JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. By way of filing the present writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner has laid called in question, two orders, first being order dated 26.10.2016 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 5 Jodhpur and the other being order dated 29.05.2017 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, No. 6, Jodhpur-Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as 'Trial Court). 2. Avoiding the unnecessary details, the brief facts leading to filing the present writ petition are that the plaintiff - respondent had filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 21.07.2009 against the defendant, who in turn completely denied the execution of the said agreement between the parties, while filing the written statement. 3. During the course of the proceedings, the evidence of the defendant was closed on 03.10.2005, as she failed to appear in the witness box, despite numerous opportunities. Which was however opened by the learned Trial Court vide its order dated 03.02.2016. The petitioner thereafter moved an application dated 08.07.2016, under Order 8, Rule 1 (A) (3) read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure inter alia seeking to place on record, the market rates issued by District Level Committee for various areas. The said application was opposed by the plaintiff by way of filing a reply to the application. 4. The learned Trial Court rejected the said application vide its order dated 26.10.2016, while holding that the document in question namely DLC rates are not relevant for adjudication of the issues involved. The said application was opposed by the plaintiff by way of filing a reply to the application. 4. The learned Trial Court rejected the said application vide its order dated 26.10.2016, while holding that the document in question namely DLC rates are not relevant for adjudication of the issues involved. It will be appropriate to keep the findings and conclusions drawn by the learned Trial Court handy, for which it is being quoted here-in-frame:- geus mHk; i{k ds ijLij fojks/kh rdksZ dks /;ku ls lquk gS] i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k gSA ;g lgh gS fd mHk; i{kh; lk{; gksus ds i'pkr~ ;g izdj.k cgl vafre vk pqdk gS vkSj oknh }kjk /kkjk 35] 39 jktLFkku LVkEi vf/kfu;e dk izkFkZuk i= izLrqr gksus ds lkFk lkFk gh ;g vkosnu izfrokfnuh dh vkSj ls izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftles izdj.k esa fnuakd 03-10-2015 dks izfrokfnuh dh lk{; esa djhc 6 volj fn;s tkus ds i'pkr~ mifLFkr ugha gksus ij mldh lk{; cUn dj nh xbZ gSA izdj.k esa izLrqr bdjkjukek tks izn'kZ 3 uksVsjh'kqnk gksdj fnuakd 21-07-2009 dks fy[kk x;k gS vkSj izLrqr M+h ,y lh jsV fnuakd 23-10-2009 dh gS vFkkZr mDr cspkuukek fu"ikfnr gksus ds djhc 3 efgus ckn mDr cspkuukek ftl ij nksuksa i{kksa ds gLrk{kj gS] izfrokfnuh f'kf{kr gksdj izkFkZuk i= esa Hkh vaxzsth esa gLrk{kj fd;s gq, gSaA bl izdkj izkFkhZuh dks fdlh Hkh rF; ds fy;s /kks[ks esa j[kdj gLrk{kj djok;s gksa] ckcr rF; vfo'oluh; gSA mldh vof/k c<+kus dk nLrkost izn'kZ 4 fnuakd 23-09-2009 fy[kk x;k gSA bl izdkj gekjh fouez jk; esa tc ;g okn lafonk dh fofuZfn"V vuqrks"k dh ikyuk gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;k gS tks ckn xq.knks"k fuf.kZr fd;s tkus dk mldks fof/kuqlkj iath;u fd;s tkus dh vko';drk izdV gksus ij gh mDr M+h ,y lh nj dks iath;u foHkkx }kjk dalhM+j fd;k tk;sxkA bl LVst ij gekjh fouez jk; esa okn ds rF;ksa] ifjfLFkfr;ksa vkSj izdj.k dh bl LVst dks ns[krs gq, mDr izkFkZuk i= fdlh Hkh izdkj ls okn esa mn~Hkwn fcUnqvksa ds fu/kkZj.k ds fy, vko';d izrhr ugha gksus ls vLohdkj fd;k tkdj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh okLrs cgl vafre fnuakd 05-11-2016 dks is'k gksA 5. The petitioner moved an application for review of the said order under Section 114 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which too was rejected by the learned Trial Court, albeit, after amending the order in relation to certain inadvertent errors crept in the order. While rejecting the review application vide its order dated 29.05.2017, the learned Court below observed that the contentions raised by the petitioner in review application as well as arguments advanced in connection therewith do not fall in the scope of error apparent. The relevant part of the said order rejecting the petitioner's application under section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure is being reproduced hereunder:- U;k;ky; dks iqujkoyksdu ds lEcU/k esa lhfer vf/kdkj izkIr gSA fdlh vkns'k dk iqujkoyksdu rHkh fd;k tk ldrk gS tc vfHkys[k ij dksbZ Hkwy ;k xyrh ns[krs gh izdV gksrh gks ;k ,slh lk{; vkSj egRoiw.kZ ckr ;k lk{; dk irk pyus ls tks lE;d rRijrk dk iz;ksx ds i'pkr~ vkns'k fd;k x;k Fkk] mldh Kku esa ugha gksA vkns'k fnuakd 26-10-2016 ds voyksdu ls dksbZ Hkwy ;k xyrh ns[krs gh izdV ugha gksrh gSA oknh vf/koDrk }kjk izLrqr lEeuh; fofu'p; 2000¼2½ flfoy dksVZ dslst 324 iatkc ,.M+ gfj;k.kk esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gSA fd In a review petition court cannot re-examine the matter afresh, lEekuh; fofu'p; 1990 lIyh flfoy dksVZ dslst 675 mM+hlk esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd A part from the aforesaid legal hurdle. I hardly see any scope for reviewing the decision of this Court in the two Civil Revisions. The jurisdiction of a Court