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2017 DIGILAW 2 (MEG)

Sohbar Sirdarship Elaka v. State of Meghalaya

2017-02-07

DINESH MAHESHWARI, VED PRAKASH VAISH

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JUDGMENT : Dinesh Maheshwari, J. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner yet again seeks a writ of mandamus that the respondent-State of Meghalaya be directed to share 50% share of the amount of royalty received on excavation of minerals from the land in question. As shall be noticed hereafter, in the past, this Court had repeatedly declined the writ jurisdiction to the same petitioner on the same claim of 50% share of royalty with the specific findings that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed relief for laches as also for acquiescence. However, undeterred by such decisions, the petitioner has chosen to approach this Court again, this time with the assertion that an alleged fresh cause of action has accrued due to the deemed renewal of mining lease w.e.f. 24.06.2013. 2. After having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned Senior Government Advocate; and having perused the material placed on record, we have clearly come to the conclusion that this repeat petition on the same cause is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court and deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs as also with other necessary directions. 3. For the order proposed to be passed in this matter, it appears appropriate that the relevant background aspects be taken note of in requisite details. Claim of the petitioner: 4. The petitioner is said to be the customary seat of Sirdarship in the name of 'Sohbar Sirdarship Elaka' and is represented by the present Sirdar. The claim of the petitioner in this petition is founded on the submissions that the elders/Sirdar of Sohbar Sirdarship and the erstwhile East India Company/British India, represented by the then Governor-General, entered into an agreement in the year 1829 whereby, the mineral limestone, good, bad and indifferent, deposited within the Sohbar Sirdarship Elaka (Areas) was divided between the parties in the ratio 50:50; and it was agreed that in the event of extraction or exploitation of limestone within Sohbar Sirdarship Elaka, the Government would be entitled to collect 50% of royalty but the remaining 50% would be retained by the people of Sohbar Sirdarship for themselves, by virtue of being the owners of the land. According to the petitioner, on 29.05.1940, the then Deputy Commissioner, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, on behalf of the erstwhile Provincial Government of Assam, entered into a mining settlement with the Assam Bengal Cement Company Limited for extraction/exploitation of limestone from an area ad-measuring 12.04 bighas within Sohbar Sirdarship for a period of 10 years (to be renewed for a further period of 20 years) for the purpose of supply of limestone to Chhatak under Sylhet District of Provincial Assam; and when exploitation of limestone started in the year 1940, the Provincial Government of Assam started sharing 50% royalty with the petitioner as per the aforesaid agreement of the year 1829. 5. The case of the petitioner is, and has always been, that until the year 1951, some payments were made by the Government of Assam towards its share of royalty but thereafter, the Government of Assam abruptly stopped making payment of the share of royalty to the petitioner, though the said Assam Bengal Company Limited continued with its limestone mining operations. The petitioner has further pointed out that the Government of Assam entered into an agreement with the United Khasi and Jaintia Hills District Council on the sharing of mining royalty in the ratio of 40:60. 6. The petitioner has also averred that in the year 1971, the respondent No. 8 Komorrah Limestone Mining Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent-company'), being a joint venture company, with the present State of Meghalaya holding 50% share therein, came into existence essentially for the purpose of revival of limestone mining in and around the area in question. It is averred that the petitioner raised serious objections against the mining of limestone by the respondent-company just after creation of the State of Meghalaya without its consent and without sharing of royalty whereupon, several meetings took place but the respondent-State, without the consent of the petitioner, formerly executed the Mining Agreement dated 25.06.1973 for 20 years (extendable to another 20 years) with the respondent-company under Rule 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 for mining of limestone over an area ad-measuring 240.55 hectares of which, according to the petitioner, 100 acres of land belongs to it. 7. 7. The petitioner has referred to Section 58 of the Assam Re-Organization (Meghalaya) Act, 1969, Section 51 of the North Eastern Area (Re-Organization) Act, 1971, and Article 294 of the Constitution of India to submit that the present State of Meghalaya has acquired all the rights as also all the liabilities and obligations arising from the aforesaid agreement of the year 1829. Hence, it is asserted that the State of Meghalaya is obliged to part with 50% of the amount of royalty, received on excavation of the mineral limestone from the area in question, in favour of the petitioner. It is further averred that the petitioner's claim for share of royalty remained under active consideration of the Government; and on the other hand, the respondent-company entered into an agreement dated 25.05.1990 (with the petitioner) to pay local tolls for extracting and exploitation of limestone within the jurisdiction of the petitioner and started making payment of such tolls from the year 1990 onwards. 8. The essence of claim in this petition is that as per the agreement of the year 1829, the petitioner has the right to receive 50% of royalty accruing for the mining operations in the area in question; and its claim of such 50% share of royalty remained under consideration of the State Government. It is, however, asserted that the respondent-company carrying on mining operations had been making payment of tolls to the petitioner. Successive litigation's and results thereof: 9. Now and at this juncture, apposite it shall be to take note of the litigation's taken up by the petitioner on its claim for the share of royalty and the results thereof. The series of litigation's by the petitioner on this claim for the share of royalty commenced in the year 1991 when the petitioner filed a writ petition in the then jurisdictional High Court i.e., Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, being WP (C) No.42 (SH) of 1991, seeking direction against the State respondents for release of its 50% share of royalty. Admittedly, the original mining lease was renewed on 14.06.1994 for another 20 years during the pendency of the said writ petition; and though the State continued to collect the royalty and other charges on such mineral excavation but nothing was made over to the petitioner towards the share, as sought to be claimed. 10. Admittedly, the original mining lease was renewed on 14.06.1994 for another 20 years during the pendency of the said writ petition; and though the State continued to collect the royalty and other charges on such mineral excavation but nothing was made over to the petitioner towards the share, as sought to be claimed. 10. The said writ petition bearing No.42 (SH) of 1991 was ultimately considered and allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court on 25.05.1995. The learned Single Judge took note of the suggestion on behalf of the State respondents that they were making over the share of royalty to the District Council and found that such a payment to the District Council by the State was not a payment to the inhabitants of Sohbar village under the agreement of the year 1829. The learned Single Judge further observed that the said agreement of the year 1829 was standing on its own footing and was holding good by virtue of Article 294 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge was further of the view that the Government, if had paid more than 50% to the District Council on account of limestone royalty, should direct the said District Council to pay the dues of Sohbar village to the tune of 50% of the overall collection. The observations and directions by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 25.05.1995 had been as under:- "25.05.1995 ... According to me, payment to the District Council and an agreement with the District Council is not a payment to the inhabitants of Sohbar village under the agreement of 1829. This agreement stands on its own footing and has been entered into with the East India Company and this agreement still holds good as per Article 294 of the Constitution of India. As such, I direct the respondent to pay 50% of the production of limestone for the period for which they have not paid any money to the village people of Sohbar. According to me, if, however the Govt. has paid more than 50% to the District Council on account of the limestone collection, the Govt. should direct the District Council to pay the dues of the Sohbar village which is 50% of the overall collection. In view of the above, I direct the Govt. According to me, if, however the Govt. has paid more than 50% to the District Council on account of the limestone collection, the Govt. should direct the District Council to pay the dues of the Sohbar village which is 50% of the overall collection. In view of the above, I direct the Govt. and the District Council to take steps for making payment of the dues of the inhabitants of Sohbar as aforesaid. The aforesaid amount should be paid to the petitioners within a period of 6 months from date. The matter is disposed of with no order as to costs." 11. The aforesaid order dated 25.05.1995 was challenged in an intra court appeal, being WA No.20 (SH) of 1999, by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council ('KHADC'). The fact of the matter remains that when the said intra court appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, an unequivocal prayer was made on behalf of the present petitioner (who was respondent No.1 in the said appeal) that the writ petition may be allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh case. The Division Bench granted the prayer so made and accordingly, the aforesaid order dated 25.05.1995 as passed in WP (C) No.42 (SH) of 1991 was recalled and annulled; and the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed on withdrawal with liberty to file afresh; and as a consequence, the appeal was treated as in-fructuous. The short order dated 06.12.2007 as passed by the Division Bench in disposal of WA No.20 (SH) of 1999 reads as under:- "06.12.2007 "Heard Mr. VGK Kynta, the learned counsel for the appellant-District Council. Also heard Mr GS Massar, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 and Mr ND Chullai, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2. We have also heard Mr HS Thangkiew, the learned counsel for the respondent No.3. In the course of hearing, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 prays that he may be allowed to withdraw the writ petition with a liberty to file a fresh case. The prayer to withdraw the writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order dated 25.5.95 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No.42 (SH) 1991 is recalled and shall be treated as non-est. The writ petition is dismissed on withdrawal with liberty to file afresh petition. The prayer to withdraw the writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order dated 25.5.95 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No.42 (SH) 1991 is recalled and shall be treated as non-est. The writ petition is dismissed on withdrawal with liberty to file afresh petition. Consequent upon the dismissal of the writ petition, this appeal does not survive for consideration and is closed as in-fructuous." 12. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the second writ petition bearing No.323 (SH) of 2009 seeking direction against the State respondents for 50% share of royalty. This writ petition was considered and dismissed by a learned Single Judge by the order dated 26.08.2011 with the precise findings that when the Provincial Government of Assam had admittedly stopped the payment of royalty to the petitioner since the year 1952, there was nothing to doubt that the petitioner had waived the right to claim the royalty in question or had acquiesced in deprivation of his right to claim the royalty with long passage of time; and that there was no explanation of the long delay of over six decades. The learned Single Judge, inter alia, observed as under:- 4. " In my opinion, the writ petition is barred by the principles of laches and is covered by the decisions of the Apex Court in Syed Maqbul Ali v. State of U.P., 2011 AIR SCW 3195 and State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 . On the own showing of the petitioner that Provincial Government of Assam had stopped payment of the royalty to him since 1952, there is no room for doubt that the petitioner has waived his right to claim the royalty in question or has acquiesced in to the deprivation of his right to claim the royalty by the State respondents by long passage of time. That apart, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay spanning over six decades in filing the writ petition. Repeated representations, it is trite, does not and cannot extend the cause of action. -" 13. A suggestion was made before the learned Single Judge that it was a matter of continuing wrong for which, there could not be any laches. This contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge, while significantly observing that even the earlier writ petition suffered from laches; and the basic infirmity could not be cured by repeat filing of the petitions. A suggestion was made before the learned Single Judge that it was a matter of continuing wrong for which, there could not be any laches. This contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge, while significantly observing that even the earlier writ petition suffered from laches; and the basic infirmity could not be cured by repeat filing of the petitions. The learned Single Judge held that the petition was not maintainable and proceeded to dismiss the same while observing as under:- "5. As for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the act complained of in the writ petition is a continuing wrong for which there can be no laches, I have carefully perused the judgments of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh, Balkhrishna, MR Gupta cases, etc. relied upon by him, but am unable to persuade myself to hold that they have relevancy to the instant case for the simple reason that the facts of the case in the three Judge Bench decision Digamber case are virtually on pari materia with the facts in this case, which is about alleged deprivation of property without authority of law. It is not known at this time as to what actually prompted the learned counsel for the petitioner to withdraw the earlier writ petition whereupon the writ appeal had been closed by the Division Bench of this Court, but the fact remains that even then the writ petition suffered from the same defect of laches. Filing a writ petition after writ petition cannot cure the infirmity of the nature under discussion herein. Resultantly, this writ petition is barred by the principles of laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver." 6. For what has been stated in the foregoing discussion, this writ petition is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs." 14. The aforesaid order was challenged by the petitioner in WA No.40 (SH) of 2011 but this intra court appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench by its considered judgment dated 01.11.2011. It was sought to be suggested before the Division Bench by the petitioner that the first writ petition was withdrawn by the counsel without specific instructions from the client. It was sought to be suggested before the Division Bench by the petitioner that the first writ petition was withdrawn by the counsel without specific instructions from the client. The Court found that the suggestions on behalf of the petitioner were lacking in bona fide and also that laches were looming large over the petitioner, while observing as under:- "9. Mr. HL Shangreiso, in support of his contention firstly argues that the writ petition in the first round was withdrawn by the counsel without specific instruction from the client and, accordingly he contends that the second writ petition ought to have been considered on merit. In order to test the bona fide of this submission, we requested Mr. Shangreiso to inform the Court as to whether any complaint was filed against the errant lawyer but counsel's answer was in the negative. Furthermore, although the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on 06.12.2007, the subsequent petition came to be filed only in the year 2009 after two years. Thus the lack of bona fide on the part of the writ petitioners is clearly discernible and they are found to be sleeping over their rights." 15. The suggestion about continuing cause of action was again rejected by the Division Bench, while observing that the appellant-petitioner had been sleeping over the claim for several decades. The Division Bench endorsed the decision of the learned Single Judge while concluding as under:- "14. Having considered the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge we are of the considered opinion that since the royalty payment was stopped in the year 1953 and the petitioner had belatedly approached the court with the excuse of making repeated representations and considering further that the second case was filed only in the year 2009 after withdrawal of the first writ petition on 06.12.2007, the absence of vigilance on the part of the writ petitioners is writ large as they slept over their rights if any through many decades. Consequently, we find no reason for taking a different view than the one taken by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we dismiss the Appeal without any order of cost." 16. Consequently, we find no reason for taking a different view than the one taken by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we dismiss the Appeal without any order of cost." 16. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench dated 01.11.2011, the petitioner even approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.7799/2012, but this petition for Special Leave to Appeal was also dismissed on 19.03.2012, while leaving it open to the petitioner to avail 'any other remedy', including making of representation to the Government. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ordered and observed as under:- "19.03.2012 The special leave petition is dismissed. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be free to avail any other remedy which may be available to it including the one by way of making representation to the State Government." 17. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the High Court again by way of writ petition bearing No.171 (SH) of 2012 seeking direction for disposal of the representation. This petition was disposed of on 04.07.2012 with the Court directing disposal of the representation expeditiously. The said representation was disposed of by the State respondents on 13.08.2012 while rejecting the petitioner's claim of sharing of royalty. 18. After rejection of the representation, the petitioner approached this Court over again by way of yet another writ petition bearing No. 93 of 2013 and this time, while assailing the order passed on representation and while reiterating the claim for the share of royalty, it was suggested that the petitioner would confine this claim only to the period commencing from the date of filing of representation. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Single Judge that the claim of the petitioner, for its 50% share of royalty on limestone, had never been decided on merits. 19. The contentions so urged on behalf of the petitioner were rejected and the repeat petition so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in another detailed order dated 29.10.2014. 19. The contentions so urged on behalf of the petitioner were rejected and the repeat petition so filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in another detailed order dated 29.10.2014. The learned Single Judge took note of the aforesaid order dated 26.08.2011 as passed in WP (C) No.323 (SH) of 2009 as also the judgment dated 01.11.2011 of the Division Bench in WA No.40 (SH) of 2011 and the order dated 19.03.2012 as passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.7799/2012 and held that the claim of the petitioner for sharing 50% of royalty on limestone with the State Government stood barred by laches and acquiescence and could not be reopened by modifying the claim for prospective sharing of royalty. The learned Single Judge even expected the petitioner 'to understand' that his claim for share of 50% of royalty could not be reopened after the said decisions on the pretext of making the claim only from the date of representation. In the last, a suggestion was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the lease agreement between the State and the respondent-company for carrying out mining activities had already expired. As regard this aspect, the learned Single Judge merely observed that the matter relating to validity of any lease agreement was to be decided in an appropriate forum; and the parties were left open to seek appropriate forum in that regard. The learned Single Judge observed and concluded as under:- "5. Mr. HL Shangreiso, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the claims of the petitioner to share 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. had not been decided on merit. The erstwhile Gauhati High Court in the said two judgments and orders clearly held that the claims of the petitioner for sharing 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. cannot be considered because it is barred by the principle of laches and acquiescence. This point had already been discussed elaborately by the erstwhile Gauhati High Court (Single Bench) in the judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 passed in WP(C)No.(SH)323/2009 and also by the Division Bench of the erstwhile Gauhati High Court in its judgment and order dated 01.11.2011 passed in WA No.(SH)40/2011. This point had already been discussed elaborately by the erstwhile Gauhati High Court (Single Bench) in the judgment and order dated 26.08.2011 passed in WP(C)No.(SH)323/2009 and also by the Division Bench of the erstwhile Gauhati High Court in its judgment and order dated 01.11.2011 passed in WA No.(SH)40/2011. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the claims of the petitioner for sharing 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. with prospective effect cannot be decided in the present writ petition. In other words, right of the petitioner which had already barred by the principle of laches and acquiescence cannot be opened indirectly by filing the present writ petition for a direction to the State respondents to pay 50% shared of the royalty to the writ petitioner prospectively. For granting the relief sought for in the present writ petition, the Court has to open and decide again the claims of the petitioner for sharing 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. which had finally been considered and decided by the erstwhile Gauhati High Court in the said writ petition as well as writ appeal. The petitioner has to understand that his claim for sharing 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. cannot be opened even after the said decisions of the erstwhile Gauhati High Court in the said writ petition as well as the said writ appeal only on the pretext that the claims of the petitioner in the present writ petition for sharing 50% of the royalty on limestone with the State Govt. is only w.e.f the date of filing the representation dated 12.04.2012. 6. It is fairly well settled law that the right or claim of the party which is barred by the principle of laches and acquiescence cannot be decided on merit inasmuch as because of the principle of laches, acquiescence and waiver, the Court itself cannot take decision on such right on merit. By the principle of laches, acquiescence and waiver, concerned party is barred from seeking the relief basing on the right, which had already been waived and the Court also cannot decide the said claim or right on merit. When the judgment is about to complete, Mr. HL Shangreiso, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the lease agreement between the State Govt. When the judgment is about to complete, Mr. HL Shangreiso, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the lease agreement between the State Govt. and the private respondent No.7 for carrying out the mining activities in the leased area had already been expired. Regarding this point, the Court is not making any observation; and validity of any lease agreement between the State Govt. and the private respondent No.7 is to be decided under the relevant provision of law in the appropriate forum. The parties are left to seek appropriate remedy under the appropriate provision of law in the appropriate forum. 7. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly." 20. Thus, it could be summed up that the claim of the petitioner, for 50% share of royalty on limestone as excavated by the respondent-company, though was initially upheld by the learned Single of the Gauhati High Court but, when the matter was in appeal filed by the District Council, the petitioner's writ petition itself was dismissed on withdrawal and the order so passed by the learned Single Judge was recalled and annulled. Hence, the first round of litigation on the claim of the petitioner for share of royalty from the year 1952, which was taken up only in the year 1991, terminated with dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition as withdrawn in the year 2007. Thereafter, the fresh writ petition filed in the year 2009 on this very claim of share of royalty was dismissed with the findings of laches and acquiescence against the petitioner. The intra-court appeal by the petitioner was also dismissed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court also declined to interfere. Thus, the matter attained finality right up to the Apex Court. Of course, the Hon'ble Apex Court extended one liberty to the petitioner but that was only to seek 'any other remedy', including making of representation. Thereafter, the petitioner made an unsuccessful representation and then filed yet another writ petition, this time confining its claim of royalty only from the date of representation. Even this artful attempt on the part of the petitioner could not remove the fundamental flaw that it had been a matter of inordinate delay and laches as also waiver and acquiescence. Hence, the third writ petition filed by the petitioner on the same cause was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Undeterred petitioner: 21. Even this artful attempt on the part of the petitioner could not remove the fundamental flaw that it had been a matter of inordinate delay and laches as also waiver and acquiescence. Hence, the third writ petition filed by the petitioner on the same cause was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Undeterred petitioner: 21. With repeated adverse pronouncements declining any relief in the writ jurisdiction, ordinarily, a litigant would have refrained from any further attempt in the High Court on the same cause. However, unfortunately, it appears that the pronouncements of the Courts have never made any impression on the petitioner that the process of court is not to be misused by repeat filing of petitions on the same subject-matter and the same cause; and undeterred by the clear, empathic, and repeated pronouncements against tenability of the claim of share of royalty in the Writ Court, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in yet another attempt at resurrecting the concluded matter, while employing new phraseologist and suggesting the accrual of alleged fresh cause of action. It is suggested that when a formal decision on the application of renewal lease of the respondent-company has not been taken by the respondent-State, there had been a deemed renewal of mining lease in question w.e.f. 24.06.2013. This fiction, according to the petitioner, furnishes a fresh cause of action to claim the share of royalty. In this petition, the petitioner has also referred to a communication, whereby the respondent-company stated its readiness to make payment of dues of tolls to the petitioner, while indicating that a sum of Rs. 19,15,109/- has already been paid by the respondent-company to the petitioner since the month of July 2013. Submission of the learned counsel: 22. In this petition, the petitioner has also referred to a communication, whereby the respondent-company stated its readiness to make payment of dues of tolls to the petitioner, while indicating that a sum of Rs. 19,15,109/- has already been paid by the respondent-company to the petitioner since the month of July 2013. Submission of the learned counsel: 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made elaborate reference to Paragraph 9 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the provisions contained in the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 as also the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (DEAD) by LRS and others: (2005) 12 SCC 1 and Therssiamma Jacob and others v. Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology and others : (2013) 9 SCC 725 , essentially to impress on the Court that the private person's right of share of royalty is not taken away by Paragraph 9 of the Sixth Schedule; and is protected under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions aforesaid. The learned counsel has strenuously argued that deemed renewal furnishes a fresh cause of action and in any case, the claim of the petitioner deserves to be considered in this writ petition because the same had never been decided on its merits. 23. Per contra, learned Sr.GA appearing for the respondents No.1 to 7 has referred to the orders aforesaid, as passed in the previous rounds of litigation and has submitted that with the concluded orders as passed in the earlier cases, this writ petition for revival of the claim for share of royalty is not maintainable on the principles of res judicata. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner would rejoin with the submissions that it is the case of fresh cause of action and the issue having never been decided in the earlier litigation's, the principle of res judicata would not apply. Writ petition cannot be entertained: 25. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that this writ petition is an attempt at the abuse of the process of Court and is required to be rejected at its threshold with exemplary costs and other directions. 26. Writ petition cannot be entertained: 25. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that this writ petition is an attempt at the abuse of the process of Court and is required to be rejected at its threshold with exemplary costs and other directions. 26. To say the very least, the present one is an apposite example of an undeterred litigant, who would choose to be rather over-adventurous with the process of Court, without any respect to the fundamental principles that a concluded order by the Court binds all the parties to the litigation; that filing of repeat petitions on the same claim and same cause remains entirely impermissible; and that some crafted suggestions or modulation of the claimed relief could never take away the substance of the matter. 27. As noticed, the basic claim in this petition is that as per the agreement of the year 1829, the petitioner has the right to receive 50% of royalty accruing for the mining operations in the area in question. It is asserted that until the year 1951, the then Government of Assam had been making over such share of royalty to the petitioner. However, according to the petitioner such a share was denied to it since the year 1952. The fact of the matter remains that while stating such a grievance against the alleged denial of share of royalty since the year 1952, the petitioner approached the Court for the first time only in the year 1991. Thus, the first writ petition filed by the petitioner was itself suffering from gross delay and laches. Although, the learned Single Judge in the first place chose to grant relief to the petitioner in the order dated 25.05.1995 but, when the matter was carried in appeal, consciously a prayer was made in the Court on behalf of the petitioner for withdrawal of the petition with liberty to file afresh. It was sought to be suggested in the second writ petition that such a prayer for withdrawal was made by the counsel for the petitioner without instructions from the petitioner, which was an entirely unjustified allegation made by the petitioner against the erstwhile counsel in his absence and with the change of counsel. It was sought to be suggested in the second writ petition that such a prayer for withdrawal was made by the counsel for the petitioner without instructions from the petitioner, which was an entirely unjustified allegation made by the petitioner against the erstwhile counsel in his absence and with the change of counsel. This aspect was duly addressed to by the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court while dealing with WA No.40 (SH) of 2011 in the judgment dated 01.11.2011. The petitioner was precisely put to question that if any complaint was made against the counsel; and the answer had only been in the negative. Any suggestion by a litigant against the former counsel with change of counsel in the next round of litigation remains entirely unacceptable; and such an attempt has been deprecated by the Courts. In fact, the same nature suggestion, about withdrawal by the counsel without instructions, was sought to be made before us too. We are impelled to comment that the indications on the record are to the effect that such a prayer for withdrawal could not have been without instructions and was rather made for the purpose of avoiding an adverse decision by the Division Bench at that stage. It is noticed that the same Hon'ble Judge, who had been a part of the Division Bench that permitted withdrawal of the first writ petition in appeal [WA No.20 (SH) of 1999], later on dealt with petitioner's second writ petition bearing No. 323 (SH) 2009, while sitting singly; and observed in no uncertain terms that in fact, the first petition [WP(C) No.42 (SH) of 1991] was itself suffering from delay and laches. 28. All said and done, the fact of the matter remains that the petitioner's second writ petition was dismissed, its appeal was also dismissed and even the SLP was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court only extended one liberty to the petitioner and that was to take recourse to 'any other remedy', including making representation to the State Government. 29. The petitioner indeed took recourse to such 'other remedy' and made a representation but even the representation was rejected. The petitioner, thereafter, chose to file yet another writ petition bearing No.93 of 2013. This time, the petitioner chose to limit the prayer of share of royalty from the date of the representation only. 29. The petitioner indeed took recourse to such 'other remedy' and made a representation but even the representation was rejected. The petitioner, thereafter, chose to file yet another writ petition bearing No.93 of 2013. This time, the petitioner chose to limit the prayer of share of royalty from the date of the representation only. The learned Single Judge found that another attempt with improvisation was hardly of any effect on the substance of the matter and again rejected the writ petition on 29.10.2014. This order has also attained finality. 