JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 2. A very small question has been raised in this petition whether after acquittal from the charge in a criminal prosecution, an employee who has been dismissed from the service under Rule 19 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 shall be reinstated from the date of acquittal and whether he would be entitled to get the back wages for the period of absence either for incarceration or for any other reason. 3. The admitted fact is that the petitioner was arrested in connection with a case being West Agartala P.S. case No. 2012/11 under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and since he was in custody for more than 48 hours, he was placed under suspension under Rule 10(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 by the order dated 25.02.2012 (Annexure P-6 to the writ petition). The said order of suspension continued till the judgment and order of conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the IPC passed on 26.11.2013 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.5 (First Track Court), West Tripura, Agartala in Sessions Trial No. 183 of 2012 emanating from the said police case. Gathering information that the petitioner has been convicted, by the order dated 19.11.2015 [Annexure P-10 to the writ petition], the petitioner was dismissed from the service w.e.f. 26.11.2013 i.e. the date of conviction, with disqualification for future employment. The period of suspension was treated as non-duty by the said order dated 19.11.2015. It is also the admitted position that before passing the said order dated 19.11.2015 the petitioner was asked to show-cause by the memorandum dated 19.09.2015. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction dated 26.11.2013, the petitioner preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal (J) 45 of 2013 in this court. This court, by the judgment and order dated 09.01.2017 set aside the said judgment of conviction by recording an order of acquittal. Immediately, thereafter the petitioner approached the respondents for reinstating him in view of the judgment and order dated 09.11.2017 as passed in Criminal Appeal (J) 45 of 2013. But it surfaces that no record has been placed to show that before approaching this court, the petitioner had approached the competent authority to press his demand. 4. Mr. Immediately, thereafter the petitioner approached the respondents for reinstating him in view of the judgment and order dated 09.11.2017 as passed in Criminal Appeal (J) 45 of 2013. But it surfaces that no record has been placed to show that before approaching this court, the petitioner had approached the competent authority to press his demand. 4. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that since the judgment of conviction has been reversed and the petitioner has been acquitted from the charges, the respondents are on bounded duty to recall the order passed under Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, but they have not. As such interference of this court is only warranted to bring an end to the predicament of the petitioner. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has further submitted that the payment of arrear pay and allowances from the date of suspension i.e. 14.11.2011 be also directed. In this regard, it is necessary to refer that by filing a representation on 30.11.2011, the petitioner had urged the respondent, the Director of Higher Education, to release his arrears, pay and allowances from the day of suspension to the day of conviction but by the order dated 04.01.2012 passed by the said respondent, the Director of Higher Education the absence of the petitioner from 18.06.2011 to 17.08.2011 has been treated as dies-non without break in his service. That period is however not related to the period relating to the suspension. For declaring the dies-non by the memorandum dated 20.06.2011, the respondents had asked the petitioner to show-cause why the said period meaning the period prior to his arrest shall not be treated as dies-non. However, that period is not the subject matter of this writ petition. The challenge is confined to the memorandum dated 04.01.2012 and 19.11.2012 [Annexure P-4 and P-10 of the writ petition]. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has in support of his contention has relied on a decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India and another vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim reported in (2013) 11 SCC 67 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: “The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has in support of his contention has relied on a decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India and another vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim reported in (2013) 11 SCC 67 wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: “The issue relating to entitlement to back wages, however, stands on a somewhat different footing. While in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra), the basis of refusal of back wages by this Court would appear to be the inability of the employer to avail of the service of the employee due to his incarceration in jail, in Banshi Dhar (supra), the refusal of back wages by this Court was in a situation largely similar to the case before us, namely, where the employee was all along on bail and was thus available for work.” In this case, for a considerable period, the petitioner was on bail but for continuation of the order of suspension he was prevented from resuming his duty till the judgment and order of conviction was delivered. 5. From the other side, Mr. Chakraborty, learned Additional Government Advocate has stoutly submitted that the petitioner does not have any right to claim the reinstatement. It is legal discretion of the employer. However, he has further submitted that the respondents have been considering the entire matter in its perspective and very soon they would pass an appropriate order. Be that as it may, when an order of dismissal is passed under Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rule 1965, the moment the employee is acquitted by the competent court either in appeal or in revision, it is the duty of the employer to reinstate him from the date of acquittal and to allow him the pay and allowances for the period after the acquittal. However, the element of discretion cannot be entirely brushed aside in respect of the payment of the back wages. 6. What is surprising here is that the petitioner did not even submit the copy of the judgment and order of acquittal to the respondents for their consideration. It was apposite for the petitioner to approach this court after placing the said judgment to the competent authority. In the considered opinion of this court is that, that might have facilitated the respondents to take an appropriate and early decision. It was apposite for the petitioner to approach this court after placing the said judgment to the competent authority. In the considered opinion of this court is that, that might have facilitated the respondents to take an appropriate and early decision. Be that as it may, now when on 14.01.2017, the office of the Government Advocate received the notice from the petitioner of the original writ petition, they came to know of the said order of acquittal, but till now they have not taken any decision. 7. In this backdrop, this court is not left with any other alternative but to hold that in terms of the above observation, the respondents are under statutory obligation to reinstate the petitioner w.e.f. 09.01.2017 when the judgment and order of acquittal had been passed by this court in Criminal Appeal (J) 45 of 2013. So far the back wages is concerned the respondents, particularly the respondent no.2, is directed to take appropriate decision in terms of FR 54 within a period of 3(three) months from the day when a copy of this order shall be placed by the petitioner. The petitioner shall be paid the pay and allowances from 09.01.2017 forthwith. 8. Having observed thus, this writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.