to review an earlier decision under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. The scoped of review is quite limited as well as well defined. lEekuh; fofu'p; 2000 2 flfoy dksVZ dslst 385 jktLFkku esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd Order 47, Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise." ^^blds vfrfjDr U;k;ky; dk /;ku lEekuh; fofu'p; vkj,yMCY;w 2006¼3½ lqizhedksVZ 1877 gjhnkl cuke Jhefr m"kkjkuh oxS0 dh vkSj vkd`"V gksrk gS ftlesa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd iqujkoyksdu dh 'kfDr vihyh; 'kfDr ls Hkzfer ugha gksus pkfg;sA iqujkoyksdu dh 'kfDr ds iz;ksx esa =qfViw.kZ fu.kZ; dh iqu% lquokbZ djuk vkSj mles lq/kkj djuk vuqKs; ugha gSa blds vfrfjDr lEekuh; fofu'p; vkj,yM+CY;w 2010¼4½ jktLFkku 2858 esa ;g vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd iqujkoyksdu fdlh Hkh ek;us esa vihy ugha gS ftlds diVos'k esa fdlh =qfViw.kZ fu.kZ; dks lgh fd;k tk ldsA ,slh dksbZ Hkh =qfV tks Lor% Li"V ugha gksrk gS ,oa ftls rdZ dh nh?kZ izfdz;k ls gh [kkstk tk ldrk gS rks mls vfHkys[k ij tkfgjk =qfV ugha dgk tk ldrkA mijksDr foospukuqlkj ,oa mDr lEekuh; fofu'p;ksa esa izfrikfnr fl)kUrksa dh jks'kuh esa izkFkhZ;k@izfrokfn;ksa dh vkSj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr /kkjk 114 lifBr /kkjk 151 lhihlh Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gksus ls vLohdkj fd;k tkdj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA izkFkZuk i= Qsly 'kqekj gksdj ewy i=koyh ds lkFk layXu jgsA^^ 6. Assailing both the orders, Dr. A.A. Bhansali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently argued that the Court below has fallen into error of law and facts in rejecting petitioner's application dated 08.07.2017 filed under Order 8, Rule 1 (A)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Assailing both the orders, Dr. A.A. Bhansali, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently argued that the Court below has fallen into error of law and facts in rejecting petitioner's application dated 08.07.2017 filed under Order 8, Rule 1 (A)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. He contended that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the applicant/defendant is a literate lady and that the DLC rates have been issued on 23.10.2009, whereas the agreement in question had been executed on 21.07.2009 for rejecting the petitioner's application are neither germane nor relevant for the adjudication of an application under Order 8, Rule 1 (A) (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. He further contended that the order impugned, which is based on such findings is illegal and liable to be quashed. He urged that though these facts were brought to the notice of the learned Court below by way of filing an application under section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same has been rejected by the learned Court below, essentially on the hyper technical ground that the same does not fall within the ambit of error apparent. 8. Taking this Court through various documents and pleadings of the parties, Mr. Bhansali, contended that the agreement in question having been allegedly executed for a sum of Rs. 9 lacs is per se fabricated and manufactured document. He emphasized that the market value of the said plot was much higher than the amount shown in the agreement. Mr. Bhansali, contended that it has been an assertion of the defendant that the actual market rate of the plot was a sum of about Rs. 40 lacs, for establishing or proving the same, it was necessary for the petitioner to place before the learned Trial Court the applicable DLC rates. 9. For the adjudication of issues involved in the present case, Mr. Bhansali, inviting attention of the Court towards issues No. 1 & 7 framed by the learned Trial Court, contended that for the adjudicated whereof the documents in question, namely DLC rates are essential. 9. For the adjudication of issues involved in the present case, Mr. Bhansali, inviting attention of the Court towards issues No. 1 & 7 framed by the learned Trial Court, contended that for the adjudicated whereof the documents in question, namely DLC rates are essential. It will not be out of context to quote issues No. 1 and 7 framed by the learned Trial Court:- fook|d vk;k okn i= dh en la[;k 1 esa of.kZr fookfnr lEifr ds lanHkZ esa izfrokfn;k us vius ,tsUV vk'kh"k ckQuk ds tfj;s oknh ls cspku dk izLrko j[kk rFkk oknh us mDr lEifr 9]00]000@& :i;s esa dz; djus dk izLrko Lohdkj djrs gq, ,d bdjkjukek fnuakfdr 21-07-2009 dks fu"ikfnr fd;k rFkk okn i= dh en la[;k 4 esa of.kZrkuqlkj oknh us izfrokfn;k dks 1]51]000@& :i;s dh jkf'k vkn dh\ 7 & vk;k tokcnkos dh en la[;k 19 esa of.kZrkuqlkj okn /kkjk 20¼2½ LisflfQd fjfyQ ,DV ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\ & izfroknh 8 & vuqrks"k\ 10. Having argued as above, Mr. Bhansali contended that the delay in filing the application under Order 8, Rule 1(A)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be a reason for rejection of such application. 11. Mr. O.P. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the learned Trial Court has rejected the application while giving cogent reasons and findings, which cannot be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the reasons that the DLC rates are for the period prior to date of the agreement and that the defendant being a literate lady cannot be misled, are only some of the reasons ascribed by the learned Trial Court, whereas in ultimate analysis, the learned Trial Court has rejected the application on the basis of a finding that the document in question is not relevant or necessary for the adjudication of the issue involved in the present case. He submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are infallible, which are the quintessential factors while deciding the application seeking documents to be taken on record. 12. Mr. Mehta vehemently contended that the petitioner's entire endeavour has been to protract the proceedings, which is evident from the fact that the evidence of the petitioner-defendant had been closed by the learned Trial Court on 03.10.2015, when the defendant failed to turn up on 7-8 occasions. 12. Mr. Mehta vehemently contended that the petitioner's entire endeavour has been to protract the proceedings, which is evident from the fact that the evidence of the petitioner-defendant had been closed by the learned Trial Court on 03.10.2015, when the defendant failed to turn up on 7-8 occasions. At her request, the right to lead evidence was resurrected by the learned Trial Court, vide its order dated 01.08.2016, subject to payment of a cost of Rs. 3000/-. 13. Learned counsel invited attention of this Court to the fact that the affidavit in evidence had already been tendered on behalf of the petitioner-defendant, wherein there was no reference of such DLC rates, let alone the written statement. He argued that the document in question namely DLC rates had neither been mentioned in the list of documents nor a reference thereof had been made in the written statement. It is to be noted that there is not even a whisper in the affidavit filed by the defendant. 14. Inviting the attention of the Court towards the notice and corresponding reply to the notice, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff pointed out that as far as the amount of agreement in question is concerned, there is no denial, rather an admission on the part of the defendant that the same was executed for a sum of Rs. 9 lacs. As such, he submitted that when the quantum of transaction has been admitted by the defendant as having entered at Rs. 9 lacs, the document namely DLC rates is of no assistance to the petitioner. 15. Having considered the arguments of the rival parties and perused the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed, as the orders passed by the learned Trial Court are perfectly just and legal. The reason for reaching to such a conclusion is not far to seek. While rejecting the petitioner's application under Order 8, Rule 1(A)(3) of Code of the Civil Procedure, the learned Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the document in question viz, DLC rates are not relevant for the adjudication of the issues involved, more particularly looking at the stage, at which the subject application had been moved. 16. While rejecting the petitioner's application under Order 8, Rule 1(A)(3) of Code of the Civil Procedure, the learned Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the document in question viz, DLC rates are not relevant for the adjudication of the issues involved, more particularly looking at the stage, at which the subject application had been moved. 16. Both the reasons ascribed by the Court below are valid considerations, rather the same are only considerations for decision of an application under Order 8, Rule 1(A)(3) of Code of the Civil Procedure. True it is, that the learned Court below has made certain observations, about the defendant being literate lady and that the DLC rates dated 23.10.2009 are of a date later than after the date of the agreement viz. 21.07.2009, however, in opinion of this Court, the same are only passing remarks, which are neither relevant nor correct, in the factual and legal matrix of the case at hand. 17. Apart from this, it is a fact on record that the written statement had been filed by the defendant in April 2010, whereas the subject application, for taking DLC rates of 2010 on record has been moved in October, 2016. In the entire application, there is neither any indication about the relevance of the document nor justification for the delay in filing the same. A perusal of the application shows that the entire edifice of the application is that the agreement in question has been executed fraudulently. The purported reasons mentioned in the application, including the reason that the DLC rates have been obtained on 05.10.2016 are not germane to the decision of the application. The assertion in the application that upon taking the documents namely DLC rates on record, no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff and the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard cannot be considered, much less accepted as a valid consideration for decision of the application. 18. Considering the averments made in the application, as a parting remark, it may be observed that creativity or ingenuity of the incoming lawyer cannot be a reason for maintaining an application and merely because a new lawyer has entered the proceedings, the lacuna allegedly left, cannot be permitted to be filled, in the manner attempted to. 19. There is no force in the present writ petition and the same is thus, dismissed.