ORDER : DHIRUBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL, J. I.A. No. 2174 of 2016 in L.P.A. No. 190 of 2016 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 14 days in preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 190 of 2016. 2. Having heard the learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the reasons stated in this interlocutory application especially in para Nos. 3 and 4, there are reasonable reasons for condoning the delay. We, therefore, condone the delay in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. This interlocutory application is allowed and disposed of. L.P.A. No. 190 of 2016 with L.P.A. No. 247 of 2016 3. These Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred, one by the employee and another by the Management, being aggrieved and feeling dis-satisfied by the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 dated 5th February, 2016 whereby the learned Single Judge has partly upheld the award delivered by the Central Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 305 of 2000 dated 16th September, 2005. 4. Factual Matrix:- • Management took examination for the post of Stenographer in which the employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani was not successful. • Thereafter request was made by the employee vide his letter dated 2nd November, 1993 (this document presented before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad as M-1 series). • This letter has also been annexed as Annexure-2 to the memo of Letters Patent Appeal No. 247 of 2016. • The speed of 80 words per minute could not be achieved by the employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani and hence he was employed for two months upon his request. Initially on 7th March, 1994, thereafter on 30th October, 1994, thereafter on 23rd March, 1995, thereafter on 31st May, 1997 then on 9th September, 1997, then on 10th December, 1997 and lastly on 12th March, 1998 sometimes for two months and sometimes for 15 days and sometimes he was continued for a longer period. • Thus, it appears that on contractual period on different occasions Probodh Kumar Sahani was engaged as a Stenographer despite he failed in the stenography examination and that too upon the request of Probodh Kumar Sahani vide his letter dated 2nd November, 1993 (M-1 series documents presented before the Industrial Tribunal). • Thus, it appears that on contractual period on different occasions Probodh Kumar Sahani was engaged as a Stenographer despite he failed in the stenography examination and that too upon the request of Probodh Kumar Sahani vide his letter dated 2nd November, 1993 (M-1 series documents presented before the Industrial Tribunal). • It appears that on 23rd April, 1997 lastly he was engaged and thereafter he was not given employment because there was no requirement with the Management and hence, industrial dispute was raised under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by Probodh Kumar Sahani and ultimately a reference was made by the appropriate Government with the following terms:- 'Whether the action of the Management, Bhelatand Washery of M/s. TISCO in terminating the services of Probodh Kumar Sahani with effect from 24th April, 1997 was legal and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled?" • This reference was made under Section 10 and Reference Case No. 305 of 2000 was instituted in the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad. Several documents were presented by the Management as well as by the employee along with the evidences given by the Management and the workman and on the basis of the evidences on record, Central Government Industrial Tribunal delivered an award dated 16th September, 2015 to the effect that the termination of the services of Probodh Kumar Sahani by the Management dated 23rd April 1997 was illegal and there was a recommendation for confirmation into the services of the employee. • Being aggrieved and feeling dis-satisfied with the aforesaid award passed by the Tribunal in Reference No. 305 of 2000 dated 23rd April, 1997 the Management preferred writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 mainly on the ground that looking to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 especially Section 2(oo)(bb) whenever contractual period of the employee is over in such type of termination there is no question of reinstatement whatsoever arises because such type of automatic termination of the services is an exception to the word "retrenchment". Automatic termination is not an action of the Management. Automatic termination is an act of the employee also because he has agreed to get employment for a limited period. Automatic termination is not an action of the Management. Automatic termination is an act of the employee also because he has agreed to get employment for a limited period. Retrenchment has something to do with action of the Management whereas looking to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 2(oo)(bb), there is exception to retrenchment. Mainly on these grounds the writ petition was preferred by the Management and the same has been reiterated in Letters Patent Appeals. • Another major ground canvassed in the writ petition that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad has travelled beyond the scope of reference i.e. recommendation to make the employee permanent. This type of recommendation ought not to have been done by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad. Even though the temporarily employed person has worked for 240 days because 240 days work in one continuous year, is not such a golden stick or is not such a golden touch which makes automatically an employee permanent in the services. On these two major grounds the writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 was preferred and the writ petition was partly allowed and the direction for confirmation was set aside nonetheless reinstatement with full back wages was continued by the learned Single Judge and hence, the Management has preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 247 of 2016. • The major contention raised by the employee of work of 240 days in one continuous year and especially for the period running from 23rd March, 1995 to 23rd April, 1997. • As the award has been partly modified by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February, 2016, both the Management as well as the employee have preferred L.P.A. Nos. 190 and 247 of 2016. 5. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the employee:- • It is submitted that employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani was employed regularly for different intervals to avoid the grant of the benefits of the permanent workmen. The different periods are for 15 days, two months and more also as stated in the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge. 5. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the employee:- • It is submitted that employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani was employed regularly for different intervals to avoid the grant of the benefits of the permanent workmen. The different periods are for 15 days, two months and more also as stated in the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge. • It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani that this employee has worked as Stenographer for more than 240 days for the period running from 23rd March, 1995 to 23rd April, 1997 and hence, termination of the services on 23rd March, 1997 without following the conditions as referred in Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will tantamount to illegal termination of the services. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the Tribunal while passing the award in Reference No. 305 of 2000 dated 23rd April, 1997 as well as the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 dated 5th February, 2016. • Learned counsel appearing for the employee has relied upon several decisions which are as under:- (2011) 6 SCC 584 (2015) 4 SCC 458 (2015) 12 SCC 39 [:2015(1) JLJR(SC) 402] (2015) 12 SCC 754 On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the employee that artificial break given into the services of Probodh Kumar Sahani is not permissible. In fact, this employee has worked continuously from 7th March, 1994 till his date of termination i.e. 23rd April, 1997 and hence, no error was committed by the Central Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad while passing the award of reinstatement with full back wages as well as looking to the evidences given by the Management-witnesses, work of Probodh Kumar Sahani was up to the mark of satisfaction and he was recommended for getting permanent services and hence, no error has been committed by the Tribunal in recommending to make the services of the employee as a permanent work. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while passing the order dated 5th February, 2016 in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 and hence, Letters Patent Appeal No. 190 of 2016 has been preferred by the employee. 6. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while passing the order dated 5th February, 2016 in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 and hence, Letters Patent Appeal No. 190 of 2016 has been preferred by the employee. 6. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the Management:- • It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Management that Probodh Kumar Sahani had failed in the stenography test, but, as he was son of one of the employees' of the Management and as he requested for getting for some temporary work of stenography, he wrote letter dated 2nd November, 1993 for getting some work and he was given two months' employment as Stenographer on 7th March, 1994. He was again given an employment for temporary period on 30th October, 1994 and again on 23rd March, 1995. For the ready reference the different dates of employment given in a tabular form is produced hereinbelow:- Sl. No. Date of Appointment Letter Period of Appointment 1 7.3.1994 The Respondent was appointed temporarily for 2 months. 2 30.10.1994 The Respondent was again appointed temporarily for 2 months. 3 23.3.1995 The Respondent was again appointed temporarily for 2 months. He continued working there beyond 2 months till 23.4.1997. He was stopped from working again from 24.4.1997. 4 31.5.1997 Again the respondent was engaged temporarily for 15 months. 5 9.9.1997 Again the respondent was engaged temporarily for 15 months. 6 10.12.1997 Again the respondent was engaged temporarily for 3 months. 7 12.3.1998 Again the respondent was engaged temporarily for 3 months. • Thus, in view of the aforesaid different appointment letters the facts remain that there was contractual employment for a definite period. Whenever such contractual period comes to an end, the services of Probodh Kumar Sahani will also come to an end, hence, such type of automatic termination of services by the joint act of Management and employee has been ousted from the definition of a word 'retrenchment' as per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad as well as by the learned Single Judge while deciding writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February, 2016. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad as well as by the learned Single Judge while deciding writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February, 2016. • It is submitted by the counsel for the Management that temporary-contractual employment for a limited period offered by the Management was accepted by the employee as he had failed in the stenography examination held by the Management and just out of sympathy the said work was being given upon the request of the employee vide his letter dated 2nd November, 1993 (documents presented as Exhibit-M-1 series before the Tribunal). This document is also annexed as Annexure-2 to the memo of Letters Patent Appeal No. 247 of 2016. Whenever any contractual employment is given for a limited time, the time is bound to be over on specific date as Time and Tide waits for none. Once a time limit is over, the contract for service will be over. Such type of termination of services cannot be levelled as 'retrenchment' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. • It has been contended by the learned counsel for the Management that even if the contractual employee has worked for 240 days or more in a continuous year, he has never acquired the status of a permanent employee unless it is so given by the Management. Work of more than 240 days is not such a golden touch which automatically makes the employee permanent into the services. Work of 240 days or more in a continuous year never creates an obligation on the part of the Management to make such employee permanent into the services. The only obligation pointed out by the Industrial Disputes Act is to follow the procedure as stated under Section 25(F) onwards, but, there is no such provision under the Industrial Disputes Act that if the employee has worked for more than 240 days he shall be conferred permanency into the services. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal while passing an award dated 16th September, 2005 in Reference No. 305 of 2000. In fact, in this case there is no question of retrenchment whatsoever arises nor any question whatsoever arises to grant permanency into the services to Probodh Kumar Sahani. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal while passing an award dated 16th September, 2005 in Reference No. 305 of 2000. In fact, in this case there is no question of retrenchment whatsoever arises nor any question whatsoever arises to grant permanency into the services to Probodh Kumar Sahani. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February, 2016. • Learned counsel appearing for the Management has further submitted that even after 23rd April, 1997 which is referred to in the terms of reference, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, on four different occasions further the employment was given and was accepted by the employee which was for 15 days or for three months and the dates starts from 31st May, 1997 onwards, as stated in the tabular format hereinabove. • Thus, as and when the work was required, it was offered to Probodh Kumar Sahani and willingly he had accepted for 15 days or for three months because otherwise he had failed in the stenography test. • Learned counsel appearing for the Management has relied upon the decisions rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in:- (2001) 5 SCC 540 [:2001(2) JLJR(SC) 519] (2001) 7 SCC 1 (2007) 1 SCC 533 (2007) 2 SCC 428 (2007) 6 SCC 207 and a decision rendered by this Court reported in 2006(3) JCR 432 . • On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Management that whenever any employment is given for a fixed period, the limited period on a contractual basis and upon secession of the said period the services of the employee which has been agreed to come to an end, cannot be levelled as retrenchment looking to Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 nor such type of employee can be awarded permanent services even though they have worked for more than 240 days in a continuous year. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad while deciding Reference No. 305 of 2000 nor by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P(L) No. 1571 of 2006. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad while deciding Reference No. 305 of 2000 nor by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P(L) No. 1571 of 2006. Hence the management has preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 247 of 2016. Reasons: 7. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby quash and set aside the order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide order dated 5th February, 2016 as well as the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 305 of 2000 dated 23rd April 1997 for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:- (i) Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidences before the Tribunal, it appears that Probodh Kumar Sahani who failed in the examination of Stenography conducted by the Management and as he was a son of another employee and as Probodh Kumar Sahani, who wrote a letter dated 2nd November, 1993 (Exhibit-M-1 series before the Industrial Tribunal) which is also presented as Annexure-2 to the memo of Letters Patent Appeal No. 247 of 2016, was given employment for two months on 7th March, 1994, thereafter, looking to the need of the Management employment was given on temporary basis on contractual basis for temporary period on different dates. For ready reference, the period has been mentioned hereinabove in a tabular form. From the said table, it appears that on 23rd April, 1997, one of the periods offered and Probodh Kumar Sahani raised industrial dispute which was ultimately referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The term of reference has been mentioned hereinabove. (ii) It further appears from the facts of the case that even if, the aforesaid cut-off date dated 23rd April, 1997, looking to the need of the Management Probodh Kumar Sahani was given employment for 15 days and 3 months on different intervals and lastly it was given on 12th March 1998. (iii) Thus, from the aforesaid details, it appears that for 15 days or 2 months or 3 months, the stenographer was engaged by the Management, once, such period comes to an end there is automatic secession of the services. (iii) Thus, from the aforesaid details, it appears that for 15 days or 2 months or 3 months, the stenographer was engaged by the Management, once, such period comes to an end there is automatic secession of the services. Such type of automatic termination of the services cannot be said that there was the termination of the services by the Management. In fact, once, the contractual period is over, services come to an end automatically, no specific action is required to be taken by the Management, in fact, because of the volition of the parties as a contractual period is over, the services of the employee will come to an end. (iv) As per Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the definition of the word 'retrenchment' is more known for its exception and especially the word is defined under Section 2 (oo) (bb) as stated hereinabove. Once, the contractual period is over, the services will come to an end automatically, without any action of the Management, whereas, retrenchment requires the action of the Management. Once, the period of service is over nothing is done by the Management, hence, it cannot be said that such automatic termination of the services tantamount to retrenchment. Once, the contractual period of services is over, there is automatic secession of the services whereas the retrenchment is a unilateral action of the Management. Once, the contractual period of services is over, nobody is responsible and much less the Management. Hence, also, it cannot be labelled as retrenchment. Once, the contractual period of service is over, it is voluntary phenomenon and 'volenti non fit injuria. Thus, no much grievance can be ventilated by the employee for termination of the services, because, he has given his consent for automatic termination, as the time and tide waits for none. The employment of fixed period is bound to be over after that fixed period is over and hence, such type of termination is "termination simplicitor". Thus, "termination simplicitor" cannot be labelled as retrenchment. Such type of 'agreed termination of the services' is not covered under subsection-2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 'Such type of agreed termination of the services cannot be challenged by the employee'. Thus, "termination simplicitor" cannot be labelled as retrenchment. Such type of 'agreed termination of the services' is not covered under subsection-2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 'Such type of agreed termination of the services cannot be challenged by the employee'. These aspects of the matters have not been properly appreciated even by the appropriate Government while making the reference in Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 305 of 2000 nor by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide order dated 5th February, 2016. (v) Much has been argued and discussed by the learned counsel for the employee and by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad as well as by the learned Single Judge by work done by Probodh Kumar Sahani for more than 240 days in a continuous year and the recommendation has also been made by the Tribunal for confirmation into the services which has been slightly modified by the learned Single Judge. It ought to be kept in mind that working for 240 days by the workman, is not a Midas touch that will always give permanency to the workman in the services. Such type of interpretation of the Industrial Disputes Act is not permissible in the eye of law, even if, the workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act has worked for 240 days or more for a continuous year. He may be confirmed or he may not, but, merely because the workman has worked for 240 days that never creates an obligation on the part of the Management to confirm such type of employee. When there is r\o legal obligation on the part of the Management to confirm such employee, there is no right vested in such workman to be confirmed into service. Once, there is no right vested in the workman for being confirmed into services, no such direction or offer be given by the Industrial Tribunal while deciding Reference No. 305 of 2000 for giving direction for confirmation to the Management. Unless, there is violation of the rights of the employees, no such type of direction could have been given by the Industrial Tribunal. Unless, there is violation of the rights of the employees, no such type of direction could have been given by the Industrial Tribunal. In fact, there is no duty vested in the Management that merely because the employee has worked for more than 240 days, there was a legal obligation on the part of the Management to confirm such employee. In fact, it is wrong notion in the mind of the Tribunal. Previously also, this Court by Division Bench has decided L.P.A. No. 229 of 2009, vide judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2015 and the copy of the said judgment and order has also been circulated because similar type of cases are being decided and this case is no exception to such type of decision. This is an error apparent on the face of the record committed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad while deciding Reference No. 305 of 2000 vide award dated 16th September, 2005 and it is correctly modified by learned Single Judge while deciding W.P. (L) No. 1571 of 2006. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. No direction could have been given by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, nor any recommendation could have been made by the Industrial Tribunal confirming such type of employee. (vi) The second major issue involved in these two Letters Patent Appeals are about retrenchment of Probodh Kumar Sahani. Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for the employee that on 23rd April, 1997 there was the termination of the services of the employee who was give a contractual employment initially for two months and it was continued for the period running from 23rd March, 1995 to 23rd April, 1997 and termination of the services of such type of employee whose services is like a temporary, if terminated without giving any notice and without giving any retrenchment compensation, such type of retrenchment is illegal as per provisions contained in Section 25 (F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We are not agreeing with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani mainly for the reasons that this employee was given the work for two months of stenography looking to the exigency or need of the Management. We are not agreeing with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the employee-Probodh Kumar Sahani mainly for the reasons that this employee was given the work for two months of stenography looking to the exigency or need of the Management. In fact, this Probodh Kumar Sahani had failed in stenography examination conducted by the Management and upon his request vide letter dated 2nd November, 1993, partly due to sympathy and partly due to temporary need, two months contractual employment was given on 7th March, 1994 and again it was given on 30th October, 1994 and it continued up to 23rd April, 1997 as contained in the tabular format given hereinabove. After 23rd April, 1997 the industrial dispute was raised by the employee, but, the fact remains that even thereafter also for 15 days and for 3 months again, looking to the need of the Management, the work of stenography was offered and accepted and lastly it was given on 12th March, 1998. It ought to be, kept in mind that contractual employment always comes to an end, no sooner did, the contractual period is over. The contract is entered into by the volition of the parties. Such type of termination of the services is not as termination punitive, in fact it is termination simplicitor which is arising out of secession of the contractual period does not tantamount to retrenchment, as per Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The exceptions, ought to be kept in mind especially defined in Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No contractual period is for infinite time. Nothing is more to be done by the Management. Even if, nothing is done by the Management also then also there will be termination of services if it is for limited contractual period. Hence, also it cannot be labelled as retrenchment since the termination of the services of the employee is, as per the terms of the contract and it does not amount to retrenchment. Only the retrenchment is being protected by Section 25 (F). Thus, all termination of the Services are not retrenchment. Sometimes, termination of services by the agreement, between the Management and the employee. Only the retrenchment is being protected by Section 25 (F). Thus, all termination of the Services are not retrenchment. Sometimes, termination of services by the agreement, between the Management and the employee. Employees should kept in mind that, when they are accepting such type of contractual employment and when they are working for two months or three months, they also are agreeing for automatic termination of their services. Once the employee is agreeing with the fixed term contractual services, he is also agreeing for termination of the services by the end of such contractual period. Once, the employee is agreeing for termination of services, such type of termination of services is known as termination similicitor which cannot be labelled as retrenchment as defined under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (vii) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra, (2005) 5 SCC 122 as under:- "5. We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them the status of workmen on the analogy of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days' work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days' work does not, under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form here." (emphasis supplied) (viii) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava, (2006) 2 SCC 702 as under:- "17. It is now well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra; Executive Engineer, ZP Engineering Divn. It is now well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra; Executive Engineer, ZP Engineering Divn. v. Digambara Rao; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Bhola Singh; Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani and Neeraj Awasthi.)" (emphasis supplied) (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. S.C. Pandey, (2006) 2 SCC 716 as under:- "17. The question raised in this appeal is now covered by a decision of this Court in M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava wherein this Court clearly opined that: (1) when the conditions of service are governed by two statutes; one relating to selection and appointment and the other relating to the terms and conditions of service, an endeavour should be made to give effect to both of the statutes; (2) a daily-wager does not hold a post as he is not appointed in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter he does not derive any legal right; (3) only because an employee had been working for more than 240 days that by itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service; (4) if an appointment has been made contrary to the provisions of the statute the same would be void and the effect thereof would be that no legal right was derived by the employee by reason thereof." (emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Post Master General, Kolkata v. Tutu Das (Dutta), (2007) 5 SCC 317 as under:- "16. The short order which was the subject-matter of decision of this Court in Debika Guha also stood overruled in Umadevi (3). The short order which was the subject-matter of decision of this Court in Debika Guha also stood overruled in Umadevi (3). We may at this stage also notice that the concept of 240 days to be the cut-off mark for the purpose of regularisation of services came up for consideration of this Court in Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra wherein it was clearly laid down that the completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year would be attracted only in a case where retrenchment has been effected without complying with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, but would not be relevant for regularisation of service." (emphasis supplied) (xi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh, (2007) 6 SCC 207 as under:- "18. The next question which requires consideration is whether completion of 240 days in a year confers any right on an employee or workman to claim regularisation in service. In Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra it was held that the completion of 240 days' work does not confer the right to regularisation under the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the services. In M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava (para 17) after referring to several earlier decisions it has been reiterated that it is well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. This view has been reiterated in Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. The same question has been examined in considerable detail with reference to an employee working in a government company in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen and paras 34 and 35 of the Report are being reproduced below: (SCC p. 426) "34. Thus, it is well settled that there is no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularisation. Regularisation can only be done in accordance with the rules and not dehors the rules. In the case of E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala this Court held that there can be no regularisation dehors the rules. The same view was taken in Kishore (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra and Union of India v. Bishamber Putt. Regularisation can only be done in accordance with the rules and not dehors the rules. In the case of E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala this Court held that there can be no regularisation dehors the rules. The same view was taken in Kishore (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra and Union of India v. Bishamber Putt. The direction issued by the Services Tribunal for regularising the services of persons who had not been appointed on regular basis in accordance with the rules was set aside although the petitioner had been working regularly for a long time. 35. In Surinder Singh Jamwal (Dr. ) v. State of J&K it was held that ad hoc appointment does not give any right for regularisation as regularisation is governed by the statutory rules." (emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Shekhar Azad Krishi Evam Prodyogiki Vishwavidyalaya v. United Trades Congress, (2008) 2 SCC 552 as under:- "12. A feeble attempt, however, was made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 2 to state that he had been appointed against a permanent vacancy. In his written statement, he did not raise any such contention. It does not also appear from the records that any offer of appointment was given to him. It is inconceivable that an employee appointed on a regular basis would not be given an offer of appointment or shall not be placed on a scale of pay. We, therefore, have no hesitation in proceeding on the premise that Respondent 2 was appointed on daily wages. The Industrial Court in passing the impugned award proceeded on the premise that Respondent 2 had been working for more than 240 days continuously from the date of his engagement. It is now trite that the same by itself does not confer any right upon a workman to be regularised in service. Working for more than 240 days in a year was relevant only for the purpose of application of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 providing for conditions precedent to retrench the workmen. It does not speak of acquisition of a right by the workman to be regularised in service. 13. In Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao it was held: (SCC p. 269, para 20) "20. It does not speak of acquisition of a right by the workman to be regularised in service. 13. In Executive Engineer, ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao it was held: (SCC p. 269, para 20) "20. It may not be out of place to mention that completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year may not by itself be a ground for directing an order of regularisation. It is also not the case of the respondents that they were appointed in accordance with the extant rules. No direction for regularisation of their services, therefore, could be issued." (See also Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi.)" (emphasis supplied) (xiii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Hospital Trust v. Dinesh Kumar, (2008) 1 SCC 542 as under:- "6. It is undisputed that the work of cleaning the hospital has been given to a contractor w.e.f 17-8-1996. Materials were placed before the Labour Court to show that the workman was engaged for doing a part-time job and that he had worked for a few days in several months. The Labour Court itself on consideration of the documents and: records produced noted as follows: "It is evident that the workman had worked in August 1996 - 16 days, July 1996 - 30 days, May 1996 - 30 days, April 1996 - 30 days, March 1996 - 29 days, February 1996 - 29 days, January 1996 - 31 days, December 1995 - 31 days, November 1995 - 20 days (full), October 1995 - 19 days (full), September 1995 - 25 days (full) @ Rs. 35 per day. In addition to this, in November 1995 - 3 days, October 1995 - 9 days @ Rs. 20 per day towards part-time work and in September 1995 - 3 days part-time @ Rs. 5 per day, had worked." 7. The basic difference between a person who is engaged on a part-time basis for one hour or few hours and one who is engaged as a daily wager on regular basis has not been kept in view either by the Labour Court or by the High Court. The documents filed clearly establish that the claim of having worked more than 240 days is clearly belied. 8. The documents filed clearly establish that the claim of having worked more than 240 days is clearly belied. 8. The stand of the appellant that the respondent was called for work whenever work was available, as and when required and that he was not called for doing any work when the same was not available has been established. The Labour Court itself noted that the workman was engaged in work by others as he was working in the appellants' establishment for one hour or little more on some days. It is also seen from the documents produced before the Labour Court that whenever the respondent was working for full period of work he was being paid Rs. 35 per day and on other days when he worked for one hour he was getting Rs. 5. 9. In the aforesaid position, the inevitable conclusion is that the Labour Court and the High Court were not justified in directing the reinstatement with partial back wages." (emphasis supplied) (xiv) Thus, in view of the aforesaid decisions, there is no legal obligation on the part of the Management to confirm the employee who has worked for 240 days. Moreover, the termination of the services because of end of contractual period of services is covered by Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence such type of termination of the services:- (i) which is automatic in nature, (ii) which is because of free volition of the parties, (iii) for which no specific action is required to be taken by the Management, (iv) which is bound to come to an end after certain specific period which is bound to happen, even if, nothing is being done by the Management, (v) which is agreed and acted upon by the employee,- such type of termination of services are not covered by the definition of retrenchment. (xv) Once, the contractual period of services comes to an end, it is not the retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no question of following any procedure mentioned in the Industrial Disputes Act much less under Section 25(F) thereof. (xv) Once, the contractual period of services comes to an end, it is not the retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no question of following any procedure mentioned in the Industrial Disputes Act much less under Section 25(F) thereof. This aspect of the matter has been lost sight by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad while deciding Reference No. 305 of 2000 vide award dated 16th September, 2005 and has also not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February; 2006 and hence the direction given by the tribunal for retrenchment with full back wages which has also been confirmed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside. Moreover, even if workman has worked for 240 days in a continuous year, there is no statutory obligation, on the part of management, to confirm the employee. 8. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons, and judicial pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 305 of 2000 dated 16th September, 2005 and we also quash and set aside the direction of the learned Single Judge given in W.P.(L) No. 1571 of 2006 vide judgment and order dated 5th February, 2016 so far as it confirms the reinstatement with back wages. Thus, L.P.A. No. 247 of 2016 is allowed and disposed of and L.P.A. No. 190 of 2016 is dismissed. 9. In view of the final order passed in these Letters Patent Appeals, all the interlocutory applications are hereby dismissed.