JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The applicants have preferred this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the impugned order dated 11.06.2014 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi, whereby the applicants have been summoned under Sections 323, 427 IPC. The learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has raised a preliminary objection that since the applicants have alternative remedy to file revision against the impugned summoning order, therefore, the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be entertained. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has relied upon several judgments which of one is reported in 2012 (11) SCC page 252 in which it has been held that the revision against the summoning order is maintainable. In another case reported in 2011 SCC page 4371 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon a recent Supreme Court judgment reported in 2016 (3) JIC page 284 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the availability of remedy of revision will not make a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. non-maintainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court has relied upon an earlier judgment rendered in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. reported in 2010 (1) JIC page 471 in which it was held that the availability of alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. by itself cannot be a good ground to dismiss an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court after considering the various pronouncements on subject, held that there cannot be a total ban on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Even if the remedy of revision is available where it is shown that the criminal proceedings are abuse of the process of the court, then it will the well within the jurisdiction of the court to prevent such abuse of the process of the court. If glaring injustice is being done to a litigant then the High Court should interfere by exercising his jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In the present case, the applicants have been summoned on a complaint filed by the opposite party no.2 in which it was stated that the applicants alongwith some other forcibly demolished the structure raised by the opposite party no.2 which caused a loss of Rs.50,000/- to the opposite party no.2. When she made complaint to the authorities, the applicants and other co-accused persons forcibly entered into her house and physically assaulted her. The Magistrate examined the complainant and its witness but by means of the impugned order he summoned only the applicants and refused to summon other co-accused on the ground that it was not probable for them to have committed the offence as they were public servant. Since there is allegation of physical assaulted and demolition of structure by the applicants, therefore, it cannot be said that by passing the impugned summoning order, the learned Magistrate has committed any illegality or has acted beyond jurisdiction. It also cannot be said that the proceedings of complaint are abuse of the process of the court. It can only be decided after trial as to whether the applicants have committed any offence or not. It is a settled law that the Magistrate at the stage of summoning, cannot examine the truthfulness of the complaint and go deep into the matter. The only requirement under the law is that the Magistrate should record its satisfaction that there is sufficient ground to proceed against accused persons. In the present case after examining the contents of the complaint, it cannot be said that the summoning of the applicants on a complaint by the opposite party no.2 is abuse of the process of the court. In view of the above, I do not find any sufficient ground for interference with the impugned order in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The application is, accordingly, dismissed.