JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. Sri Swarup Ghosh (hereafter the victim) in the early morning of March 12, 2007 was travelling in a trekker, bearing registration no. WB-57/3620 (hereafter the said trekker). At about 06.00 hours, the said trekker was stationary on N.H.-34 when a truck bearing registration no. WB-41B/8931 (hereafter the said truck) dashed it from behind. As a result of the collision, one passenger of the said trekker died instantaneously and several others were injured. The victim was one of them. All the injured were immediately shifted to local hospitals. The victim too was shifted to Berhampore New General Hospital on the same day. After treatment, the victim was discharged from the hospital nearly three months later, June 10, 2007 to be precise. As a result of the accident, the victim virtually lost his right leg which had to be amputated from below his thigh. Alleging rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the said truck, a petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter the Act) was lodged by the victim on August 14, 2007 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Murshidabad, registered as M.V. Case No.266 of 2007. The insurers of the said trekker and the said truck, inter alia, were the respondents in such petition. It was claimed by the victim that he was aged 21 years and that working as a ‘khalasi’ of a trekker bearing no. WB-57/2603, owned by one Utpal Ghosh, he was in receipt of salary of Rs.3,200/- per month. Because of permanent disablement, the victim claimed compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/-. The insurer of the said truck contested the claim petition by filing a written statement. It denied the age of the victim (according to it, the victim was 17 years of age), that the victim was not a passenger of the said trekker, that he was not earning Rs. 3,200/, that the said truck was not involved in any accident on March 12, 2007, and that the victim was not a casualty of the alleged accident; if at all there was any accident, the driver of the said trekker was at fault. 3,200/, that the said truck was not involved in any accident on March 12, 2007, and that the victim was not a casualty of the alleged accident; if at all there was any accident, the driver of the said trekker was at fault. A written note of arguments had been filed on behalf of the victim (pages 45 to 47 of the LCR, ‘File C’) wherein certain judicial authorities were referred for consideration and compensation computed in the light thereof was claimed, being higher than the sum claimed in the claim petition. The tribunal by its award dated February 28, 2014 allowed the claim on contest against the insurer of the said truck and ex-parte against the insurer of the said trekker by awarding compensation of Rs.6,19,400/- to be paid within two months from date, failing which the awarded sum would carry interest @ 6% per annum till realization thereof. These appeals, at the instance of the award-holder (the victim) and the award-debtor (the insurer), are directed against the said award dated February 28, 2014. 2. On behalf of the appellant-insurer, Mr. Pahari, learned advocate has questioned the quantum of compensation determined by the tribunal as payable to the victim. Ms. Ghosh, learned advocate for the appellant-victim has also assailed the method of computation of compensation by the tribunal. The effect of the arguments raised from the Bar is that we are spared the exercise of examining the evidence in detail to ascertain whether the tribunal was right in its finding that the victim suffered permanent disablement consequent to the concerned accident and that he is liable to be compensated. It is, therefore, time to consider whether the tribunal was justified in fastening the appellant-insurer with the liability of compensating the victim by determining Rs. 6,19,000/- as the sum payable, or should have awarded a higher sum. 3. We have for our guidance at least three decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2010) 10 SCC 254 = (2011) 3 WBLR (SC) 894; Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 343 = (2011) 1 WBLR (SC) 352 ; and Govind Yadav v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2011) 10 SCC 683 , which light our path to determine appropriate compensation payable to a victim of permanent disablement arising out of a motor accident. Ltd., reported in (2011) 10 SCC 683 , which light our path to determine appropriate compensation payable to a victim of permanent disablement arising out of a motor accident. Reference to the decision in Raj Kumar (supra), as reported in WBLR, finds place in the written notes of arguments filed on behalf of the appellant-victim. It seems that without considering the decision in Raj Kumar (supra) the tribunal proceeded to compute compensation which, to say the least, is erroneous. We are minded to observe that the tribunal would have done well to notice the relevant decisions instead of spending time, effort as well as pages after pages on a non-issue (issue no.3 appearing in its award, in view of confusion ‘thrown upon’ it requiring ‘permanent solution for removing confusions once and for all’) in an attempt to show its extensive research and profound knowledge on the subject, despite the fact that such issue was neither part of the issues that were framed on December 17, 2009 (page 19 of the LCR) nor was such discussion required in view of the law settled by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 (Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation) and previous decisions referred to therein. Be that as it may. 4. In Govind Yadav (supra), the Court after quoting relevant passages from the previous two decisions observed: “18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.” (underlining for emphasis) 5. In Raj Kumar (supra), Hon’ble R.V. Raveendran, J. (as His Lordship then was) in his own inimitable style pin-pointed what the tribunals and/or courts dealing with compensation claims arising out of personal injury cases are required to consider and specified the heads under which compensation ought to be awarded in such cases. In Raj Kumar (supra), Hon’ble R.V. Raveendran, J. (as His Lordship then was) in his own inimitable style pin-pointed what the tribunals and/or courts dealing with compensation claims arising out of personal injury cases are required to consider and specified the heads under which compensation ought to be awarded in such cases. Considering the same, the Court in Govind Yadav (supra) proceeded to consider whether compensation awarded to the appellant before it was just or reasonable or he is entitled to enhanced compensation. The heads under which compensation could be considered to be payable were noted as: “(i) Loss of earning and other gains due to the amputation of leg. (ii) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. (iv) Compensation for pain, suffering and trauma caused due to the amputation of leg. (v) Loss of amenities including loss of the prospects of marriage. (vi) Loss of expectation of life.” (quoted from paragraph 19 of the report) 6. Interestingly, in Govind Yadav (supra), the appellant was 24 years old when on November 14, 2004, in a motor accident, he lost his left leg. He was drawing Rs. 4,000/- as salary and was certified to be 70% physically disabled. There are striking resemblances here and bearing the decision in Govind Yadav (supra) in mind, we shall proceed to quantify compensation. However, before we embark on such journey, it would be prudent to deal with some of the arguments advanced by Mr. Pahari. 7. The first argument touched on the age of the victim and his capacity to enter into a contract. A transfer certificate dated September 2, 2005 issued by the Headmaster, Bhabta Netaji High School, P.O. Bhabta, Dist. Murshidabad (a Government aided school) where the victim studied up to Class V was filed before the tribunal on September 9, 2011 along with other documents by ‘firisti’ (page 25 of ‘List of Documents:- File D’ of the LCR). There, the victim’s date of birth is written as June 23, 1988. Although the transfer certificate was not formally exhibited in course of trial, it does not also appear that the victim’s age was seriously contested by the appellant-insurer before the tribunal by posing any question during cross-examination. There, the victim’s date of birth is written as June 23, 1988. Although the transfer certificate was not formally exhibited in course of trial, it does not also appear that the victim’s age was seriously contested by the appellant-insurer before the tribunal by posing any question during cross-examination. Bearing in mind the materials in the file, we hold that on the fateful day, the victim was a little less than 19 years old and being a major was entitled to enter into a contract of service. The contention that the victim was less than 16 years old and thus unable to contract, is thus rejected. 8. The further contention of Mr. Pahari centered on the salary the victim was allegedly receiving from his employer. That the victim was earning Rs. 3,200/- as a ‘khalasi’ was proved by his employer, the said Utpal Ghosh (PW-3). The argument of Mr. Pahari, based on Ground No. X of the memorandum of appeal that the victim in the claim petition had mentioned the name of one Mr. Sukhen Bhattacharjee as the owner of the trekker and, therefore, the evidence of PW-3 is unreliable, is based on an absolute misreading of the pleadings. A careful reading of the claim petition would reveal that PW-3 was the owner of the trekker bearing registration no. WB-57/2603 of which the victim was a ‘khalasi’, whereas the said Sukhen Bhattacharjee was the owner of the trekker involved in the accident bearing registration no. WB-57/3620. Question of disbelieving PW-3, therefore, does not and cannot arise on facts and in the circumstances. 9.Next, Mr. Pahari doubted the disability certificate issued in favour of the victim and submitted that it was not a reliable piece of evidence. According to him, one of the doctors (PW-4) constituting the Medical Board had not even examined the victim. While it is true that PW-4 did not examine the victim, the disability certificate dated September 20, 2007 refers to an amputation of a leg rendering the victim physically (orthopaedically) challenged and such disability ‘is calculated as 70%’. According to him, one of the doctors (PW-4) constituting the Medical Board had not even examined the victim. While it is true that PW-4 did not examine the victim, the disability certificate dated September 20, 2007 refers to an amputation of a leg rendering the victim physically (orthopaedically) challenged and such disability ‘is calculated as 70%’. PW-4 apart from identifying her own signature on the disability certificate identified the signatures of the Superintendent, District Hospital, Murshidabad and the orthopedic surgeon attached to such hospital, who were the other doctors comprising the Medical Board that examined the victim and also deposed that the said orthopedic surgeon had, in his own handwriting, filled up the portion regarding the percentage of disability suffered by the victim. In view of such clinching evidence (the disability certificate) and the presumption of official acts having been regularly performed, we find little reason to accept Mr. Pahari’s contention. We also find that in Govind Yadav (supra), the left leg of the appellant before the Court from above the knee was amputated and his disability was also calculated at 70%. There being parity in calculation of disability in the two cases, this is an additional ground to reject Mr. Pahari’s contention. 