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2017 DIGILAW 1952 (RAJ)

Mangat Ram v. Sushil Kumar

2017-09-01

NIRMAJIT KAUR

body2017
JUDGMENT : Nirmajit Kaur, J. The present writ petition has been filed for setting aside the order and judgment dated 01.06.2017 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal (District Judge), Hanumangarh vide which the appeal against the order and judgment dated 28.08.2015 passed by the Rent Tribunal (Civil Judge), Hanumangarh was rejected. 2. The respondents-applicants/landlords filed an application under Section 9 (A & I) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 for ejectment, recovery of rent and possession before the Rent Tribunal, Hanumangarh on 17.10.2012 against the petitioners tenants regarding the shop in question on the ground of default as well as personal and bona fide necessity. Both the issues have been decided against the petitioners-tenants. A concurrent finding has been recorded by the courts below on the point of petitioner being defaulter in the payment of rent for more than 28 months i.e. after service of the notice of 30 days. Hence, they committed default in paying the rent to the tune of Rs. 61,664.21. The issue No.2 was also decided in favour of the respondent landlord and it was held that the respondent has reasonable and bona fide requirement of the shop in dispute for his business. 3. While praying for setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, the only argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that another shop of the respondent landlord which was rented out to Kamal Matching Centre has since been vacated and therefore, the same was now sufficient for the respondent landlord to carry on his business from the said shop. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained. The bona fide requirement is to be seen on the date of the application. The Apex Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Sh. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained. The bona fide requirement is to be seen on the date of the application. The Apex Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava reported in AIR 2001 SC 803 after taking into consideration the judgment rendered in the cases of Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram reported in AIR 1992 SC 700 , Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal reported in (1997) 3 SCR 508 and Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders reported in (1975) 3 SCR 958 held that the date of application for eviction which is crucial, reiterated the principle as under: "The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused." 4. It is repeatedly held that the landlord is the best judge with respect to his bona fide need. Neither the tenant nor the court can adjudicate with respect to his subjective choice. In fact, it was specifically noticed by the courts below that the respondent landlord was unemployed. 5. The petitioner has lost from both the courts below. In case concurrent findings of facts is based on proper appreciation and analysis of the evidence on record, the said findings should not be interfered by the High Court in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It cannot assume the powers of an appeal as also held by this Court in the case of Shailendra Kumar v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur and ors. reported in 2013 (4) RLW 3371(Raj.) in para 7, 8 and 9 as under: "7. It cannot assume the powers of an appeal as also held by this Court in the case of Shailendra Kumar v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur and ors. reported in 2013 (4) RLW 3371(Raj.) in para 7, 8 and 9 as under: "7. Coming to another aspect of the present case with regard to the limited scope which is left to this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of concurrent findings arrived at by both the Tribunals, an aspect which has been much emphasized by learned counsel for the respondent, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is a settled principle of law since long that the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution are neither akin to appellate powers or revisional powers. Moreso, when the proceedings in the present case arises under the Act governing the land lord and tenant relationship and their dispute, it does not provide for any second appeal or revision to the High Court. The purpose behind providing such a remedy is to give finality to the orders passed under the Act. The power under Article 227 is exercisable when it is found by the High Court that due to a certain grave error, an injustice has been caused to a party. The said jurisdiction of the High Court is limited only to seeing that the subordinate courts functions within the limits of its authority and does not extend to correction of mere error of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating an error of fact that can be corrected only by a superior court in exercise of statutory powers as a court of law. Therefore, the High Court cannot be anxious in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to convert itself into a court of appeal. 8. About half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Negendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner Of Hills, AIR 1958 SC 398 has laid down that the powers under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts of law function within the limits in its authority or jurisdiction. The said principle was then followed in the case of Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 12 held that: "... The said principle was then followed in the case of Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 12 held that: "... jurisdiction conferred (under Article 227) is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority ..." 6. Similarly, in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, (1983) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Para 7, observed : "7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited 'to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority', and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him nor in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decisions." 9. Later on in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had again observed, in Para 9 that: "9. ... The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes." 7. Similar view was also taken by this Court in the case of Mahendra Kaur Arora (Smt.) v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur and anr. Reported in 2013(2) RLW 1525 (Raj.) thus : "23. The present proceedings are quite plainly not original proceedings. Similar view was also taken by this Court in the case of Mahendra Kaur Arora (Smt.) v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur and anr. Reported in 2013(2) RLW 1525 (Raj.) thus : "23. The present proceedings are quite plainly not original proceedings. The present proceedings seek to impugn orders of fact findings authorities arrived at in accordance with the substantive law and the procedure as prescribed by the statute. Consequently in my considered opinion, the present petition is fundamentally one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court is bound to follow the regime of law as settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being a reserved and exceptional power of judicial intervention is to be exercised not on any technical ground, but only is to be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice. It has been held that such power is to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principles even though the power under Article 227 may be unfettered. The object of the exercise of such power is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept at the minimum to ensure that fountains of justice remain pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. In the case of Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan [ (2005) 3 SCC 193 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the findings arrived at by Tribunal are not perverse and based on cogent evidence, there should be no interference. In the case of Shamshad Ahmad & Ors. v. Tilak Raj Bajaj (deceased) through Lrs. & Ors [ (2008) 9 SCC 1 ], it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in proceedings Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, a court cannot review, reappreciate or reweigh the evidence upon which determination has been arrived at by the final court of fact. In the case of Tgn Kumar v. State of Kerala & Ors. In the case of Tgn Kumar v. State of Kerala & Ors. [ (2011) 2 SCC 772 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be utilized by the High Court only to keep the authorities under its jurisdiction within the four corners of the statute. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court ought to interfere in the exercise of power under Article 227 only in cases where the conclusions are not reached on evidence and all material not taken into consideration." 8. There is nothing to suggest that the finding with respect to personal necessity was in any manner erroneous or perverse to enable this Court to interfere in its exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. No other argument was raised. 10. In view of the above, the present writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit.