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2017 DIGILAW 1927 (ALL)

Mewa Lal v. Asha Ram

2017-08-21

ANIL KUMAR

body2017
JUDGMENT : Anil Kumar, J. Heard, Sri Humayun Mirza holding brief of Sri S. Mirza, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondent and perused the record. 2. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that plaintiff/Asharam has filed a suit for cancellation of sale deed and Will, registered as Regular Suit No. 19 of 1985 (Asharam v. Mewa Lal and others), same was decreed by means of judgment and decree dated 16.1.1998 passed by Ist Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) Faizabad. The order dated 16.1.1998 was challenged by defendant/appellant by filing Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1998 (Mewa Lal v. Ashra Ram), dismissed by means of judgment and order dated 10.9.1999 passed by VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Faizabad. 3. In view of the above said factual background, the present second appeal has been filed before this Court under section 100 CPC. 4. Present second appeal is being heard on the following substantial question of law: "Whether it is incumbent upon the First Appellate Court to frame the point of determination as per the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC or not ? " 5. In order to decide the point in issue, it will be appropriate to go through the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC, which reads as under :- "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment-The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 6. The word used by the legislature under Order 41, Rule 31 CPC are to the effect that the order of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state (a) the point for determination; so the question which is to be considered whether intention of the legislature while indicating the provisions as provided under Order 41, Rule 31 (a) CPC is mandatory in nature or not ? 7. 7. The word shall has been interpreted by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Pesara Pushpamata Reddy v. G. Veera Swamy and Ors., 2011(3) SCR 496, after taking into consideration the principle of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition, 2010 at page 406-407, held as under:- "The use of word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative; but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction." 8. In the case of Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074 , Hon'ble the Apex Court held that the term "shall" in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act. The construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations. (See M/s. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and others v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480 ). 9. In addition to the above said facts, Order 41, Rule 31 CPC had come up for consideration in the case of Gupta Nand v. Behari Lal and others AIR 1924 Allahabad 100, wherein this Court has held that the provisions of the law are mandatory and the reason is obvious. A Judge is bound to give the points for decision and the reasons for the decision thereon in order to enable the Court of appeal to see that the judge whose findings on facts are binding on this Court, has put properly before him the points at issue and has decided them. (See Baban Singh v. Jaimangal Singh (1906) A.W.N. 86). 10. And Hon'ble three Judges of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh AIR 1963 has held as under :- "Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute these propositions. (See Baban Singh v. Jaimangal Singh (1906) A.W.N. 86). 10. And Hon'ble three Judges of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh AIR 1963 has held as under :- "Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute these propositions. His contention, however is that even if the appellant does not address the Court, the Court must go through the record and the judgment under appeal and come to its own conclusion about the correctness of the decision under appeal. Support for this contention is sought from the provisions of Rule 32 of Order 41 which reads : "The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state - (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision there on; (c) the reasons for the decision; and, (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 7. It is urged that the judgment of the appellate Court has to state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and these the appellate Court cannot do till it has gone through the record and considered the entire matter on record including the judgment under appeal. The matters have to be in the judgment when points in dispute between the parties are raised before the appellate Court. If no such points are raised for consideration, the appellate judgment cannot refer to the points for determination in its judgment and, when there be no points raised for determination, there can be no decision thereon and no reasons for such decision. Such is the position when the appellant does not address the Court and does not submit anything against the decision of the Court below. The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection of the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in sub-r (2) of rule 1, Order 41. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by r. 31. The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection of the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in sub-r (2) of rule 1, Order 41. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by r. 31. Not un often certain grounds of objection raised in the memorandum of appeal are not argued or passed at the hearing and in that case such grounds cannot be taken to be the points for determination and are rightly not discussed in the judgment at all. It is for the appellant to raise the points against the judgment appealed from. He has to submit reasons against its correctness. He cannot just raise objections in his memorandum of appeal and leave it to the appellant Court to give its decision on those points after going through the record and determining the correctness thereof. It is not for the appellate Court itself to find out that the points for determination can be and then proceed to give a decision on those points. 11. The Privy Council observed in Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 55 "In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lord-ships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged." With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate Court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate Court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in rule 31, Order 41." 