CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ZILLA PARISHAD, WARDHA v. SURESH KESARIMAL CHURA (dead) through L. Rs. SAROJ wd/o SURESHCHANDRA CHURA
2017-09-21
ARUN D.UPADHYE, B.P.DHARMADHIKARI
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. Heard Shri S. D. Thakur learned counsel for the employee and Shri P. D. Meghe, learned counsel for the employer in these letters patent appeals. 2. Both these letters patent appeals challenge the judgment dated 8-9-2009 delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5809 of 2007, modifying award of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Wardha, in Reference (IDA) No. 13 of 2002. Letters Patent Appeal No. 6/2010 is filed by the workman, whereas Letters Patent Appeal No. 147/2010 is filed by the employer. 3. The only contention raised by the employer is absence of provision and power to treat the period from 1-4-1976 till 31-3-2000 as leave or otherwise in the light of direction by the learned Single Judge to grant continuity in service. The workman seeks restoration of award of Labour Court. 4. The question referred to the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Wardha for adjudication reads as under : “Shri Suresh Kesarimal Chura, R/o Krushna Nagar, Wardha, who has been terminated from the employment of the Chief Executive Engineer, Zilla Parishad, Wardha should be reinstated with payment of back wages and continuity of service w.e.f. 1-4-1976.” 5. Labour Court delivered the award on 30-7-2007 and declared oral termination w.e.f. 1-4-1976, illegal. It was accordingly set aside and the workman was given reinstatement with 50% back wages and continuity till the date of superannuation. The Labour Court also found that workman was born on 1-4-1945. In lieu of reinstatement, 50% back wages were also allowed. 6. While adjudicating Writ Petition No. 5809/2007 filed by the employer, the learned Single Judge has on 8-9-2009 found it necessary to modify the above directions of the Labour Court. In paragraph 12 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge observed that period from the date of demand i.e. notice dated 31-3-2000 till the workman attained the age of superannuation, should be counted for pensionary benefits. Apart from this, other directions issued while allowing the writ petition partly, read as under : “13. In view of this, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned award, insofar as it grants 50% back wages, is set aside. The respondent would be entitled to continuity of service.
Apart from this, other directions issued while allowing the writ petition partly, read as under : “13. In view of this, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned award, insofar as it grants 50% back wages, is set aside. The respondent would be entitled to continuity of service. The petitioner may decide as to how the period of absence from 1-4-1976 till 31-3-2000, when the notice of demand was issued, should be regulated by granting admissible leave, if any. The period from 31-3-2000 till the date of superannuation shall, however, be decidedly computed as pensionable service.” 7. Shri P. D. Meghe, learned counsel for the employer submits that the workman was away from 1-4-1976 and his first overt act is issuing notice of demand dated 31-3-2000. Thus, the dispute has been raised almost after 24 years and this period being unreasonable, the reference ought to have been answered in negative. He has relied upon the judgments reported in (2006) 5 SCC 433 in case of U. P. State Road Transport Corpn. vs. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 481 in case of Asstt. Engineer, CAD, Kota vs. Dhan Kunwar, (2006) 9 SCC 124 in case of Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and another vs. Sham Lal, 2008 (I) CLR 240 in case of Lalit Kumar vs. Union of India and others, and the judgment and order in L.P.A. No. 374/2008 dated 25-11-2008 upholding the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 29-7-2008 in W. P. No. 570/2008. 8. Shri Meghe, learned counsel has taken us through the award and impugned judgment to urge that the workman has not explained huge delay at all. 9. Shri Thakur, learned counsel for the employer points out that the workman was a permanent employee and he worked from 1965 till 1976. There was oral termination in 1976 and because of family problems, he could not take any legal action. He sent some letters to his employer intermittently, but could not follow them. He states that all this has been deposed on oath by the workman and in his cross-examination, nothing has been brought on record to doubt his credibility. 10. Shri Thakur, learned counsel also emphasizes that the employer come up with defence of abandonment of service.
He sent some letters to his employer intermittently, but could not follow them. He states that all this has been deposed on oath by the workman and in his cross-examination, nothing has been brought on record to doubt his credibility. 10. Shri Thakur, learned counsel also emphasizes that the employer come up with defence of abandonment of service. The employer being a public body could have taken action for not remaining present or abandoning services and could have issued notice to resume the work, but it was never done. He contends that in this situation as relationship was never terminated, taking overall view of the matter, learned Labour Court has delivered award in favour of the workman and those findings are held not perverse by the learned Single Judge. He also points out that though, there was a direction to pay 50% backwages, the learned Single Judge has deleted it without any justification. As letters at Exhs. 9 to 12 are proved, the workman was entitled to backwages also. 11. Shri Thakur, learned counsel submits that the workman stood retired after reaching the age of 58 years and therefore, the learned Single Judge has given him only benefit of continuity to club earlier services of 11 years with his service after raising demand i.e. after 31-3-2000. The workman has expired during pendency of these letters patent appeals and his legal heirs are now brought on record. 12. Shri Meghe, the learned counsel, in his brief reply, submits that the workman in his cross-examination, accepted that he attained the age of superannuation some time in the year 2000 and as such, the Labour Court could not have accepted the date 1-4-1945 as the date of birth. He also submits that no records of Zilla Parishad were available in 2000 to verify correctness or otherwise of the story pleaded by the workman. 13. We find that the continuous employment of deceased workman from 1-4-1965 till 1-4-1976 is not in dispute. He happened to be a permanent employee. If he did not report for duty and absconded, the employer being a public body ought to have taken necessary action against him. The employer should have proceeded against him departmentally and dismissed him from service or terminated as deserter. No such steps have been taken. Hence, legally the relationship as employer – workman subsisted till death of workman. 14.
If he did not report for duty and absconded, the employer being a public body ought to have taken necessary action against him. The employer should have proceeded against him departmentally and dismissed him from service or terminated as deserter. No such steps have been taken. Hence, legally the relationship as employer – workman subsisted till death of workman. 14. The workman also, on the other hand, has not taken any immediate action. The letters/communications looked into by the learned Single Judge were written by him pointing out injustice done to him. Last of the letters written by him is dated 1-5-1992. The Labour Court has referred to his letters as Exhs. 9, 10, 11 and 12. Thus, before 31-3-2000 and after 1-4-1976, the workman sent four letters/communications on different occasions complaining about the oral termination. He has entered into witness box and proved those communications. He has been cross-examined, but the cross-examination is only about non-availability of any acknowledgement i.e. proof of receipt of those letters by the employer. The employer has not entered the witness box and has not examined anybody to rebut this fact. The employer could have produced its Inward-Outward register or other similar material to show that no such letters were received by it during said period. The employer did not send any reply to these letters asking workman to join duties immediately. Not only this, in written statement before Labour Court also, he was not asked to join. 15. Though, the workman should have been more diligent and acknowledgements should have been procured, that by itself cannot be used to his prejudice when he has entered the witness box, deposed on oath and proved the fact of forwarding letters/communications to the employer. This could have been rebutted by the employer by deposing on same lines, but that has not been done. 16. Thus, we get the workman who did not join duties after 1-4-1976 and makes a grievance about it belatedly. Because he makes grievance, the employer takes a particular stand. The employer otherwise had not taken any action after 1-4-1976 till filing of written statement before the Labour Court or even thereafter. The employer nowhere pleads and points out any date on which it brought relationship with workman to an end. 17. In this situation, we find consideration of controversy by the Labour Court on merits, not unjust.
