Order Anil Kumar Chaudhary, J.- Heard the parties. 2. This Criminal Miscellaneous petition has been filed u/s 482 of Cr.P.C., on behalf of the petitioner with a prayer for quashing the order dated 18.11.2009 passed in Special Case No. 38 of 2002 arising out of Vigilance Case No. 33 of 2002 by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi as also to quash the entire criminal prosecution pending against the petitioner vide the said case. 3. The facts giving rise to this application are that certain lands measuring 1.8 acres pertaining to Khata No. 268, plot no. 2983 situated at Mouza-Argora, was recorded in record, of right as Gairmajurwa Malik. However, in the year 1970-71 two rent receipts were issued against that land in the name of Samu Sao. After his death, his son-Chandan Sao inherited the property and got his name mutated against the aforesaid land in the year 1982-83. 4. In course of time, Chandan Sao sold 0.49 acres and .59 acres of land separately to Mahavir Kashi, the then Secretary of Jai Bhawani Cooperative Society in the year 1988-91 who got his name mutated against the vended land. Mahavir Kashi sold the land to ten persons. Thereupon this petitioner who at the relevant point of time was posted as the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi was himself empowered and capable of cancelling the Zamabandi at the very early stage but he immediately did not cancel the Zamabandi on the ground that he has no such power and cancelled the Zamabandi only after the Additional Collector informed him that he has the power for cancellation of the Zamabandi. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court at page 3 Annexure-4 of the 3rd supplementary-affidavit dated 6.11.2017 and submits that the said Zamabandi was cancelled by the petitioner as per direction of the Additional Collector vide letter no. 2356(ii) dated 9th August, 1994, but the FIR was registered against the petitioner on 14.5.2002 much after the cancellation of the said Zamabandi. It is further submitted that the petitioner came to know by the said direction of the Additional Collector that he himself is empowered for such cancellation. 2356(ii) dated 9th August, 1994, but the FIR was registered against the petitioner on 14.5.2002 much after the cancellation of the said Zamabandi. It is further submitted that the petitioner came to know by the said direction of the Additional Collector that he himself is empowered for such cancellation. Further, the learned senior counsel by drawing the attention of this Court at page 5-6 of the 2nd Supplementary affidavit, dated 17.4.2017, submits that for the identical charges departmental proceeding was also initiated against the petitioner and show-cause was called for from the petitioner and the petitioner has been exonerated from all the charges alleged against him in the said departmental proceeding. It is further submitted that this Court vide order dated 22.2.2013 passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1309 of 2009 has quashed the entire criminal proceeding as well as the order dated 16.11.2011 by which cognizance was taken against the co-accused Naresh Kumar. 6. Learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar reported in [1996(2) East.Cr.C. 337(SC)] wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the case held as under: "Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued." 7. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lokesh Kumar VS. State of Rajasthan reported in 2013(4) Supreme 606 , wherein in the facts and circumstances of that case, where neither the original records could be traced nor the relevant documents could be found to implicate the petitioner and the appellant was already exonerated in the departmental proceeding for identical charges, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon P.S. Rajya Vs. State of Bihar (supra) observed that keeping the case against the appellant for investigation is unwarranted and quashed the FIR against the appellant. 8. State of Bihar (supra) observed that keeping the case against the appellant for investigation is unwarranted and quashed the FIR against the appellant. 8. Learned senior counsel further, relied upon the order of this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 534 of 2008 in the case of Rajendra Pandey Vs. State of Jharkhand & Am. reported in 2011 (3) JLJR 305 . In that case as the petitioner of that case was exonerated from the charges framed against him during the departmental proceeding and the same allegations were also made in the FIR and the findings of that departmental proceedings were not disputed by the State Government, this Court held that continuance of criminal proceedings tantamount to misuse of power of court and quashed the criminal proceedings. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the ACB submits that he does not dispute the fact that the present petitioner has been exonerated from the identical charges, as alleged in the FIR, in the departmental but opposes prayer for quashing the cognizance order. 10. In the facts and circumstances the question for consideration is as to whether the allegation made in the FIR does constitute offence of cheating, forgery, misappropriation or even the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act? In the case of Mohammed Ibrahim and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. { (2009)8 SCC 751 }={2009 (4) JLJR (SC)75} their Lordships after having regard to the provision contained in Section 470 of the I.P.C. As well as other provisions relating to forgery did observe as follows:- 'The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused." The Court has further observed that analysis of Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories as follows: "The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such documents was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made to executed. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a documents in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of: (a) unsoundness of mind; (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practiced upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a 'false statement", if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorized by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document, or (iii) he obtained a documents by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of "false statement". The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of "false statement". It therefore, remains to be seen whether the claim of the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorized or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of "False documents", it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorized by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined 'under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted. " The ratio laid down in the aforesaid Cases is squarely applicable in this case. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted. " The ratio laid down in the aforesaid Cases is squarely applicable in this case. A transferor, who at once claim that the property belongs to him and got rent receipts, in the name of persons the said land was mutated, from the petitioner can never be said to have committed an offence and further there is no allegation that the petitioner was involved in any way in the mutation process. Only allegation against the petitioner is that petitioner has not promptly cancelled the zamabandi. So it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed the offence of forgery Similarly, the offence punishable u/s 423 or 424 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be made out against the petitioner because there has been no allegation against him of dishonestly or fraudulently inducing execution of the deed of transfer containing false statement or consideration and there is also no allegation of dishonest and fraudulent concealment of property. Similarly it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed the offence of cheating as defined under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code and punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Likewise in the absence of any specific allegation about the ingredients constituting the offence punishable u/s 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it cannot be said that the said offence is made out against the petitioner. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the entire criminal proceeding of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 33 of 2002 arising out of Special Case No. 38 of 2002 including the said order dated 18.11.2011 passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi taking cognizance, is hereby quashed, so far as the petitioner is concerned. In the result this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed.