwith come to know about the reference and would be interested to get the matter concluded. In the first case the Instrument would remain unregistered and in the second case he will not get back the instrument after registration on account of it having been referred to the Collector. Therefore, in cases covered by sub-section (1) and subsection (2) at least the factum of reference would be immediately known to the person in whose favour instrument has been executed and he is bound to take all proceedings expeditiously in order to secure his title or get the benefits of the instrument. Under subsection (4) power has been conferred on the Collector to call for and examine the instrument after it has been registered for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is subject of such instrument and the duty payable thereon. This action can be taken either suo motu or on a reference from any Court or any one of the authorities enumerated in the sub-section. In our opinion, the language of the sub-section shows that the period of four years qualifies the action which may be taken by the Collector. If the Interpretation suggested by learned Chief Standing Counsel was correct, the subsection would have read like this : "The Collector may, suo motu or on a reference from any Court or from the Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board of Revenue in that behalf made within four years from the date of registration of any instrument." From the language in which the sub-section has been couched, it is not possible to hold that the period of four years qualifies the reference. 11. 11. It may be noticed that the language used in the opening part of subsection (4) of Section 33 is exactly similar to the language used in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A. The proviso to subsection (5) of Section 33 says that no action under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) shall be taken after a period of four years from the date of execution of the Instrument. Here the bar of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. There is no reason why similar interpretation should not be given to sub-section (4) of Section 47A specially when both the sections namely Section 33 and Section 47A find place in same Chapter IV of the Stamp Act which deals with Instrument Not Duly Stamped. 12........... 13. There is another reason for not accepting the submission made by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. If the period of limitation is held to be applicable only to the making of a reference, a very anomalous situation may arise. There will be no limitation where the Collector chooses to take suo motu action and he may do so at any time at his sweet will. Even where a reference is made within limitation i.e., within four years either by a Court or any of the authorities enumerated in the sub-section, the Collector may not proceed forthwith and the matter may be kept pending for years. He may commence proceedings after a long period, may be after decades. The property may change hands several times during this period which may create complications for the present owner who may not even be aware of the circumstances attending the execution of the instrument which is alleged to be undervalued and may not be in a position to lead evidence. The value of immovable property changes fast. There has been a meteoric rise in the value of Immovable property in the recent past. If the proceedings are taken after a long period it may become very difficult to give evidence regarding the market value of the property at the time the instrument was executed. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to fix a period of limitation within which the Collector must initiate action so that the enquiry may not be unnecessarily delayed. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to fix a period of limitation within which the Collector must initiate action so that the enquiry may not be unnecessarily delayed. In this connection, it may be pointed out that after the decision of Himalaya House Co. Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, AIR 1972 SC 899 (supra) many States inserted Section 47A by amendment in the Stamp Act and the Collector was conferred power to suo motu call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property. In Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Goa, Daman and Diu and West Bengal the period of limitation for the Collector to suo motu call for and examine the instrument is two years while in Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh it is three years. This shows that the intention of the Legislature is that the entire exercise should be concluded within a reasonable period and may not be kept pending for long. 14. Learned Chief Standing Counsel vehemently urged that Rule 346 of the U.P. Stamp Rules showed that the period of limitation of four years is provided for making a reference to the Collector. Rule 346, no doubt, provides that the Inspector of Stamps and Registration shall make a reference to the Collector within four years from the date of registration of the instrument. But this rule cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Rule 352. Rule 352 shows that the period of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. As observed earlier, the Rules are always subservient to the Act under which they have been made and they cannot override or amend the provisions of the Act itself. Rule 346 cannot change the meaning of subsection (4) of Section 47A. Learned Chief Standing Counsel also referred to a Supreme Court decision rendered in Trideshwar Dayal v. Mahenswar Dayal, 1990 (1) SCC 377 : AIR 1990 SC 485 and urged on its basis that the period of limitation does not apply to the action of the Collector. Rule 346 cannot change the meaning of subsection (4) of Section 47A. Learned Chief Standing Counsel also referred to a Supreme Court decision rendered in Trideshwar Dayal v. Mahenswar Dayal, 1990 (1) SCC 377 : AIR 1990 SC 485 and urged on its basis that the period of limitation does not apply to the action of the Collector. We do not think that in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has held as a proposition of law that the period of limitation does not apply to the action which may be initiated by the Collector but applies only to a reference by a Court or other authority enumerated in the sub-section. In this case, order for impounding the award of the arbitrator had been passed by the civil court itself and subsequent order of the Collector was held to have been passed merely as a follow-up step in pursuance of the civil court's order. 15. Our answers to the questions referred are as follows: 1. While exercising power under sub-section (4) of Section 47-A the Collector can determine the market value of the property and the duty payable on the instrument as a result of such determination but he has no power to impose penalty. 2. The period of limitation of four years in subsection (4) to Section 47-A applies to the action which may be initiated by the Collector and not to a reference from any Court or other authorities enumerated in the sub-section." 7. In the present case also, what is noticed is that the sale deed was executed on 19.12.1989 whereas the proceedings under Section 47A of the Act, 1899 were initiated for computation of deficiency of stamp duty in the year 2000 and therefore, the entire proceedings against the petitioner were initiated beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 47A (3) of the Act, 1899. 8. For reasons aforesaid and the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava (supra), the impugned orders dated 18.11.2000 and 24.12.2002 are absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction and are accordingly, quashed. 9. The writ petition is allowed. 10. 8. For reasons aforesaid and the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava (supra), the impugned orders dated 18.11.2000 and 24.12.2002 are absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction and are accordingly, quashed. 9. The writ petition is allowed. 10. In case any amount has been deposited by the petitioner towards deficiency of stamp duty under the interim orders of this court, the same shall be refunded to him by the respondents within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.