10.Ground No. VIII, to which our attention was finally drawn by Mr. Pahari, does not in the long run advance the cause of the appellant-insurer to settle for reduced compensation. The certificate issued by the hospital certifies that the victim sustained 70% permanent disability. In the written notes of argument, the victim claimed loss of earning due to functional disability @ 70% of Rs.6,91,200/- (Rs.3,200/- x 12 x 18) but the tribunal determined compensation as if the victim was 100% permanently disabled applying an inappropriate multiplier (16). We hasten to observe that while we proceed to determine compensation in the light of the observations in the three decisions referred to above, the amount of compensation payable would be much more than what the victim himself prayed and what was ultimately awarded by the tribunal. Award of compensation to the victim by the tribunal based on 100% loss of earning arising out of 70% physical disability notwithstanding, the victim would be entitled to higher sums which the tribunal failed to award to him. 11.Turning attention to determination of just compensation, there is no reason not to accept Rs. Award of compensation to the victim by the tribunal based on 100% loss of earning arising out of 70% physical disability notwithstanding, the victim would be entitled to higher sums which the tribunal failed to award to him. 11.Turning attention to determination of just compensation, there is no reason not to accept Rs. 3,200/- per month as the sum being paid to the victim by PW-3 as salary in the absence of any contra-evidence adduced by the appellant-insurer or its failure to dislodge the evidence of the victim and PW-3. Therefore, the notional annual income being Rs. 38,400/-, the loss of earning on account of permanent disability is Rs. 26,880/-. The application of multiplier of 16 by the tribunal is treated as erroneous and the appropriate multiplier, having regard to the age of the victim, would be 18. By applying that multiplier, we hold compensation payable to the victim by the appellant-insurer in lieu of loss of earning as Rs. 4,83,840/-. It is noted that under the head ‘future medical expenses’, the tribunal did not award any sum. A manifest error was thus again committed. Accordingly, to such sum i.e. Rs. 4,83,840/-, we add Rs. 2,00,000/- for the victim’s future medical expenses taking cue from paragraph 24 of the decision in Govind Yadav (supra). A meagre sum of Rs. 5,000/- was awarded by the tribunal on account of ‘pain, suffering and trauma’ caused to the victim and no sum was awarded on account of ‘loss of amenities including loss of prospect of marriage’. In Govind Yadav (supra), the Court felt that ends of justice would be met by awarding a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- each in lieu of ‘pain, suffering and trauma’ caused due to amputation of leg as well as ‘loss of amenities and enjoyment of life’. There is no reason as to why the victim, similarly placed as he is like Govind Yadav, should not be awarded Rs.1,50,000/- in lieu of ‘pain, suffering and trauma’ caused due to amputation of his right leg as well as Rs.1,50,000/- on account of ‘loss of amenities and enjoyment of life’. 12.We, accordingly, hold that the victim is entitled to receive as compensation a total sum of Rs.9,83,840/- (Rs.4,83,840/- + Rs.2,00,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/-) with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of realization. 12.We, accordingly, hold that the victim is entitled to receive as compensation a total sum of Rs.9,83,840/- (Rs.4,83,840/- + Rs.2,00,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/-) with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of realization. 13.Since Rs.6,19,400/- has been deposited by the insurer with the Registrar General of this Court, the victim shall be entitled to claim such sum by approaching the Registrar General with a copy of this judgment and order. 14. Insofar as the balance awarded sum of Rs.3,64,440/- (Rs.9,83,840/- - Rs.6,19,400/-) together with interest thereon is concerned, the same shall be paid by the insurer by an account payee cheque in favour of the Registrar General of this Court within a month from date; thereupon, the victim shall be entitled to claim such sum from the Registrar General in the same manner as indicated above. 15. In the result, the award of the tribunal is set aside. The appeal filed by the insurer (FMA 1555 of 2015) stands dismissed while the appeal filed by the victim (FMA 1530 of 2015) is allowed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs. 16. The lower court records be transmitted by the office at the earliest. 17. Photocopy of this judgment and order, duly counter-signed by the Assistant Court Officer, shall be retained with the records of FMA 1555 of 2015. 18. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI, J. I agree.