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2017 DIGILAW 1982 (RAJ)

Manni Devi v. State of Rajasthan

2017-09-05

ALOK SHARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Alok Sharma, J. Under challenge is the order dated 24-3-2017 passed by the Divisional Commissioner Jaipur suspending the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch of village Karad, Panchayat Samiti Dantaramgarh, District Sikar. 2. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is a duly elected Sarpanch reflective of popular will and she could not have been suspended mechanically. He submitted that the only way for removal of the petitioner was by way of duly constituted election petition. Counsel submitted that even otherwise the petitioner has not yet been found guilty of any misconduct post her election as Sarpanch as per an enquiry conducted under Section 39 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter 'the Act of 1994') read with Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Election) Rules, 1996 (hereinafter 'the Rules of 1996'). And when the petitioner cannot be removed as Sarpanch by the State Government for an alleged pre election disqualification she cannot be suspended therefore even if charged by a court of criminal jurisdiction in respect thereof. It was submitted that framing of a charge in a criminal trial is not the end of the matter, the burden to prove guilt is on the prosecution. And an elected sarpanch cannot be suspended and denied right to do public service for which she has been elected only for being charged for offences. It was submitted that in any event charges under Section 420, 464, 467, 468 and 120 IPC are not in respect of offence involving moral turpitude. 3. Mr. Krishnaveer Singh appearing on behalf of Mr. Anurag Sharma, AAG for the State submitted that the petitioner has been suspended by resort to the State's power under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, inasmuch as charges for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC have been framed against the petitioner, all of which entail moral turpitude. He submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are of serious nature. She has been charged for having used forged and fabricated mark-sheet of passing class VIII to supply the requisite minimum educational qualification to contest election for the post of Sarpanch. This court should not countenance exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction where case of forgery is prima facie made out against the petitioner-as in the instant case. Mr. She has been charged for having used forged and fabricated mark-sheet of passing class VIII to supply the requisite minimum educational qualification to contest election for the post of Sarpanch. This court should not countenance exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction where case of forgery is prima facie made out against the petitioner-as in the instant case. Mr. Krishnaveer Singh submitted that the petitioner has no moral authority to hold the post of Sarpanch and to challenge the impugned order. An elected representative cannot be allowed to continue in office with taint as it would otherwise be destructive of democracy. It was submitted that charge for offence under Sections 420, 464, 467, 468 and 120B IPC entail moral turpitude. 4. Heard. Considered. 5. This court in the case of Bhupendra Singh Hada v. State of Rajasthan, SBCWP No.16070/2015, and 38 other connected matters, decided on 11-2-2016 has held that in the event of elected chairpersons/members being charged for an offence involving moral turpitude even in respect of the period prior to the elections, the State Government would be free to suspend such chairpersons/members of Panchayati Raj Institutions under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994. Similarly the Division Bench of this court in the case of Satish Valmiki v. State of Rajasthan, DB Special Appeal writ No.955/2017, and two other connect matters, decided on 11-8- 2017 has upheld the suspension of a Sarpanch referable to Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, where charges for criminal offences involving moral turpitude have been framed by a competent court of law. I am of the view that offence under Sections 420, 464, 467, 468 and 120B IPC relate as they do to forgery, knowingly use of forged documents are offences of moral turpitude. 6. The upshot of aforesaid discussion is that the impugned order dated 24-3-2017 passed by the Divisional Commissioner suspending the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch of village Karad, Panchayat Samiti Dantaramgarh District Sikar for reason of charges for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC having been framed against her by the competent court of law does not warrant any interference by this court. 7. There is no force in the petition. Dismissed. 8. However, in the event the charges for criminal offence framed against the petitioner being quashed or she being acquitted by the court of law, the petitioner shall be free to revive this petition.