30. The suggestion on behalf of the petitioner now is that the deemed renewal of the mining lease furnishes a fresh cause of action. The argument remains unworthy of substance and is required to be rejected outright. 31. There could never be anything of the so called fresh cause of action in the present case on the claim of the petitioner for share of royalty on the material excavated from the area in question. The cause of action is essentially a bundle of facts which, if not traversed, entitles a suitor right to relief. The petitioner's claim for share of royalty is founded on integral facts about existence of the alleged agreement of the year 1829 and subsequently, the alleged initial payment by the Government of Assam. Only on the basis of these facts does the petitioner assert that the Government of Meghalaya has the obligation to part with a share of royalty. The relief as claimed on the basis of such facts having been declined by the Writ Court in at least two detailed speaking orders with precise findings that the claim suffered from laches and acquiescence, renewal of the existing mining lease by operation of law, does not, in any manner, furnishes any fresh cause of action to the petitioner. In fact, in the face of the concluded findings in this matter, there could not be any 'fresh' cause of action when the Courts have found that even the earlier petitions suffered from delay and laches and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief in the writ jurisdiction. In fact, in the face of the concluded findings in this matter, there could not be any 'fresh' cause of action when the Courts have found that even the earlier petitions suffered from delay and laches and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief in the writ jurisdiction. The conclusion in at least two previous writ petitions that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ jurisdiction on its claim for share of royalty against the State of Meghalaya remains final and binding; and such a conclusion is neither nullified nor taken over by the event of deemed renewal of the mining lease. The event of renewal of the existing mining lease does not bring about any such new facts into existence whereby the lost cause of the petitioner could be resurrected. As a matter of fact, any renewal of the mining lease in question would ipso facto carry with it the concluded orders of the court that the petitioner cannot get the relief of the share of royalty by way of a writ petition. 32. A submission, that the cause of the petitioner has not been considered on merits earlier, has only been noted for rejection. It remains trite that the relief in the discretionary writ jurisdiction of High Court could be denied on any relevant consideration; and delay and laches are those of significant and relevant factors where for the writ jurisdiction could be declined. In the present case, it had not been a matter of mere delay of a few months or years but, as noticed above, the petitioner chose to approach the Court for the first time only in the year 1991 while complaining of denial of royalty share since the year 1952. The first writ petition, even when was allowed in the year 1995, was ultimately withdrawn in appeal in the year 2007. Then, the second writ petition filed in the year 2009 was dismissed with emphatic findings that the petitioner had waived the right to claim the royalty in question. The third writ petition filed in the year 2013 was also dismissed with repeat findings by the Court that the right of the petitioner is barred by the principle of laches and acquiescence. The third writ petition filed in the year 2013 was also dismissed with repeat findings by the Court that the right of the petitioner is barred by the principle of laches and acquiescence. In our view, merit consideration of a matter necessarily involves the determination of the claimed right as also the determination of the question of the right to relief. A look at the detailed orders passed in the previous two writ petitions puts it beyond the pale of doubt that the Courts have ruled against the petitioner with the findings not merely on delay but on waiver and acquiescence. When it has been found that the petitioner has waived a right, and is thereby not entitled to the claimed relief, in our view, nothing further is now left to be re-examined in the matter on the claim of the petitioner. Conduct of the petitioner: 33. For what has been discussed here-in-above, it is but clear that the present writ petition has been a rather adventurous attempt on the part of the petitioner to again invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, though the same has been repeatedly declined with the specific finding that the writ petitioner was not entitled to the claimed relief; and one such decision has attained finality up to the highest Court. The petition is required to be dismissed on this ground alone and for that matter, with costs. 34. Apart from the foregoing, we are impelled to indicate a few more aspects related with the shortcomings on the conduct of the petitioner where for it appears necessary that this writ petition be dismissed with exemplary costs. 