12. In the case of Girijanandini v. Bijendra Narain AIR 1967 SCC 1124, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "The Trial Court, as we have already observed, on a consideration of the entire evidence and the subsequent conduct of the parties came to the conclusion that there was no severance of Bijendra Narain from his uncle Bidya Narain and with that view the High Court agreed. It is true that the High Court did not enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence, but it generally approved of the reasons adduced by the Trial Court in support of its conclusion. We are unable to hold that the learned Judges of the High Court did not, as is contended before us, consider the evidence. It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 13. However, in the case of Girijanandini (Supra), Hon'ble the Apex Court had not considered the judgment rendered by three Judges Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh (Supra). 14. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate Court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi & Ors. v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 ). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate Court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial Court must weigh with the appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact (See Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 114 ). As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact (See Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 114 ). The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact.(See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 120 ). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 15. In the case of Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan v. Hari Prasad Bhuyan and others (2003) 1 SCC 197 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "The obligation is cast not only on the Trial Court but also on the Appellate Court. In the event of the suit having been decreed by the Trial Court if the Appellate Court interferes with the judgment of the trial court the judgment of the Appellate Court should precisely and specifically set out the reliefs granted on the modifications, if any, made in the original decree explicitly and with particularity and precision. Order 41, Rule 31 of the CPC casts an obligation on the author of the appellate judgments to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and when the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled." 16. In the case of G. Amalorpavam and others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others (2006) 3 SCC 224 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the cases of Girijanandini (Supra) and Sanotsh Hazari (Supra) while interpreting the provisions as provided under Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C. has held as under :- "The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Noncompliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate Court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the Rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the Court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of Second Appeal conferred by section 100 CPC." 17. In the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari (2007) 8 SCC 600 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in framing the additional issues of its own which did not arise for consideration in the suit or in the appeal. Even otherwise, the High Court should have formulated the points for its consideration in terms of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code. On the pleadings of the parties and in view of the submissions made, no such question arose for its consideration. Even otherwise, the High Court should have formulated the points for its consideration in terms of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code. On the pleadings of the parties and in view of the submissions made, no such question arose for its consideration. In any event, if a second suit was maintainable in terms of Order 2, Rule 4 of the Code, as was submitted by Ms. Luthra, no leave was required to be granted therefore. A civil court does not grant leave to file another suit. If the law permits, the plaintiff may file another suit but not on the basis of observations made by a superior court." 18. In the case of Gannmani Anasuya and others v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary and others (2007) 10 SCC 296 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "It was for the High Court to frame appropriate points for its determination in the light of the submissions made on behalf of Appellants in terms of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court failed to address itself on the said issue. Thus, apart from Issues Nos. 2 and 4, other points which for its consideration including the extent of the share of Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1 were required to be specifically gone into particularly in view of the fact that such a contention had been considered by the learned Trial Judge. Issue Nos. 2 and 4, in our opinion, therefore, require fresh consideration at the hands of the High Court." 19. In the case of M/s. Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF) (2008) 2 SCC 728 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "In view of our discussions made herein above, we are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta that the High Court was not justified in holding that the findings of the first appellate court were in compliance with Order 41 of the CPC. That apart, the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta could not satisfy us or even point out the specific issues which, in his opinion, had been left to be addressed by the first appellate court. That apart, the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta could not satisfy us or even point out the specific issues which, in his opinion, had been left to be addressed by the first appellate court. In view of the discussions made herein above, we are, therefore, of the view that no ground was made out by the appellant to set aside the judgment of the High Court on the question whether the judgment of the first appellate court was liable to be set aside for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order 41 of the CPC." 20. In the case of B.V. Nagesh and another v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy JT (2010) 13 SCC 530 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for re-hearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put-forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. [Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar and Ors. v. Sangram and Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 756 ] 21. In the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead) by Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam (2011) 4 SCC 240 , while interpreting the Order 41, Rule 31 CPC, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions. (Vide: Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 146 ; Girijanandini Devi & Ors. v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 ; G. Amalorpavam & Ors. v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai & Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 224 ; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600 ; and Gannmani Anasuya & Ors. v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2380 ), B.V. Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar and Others v. Sangram and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ]." 22. v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2380 ), B.V. Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar and Others v. Sangram and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ]." 22. In the case of United Engineers and Contractors v. Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh and others (2014) 16 SCC 109 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the judgment given by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh (Supra), Girijanandini Devi (Supra), G. Amalorpavam (Supra), Shiv Kumar Sharma (Supra) and Gannmani Anasuya (Supra) has held as under :- "The High Court decided the appeal without following the procedure required under Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, without entering into the merits, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court to decide the first appeal in accordance with law. As the matter is quite old, we request the High Court to dispose of the first appeal as early as possible." 23. In the case of A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa v. Sangondeppa & Anr. 2014 (102) ALR 274, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "In a series of decisions, this Court has highlighted how a regular first appeal is to be disposed of, particularly, in the light of Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. It mandates that the appellate Court has to frame points for determination, decision thereon, reasons for the decision and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled. Such recourse has not been followed by the High Court, while disposing of the regular first appeal. It is not in dispute that the first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth by both the sides. These principles have been reiterated in B.V. Nagesh and Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 ." 24. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth by both the sides. These principles have been reiterated in B.V. Nagesh and Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 ." 24. In the case of Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the earlier judgment given by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B.V. Nagesh (Supra), Santosh Hazari (Supra) has held as under :- "Being the first appellate court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order 41, Rule 31 ibid mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, resulting in causing prejudice to the appellant whose valuable right to prosecute in the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived him of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law. It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court." 25. In the case of Shasidhar v. Smt. Ashwini Uma Mathad and another 2015 (33) LCD 579 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the law laid down in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 756 , H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 303 and B.V. Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 held that mandatory duty has been casted upon the First Appellate Court to decide the appeal after framing the point of determination. 26. In the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Km. Mamta & Ors. AIR 2016 Supreme Court 948, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "As observed supra, as a first appellate Court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the appeal keeping in view the powers conferred on it by the statute. 26. In the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Km. Mamta & Ors. AIR 2016 Supreme Court 948, Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :- "As observed supra, as a first appellate Court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the appeal keeping in view the powers conferred on it by the statute. The impugned judgment also does not, in our opinion, satisfy the requirements of Order 20, Rule 4 (2) read with Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code which requires that judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, points for determination, decisions thereon and the reasons. It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court." 27. In the case of Laliteshwar Prasad Singh v. S.P. Srivastava (2017) 2 SCC 415 , Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that an appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore reflect court's application of mind and as per Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment of the first appellate court must explicitly set out the points for determination, record its reasons thereon and to give its reasonings based on evidence. 28. It is further held that the points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court is erroneous. 29. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court is erroneous. 29. In the case of Lakshmi v. Jugendra Lal 2014 (32) LCD page 1824, this Court after placing the reliance on the judgment given by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the cases of Union of India and another v. Ranchod and others 2009 (27) LCD 407, G. Amalorpavam and others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others (2006) 3 SCC 224 , Girijanandini v. Bijendra Narain AIR 1967 SCC 1124, Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , United Engineers and Contractors v. Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh and others AIR 2013 SC 2239, B.V. Nagesh and another v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 , A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa v. Sangondeppa & Anr. 2014 (102) ALR 274, has held that the Appellate Court should follow the procedure required under Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure and frame the point of determination while deciding the appeal. 30. In the case of Bala Devi (Smt.) v. Mukhtyar Singh 2017 (2) ARC 363, this Court held that First Appellate Court must decide the appeal giving adherence to the statutory provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. 31. In the light of the above said law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court, the position which emerges out is that :- (a) There is one set of judgment given by Hon'ble three Judges or two Judges of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that it is mandatory on the part of the Appellate Court while deciding the First Appeal under section 96 CPC to frame the point of determination as per provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. (b) There is another set of judgment given by Hon'ble three Judges or two Judges of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that it is mandatory on the part of the Appellate Court while deciding the First Appeal under section 96 CPC to frame the point of determination as per provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC, if there is substantial compliance of the said provision that is to say the Appellate Court had decided the first appeal after taking into consideration the entire facts and evidence on record. 32. Thus, the question to be considered is which set of judgment should be followed by the First Appellate Court while deciding the First Appeal under section 96 CPC. 33. The answer to the said question finds place in the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna v. 5th Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others AIR 1981 Allahabad 300 wherein it has been held as under :- "The Supreme Court has dealt with the binding nature of its pronouncements in a number of decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those cases. In a case where a High Court finds any conflict between views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said that proper course for such a High Court is to follow the opinion expressed by larger Benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller Benches of the Court (See State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra. AIR 1976 SC 2547 . The difficulty, however, before us is slightly different and is not covered by the authority cited above. We are faced with a situation where there are conflicts between the two decisions of the Supreme Court given by Judges of equal strength. We are not concerned here with reasons which led to these conflicts. To the same effect is the view taken by a Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in Govindanaik G. Kalghatagi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. AIR 1980 Kant 92 and by Calcutta High Court in M/s. Sovachand Mulchand v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs AIR 1968 Calcutta 174. Thus, what follows is that in the event of there being clear conflict, the decision of such latter Bench would be binding on us. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that since in Ram Swarup Rai Vs. Thus, what follows is that in the event of there being clear conflict, the decision of such latter Bench would be binding on us. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that since in Ram Swarup Rai Vs. Lilavati, (1980) ALL LJ 651 SC (1980 ALL LJ 651) (SC) the earlier decision given in Ratan Lal Singhal Vs. Smt. Murti Devi, AIR 1980 SC 635 had not been cited, the decision being in ignorance of a case which was binding on the Court is per incuriam. Counsel urged that Ram Swarup Rai's decision does not have a binding authority. We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur AIR 1970 SC 1002 , the Supreme Court held that a Supreme Court's judgment is binding on High Court and it cannot be ignored on ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. To us, it appears that it is only in cases of decision of concurrent Courts that the doctrine of per incuriam can be applied. Thus, the law declared by the Supreme Court cannot be ignored on that basis. A failure to cite authority of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court before it is not sufficient to render its latter decision per incuriam. Overruling a similar argument made in Ambika Prasad Misra v. State of U.P. AIR 1980 SC 1762 Krishna Iyer. J., agreed with the following observations made in Salmond 'Jurisprudence', page 215 (11th edition):- "A decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned." We, therefore, cannot ignore the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court on the basis of the same being per incuriam. To the same effect is the law laid down by Jassel M.R. in Baker v. White (1877) 5 Ch D 183(7). We do not wish to express opinion on this aspect of the matter. We would only content ourselves by saying that since we are bound by the latter decision of the Supreme Court, we must follow the same. To us, it appears that the latter decision has impliedly overruled the earlier." 34. We do not wish to express opinion on this aspect of the matter. We would only content ourselves by saying that since we are bound by the latter decision of the Supreme Court, we must follow the same. To us, it appears that the latter decision has impliedly overruled the earlier." 34. In the light of the judgment given by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna (Supra), the judgment given by Hon'ble three Judges of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of A.M. Sangappa (Supra) is latest one which lays down that the compliance of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC while deciding the First Appeal by the Appellate Court is mandatory. 35. Accordingly, in the light of the above said judgment, it is held as under :- (a) Mandatory duty has been casted upon the Appellate Court to frame the point of determination while deciding the First Appeal. 36. As in the instant matter, the Appellate Court has not framed the point of determination as per provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC, so the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.9.1999 passed by VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Faizabad in Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1998 is contrary to the said provisions, liable to be set aside. 37. For the foregoing reasons, present second appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 10.9.1999 passed by VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Faizabad in Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1998 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the appellate court to decide the same in view of the observations made herein above. The said exercise shall be done within a period of one year from the date of receiving a certified copy of this order. 38. Office is directed to send back the lower court record to the court concerned forthwith.