Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1969 (ALL)

MAHATMA KISHORI DAS v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-08-25

A.P.SAHI, RAJIV LOCHAN MEHROTRA

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—These writ petitions have basically challenged the notifications issued under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land situated in village Dostpur Mangrauli Bangar, Tehsil Dadari, District Gautam Budh Nagar, on the grounds of an incorrect dispensation of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and proceeding to invoke Section 17 of the Act for acquiring the land in question. The writ petitions were entertained and an interim order was passed on 14th June, 2010. 2. A bunch of writ petitions relating to the same acquisition including writ petitions pertaining to the village in question came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gajraj and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(11) ADJ 1 , where all the acquisition proceedings were upheld but certain benefits were extended to the tenure holders in the terms thereof. The Full bench while dealing with this matter under the heading of Group 49 in paragraph 113 held as follows : “113. The writ petition in Group-49 relates to village Dostpur Mangrauli Bangar, District Gautambudh Nagar. In Civil Writ Petition No. 47259 of 2011 (Rajveer and others v. State of U.P. and others), 11 petitioners have challenged the notification dated 17.3.2009 issued under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring 66.684 hectares of land situated in village Dostpur Mangrauli Bangar, District Gautambudh Nagar. Declaration under Section 6 was issued vide notification dated 8.4.2010. Plot Nos. 222, 423, 268, 328 are being used by the petitioners as abadi, which is recorded in the revenue record. There is delay of more than one year in issuing of notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which clearly indicates that there was no urgency in the matter. Petitioners claim that possession has yet not been taken. It is stated that there is no material with the State Government to invoke urgency clause. Counter-affidavit has been filed by the authority stating that possession was taken by the State Government on 22.5.2010. There was no reason to exempt the land of the petitioners. Petitioners are not in possession of the land.” 3. It is stated that there is no material with the State Government to invoke urgency clause. Counter-affidavit has been filed by the authority stating that possession was taken by the State Government on 22.5.2010. There was no reason to exempt the land of the petitioners. Petitioners are not in possession of the land.” 3. The above Full Bench judgment became subject-matter of challenge before the Apex Court and the same was affirmed in the case of Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (2015) 7 SCC 21 . 4. Consequently, the notifications of acquisition were upheld subject to the directions given by the Full Bench. Learned counsel for the respondents have also placed before the Court, orders of three Division Benches in relation to the same village dismissing the writ petitions in the light of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Gajraj (supra). The judgment of the three writ petitions are extracted hereinunder : 1. Mahaveer and others v. State of U.P. and others in Writ C No. -34618 of 2010 decided on 4.5.2017 is extracted hereinunder : “Heard learned counsel for the parties. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the notifications issued under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 17th March, 2009 and 8th March, 2010 respectively relating to petitioners’ plots of village Dostpur Mangrauli (Banger). Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that notifications in question have already been considered in bunch of writ petitions leading being Writ Petition No. 37443 of 2011 (Gajraj and others v. State of U.P. and others) decided by the Full Bench of this Court on 21st October, 2011 reported in 2011(1) ADJ 1 . It is submitted that this writ petition is fully covered by the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Gajraj (Supra). Learned counsel for the respondents could not dispute the submission so made. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Gajraj (Supra).” Order on Amendment Application. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The writ petition was filed in the year 2010. Learned counsel for the respondents could not dispute the submission so made. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Gajraj (Supra).” Order on Amendment Application. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The writ petition was filed in the year 2010. After more than 7 years of the filing of the writ petition, the present amendment application has been filed seeking to introduce new facts and grounds completely outside the scope of the issues, which were raised in the writ petition. The amendment application stands rejected.” 2. Harpal Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others in Writ C No. -31616 of 2010 decided on 14.2.2017 is extracted hereinunder : “The controversy involved in the present writ petition is squarely covered by the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gajraj and others v. State of U.P., 2011(1) ADJ 1 . In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.” 3. Nauraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others in Writ C No. -68019 of 2011 decided on 9.12.2011 is extracted hereinunder : “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh appearing for respondent No. 4 and learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the notifications issued under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 17th March, 2009 and 8th March, 2010 respectively relating to petitioners’ plots of village Dostpur Mangrauli(Banger). Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that notifications in question have already been considered and bunch writ petitions being leading Writ Petition No. 37443 of 2011 (Gajraj and others v. State of U.P. and others) have already been decided by the Full Bench judgment on 21st October, 2011. It is submitted that this writ petition is fully covered by the judgment of the Full Bench. Learned counsel for the respondents do not dispute the aforesaid submission. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment dated 21st October, 2011 in Gajraj’s case.” 5. It is submitted that this writ petition is fully covered by the judgment of the Full Bench. Learned counsel for the respondents do not dispute the aforesaid submission. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment dated 21st October, 2011 in Gajraj’s case.” 5. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that another Division Bench, however, took a contrary view and quashed the notifications of a separate village which was also a matter of consideration in the case of Gajraj (supra). The said Division Bench judgment is in Smt. Savitri Mohan v. State of U.P. and others, 2012(8) ADJ 318 . The Greater Noida Authority challenged the said judgment before the Apex Court and it was set aside in the case of Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Savitri Mohan and others, 2016 (117) ALR 868, reiterating the law as declared by the Full Bench in the decision of Gajraj (supra). 6. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions and the issue raised herein, we do not find any reason to differ from the aforesaid view and therefore, all the writ petitions have to be disposed of in the light of the judgment in the case of Gajraj (supra) as it is fully covered by the same. 7. An additional ground of challenge has been raised through a fresh Amendment Application filed in all these writ petitions raising a very attractive plea that the area of the notifications did not fall within the area of the respondent No. 4 (Authority). Thus, in the absence of any such notification of the village presently involved namely Dostpur Mangrauli, the acquisition is bad in law. The Amendment Application goes a step further to raise a novel plea that the constitution of the respondent No. 4 (Authority) is invalid as it cannot be construed to have been created by taking recourse to Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and therefore, in the absence of any valid notification, the very basis of the existence of the authority evaporates. The authority therefore, had no foundation to submit any proposal to the State Government for acquisition of the said land and consequently, the entire procedure of acquisition is vitiated. 8. The authority therefore, had no foundation to submit any proposal to the State Government for acquisition of the said land and consequently, the entire procedure of acquisition is vitiated. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on several cases decided by the Apex Court to urge that Amendment should be construed liberally as held in the following decisions : “1. Baldev Singh and others v. Manohar Singh and another, (2006) 6 SCC 498 . 2. L.J. Leach and Company Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 . 3. Pandit Ishwardas v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1979) 4 SCC 163 . 4. Andhra Bank v. ABN Amro Bank N.V. and others, (2007) 6 SCC 167 .” 9. Countering the said submissions Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh has invited the attention of the Court to the decisions in the case of Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Company Ltd. and another v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1976) 4 SCC 320 , Shiv Gopal Sah v. Sita Ram Saraugi and others, (2007) 14 SCC 120 and Revajeetu Builders And Developers v. Narayanaswamy And Sons and others, (2009) 10 SCC 84 , to urge that : 10. Firstly the Amendment Application proceeds to bring in such facts which might and ought to have been raised initially but the same cannot now be permitted after the acquisition has been upheld in the Full Bench decision of Gajraj (supra) affirmed by the Apex Court. 11. Secondly, the amendment changes the entire nature of the litigation inasmuch as the very existence of the respondent No. 4 (Authority) its constitution and its proposal for acquisition have been questioned on the ground that it is not a validly constituted authority under the 1976 Act. Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh contends that this plea clearly changes the entire nature of the litigation which is only of acquisition and not with regard to the constitution of the authority. 12. Thirdly, Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, submits that the bar of limitation should be read against the petitioner in bringing about this amendment at this stage, when the acquisition proceeding as narrated above now stands finalized up to the Apex Court. The petitioner’s case being no exception to the same, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 13. 12. Thirdly, Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, submits that the bar of limitation should be read against the petitioner in bringing about this amendment at this stage, when the acquisition proceeding as narrated above now stands finalized up to the Apex Court. The petitioner’s case being no exception to the same, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have perused the pleadings in the Amendment Application and what we find is that the same is absolutely irrelevant and is altogether a new case sought to be set up with a view to dislodge the acquisition proceedings which are complete in all respects. 14. A distinction has to be drawn on the basis of the nature of the litigation as initially filed namely, that of a challenge raised to acquisition proceedings. The power of the State to acquire land falls within its eminent domain and the State Government has acquired the land. The acquisition proceedings therefore, have no bearing at all with regard to the status of the respondent No. 4 (Authority). The State is otherwise also competent to proceed with acquisition and the acquisition has been made by the State and not by the Authority. The cause of action primarily of the petitioner is of the action of the State in proceeding to acquire the land. This issue therefore, cannot be mixed up now at this stage through an amendment questioning the very status of the constitution of the respondent No. 4 (Authority). 15. Secondly, this plea of the Authority being not constituted in terms of the 1976, Act and thereby being non-existence is a new plea altogether that changes the nature of the litigation which has nothing to do with the issue of eminent domain of the state to acquire land. 16. Thirdly, at this belated stage it will be absolutely inappropriate to entertain this Amendment Application when the major part of the acquisition proceedings and the notifications under challenge have already been upheld upto the Apex Court as per the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra). Consequently, for all the aforesaid reasons there is no occasion for this Court now to allow the Amendment Application and permit the petitioner to raise this plea of challenge at this stage. We do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a liberal view should be taken in allowing these amendments. Consequently, for all the aforesaid reasons there is no occasion for this Court now to allow the Amendment Application and permit the petitioner to raise this plea of challenge at this stage. We do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a liberal view should be taken in allowing these amendments. The Amendment Application filed in all these petitions are accordingly, rejected. 17. As a result of the foregoing conclusions, the writ petitions also do not merit any consideration and are hereby dismissed in terms of the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra).