Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1913 (GUJ)

Janakben Agarsangbhai Jadav v. State of Gujarat

2017-12-11

A.J.SHASTRI

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Rule. Learned advocates waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respective respondents. 2. By way of present petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of the communication dated 12.9.2017 issued by respondent No. 3 - District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, whereby the District Registrar has directed to approach the Board of Nominees for the grievance raised in the letter of the petitioners. 3. The premise upon which the present petition is brought before the Court is that respondent No. 4 -society is a specified society within the meaning of Section 74C of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (for short 'the Societies Act') and the area of operation of respondent No. 4 is District Surendranagar and all primary milk cooperative societies are affiliated with Sursagar Dairy and are the members of it. The primary milk cooperative societies registered at village level are affiliated with respondent No. 4 - society and all members are depositing the milk with the Primary Milk Cooperative Societies, who, in turn, transmitting to the plant of respondent No. 4 - society and thereafter, the milk is being processed and milk products are put in the market. 3.1 The present petitioner No. 1 is the elected Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society, whereas petitioner No. 2 is an elected Director of respondent No. 4 - society. The election of Directors of respondent No. 4 - society previously conducted in the year 2014 and resultantly, the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society was held by Deputy Collector lastly on 29.9.2014 and in that election, the present petitioners are the elected representatives of respondent No. 4 - society. 3.2 It is the case of the petitioners that despite the fact that the tenure of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society, as per the Rules came to be over, still, on account of some surprising factor, the respondent No. 3, who is an authority to hold the election, has adopted an approach not to hold the same even though the term, according to the petitioners, has expired on 28.9.2013. It is the case of the petitioners that bye-laws of respondent No. 4 - society came to be approved by the State authority i.e. respondent No. 2 - the State Registrar on 14.10.2013. It is the case of the petitioners that bye-laws of respondent No. 4 - society came to be approved by the State authority i.e. respondent No. 2 - the State Registrar on 14.10.2013. As per the say of the petitioners, the bye-laws of the respondent No. 4 - society have been approved prior to the amendment which took place in the Act on 10.4.2015. However, that bye-law is running counter to even the existing rule prior to the amendment and by virtue of that rule, the term of office bearers of the managing committee is three years. It is further the case of the petitioners that here in the facts of case on hand, the term of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, who were elected on 29.9.2014, has come to an end on 28.9.2017 upon expiration of a period of 3 years and, therefore, it was the duty of respondent No. 4 - society to send requisition to the Collector to hold election of Chairman and Vice Chairman. A fact is to be noticed that petitioner No. 1 is an elected Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society, whereas petitioner No. 2 a Director of respondent No. 4 - society. 3.3 By bringing this petition, it is contended that it was incumbent on the part of the authorities to hold the election and in any case, by virtue of provision contained under Section 74C(2)(ii) of the Societies Act, the amendment which took place on 10.4.2015 has prescribed the term of office bearer of the managing committee to be two and half years from the date of election. It has been stated in the petition that despite the fact that even prior to expiration of term, in anticipation a request was made on 9.3.2017 to hold the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society. Such request was not even answered or responded by respondent No. 3 authority. As a result of which, again a representation was made on 16.8.2017. The petitioners wrote a specific letter to the Managing Director of respondent No. 4 society requesting to hold the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society well in time as per Bye-law No. 17.2.3 and as per the amended provisions of the Act. As a result of which, again a representation was made on 16.8.2017. The petitioners wrote a specific letter to the Managing Director of respondent No. 4 society requesting to hold the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - society well in time as per Bye-law No. 17.2.3 and as per the amended provisions of the Act. It was also agitated in the said request that proceedings drawn by Deputy Collector and Election Officer on 29.9.2014 are erroneous, illegal and against the provisions of law and requested to take all necessary steps in the direction of holding election of Chairman and Vice Chairman. Along with the said letter, copies of the proceedings of election of Chairman and Vice Chairman drawn by the Deputy Collector as well as Bye-laws of respondent No. 4 society were also annexed. However, to the surprise of the petitioners, respondent No. 3 authority on 12.9.2017 informed the petitioners that election of Chairman and Vice Chairman has been held already as per the Bye-laws of respondent No. 4 - society which were approved by the State Registrar and if there is any grievance, then petitioners are at liberty to approach the Court of learned Board of Nominees and the District Registrar has no jurisdiction to interfere in the said matter and practically, thereby has refrained from accepting the request of the petitioners and it is this communication and action has brought the petitioners before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reliefs sought in the petition. For the purpose of immediate perusal, the reliefs contained in Para. 27 are reproduced hereinafter: "A. To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the letter No. VHT/KH/340/2017 dated 12.9.2017 of the respondent No. 3 - District Registrar - Cooperative Societies, Surendranagar declining the request of petitioners to hold election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - The Surendranagar Jilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. on completion of 3 years on 28.9.2017, for the reasons stated in the memo of petition and in the interest of justice. B. To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent Nos. B. To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to forthwith hold the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - The Surendranagar Jilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. as early as possible after 28.9.2017 and not later than on or before 10.10.2017 as allowing to continue the Chairman and Vice Chairman after 28.9.2017 is against the bye-laws and the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 and, therefore, all the acts done by the Chairman and Vice Chairman after 28.9.2017 will be without authority of law, for the reasons stated in the memo of petition and in the interest of justice. C. To issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent No. 4 - The Surendranagar Jilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. respondents to forthwith send requisition for holding election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - The Surendranagar Jilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. keeping in mind the provisions of bye-laws No. 17.2.3 of the respondent No. 4 and also provisions of Section 74C of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, for the reasons stated in the memo of petition and in the interest of justice. D. Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the above Special Civil Application to direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to forthwith send requisition for holding election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 - The Surendranagar Jilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. keeping in mind the provisions of bye-laws No. 17.2.3 of the respondent No. 4 and also provisions of Section 74C of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, for the reasons stated in the memo of petition and in the interest of justice. E. To grant ad-interim relief in terms of Para. 27(D)" 3.4 In the background of aforesaid fact situation, upon hearing the learned advocate for the petitioners, this Court was pleased to issue notice on 26.9.2017 and thereafter, later on with a view to enable the parties to complete the pleadings, the matter was adjourned from time to time and later on, it has come up for hearing on 10.11.2017, wherein the Court has heard at length the Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, Ms. Manisha Lavkumar, learned Government Pleader with Mr. Swapneshwar Gautam, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Rutul P. Desai, learned advocate for respondent No. 4. 4. With consensus and the request of learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the Court has taken up the matter for final disposal. 5. Mr. Bharat T. Rao, learned advocate for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that since the respondent No. 4 - society is a specified society and the apex society as well, the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman thereof is essentially governed by the provisions of Section 145Z of the Societies Act as contained under Chapter-XI and, therefore, the dispute related to election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of such specified society would not be agitated in the Court of learned Board of Nominees and, therefore also, the communication dated 12.9.2017 is ex-facie erroneous and illegal. It has been further contended by Mr. Rao that respondent No. 3 has failed to appreciate the statutory provision since now there is no saving clause in the provision and the Act has been amended on 10.4.2015 and the operation of Section 74C(2)(ii) of the Societies Act comes into play and, therefore, it is not open for the respondent No. 3 - District Registrar to mechanically reject the requisition made by the petitioners in such a cavalier way. 5.1 Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further contended that it is clear from the bare reading of the provision that term of Chairman and Vice Chairman should be only as per the provisions of the Act. The tenure of three years even as per the Rules has expired on 28.9.2017. While contending this, Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further pointed out that respondent No. 3 - District Registrar has already made up his mind not to consider the request of holding election of Chairman and Vice Chairman is very clear from the tenor of the impugned communication. It has been contended that post of Chairman and Vice Chairman is an influential key position in the respondent No. 4 society and the volume of structure of respondent No. 4 society is such that there are all possibilities that for some convenience, the election, though due, is not to be conducted. It has been contended that post of Chairman and Vice Chairman is an influential key position in the respondent No. 4 society and the volume of structure of respondent No. 4 society is such that there are all possibilities that for some convenience, the election, though due, is not to be conducted. The business of respondent No. 4 society is running approximately to the tune of Rs. 800 crores and the affairs of respondent No. 4 society would affect all milk producers of the entire district and, therefore also, on account of some political influential the respondent No. 3 authority is not inclined to send requisition for holding election of Chairman and Vice Chairman. It is clear from the record, as per the say of Mr. Rao, learned advocate, that respondent - District Registrar is acting either under some political pressure or on account of some unforeseen circumstance and, therefore, since the impugned communication is not in the spirit in which the provisions are made, the same deserves to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the same. 5.2 Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further contended that even otherwise the term is already over and, therefore, the request of the petitioners deserves consideration. While contending this, Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has stated that bye-laws of respondent No. 4 society which were amended and approved by the authority which stipulate the period of five years' term and the said tenure is reduced by virtue of amendment to two and half years which is reflecting from a communication dated 7.3.2017. It has been contended that since the respondent No. 4 is a specified society, the provision contained under Section 74 has no application because Section 74 is meant for and related to primary cooperative credit society, whereas undisputedly, respondent No. 4 is a specified society and hence, the effect of the Bye-laws cannot be in conflict with provision of the Act. According to learned advocate for the petitioners, in view of the amendment and in view of the time stipulated in the amended bye-laws are in conflict, the term, at least, which has been provided has expired and hence, the election of entire committee, on the contrary, has become due and, therefore, considering this situation, the communication which has been issued by the authority is erroneous. On the contrary, it is nothing but a clear convenient misreading on the part of authority. The reason which has been assigned by the District Registrar in the impugned communication dated 12.9.2017 is quite in conflict with settled position of law, hence, the same is required to be quashed and set aside. The authority which has again considered the request of petitioners in such a manner which would be in conflict with very object of fixation of term. Hence, in the background of these facts, Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has requested the Court to grant the relief, as prayed for, in the petition. 5.3 It has also been contended that close reading of the amendment which took place and the bye-laws which have been approved is in clear conflict with regard to term of the office bearer of the committee. It is settled position of law that if there is a conflict between the statutory provisions and the bye-laws, the earlier should have been given a preference and in any case, the term has expired and, therefore, the communication dated 12.9.2017 is erroneous. Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further contended that dragging the petitioners to a remedy of election petition would be allowing to create an irreversible situation and even if such remedy is available, the same would not be an efficacious remedy and, therefore, since a pure question of law has arisen with regard to interpretation, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly exercise the jurisdiction and quash the communication dated 12.9.2017. 5.4 Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further contended that the District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, is a person in-charge of the implementation of the provisions in their proper perspective and by giving such evasive reply and determining the tenure of five years is an exercise which cannot be termed as proper and valid exercise of authority and, therefore, considering this background of fact, the impugned communication dated 12.9.2017 is not sustainable. Learned advocate has, therefore, contended that it was obligatory on the part of respondent authority as well as respondent No. 4 to adhere to the object and spirit of the provision of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and thereby, ought to have held the election. 6. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Learned advocate has, therefore, contended that it was obligatory on the part of respondent authority as well as respondent No. 4 to adhere to the object and spirit of the provision of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and thereby, ought to have held the election. 6. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Rutul P. Desai, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4, has vehemently contended that the impugned communication is just and proper and in consonance with the bye-laws which have been approved. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, by drawing the attention to two affidavits which have been filed; one is affidavit-in-reply and another additional affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4 and has then contended specifically that election of Chairman and Vice Chairman has taken place on 29.9.2014 and there was a clear proceeding drawn by the Deputy Collector in the presence of all the respective members that tenure of Chairman and Vice Chairman was mentioned that of five years. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further contended that right from September, 2014 it was noticed by the present petitioners that term would be that of five years of Chairman and Vice Chairman and not agitated so far and accordingly, the members have proceeded with in respondent No. 4. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further contended that it is the domain of respondent No. 3 to hold or not to hold the election and, therefore, simply by making allegations and averments, it is not open for the petitioners to assail the order which has been passed by the District Registrar. Mr. Desai has further contended that as soon as the communication and the representation is sent by the petitioners on 16.8.2017, prompt steps have been taken for addressing such grievance raised by the petitioners and in response thereto, a letter has already been written by respondent No. 3 to respondent No. 4 which is well within the knowledge of the petitioners. It has been contended that petitioners cannot divert the attention of the Court by projecting differently and try to create an element of malafide. It has been contended that petitioners cannot divert the attention of the Court by projecting differently and try to create an element of malafide. On the contrary, there is a constitutional amendment and by virtue of 97th amendment by the Parliament in the Constitution of India, Part-IX-B in the Societies Act came to be incorporated and Article 243ZJ deals with regard to the tenure of the terms of the members of the Board and its office bearers and by pointing out and making a reference to this Article, it has been contended that what has been decided is not in conflict with law in any way. As per Article 243ZJ, the term of office of elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearer shall be co-terminus with the term of the Board. It has been pointed out that this 97th amendment came up for consideration before this Court in a Writ Petition (PIL) No. 166 of 2012, wherein on 24.4.2013, this Court was pleased to allow the Writ Petition (PIL) by declaring that 97th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2011 inserting Part-IX-B contained in Article 243ZH to 243ZT is ultra vires to the Constitution and the said judgment is challenged by way of Special Leave to Appeal bearing No. 25266-25267 of 2013 which is admitted by the Apex Court and the same is pending for final adjudication and, therefore, it has been contended strenuously by learned Senior Advocate that subject matter is pending before the Apex Court. 6.1 Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further contended that the intention of the Constitutional Amendment of Legislature is to keep the terms of the elected members as co-terminus and, therefore, office bearers' tenure would be parallel to the tenure of the elected members and hence, what has been derived by the authority in the communication dated 12.9.2017 cannot be said to be erroneous. Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has pointed out that provisions of Section 74C, more particularly sub-clause (i) of Clause (2) of the Societies Act provides that provisions will not be applicable to the managing committee, who has been elected before insertion of the amendment and, therefore, in no case, the tenure which has been curtailed can be made applicable to the tenure of present office bearers. Learned Senior advocate has, therefore, submitted that no case is made out by the petitioners and hence, requested the Court to dismiss the petition with costs. 6.2 Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further pointed out that in view of the fact that there is special alternative mechanism is available to assail the action of the authority even for non holding of election, the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not an answer to the said grievance and, therefore, Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has requested the Court not to entertain the petition. To substantiate his submission, learned Senior Advocate, has relied upon the decision reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 and by referring to some of the paragraphs, A contention is raised that either the bye-law or the statutory provision if is not in conformity with mandate of Constitutional provision i.e. Article 243ZJ, the same cannot be given effect too and, therefore, in view of Article 243ZJ, the term which has been prescribed is of five years, it cannot be said that the impugned communication is erroneous. On the contrary, it is in consonance with the Constitutional provision. Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further contended that since the SLP is admitted and pending for final disposal, the doctrine of implied overruling of the High Court's judgment is to be made applicable and, therefore, so long as no finality is attached to the said issue of ultra viresness of 97th Constitutional Amendment, the said provision cannot be ignored and, therefore also, learned Senior Advocate has contended to dismiss the petition. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has pointed out about the conduct of the petitioners that petitioners have acquiesced their right of agitating this issue since they participated in the process of September, 2014 election of Chairman and Vice Chairman and petitioner No. 2, who proposed the name of Chairman who is not joined and petitioner No. 2 has participated and till March, 2017 the petitioners have not agitated and challenged and only on account of some calculation in mind, the equitable jurisdiction of this Court is invoked which conduct is sufficient enough to oust the petitioners from discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate, has further pointed out that even the bye-laws of respondent No. 4 society which came to be approved is stipulating tenure of five years and, therefore, the decision cannot be said to be not in consonance with even bye-laws of respondent No. 4 society and, therefore, when wrong projection is given in the petition by the petitioners, the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction may not be exercised. No other submissions have been made. 7. Ms. Manisha Lavkumar, learned Government Pleader with Mr. Swapneshwar Gautam, learned AGP appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, have substantially canvassed the submissions on the same line which have been canvassed by learned advocate for respondent No. 4. But in addition thereto, learned Government Pleader has specifically drawn the attention of this Court that in the recent ensuing election, a notification is issued on 2.11.2017 in exercise of power under Section 161 of the Societies Act, whereby all the election process of local bodies are kept in abeyance till 31.12.2017 and, therefore, has contended that the petition may not be entertained at this stage of the proceedings. Learned Government Pleader has further contended that the communication dated 12.9.2017 is a communication which is not only in consonance with the 97th Constitutional amendment as referred to by learned Senior Advocate, but