The employer otherwise had not taken any action after 1-4-1976 till filing of written statement before the Labour Court or even thereafter. The employer nowhere pleads and points out any date on which it brought relationship with workman to an end. 17. In this situation, we find consideration of controversy by the Labour Court on merits, not unjust. The learned Single Judge has looked into the findings recorded by the Labour Court and with some reservations, decided to accept the same. Here the fact that on date of demand i.e. on 31-3-2000, jural relationship was in existence and reference was by a workman who was not terminated by employer, (as per employer’s version) assumes importance. The learned Single Judge has accordingly modified the final relief given to the workman. In the light of this molding, the act of learned Single Judge in accepting the letters at Exhs. 9, 10, 11 and 12 cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. With full notices of rival contentions, the learned Single Judge has appreciated the facts and has applied mind in a particular mode and manner. We do not see any perversity in said approach. 18. Coming to the case laws cited by Shri Meghe or by Shri Thakur, learned counsel, we find that when period of limitation is not prescribed and reasonable period, therefore, needs to be ascertained, the necessary facts must be brought on record by the party who is prejudiced because of such delay. Shri Meghe, learned counsel has pointed out absence of record with the Zilla Parishad, but then he has not pointed out such a plea taken in the written statement filed before the Labour Court. No provision in law, requiring Zilla Parishad to destroy records after a particular number of years or then the facts showing actual destruction of record, have been brought on record before the Labour Court. The various judgments, which expect ventilation of dispute within reasonable time, in this situation do not help the appellant and the employer in any way. Normally, industrial disputes never dies till it is redressed and here, in the eyes of employer, the relationship was subsisting even when dispute was raised. Hence, there is no delay or unreasonable delay at all. We find that the law on the point is concluded in (1999) 6 SCC 82 in case of Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Co.op.
Normally, industrial disputes never dies till it is redressed and here, in the eyes of employer, the relationship was subsisting even when dispute was raised. Hence, there is no delay or unreasonable delay at all. We find that the law on the point is concluded in (1999) 6 SCC 82 in case of Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Co.op. Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., where, while resorting to doctrine of social justice, Hon’ble Apex Court points out that employer’s plea of delay is not sufficient to deny relief to workman unless it is coupled with proof of “real prejudice” to him. It also lays down that even in case of proved delay, relief to workman can be molded by declining whole or part of backwages. The Hon’ble Apex Court reiterates this law in (2014) 10 SCC 301 in case of Raghubir Singh vs. Haryana Roadways. 19. Hence, when the learned Single Judge has modified the award and omitted the portion granting 50% backwages to the workman, there is a direction to regularise that period as leave period. We find substance in the contention of Shri Meghe that the period cannot be accordingly regularised in absence of specific power with the employer. But, then that does not render the industrial adjudicator helpless to modify the service conditions or arrangement. In present situation, we find that continuity has been awarded with a view to club earlier service of 11 years with the service which the deceased workman would have rendered after 31-3-2000 till his superannuation. Shri Meghe, learned counsel has pointed out that the workman in his cross-examination has accepted that he reached the age of superannuation some time in 2000 only. However, the specific date of superannuation as such has not been brought on record either by the employer or by the workman. The Labour Court has found in paragraph 22 of its judgment that date of birth of the second party is 1-4-1945 but then there is no basis for this finding on record. 20. The workman’s service record and date of birth ought to have been proved by the employer and for not producing records, adverse inference must be drawn. We, in these facts, presume that workman retired on last day of year 2000.
20. The workman’s service record and date of birth ought to have been proved by the employer and for not producing records, adverse inference must be drawn. We, in these facts, presume that workman retired on last day of year 2000. In this situation, we find that in order to enable the workman to have benefit of his service, which could have been rendered after 31-3-2000 till 31-12-2000, his salary should be notionally fixed as on 1-1-1996 at minimum and then worked out accordingly up to 31-3-2000. Thus, the average pay on which the pension needs to be computed is to be worked out after notionally working out salary from 1-4-2000 up to 31-12-2000. 21. The aforesaid period shall be added to the period of service of the workman prior to 1-4-1976 and as per service rules, compassionate pension or other pension payable in such circumstances, shall be paid to him for the period from the date of his superannuation till the date of his death. Accordingly, we modify the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge. The exercise stipulated supra shall be completed within a period of four months from today and amount due shall be paid to his legal heirs as per law. 22. The Letters Patent Appeal No. 6/2010 is thus partly allowed. In view of above discussion, Letters Patent Appeal No. 147/2010 is dismissed. No costs. Appeal partly allowed.