JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. ADMIT. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate waives service of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent No. 2 - Company. The respondent No. 1 stands deleted. 2. In the facts and circumstances of the case and with the consent of the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties, present Appeal is taken up for final hearing today. 3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned CAV Order dated 2/8/2016 passed by the learned Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No. 570 of 2016, by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said petition preferred by the appellants herein and has confirmed the order passed by the Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi passed in ATA No. 345(5) of 2013, by which the learned Appellate Tribunal reduced the penalty imposed under section 14(B) of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the EPF Act" for short), Provident Fund Department has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 4. That on failure of the respondent management - employer to deposit the amount of provident fund for the period from March, 2008 to February, 2012 to the extent of approximately Rs. 43,00,000/-, proceedings under section 14(B) of the EPF Act came to be initiated against the respondent. A show cause notice was issued to the employer on 11/12/2012 to show cause as to why damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act should not be imposed and recovered for the default committed in depositing the amount of provident fund for the period from March, 2008 to February, 2012. The details of the defaults committed were furnished to the employer along with the notice. 4.1. In response to the show cause notice, the employer appeared before the appropriate authority and submitted that because of financial problem, the amount of provident fund could not be deposited. However, having found that the employer was habitual defaulter in respect of payment under the EPF Act, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner imposed/levied damages totalling Rs. 43,57,177/- under section 14(B) of the EPF Act. 4.2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, levying damages totalling Rs. However, having found that the employer was habitual defaulter in respect of payment under the EPF Act, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner imposed/levied damages totalling Rs. 43,57,177/- under section 14(B) of the EPF Act. 4.2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, levying damages totalling Rs. 43,57,177/- under section 14(B) of the EPF Act, the employer preferred Appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal under section 7(I) of the EPF Act and the employer deposited Rs. 10,90,000/-. 4.3. That the learned Appellate Tribunal reduced the damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act to Rs. 10,90,000/- from Rs. 43,57,177/- as imposed by the learned Provident Fund Commissioner, solely on the ground that since the employer has remitted interest under section 7(Q) under the combined notice amounting to Rs. 32,86,132/- before levy by the Authorized Officer, the levy of quantum of damages should be restricted to equivalent to the amount of deposit remitted by the employer at the time of preferring appeal under section 7(I). 4.4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal restricting damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- as against damages of Rs. 43,57,177/- imposed by the learned Provident Fund Commissioner, the Department preferred Special Civil Application No. 570 of 2016 before the learned Single Judge. By the impugned order the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition which has given rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Mr. Meena, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellants - Department and Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent - employer - management. 6. Mr. Meena, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Department has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the petition and confirming the order passed by the learned tribunal and in not interfering with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in reducing the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only. 6.1. Mr. Meena, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Department has further submitted that as such no cogent reasons have been given by the learned tribunal while restricting the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only as against damages of Rs. 43,57,177/- imposed by the Provident Fund Commissioner. 6.2. Mr. 10,90,000/- only. 6.1. Mr. Meena, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Department has further submitted that as such no cogent reasons have been given by the learned tribunal while restricting the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only as against damages of Rs. 43,57,177/- imposed by the Provident Fund Commissioner. 6.2. Mr. Meena, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Department has further submitted that the learned tribunal has interfered with the amount of damages levied by the Commissioner solely on the ground that the employer has remitted interest under section 7(Q) before levy by the Authorized Officer. It is submitted that as such no other reasons have been assigned by the learned tribunal. It is submitted that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions, both, levy of interest under section 7(Q) and levy of damages under section 14(B) are different, distinct and independent. It is submitted that merely because the employer remitted interest under section 7(Q), may be before levy by the Authorized Officer, the same cannot be a ground to restrict the amount of damages. 