is also in consonance with the bye-laws which have been specifically approved by the competent authority and, therefore, unless and until the bye-laws are under challenge, it cannot be contended by petitioners that tenure is two and half years or three years in any way. Therefore, there appears to be no illegality of any nature in the impugned communication. Learned Government Pleader has further contended that this Court while coming in conflict with almost similar issue in a writ petition being SCA No. 13779 of 2017, in which a question arose as to whether the amendment which took place in the year 2015 is retrospective or prospective which has stipulated the term of office bearers of the managing committee as two and half years. This question has come up for consideration before this Court and the coordinate Bench of this Court on 11.10.2017 has specifically come to the conclusion that amended provision will not be applicable to the existing managing committee and hence, it has been contended by learned Government Pleader that tenure of five years which is approved under the bye-laws can be a term for office bearers of the managing committee and, therefore, there is no question of holding any election for the moment and has specifically opposed the grant of any relief, as prayed for, in the petition. 8. To meet with the stand taken by the State authority and the respondent No. 4 by their respective advocates, in rejoinder, Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate for the petitioners, has contended that undisputedly, the petitioner is a specified society and, therefore, Section 74 has no application. In addition thereto, it has been contended that judgment which has been tried to be pressed into service in a writ petition which is decided on 11.10.2017 has no bearing on the present factual background of the case. Since the society to which the petitioners are belonging is a specified society, the same would undisputedly govern by the provisions of Section 74C of the Societies Act. According to learned advocate for the petitioners, the petitioner No. 2, who is the Vice Chairman of the respondent No. 4, can very well enjoy the long tenure of five years, still they came forward to challenge such illegally the office bearers cannot stick to the office. Mr. B.T. Rao, learned advocate, has further pointed out that here is a case where the bye-laws are prescribing the tenure of office bearer of the managing committee quite contrary to the statutory provision and, therefore, when there is a conflict in the bye-laws and the statutory provisions, the Statute should be allowed to be prevailed and, therefore, the tenure being three years is already over, it was incumbent on the part of authority to hold the election. Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has further stated that constitutional amendment which was tried to be pressed into service is for the moment declared ultra vires by the Division Bench of this Court, against which no doubt SLP is pending, but undisputedly no stay is granted and, therefore, the present position is that the order passed by this Court is not inoperative. Rao, learned advocate, has further stated that constitutional amendment which was tried to be pressed into service is for the moment declared ultra vires by the Division Bench of this Court, against which no doubt SLP is pending, but undisputedly no stay is granted and, therefore, the present position is that the order passed by this Court is not inoperative. Simply because the challenge is pending, the effect as if it is intra vires is not be considered and, therefore, contention is raised that the Court should not be guided by such fact of position with regard to Article 243ZJ of the Constitution of India. 8.1 Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has further contended that since here on the basis of undisputed position, the question of law has cropped up before this court and, therefore, alternative remedy is of no consequence. On the contrary, a writ petition would be a proper remedy for the petitioners to get it decided the question of law involved in the petition. In any case, Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has stated that undisputedly, the society to which the petitioners are belonging is a specified society and, therefore, routine mode of Section 96 of the Societies Act for redressal of grievance, wherein non holding of election would not be an alternative remedy much less an efficacious remedy and, therefore, in view of settled position of law, writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has further submitted that notification which has been issued by the State Government dated 2.11.2017 of postponing the process of election of local cooperative societies, the same cannot be allowed to be pressed into service as there is no extraordinary emergent situation which would not permit the authority to hold the election and, therefore, no cognizance of this notification can be taken. However, Mr. Rao, learned advocate, has candidly submitted that there is no challenge to the said notification in the present proceedings, but has also alternatively submitted that even if that be so, then also the election can be held even after December, 2017 in any case and, therefore, appropriate relief be granted in the present petition. With these submissions, learned advocates have requested the Court to take up the present proceedings for final disposal. 9. With these submissions, learned advocates have requested the Court to take up the present proceedings for final disposal. 9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the details which are provided in the petition, before dealing with rival contentions, some preface is required to be mentioned with regard to the provisions of law. 10. Section 12 of the Societies Act is dealing with classification of societies and it is the Registrar who may classify all societies in such a manner and into such classes as he deems it proper and such classification of society under any head fixed by the Registrar shall be final and in that process, the respondent No. 4 is classified as a specified society within the meaning of Section 74C of the Societies Act and is also an apex society in respect of the said provision. Section 13 of the Societies Act deals with amendment of bye-laws of the society which indicates that no amendment of bye-laws of the society shall be valid until registered under this Act. The Registrar is entrusted with the power to deal with such amendment of bye-laws, but in view of settled position of law, any amendment in the bye-laws shall not be contrary to any provisions of the Act or the Rules. It is also settled position of law that if any bye-law or its amendment is inconsistent with or repugnant to any provisions of the Act, the bye-laws would be invalid even though it is registered under the Act and, therefore, ultimate effect of this position is that bye-laws shall not be in conflict with statutory provisions. Section 14 of the Societies Act has taken care of aforesaid situation that at any time if Registrar is of the opinion that any alteration is necessitated in the bye-laws, then he can direct the amendment of the bye-laws. 11. Now, turning straight to the relevant provision of the Societies Act which deals with and governs the issue involved in the present position is Section 74C of the Societies Act which deals with the provisions for conduct of election of committees and office bearers of certain societies and further dealing with the term of office of the members of the committees. Sub-section (i) thereof is dealing with apex society and sub-section (ii) of Section 74C is clearly indicating that when the election of all members of the committee of any such society held at the same time, the members elected on the committee by such general election shall hold the office for a period of three years. Relevant sub-section (ii) reads, thus; "(ii) When the election of all the members of the committee of any such societies held at the same time, the member elected on the committee as such general election shall hold office for a period of three years from the date on which the first meeting is held and shall continue in office until immediately before the first meeting of the members of the new committee." 12. A fact to be taken note of is that prior to 1982, the term of three years or five years which was substituted by Gujarat Act 23 of 1982 and, therefore, right from 1982, this statutory provision has prescribed the tenure of three years. By virtue of the further amendment, w.e.f. 10.4.2015 this three years period has been substituted further by two and half years i.e. from April, 2015, the office bearers of the managing committee's tenure would be two and half years. Now, this is the position with regard to statutory provision which is applicable to respondent No. 4 society. 13. Further Section which is to be dealt with is Section 96 of the Societies Act, wherein any dispute with regard to election, management, amending bye-laws etc. are some of the disputes which are falling within the purview of any dispute as defined under Section 96 which fact is not in dispute. However, the mechanism which has been provided to deal with this issue whether can be termed as efficacious or whether the remedy is such which would oust the petitioners from writ jurisdiction of this Court is a question to be dealt with at a later point of time in the present proceedings. 14. Yet another provision which is to be kept in mind is a provision contained in Chapter-XI-A of the Societies Act which deals the election of committees and officers of certain societies. 14. Yet another provision which is to be kept in mind is a provision contained in Chapter-XI-A of the Societies Act which deals the election of committees and officers of certain societies. This new chapter which has been inserted by the Gujarat Act of 6 of 1981 is for the purpose of regulating the elections of managing committees of certain categories of big cooperative institutions specified under the Act. Prior to the insertion of this Section, the election of the committees were held as per the provisions of their respective bye-laws, but this chapter right from Section 145A to 145Z has laid down a procedure to be followed in the conduct of election of committees of specified societies through the Collector paying the cost of disqualification of membership of the committee, corrupt practice etc. and, therefore, specific mechanism is provided as to in which manner the elections of the committees to be undertaken. Section 145A deals with application of this chapter and except Section 145Z, all sections are made applicable to the committees of the societies belonging to the categories specified under Section 74C. Section 145C has clearly spelt out that every election shall be held as far as possible one month before the date on which the term of office of members is due to expire. Since the words 'as far as possible' is mentioned which denotes that it is not mandatory on the part of authority. But as far as possible the same shall be prior to the expiration of the terms of the member so as to see that the affairs of the society may not be at peril and, therefore, this Chapter-XI-A points out the manner in which the elections are to be held. Section 145U is dealing with the dispute relating to elections to be submitted to the Tribunal which is irrespective of Section 96 of the Act. Subsection (2) of Section 145U has categorically mentioned that any aggrieved party may present the petition to the Tribunal. However, no such petition shall be made till after the final result of election is declared and where any such petition is made, it shall not be admitted unless it is made within two months from the date of such declaration of result. Section 145Z is a special provision for election of officers of specified societies. 15. However, no such petition shall be made till after the final result of election is declared and where any such petition is made, it shall not be admitted unless it is made within two months from the date of such declaration of result. Section 145Z is a special provision for election of officers of specified societies. 15. Bare reading of this provision indicates that this Section shall apply only to the election of officers by the members of the committees of societies belonging to the category specified under Section 74C. Sub-section (2) of Section 74(C) stipulates that after the election of members of the committee or whenever such election is due, the election of the officer or the officers of any such society shall be held as provided in the bye-laws and, therefore, conjoin reading of the provision of Chapter-XIA indicates that as far as possible the elections to be held well in advance before the term of the office bearers of the committee expires which is a mandate of statute. Further relevant provision which is pressed into service is Section 161 of the Societies Act which deals with the power of the State Government to exempt the society from provisions of the Act. Under the guise of these statutory provisions, the State Government may, by general or special order, is at liberty to exempt any society or class of societies from any of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, by virtue of this, it appears that the State Government has issued the notification on 2.11.2017. 16. Now, with this preface of the relevant provisions contained under the Act, coming back to the facts on hand is reflecting that present petition has been brought on the premise that the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the respondent No. 4 society, who were elected on 29.9.2014. As per the provisions, their tenure has been completed of three years on 28.9.2017 and, therefore, the election of the said Chairman and Vice Chairman is required to be held. Pursuant to the order of the Collector, Surendranagar dated 22.9.2014, first general meeting was held of all the members of respondent No. 4 society on 29.9.2014 at 1.00 p.m. at Taluka Seva Sadan, Wadhwan. Pursuant to the order of the Collector, Surendranagar dated 22.9.2014, first general meeting was held of all the members of respondent No. 4 society on 29.9.2014 at 1.00 p.m. at Taluka Seva Sadan, Wadhwan. In the proceedings of such meeting, having completed quorum of 50 per cent in view of Bye-law No. 17.2.8, the proceedings precipitated further in which the tenure of five years which has been prescribed under Bye-law No. 17.2.3 of the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The election was held and the Chairman - Ramjibhai Punjabhai Mevada, who was proposed by petitioner No. 2 herein came to be elected uncontested and Vice Chairman - Smt. Janakben Agarsangbhai Jadav, petitioner No. 1 herein, is elected as Vice Chairman. These proceedings have been drawn by the Deputy Collector and Election Officer, Wadhvan on 29.9.2014 which is reflecting from page-18 and 19 of the petition compilation. At Page-20 of the petition compilation, the amended bye-laws which are prescribed in Annual General Meeting held for the year 2012-13 appears to have been approved by the Cooperative Commissioner and Registrar, Cooperative Societies w.e.f. 14.10.2013. 17. Now, these amended bye-laws are prescribing a tenure of members of respondent No. 4 for five years as per Bye-law No. 17.2 with respect to managing committee. Bye-law No. 17.1.1 is indicating that the election to be held of respondent No. 4 as per the statutory provision of Section 74C. Bye-law No. 17.2 which originally was prescribing the members of the managing committee of three years or till new members are elected, the amendment of this bye-law which took place on 14.10.2013 has now prescribed a period of five years, whereas Bye-law No. 17.2.1 is indicating three years period which is said to have amended and substituted by five years. Bye-law No. 17.2.3 is specifically prescribing the tenure of Chairman and Vice Chairman of three years period or till new Chairman and Vice Chairman election to be held and, therefore, it appears that previously i.e. prior to October, 2013, the relevant bye-laws prescribing the tenure was perfectly in consonance with the statutory provisions, whereas it got amended in conflict with the period prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act and, therefore, there appears to be a clear conflict between this amended bye-law and the statutory provision contained under Sub-section(2) of Section 74C. A fact is to be noted here that three years tenure was very much prevailing at the time when the amendment of bye-law took place and still, in clear conflict with this statutory provision, an amendment is approved which prima facie is running counter to the statutory provision itself and the law as stated above is clear enough that any bye-law which is in conflict with the statute is to be treated as inoperative in respect of its relevant effect. So long as the relevant amendment is inconsistent with or repugnant to any provision of the Act, the bye-law will be invalid even though it has been registered under the Act and got it approved. 18. This law is aptly clear right from the decision delivered by the Apex Court in case of Rajkot District Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 401 . It is also clear proposition of law that bye-laws of the society must not be contrary to the Act or the Rules and as such, what is being canvassed by the petitioners that term of the office bearer of the managing committee, especially the Chairman and Vice Chairman is three years and has been completed sounds proper. A close look further at the statutory provision i.e. Section 74C, Sub-section (2) is clearly indicating that originally prior to 1982, the term which was mentioned was five years which, later on, by Gujarat Act 23 of 1982 has been substituted as three years and the last election which took place in the present respondent No. 4 society is in the year 2014 where this existing period of three years mentioned under sub-section (2) is applicable and, therefore, at the time when the amendment got approved, this statutory provision ought to have been taken note of and, therefore, qua this, Bye-law No. 17.2.3 and 17.2.5 are to be read in the context of this statutory provision and the term is to be understood that of three years instead of five years as qua this, amended bye-laws are to be treated as inoperative insofar as the period which has been stipulated. Therefore, prima facie look of this would clearly indicate that the tenure of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 society has elapsed in September, 2017 and it is incumbent on the part of respondent authority to hold the election on the basis of term which has been stipulated in the statutory provision. 19. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that intention of the Legislature is not to treat the term of the Chairman and Vice Chairman co-terminus with the members of the society i.e. five years which is very much clear from the substitution of three years in the year 1982 and further amendment which took place w.e.f. April, 2015. Now, in the context of this, even the Gujarat Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2015 if to be viewed, the tenure has been prescribed as two and half years from the date of election of office bearers of the managing committee and prior to substitution, sub-section (2) was prescribing three years which is quite visible from Annexure-C at Page-38. 20. However, since it has been held by this Court in a decision delivered on 11.10.2017 in SCA No. 13779 of 2017 in Para. 12 that when the managing committee of petitioner of that petition was in existent before 10.4.2015, the provision of such amendment would not be applicable and the relevant Act on 29.10.2014 provides that term of the committee is for three years from the date of first meeting is held, to be treated as tenure and, therefore, since the amending Act of 2015 is not made applicable by treating it to be prospective, this Court is refrained from making any observations as are to be followed by this Court and, therefore, considering this decision also, what is prevailing on the statute is to be treated as operative with regard to term of office bearer of the managing committee i.e. three years since the election of office bearers of respondent No. 4, came to be held prior to the amending Act of 2015 and, therefore, tenure is to be treated as three years, in any case. 21. Of course, a bare reading of the entire provision of Section 74Cand in co-relation with its amendment would prima facie indicating that the term should be two and half years. 21. Of course, a bare reading of the entire provision of Section 74Cand in co-relation with its amendment would prima facie indicating that the term should be two and half years. Clause (v) of Sub-section (2) of Section 74C has prescribed like this; "(v) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (ii), the office bearers of managing committee who have completed two and half years on the date of the commencement of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2015, shall continue to be such office bearer for the remainder terms." 21.1 Bare reading of the wordings of clause (v) would indicate that notwithstanding anything contained in (ii) and not in (i), the office bearers of the managing committee who have completed two and half years, on the commencement of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act (Amendment) Act, 2015, shall continue to be such office bearer for the remainder term. Now, this bare reading would indicate that only such office bearers shall continue for remainder period, who have completed two and half years as on date of commencement of this Act i.e. 10.4.2015 and here undisputedly, two and half years are not completed by office bearers as on this date as their election took place on 29.9.2014 and, therefore, a prima facie look at this provision would indicate that their tenure should be two and half years and further, clause (vi) is indicating that nothing in clause (i) i.e. with regard to elected members of the managing committee, shall be applicable to the managing committee existing on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act, 2015. Therefore, so far as clause (ii) is concerned, those who have completed two and half years on the date of coming into force of Amendment Act, 2015 shall have a right to continue for a remainder period and sub-clause (vi) as stipulated for existing managing committee i.e. for members and, therefore, conjoin reading of this would indicate that it is only those office bearers to have completed two and half years as on date of coming into force of Amendment Act, 2015, shall have the right for remainder period. Be that as it may, since now this issue has been dealt with by coordinate bench of this Court, this Court is not opining contrary with regard to interpretation of this clause minutely and leave it without any further comment, as even otherwise from both ends i.e. with respect to completion of two and half years or with respect to completion of three years, in any case the period has elapsed of three years in September, 2017 and, therefore, it is obligatory on the part of authority to hold the election. 