35. The petitioner is said to be carrying several singular rights under the customary law which are recognized by the Courts. However, it appears that the petitioner, in the name of its rights as an administrator of the village concerned and while claiming ownership over the land, has subjected the respondent-company to enter into an agreement dated 28.05.1990 for payment of tolls and then, another agreement dated 10.05.2013 with yet further obligations. We shall refer to a few aspects related with the terms of such agreements a little later but, noticeable it is on the conduct of the petitioner that the agreement dated 10.07.2013 was entered into during the course of pendency of the earlier writ petition bearing No.93 of 2013, which was filed on 09.05.2013. We shall refer to a few aspects related with the terms of such agreements a little later but, noticeable it is on the conduct of the petitioner that the agreement dated 10.07.2013 was entered into during the course of pendency of the earlier writ petition bearing No.93 of 2013, which was filed on 09.05.2013. In the said writ petition, rejoinder affidavit was filed by the petitioner on 29.01.2014. However, the said agreement dated 10.07.2013 was concealed and was not brought to the notice of the Court. Significantly, in the said writ petition, the petitioner never even whispered about the alleged deemed renewal of the mining lease though, the agreement dated 10.07.2013 itself indicated the knowledge of the petitioner about deemed renewal and continuation of the mining lease. The suggestion about a fresh cause of action because of deemed renewal was never made before the Court and on the contrary, the suggestion was that the earlier lease had come to an end. The petitioner has, obviously, been lacking in forthrightness before the Court and rather concealed the relevant material facts in the earlier litigation. 36. Apart from the want of bona fide and forthrightness in submissions before the Court, it appears that the petitioner, in the name of its right as an administrator of the villages concerned, had subjected the respondent-company to enter into an agreement dated 25.05.1990 for making payment of tolls on limestone w.e.f. June, 1990. Significantly, nothing was even whispered in the said agreement as regards petitioner's claim of the share of royalty. Then, the petitioner allegedly entered into the other agreement dated 10.07.2013 with the respondent-company for recovering such tolls and therein, it was suggested that the agreement will have nothing to do with the alleged sharing of royalty (Clause 31) between Sohbar Elaka and the State Government. In the said agreement dated 10.07.2013, several other duties were enjoined upon the respondent-company including those of carrying out its responsibilities towards health care and education; to offer employment to the local people while giving preference to the candidates from Sohbar Elaka and the persons of Khasi Schedule Tribe; to sponsor any student from Sohbar Elaka for pursuing studies in different branches in mining activities; and to give preference in allotment of work and buying of scraps etc. to the indigenous people. to the indigenous people. We are not making any comment on the validity or otherwise of the clauses of the agreement and would leave the matter to be examined in the appropriate proceedings, if occasion so arise. However, it is apparent that on one hand, the petitioner is somehow trying to claim such relief which has been repeatedly declined by this Court; and on the other hand, while asserting its rights over the area in question, has been entering into agreements with the company concerned and is also collecting tolls from the said company. A document bearing the date 22.08.2016, said to be a letter from the company concerned to the petitioner, has been placed on record, while suggesting that the company had admitted the dues to the tune of about Rs. 4630624.10 towards tolls. It is noticed from this document that the petitioner has received at least an amount of Rs. 19,15,109/- from the respondent-company towards tolls. It is high time that such collection of tolls by the petitioner is duly regulated and accounted for. The concerned District Council i.e., KHADC is expected to take note of the observations made in this order and to take appropriate corrective and regulatory measures, so as to ensure that the amount collected by the petitioner is precisely utilized for development of the area in question and is duly accounted for. 37. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, when we find that the petitioner has collected substantial amount from the respondent-company towards tolls; and this petition is to be dismissed with exemplary costs, appropriate it would be that heavy amount of costs be recovered from the petitioner but the same be utilized only for the development and benefit of the area in question. Conclusion: 38. Accordingly, and for what has been discussed and observed here-in-above, this writ petition is dismissed with costs quantified at the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs). It shall be required of the petitioner to make payment of costs in the manner that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be deposited in the account of the Meghalaya State Legal Services Authority for being utilized for legal aid activities in the area in question. Another sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be paid to the State Government and yet another sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be paid to KHADC. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be deposited in the account of the Meghalaya State Legal Services Authority for being utilized for legal aid activities in the area in question. Another sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be paid to the State Government and yet another sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) shall be paid to KHADC. The State as also the District Council shall ensure that the amount of costs recovered from the petitioner is utilized only for developmental activities in the area in question. If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount of costs within thirty days from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order, the KHADC shall ensure its recovery and appropriate disbursement in accordance with law.