6.3. Mr. Meena, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant Department has further submitted that even after 2012 also the employer has continued to commit defaults in making deposit of the provident fund amount. It is submitted that therefore, in the present case the employer is habitual defaulter in respect of payment under the EPF Act. It is submitted that as held by this Court in the case of New Commercial Mills Company Limited and another Versus Union of India and others, reported in 1998 (3) LLJ (Suppl.) 334 (Gujarat High Court), financial hardship is not sufficient for every default to mitigate the damages. He has further submitted that it is further observed in the said decision that once in a while a default where financial hardship or constraint beyond control of the party and establishment be taken sufficient to mitigate damages but it cannot be taken as a license or permit to commit defaults repeatedly in respect of payment under the EFP Act. It is submitted that therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the petition and confirming the order passed by the learned tribunal restricting the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only. It is submitted that therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the petition and confirming the order passed by the learned tribunal restricting the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only. Making above submissions and relying upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical Industries and another Versus Union of India and others, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 573 and in the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. Versus Union of India and others, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 242 , it is requested to allow the present appeal. In the alternative, it is requested to remand the matter either to the first appellate authority or to the learned Tribunal. 7. Present appeal is opposed by Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent employer. 7.1. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent employer has submitted that considering the fact that the employer was facing financial difficulty and there was no mens-rea on the part of the employer in not depositing the amount of provident fund under the EPF Act and the employer in fact deposited the amount of interest under section 7(Q) of the EPF Act before any demand by the Authorized Officer and therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned tribunal rightly restricted the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- and the same has been rightly confirmed by the learned Single Judge. Making above submissions and relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation Versus HMT Limited, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 35 , it is requested to dismiss the present appeal. In the alternative, it is requested to remand the matter back to the learned Appellate Tribunal. 8. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. Perused and considered the orders passed by the Provident Fund Commissioner levying damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act of Rs. 43,57,177/- and order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal restricting damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act to Rs. 10,90,000/- and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 8.1. Perused and considered the orders passed by the Provident Fund Commissioner levying damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act of Rs. 43,57,177/- and order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal restricting damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act to Rs. 10,90,000/- and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 8.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in fact, the employer committed defaults in not remitting the amount of provident fund for the period from March, 2008 to February, 2012. It is reported that even thereafter also the employer has failed to remit/deposit the amount of provident fund in the subsequent period also. When the employer was served with the show cause notice under section 14(B) of the EPF Act, his only submission was that because of the financial problem he could not remit/deposit the amount of provident fund. However, it is required to be noted that the default was for the period from march, 2008 to February, 2012, which can be said to be a very long period i.e. four years. Therefore, the Provident Fund Commissioner having regard to the circumstances, persistent default and length of each default, levelled damages to Rs. 43,57,177/- under section 14(B) of the Act. However, the aforesaid has been interfered with by the learned Appellate Tribunal restricting the damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- only solely on the ground that the employer deposited the amount of interest under section 7(Q) of the EFP Act totaling Rs. 32,86,132/-. No further reasons have been assigned and the aforesaid order has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge. 8.2. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in catena of decisions, levy of interest under section 7(Q) of the EPF Act and levy of damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act both are independent and operate in two different fields. 8.3. In the case of Organo Chemical Industries and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the "Damages" under section 14(B) of the EFP Act and it is held that the damages under section 14(B) of the Act is a penalty for default or failure in performance of duty imposed under the EPF Act as well as compensation for the loss sustained by the employees. It is further observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the object and purpose of section 14(B) of the EPF Act is to authorize Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to prevent the employer from making defaults. It is further observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is also meant to provide repatriation for the loss suffered by the employees. In the case of Organo Chemical Industries and another (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 38 to 43 has observed and held as under :- "38. What do we mean by 'damages'? The expression 'damages' is neither vague nor over-wide. It has more than one signification but the precise import in a given context is not difficult to discern. A plurality of variants stemming out of a core concept is seen in such words as actual damages, civil damages, compensatory damages, consequential damages, contingent damages, continuing damages, double damages, excessive damages, exemplary damages, general damages, irreparable damages, pecuniary damages, prospective damages, special damages, speculative damages, substantial damages, unliquidated damages. But the essentials are (a) detriment to one by the wrong-doing of another (b) reparation awarded to the injured through legal remedies and (c) its quantum being determined by the dual components of pecuniary compensation for the loss suffered and often, not always, a punitive addition as a deterrent-cum-denunciation by the law. For instance, 'exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which reason they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages, and (vulgarly) "smart-money". (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition p. 467/468). It is sufficient for our present purpose to state that the power conferred to award damages is delimited by the content and contour of the concept itself and if the Court finds the Commissioner travelling beyond, the blow will fall. Sec. 14B is good for these reasons. 39. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition p. 467/468). It is sufficient for our present purpose to state that the power conferred to award damages is delimited by the content and contour of the concept itself and if the Court finds the Commissioner travelling beyond, the blow will fall. Sec. 14B is good for these reasons. 39. The further submission is that damages being compensatory in character could not exceed the interest the amount defaulted would have carried during the period of delay. The respondent has gone beyond the mere quantum of interest and has rounded it off to a sum equal to the defaulted contribution. Is this excess an illegal extravagance or a legal levy? This turns on what is 'damages' in the setting of the Act. 40. The measure was enacted for the support of a weaker sector viz. the working class during the superannuated winter of their life. The financial reservoir for the distribution of benefits is filled by the employer collecting, by deducting from the workers' wages, completing it with his own equal share and duly making over the gross sums to the Fund. If the employer neglects to remit or diverts the moneys for alien purposes the Fund gets dry and the retirees are denied the meagre support when they most need it. This prospect of destitution demoralises the working class and frustrates the hopes of the community itself. The whole project gets stultified if employers thwart contributory responsibility and this wider fall-out must colour the concept of 'damages' when the court seeks to define its content in the special setting of the Act. For, judicial interpretation must further the purpose of a statute. In a different context and considering a fundamental treaty, the European Court of Human Rights, in the Sunday Times Case, observed : "The Court must interpret them in a way that reconciles them as far as possible and is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty". 41. A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislation falls for determination, especially in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned by principle and precedent and is implicit in Art. 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning. 42. 41. A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislation falls for determination, especially in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned by principle and precedent and is implicit in Art. 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning. 42. What are the strands which make the fabric of 'damages' under the Article? I have stated earlier that the composite idea of 'damages' includes more than pecuniary compensation. Moreover, the injured party is the Board of Trustees who administer the Fund. That Fund not merely loses the interest consequent on the non-payment but receives a shock in that its scarce resources are further famished by employers' default. There is great social injury to the scheme when employers default in numbers. So the lash of the law is delivered when its object is frustrated. What is more denunciatory is the fact that the employer makes deductions from the poor wages of the workers (and makes them suffer to that extent) and diverts even those sums for his private purposes by failing to make prompt remittances. Thus, default in contributions is compounded by embezzlement, as it were, Naturally, damages will take an exemplary character and inflict a heavy blow on the shady defaulter. 43. I am clearly of the view that 'damages', as imposed by Section 14B, included a punitive sum quantified according to the circumstances of the case. In 'exemplary damages' this aggravating element is prominent. Constitutionally speaking, such a penal levy included in damages is perfectly within the area of implied powers and the legislature may, while enforcing collections, legitimately and reasonably provide for recovery of additional sums in the shape of penalty so as to see that avoidance is obviated. Such a penal levy can take the form of damages because the reparation for the injury suffered by the default is more than the narrow computation of interest on contribution." 8.4. In the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering levy of damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act has observed and held that power-cut, financial problem relating to other indebtedness or delay in realisation of amount paid by cheques or drafts are not relevant explanation to avoid liability for default. In the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering levy of damages under section 14(B) of the EPF Act has observed and held that power-cut, financial problem relating to other indebtedness or delay in realisation of amount paid by cheques or drafts are not relevant explanation to avoid liability for default. In the said decision in the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 28 and 29 has observed and held as under :- "28. We have already stated that in Organo, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner held that power-cut, financial problems, disputes between the partners were not relevant explanations and that the said view was not interfered with by this Court. 