22. This provision has indicated words 'anything contained in the bye-laws of any such society' which means further process as contemplated under subsection (3) shall be carried out and, therefore, this also indicates that irrespective of what is contained in the bye-laws, the statutory provision must have a predominance and, therefore, here in the present case on hand when sub-section (2) of Section 74 which is undisputedly applicable to respondent No. 4 society, the tenure of office bearers of the managing committee shall be treated as three years from the date of first meeting which was held in the case on hand on 29.9.2014. Therefore, since the tenure has elapsed, it is incumbent on the part of the authority to hold the election by virtue of mandate as provided under subsection (4) of Section 74C. 23. Therefore, since the tenure has elapsed, it is incumbent on the part of the authority to hold the election by virtue of mandate as provided under subsection (4) of Section 74C. 23. In view of aforesaid situation which is prevailing is that the parameters must be in conformity with the statutory provision and it is settled position of law that when there is a conflict between the bye-laws and the statutory rules, even if the bye-laws are approved, the effect of the Rules cannot be given go-bye and, therefore, insofar as it is repugnant to the Rules the same will have to be read in the context of statutory prescription and, therefore also, even if the bye-laws which are approved on 14.10.2013 prescribing tenure of five years since are in conflict with sub-section (2) of Section 74C which are undisputedly applicable, the tenure is to be treated as three years and since the three years have elapsed on 29.9.2017, by virtue of mandate of statute the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman deserves to be held without any undue delay and, therefore, keeping aforesaid facts and circumstances in mind, it appears to this Court that petitioners have made out the case and the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioners are of strong persuasive value backed by provisions of law. 24. Now, to meet with the stand taken by learned advocates for the respondent authorities including respondent No. 4 society, a perusal of aforesaid position is making it clear that the relief prayed for in the petition with regard to holding of election of office bearers of the managing committee, especially Chairman and the Vice Chairman, deserves to be held. 25. Now, in this context if the plea of Article 243ZJ if to be examined at first blush, the same appeared to be attractive. But on going through the details with regard challenge of it, it appears that effect of that cannot be at this juncture made applicable. This 97th Constitutional Amendment whereby provisions of Part-XI-B of the Societies Act came to be incorporated in the Constitution of India, the number and term of members of the Board and its office bearers are prescribed. But on going through the details with regard challenge of it, it appears that effect of that cannot be at this juncture made applicable. This 97th Constitutional Amendment whereby provisions of Part-XI-B of the Societies Act came to be incorporated in the Constitution of India, the number and term of members of the Board and its office bearers are prescribed. Sub-Article (2) of Article 243ZJ has prescribed the term of elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall be co-terminus with the term of the Board. But it has been brought to the notice of this Court that this very amendment of insertion of Article 243ZJ has been the subject matter of challenge before this Court in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 166 of 2012 and this Court, vide judgment and order dated 24.4.2013, was pleased to allow the said Writ Petition (PIL) by declaring that 97th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2011 inserting Part-XI-B consisting of Article 243ZH, 243ZT has been held to be ultra vires and, therefore, with regard to this judgment and order, aggrieved party has approach the Apex Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal bearing No. 25266-25267 of 2013 which is pending. A perusal of the order of the Apex Court which is attached to the affidavit filed by respondent No. 4 herein at Page-54, it would transpire that leave was granted and the pleadings were ordered to be completed. However, a close perusal of the same would indicate that no interim relief is granted and the High Court's order is not stayed and, therefore, at present simply because the proceedings are pending, without stay being granted, what is prevailing as on date is to be considered by the Court and that is the provision of Article 243ZJ for the moment are inoperative and, therefore, the Court cannot rely upon the contention of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 4 that the term of office bearers is five years to be treated by virtue of Article 243ZJ. What is prevailing as on date is that operation of sub-section (2) of Section 74C is in subsistence. Hence, it is to be treated as predominant and in that context, if bye-laws are in conflict, the same to be treated as inoperative insofar as the tenure issue is concerned. 26. What is prevailing as on date is that operation of sub-section (2) of Section 74C is in subsistence. Hence, it is to be treated as predominant and in that context, if bye-laws are in conflict, the same to be treated as inoperative insofar as the tenure issue is concerned. 26. Insofar as the contention of learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 4 that since the petitioners have participated in the process of election dated 29.9.2014 in which Chairman and Vice Chairman have been elected, they have acquiesced their right of making any grievance. This contention is not so impressive and acceptable in view of bare reading of the statutory provisions which are applicable on the case on hand. Under the guise of such contention, the illegality which is being continued cannot be perpetuated. This is because of the fact that statutory provision must be given full effect and the Court cannot pass any order contrary to it so long as it is on the statute. 27. In respect of the decision which has been pointed out by Mr. Prashant G. Desai, the Court is in respectful agreement with the same. However, the facts of that case are quite distinct and, therefore, as a straitjacket formula, the observations are not to be applied, as it is a settled position of law that slight change in facts would make a world of difference in applying the principle. Therefore, when a bare reading of the entire position of the case on hand is indicating that term of the office bearers of the managing committee is to be treated as three years by virtue of statutory provision, irrespective of bye-laws the same will have to be given effect to and, therefore, what is being indicated herein-before would lead to a situation where authorities are under an obligation to conduct the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 as their tenure is long back over. Instead of conducting and initiating process of election prior to the expiration of term, though well in advance informed, there appears to be a clear inaction and based upon misconstruction of the bye-laws and the provision since evasive reply is reflected, the Court is left with no alternate but to accept the petition and in the considered opinion of the Court, the impugned communication dated 12.9.2017 is deserves to be quashed and set aside. 28. 28. From the bare reading of the impugned communication dated 12.9.2017, it appears that the District Registrar has merely gone on the basis of bye-laws which came to be amended on 14.10.2013 without referring to the relevant statutory provision which is undisputedly applicable to respondent No. 4 and has also chosen to indicate that for want of authority, the petitioners have to approach the Board of Nominees and without assigning any valid reason, the request of the petitioners appears to have been turned down and shunted off. It is this exercise of powers by the District Registrar, the petitioners have approached this Court which appears to be well founded and, therefore also, the impugned communication dated 12.9.2017 requires to be quashed and set aside. 