Balbir Singh Khandekar Son of Late Shri Ramdhan Khandekar v. Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Limited
2017-08-29
SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
1. Petitioner has preferred instant writ petition assailing order dated 12/02/2016 whereby he has been removed from service by upholding the punishment order passed earlier dt.18/04/1996 after he had already attained superannuation. 2. Brief facts to be noted are that the petitioner was holding the post of Junior Sales Assistant in the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation (hereinafter referred as ‘RSIC’). He was served with a charge sheet on 30/06/1995 under Rule 8 of the RSIC Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1974. Four charges were levelled against him. He denied the charges and enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer submitted enquiry report on 11/04/1996 and punishment order was passed on 18/04/1996 removing the petitioner from service after holding him guilty of the charges. 3. The petitioner assailed the punishment order dated 18/04/1996 and the order passed in departmental appeal dated 19/09/1998 by preferring SB Civil Writ Petition No.2672/1999 which was allowed vide judgment dated 08/08/2008 and following order was passed:- “In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the order of penalty and removal of the petitioner from service dated 18.4.96 is set aside and the order by which the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed dated 19.9.1998 is also set aside. Since the petitioner was removed a decade ago and this matter has remained pending for more than nine years, owing to which the petitioner was not required to discharge his duties, all this time, he would therefore be only entitled to notional benefits for the intervening period. In so far however other benefits are concerned such as increments, revision of pay, seniority and consideration of promotion etc., the petitioner would be deemed to be continuous in service and this period of service would held valid for the purpose of all these benefits.” 4. DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.2028/2008 was preferred before the Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 04/05/2012 upholding order of the learned Single Judge with observations as under:- “We find that order of termination of services of the respondent has rightly been set aside by learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. However, the appellant-employer is granted a liberty, as prayed for, to pass the order in accordance with law after removing the defects in the course of departmental enquiry, as pointed by the Single Judge.” 5.
However, the appellant-employer is granted a liberty, as prayed for, to pass the order in accordance with law after removing the defects in the course of departmental enquiry, as pointed by the Single Judge.” 5. The petitioner was reinstated by the respondents vide order dated 14/05/2012 and posted in the office. Vide order dated 09/07/2014 the petitioner was retired on attaining superannuation in terms of Rule 36 of RSIC Service Rules of 1972. 6. While the aforesaid was done, in view of the observations made by the Division Bench (supra), a new enquiry officer was appointed and the enquiry was continued after retirement and the petitioner was served with enquiry report vide letter dated 19/10/2015. It appears that there was another memorandum issued to the petitioner on 21/03/1996 for which also the enquiry was conducted and a joint enquiry report was prepared by the enquiry officer relating to both the charge-sheets and on the basis of the said enquiry report, the impugned order dated 12/02/2016 was passed whereby the earlier order passed of removal from service was kept as it is and the petitioner was treated as having been removed from service w.e.f. 18/04/1996. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly challenged the order impugned on two counts. Firstly, the RSIC Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1974 do not provide for continuation of departmental enquiry after retirement. It also does not provide for passing punishment of removal from service after retirement. The second submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order impugned is ex-facie illegal and unjustified. The enquiry officer has conducted the enquiry beyond his jurisdiction. A joint enquiry regarding two charge-sheets could not have been conducted afresh as there is no such direction issued by the Division Bench while deciding the appeal. The only leverage given to the respondents was to pass order in accordance with law after removing the defects in the course of the departmental enquiry which had already been conducted. However, the respondents have conducted a fresh enquiry and prepared another report. Further, they have passed an order of punishment retrospectively w.e.f. 1996 although the said order dated 18/04/1996 stood already quashed & set aside by the orders passed by the learned Single Judge which was upheld by the Division Bench. It is submitted that no punishment order could have been passed with retrospective effect. 8.
Further, they have passed an order of punishment retrospectively w.e.f. 1996 although the said order dated 18/04/1996 stood already quashed & set aside by the orders passed by the learned Single Judge which was upheld by the Division Bench. It is submitted that no punishment order could have been passed with retrospective effect. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that as the respondents were given liberty, in order to do complete justice, the enquiry was conducted afresh and there is no bar under the Rules for continuing enquiry even after retirement. Learned counsel for the respondents supports the punishment order on the ground that once liberty was granted by the Division Bench, the only requirement for the authority was to examine whether the earlier order of the respondents was correct or not and would relate back to the earlier order of 1996. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the material available on record. 10. A look at the judgments passed earlier by this Court and upheld by the Division Bench goes to show that the punishment order dated 18/04/1996 stood quashed and set aside and therefore, it had become non-existent in law. The respondents have, however, revived the same while passing the impugned order dated 12/02/2016. which could not have been done as the order of the learned Single Judge has been upheld by the Division Bench. The respondents were given liberty to pass fresh orders after removing the defects in the enquiry which they had already conducted, meaning thereby, the respondents were required to give the petitioner necessary documents which they had relied upon the earlier enquiry and also give him a copy of the enquiry report and take his objection and pass the order. The Division Bench or the learned Single Judge did not allow the respondents to conduct a fresh enquiry with regard to the charge sheet of 1995. The proceedings conducted by the new enquiry officer, therefore, are vitiated in law and are liable to be set aside. 11. Apart from above, this Court accepts contention of learned counsel of the petitioner that the RSIC Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1974 do not provide for continuation of departmental enquiry after retirement.
The proceedings conducted by the new enquiry officer, therefore, are vitiated in law and are liable to be set aside. 11. Apart from above, this Court accepts contention of learned counsel of the petitioner that the RSIC Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1974 do not provide for continuation of departmental enquiry after retirement. In absence of any power available under the Rules, the respondents could not have conducted the enquiry after retirement as the petitioner had already retired and his employer employee relation with the respondents had come to an end. The law regarding continuation of enquiry after retirement is settled in the case of Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and others: (1999) 3 SCC 666 wherein it was held in Para 6 & 7 as under:- “6. It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of the departmental enquiry after superannuation. 7. In view of the absence of such a provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30-6-1995, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement. “Thus, the enquiry proceedings stand vitiated on this Court also. 12. In the case of Dev Prakash Tewari Vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and others: (2014) 7 SCC 260 , which was almost on similar facts, it was observed by the Supreme Court in Para 7 & 8 as under:- “7. In a subsequent decision of this Court in U.P. Coop.
12. In the case of Dev Prakash Tewari Vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and others: (2014) 7 SCC 260 , which was almost on similar facts, it was observed by the Supreme Court in Para 7 & 8 as under:- “7. In a subsequent decision of this Court in U.P. Coop. Federation case on facts, the disciplinary proceeding against employee was quashed by the High Court since no opportunity of hearing was given to him in the inquiry and the management in its appeal before this Court sought for grant of liberty to hold a fresh inquiry and this Court held that charges levelled against the employee were not minor in nature, and therefore, it would not be proper to foreclose the right of the employer to hold a fresh inquiry only on the ground that the employee has since retired from the service and accordingly granted the liberty sought for by the management. While dealing with the above case, the earlier decision in Bhagirathi Jena case was not brought to the notice of this Court and no contention was raised pertaining to the provisions under which the disciplinary proceeding was initiated and as such no ratio came to be laid down. In our view the said decision cannot help the respondents herein. 8. Once the appellant had retired from service on 31-3-2009, there was no authority vested with the respondents for continuing the disciplinary proceeding even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to get full retiral benefits.” 13. The contention of learned counsel of retrospectivity of punishment order is also tenable. If retrospective punishment is upheld, it would mean that post-decisional hearing can be allowed in the departmental proceedings. Principally, it would be amounting to put the cart before the horse. The action of the respondents in punishing with effect from anterior date is liable to be set aside. 14.
If retrospective punishment is upheld, it would mean that post-decisional hearing can be allowed in the departmental proceedings. Principally, it would be amounting to put the cart before the horse. The action of the respondents in punishing with effect from anterior date is liable to be set aside. 14. In view of what has been discussed herein above, the order impugned passed by the respondents dated 12/02/2016 is quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to pay arrears of salary and allowance payable to the petitioner and also pay him all retiral benefits in accordance with Rules and Regulations as if their had been no disciplinary proceedings initiated and no punishment order passed against him therein. Compliance of this order shall be made by the respondents within three months of receipt of certified copy of this order. 15. The writ petition stands allowed with the observations/directions as indicated above. No costs.