29. From the aforesaid decisions, the following principles can be summarized : The authority under section 14-B has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and the reply to the show cause notice and pass a reasoned order after following principles of natural justice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard; the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of default and amounts involved; default on the part of the employer based on plea of power-cut, financial problems relating to other indebtedness or the delay in realisation of amounts paid by the cheques or drafts, cannot be justifiable grounds for the employer to escape liability; there is no period of limitation prescribed by the legislature for initiating action for recovery of damages under section 14-B. The fact the proceedings are initiated or demand for damages is made after several years cannot by itself be a ground for drawing an inference of waiver or that the employer was lulled into a belief that no proceedings under section 14-B would be taken; mere delay in initiating action under section 14-B cannot amount to prejudice inasmuch as the delay on the part of the department, would have only allowed the employer to use the monies for his own purposes or for his business especially when there is no additional provision for charging interest. However, the employer can claim prejudice if there is proof that between the period of default and the date of initiation of action under section 14-B, he has changed his position to his detriment to such an extent that if the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice to him is of an "irretrievable" nature, he might also claim prejudice upon proof of loss of all the relevant records and/or non-availability of the personnel who were, several years back in charge of these payments and provided he further establishes that there is no other way he can reconstruct the record or produce the evidence; or there are other similar grounds which could lead to "irretrievable" prejudice; further, in such cases of "irretrievable" prejudice, the defaulter must take the necessary pleas in defence in the reply to the show cause notice and must satisfy the authority concerned with acceptable material; if those pleas are rejected, he cannot raise them in the High Court unless there is a clear pleading in the writ petition to that effect." 8.5. In the case of Arcot Textile Mills Limited Versus Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and others, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held that section 14(B) has been enacted to penalise defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is further observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is not only a warning to the employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries i.e. to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them. It is further observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the entire amount of damages awarded under section 14(B) except for the amount relatable to administrative charges is to be transferred to the Employees' Provident Fund. 8.6. Applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, further confirmed by the learned Single Judge restricting damages to Rs. 10,90,000/- against damages imposed by the Provident Fund Commissioner of Rs. 43,57,177/- cannot be sustained. The reasons given by the learned Appellate Tribunal to reduce the amount of damages from Rs. 43,57,177/- to Rs. 10,90,000/- against damages imposed by the Provident Fund Commissioner of Rs. 43,57,177/- cannot be sustained. The reasons given by the learned Appellate Tribunal to reduce the amount of damages from Rs. 43,57,177/- to Rs. 10,90,000/- also cannot be sustained. The order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal confirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be in consonance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal further confirmed by the learned Single Judge deserve to be quashed and set aside and considering the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and considering the alternative submission made by the learned advocates appearing on behalf respective parties, the matter is required to be remanded to the learned Appellate Tribunal to decide the Appeal afresh and pass a fresh speaking and detailed order on merits and after considering the observations made hereinabove and after considering the object and purpose of section 14(B) of the EPF Act. 9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present appeal succeeds in part. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No. 570 of 2016 and order passed by the learned Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA No. 345(5) of 2013 dated 17/11/2014 are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi to decide the appeal afresh, in accordance with law and on merits and after considering the observations made hereinabove and after considering the object and purpose of section 14(B) of the EPF Act. The said exercise shall be completed by the learned tribunal within a period of FOUR MONTHS from the date of receipt of the writ of the present order. Present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs. In view of disposal of the main Letters Patent Appeal, Mr. Meena does not press Civil Application No. 16372 of 2017 for production of additional documents on record of the main Letters Patent Appeal and hence the same stands disposed of as not pressed. Registry is directed to send writ of this order to the learned Employees' Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, forthwith.