29. Now, coming to an issue whether in such a situation, the Court can exercise the writ jurisdiction or not, is a center of controversy generated by learned advocates appearing for the respondents. For this issue this Court is mindful of the situation and the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions that normally, the statutory alternative remedy which has been prescribed is to be respected to. However, there are certain cases in which even in a disputed question of fact when High Courts have exercised the jurisdiction extraordinary in nature, the Apex Court has affirmed the same. Here, on the facts on hand, it is quite evident from the record that question of law which is involved apparently is the conflict between the statutory provisions and the amended bye-laws and what is to be prevailed upon and this question was to be addressed by the Court on an undisputed position of fact. It is not in dispute that previous election has taken place on 29.9.2014 and it is also not in dispute that the Chairman and Vice Chairman have been elected on that day. It is not in dispute that previous election has taken place on 29.9.2014 and it is also not in dispute that the Chairman and Vice Chairman have been elected on that day. The Court has ascertained in the present case on hand as to whether which provision of the Act is applicable and decide that there are no other questions of fact to be adjudicated and, therefore, in the absence of any substantial disputed question of fact since the issue involved in the petition was on a question of applicability of statutory provision, the Court has thought it fit to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction keeping in mind the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of (2015) 15 SCC 431 (Para. 23), (2016) 13 SCC 223 and (2016) 13 SCC 304. 30. Therefore, even if there is an alternate remedy available either to approach the Board of Nominees under Section 96 or before the Tribunal in view of Section 145U, the Court has thought it fit to examine the issue involved in the present petition as has been pressed into service by learned advocates for the respective parties. Since the Court has taken an assistance of the observations of the Apex Court in the decision reported in (2015) 15 SCC 431 (Para. 23), the Court deems it proper to quote hereinafter: "23. The position would have been different if it was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. That is not so. The powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, while issuing appropriate writs, are very wide. Even if there is an alternate remedy that may not preclude the High Court from exercising the jurisdiction in a particular case. In the face of alternate statutory remedies, when the High Court declines to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is a self imposed restriction only. In the instant case, what is pertinent is that it is the appellant which not only made a prayer in the writ petition for deciding the issue in question, even at the time of hearing (as noted above), it is the appellant which pressed for the decision with the submission that existence of alternate remedy should not deter the Court to render the decision on merits. In such a situation, the objection, if any, to the maintainability of the writ petition could have been taken by the respondent and it does not behove the appellant to raise this objection in the present appeal after pleading in the High Court that the matter be decided on merits. 31. While coming to this conclusion, the Court is also mindful of a situation that when there is a conflict between the bye-laws even if registered and the statutory provisions, then statutory provisions must have been given a predominance and exactly the same is the position on the case on hand and, therefore, the Court has taken an assistance from the decision of the Apex Court in case of Rajkot District Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 401 . Relevant Head Note-C is quoted hereinafter : "Head Note-C - Cooperative Societies - Bye-laws - Statute of - Overriding effect of Constitution, Statutes and Rules - Bye-laws of any society have to be in conformity with Act and the Rules and Constitution of India - Hence, it is obligatory on the part of any specified society to bring about the amendment in its registered bye-laws in conformity with the provisions of the Rules and the Act - But if the society/societies have not amended their bye-laws, the effect of the Rule would not stand nullified or inoperable - Rather, the bye-laws concerned shall stand nullified - Bye-laws of any society cannot be permitted to prevail over the statutory provision, rules and the Constitution." 32. The Court is also respectfully agreeing to the proposition that election laws, statute and if the provisions are to be strictly construed and the requirements contained under them are strictly to be observed and, therefore, keeping this proposition of law in mind which has been stipulated in earlier decision i.e. (2016) 10 SCC 467 , the Court is of the considered opinion that a bare reading of the statutory provision related to this very aspect with regard to election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of managing committee has to be given its full effect to and it is rather a duty of the Court to see that authorities must scrupulously observe and implement the mandate of the statute and, therefore, keeping these factors in mind, it appears that a strong case is reflecting in favour of the petitioners with regard to grievance voiced out. Since the decisions which have been relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioners are broadly in the context of aforesaid position prevailing and the conclusion of this Court, the same are not being dealt with in detail and, therefore, considering those decisions also, the Court is of the considered opinion that the relief as prayed for in the petition deserves to be granted. 33. Now, so far as alternate submission of learned advocate for the petitioners with regard to notification issued by the State authority dated 2.11.2017, which is brought to the notice of this Court by learned Government Pleader to the effect that all cooperative societies are exempted from holding or concluding the process of election till 31.12.2017 on account of impracticality as the entire State administration is engaged in the ensuing election in the State is concerned, as found it is not under challenge by the petitioners and the State authorities have exercised their statutory discretion vested under Section 161 of the Societies Act. In the absence of any challenge, the Court has to look into such aspect and hence, the relief and the direction given in the present proceedings are ordered to give effect after 31.12.2017 as the learned advocate for the petitioners have also not much agitated, rather made alternative submission that time may be prescribed even after this period i.e. December, 2017. Considering this fact, without entering into merit or de-merit of exercise of this power exercised by the State authority since it is not in question before this Court, in the opinion of this Court, the interest of justice would be met if the following directions are issued while allowing the present petition : (i) The impugned communication dated 12.9.2017 issued by respondent No. 3 - District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Surendranagar, is quashed and set aside hereby. (ii) The respondents are directed to initiate the process of holding of election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of respondent No. 4 at the earliest and such process be commenced within a period of two weeks from 31.12.2017, without fail and the authorities are further directed to see that such election be completed at the earliest, but in any case not later than 15.1.2018. (iii) So far as the relief in para : 27(B) is concerned, the same is not being granted and considered in view of the fact that the petitioners have chosen to approach this Court in the month of September, 2017, though were well aggrieved from March, 2017 as well as August, 2017 and throughout the petitioners have allowed to function the office bearers. This is more so in view of the fact that petitioner No. 1 is the Vice Chairman of this very respondent No. 4 and the petitioner No. 2 is the elected Director and, therefore, sufficient check is provided under the relevant provisions of the statute and bye-laws. Consequently, the relief is not possible to be granted at this stage especially when the Court is essentially dealing with an issue of holding of Election. However, it is made clear that it is open for the petitioners to approach appropriate authorities, if any, misdeed is being committed by the Chairman and the Vice Chairman or any members of Committee, in the meantime. 34. With these observations, the present petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs.