MADHUSUDAN S/O RAMVILAS SHARMA @ CHOMWAL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
2017-01-04
P.N.DESHMUKH
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : P.N. Deshmukh, J. Both these appeals filed by original accused Nos.1, 2, and 3 respectively take exception to judgment dated 30.11.1998, passed in Sessions Trial No.42 of 1995 by learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Akola, by which the appellants came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months. 2. In brief, it is the case of the prosecution that on 2.3.1994 deceased Shripad Yashwant Ranade was found lying on the floor in his house by one Sudhir Deshpande who informed said fact to PW3 Mahadeo Raut, neighbour of deceased, who accordingly visited the house of deceased and found the deceased lying on the floor. Accordingly, one Doctor Mattalwar was called who on examining the deceased declared him dead. PW3 Mahadeo, therefore, lodged report, Exhibit 3, with Civil Lines Police Station, Akola on the strength of which A.D. No.13 of 1994 was registered and was investigated. During the course of investigation, inquest panchanama was carried out vide Exhibit 26 and the body was forwarded to postmortem under requisition Exhibit 39. Spot panchanama was drawn vide Exhibit 25. 3. It is the case of the prosecution that on the day of incident of death of deceased Shripad, his wife PW6 Jyoti was not with him as she was at Badoda and she arrived at Akola along with her brother PW5 Shashikant Krishnarao Pisolkar on the following day. On her visiting the investigating officer, she was shown with some letters which were recovered by the investigating officer from the room of the deceased and were identified by PW6 Jyoti to be the letters written by her husband. Having therein involvement of the appellants, she thus lodged her report Exhibit 43 on the basis of which offence came to be registered vide Crime No.142 of 1994 under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, during the course of investigation it was revealed that the appellants had involved financial transaction with deceased Shripad as they had provided monetary assistance to him.
According to the prosecution, during the course of investigation it was revealed that the appellants had involved financial transaction with deceased Shripad as they had provided monetary assistance to him. However, since deceased was unable to repay the said amount, he was subjected to torture, harassment, and humiliation at the hands of the appellants which was to such an extent that deceased committed suicide. 4. After the investigation, the charge-sheet is filed which in the course of time came to be committed for the trial before the Court of Sessions. The charges are framed against the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code to which the appellants denied and claimed to be tried. 5. To prove the charge levelled against the accused, the prosecution has examined in all nine witnesses and has commenced with the evidence by examining PW1 Namdeo Jairam Palaspagar on circumstantial evidence who did not support the case of the prosecution, classmate and neighbour of deceased PW2 Omprakash Agrawal, neighbour PW3 Mahadeo Raut who has given report to police on the basis of which A.D. is registered, PW4 Dilip Ahiwale, brother-in-law of deceased PW5 Shashikant Pisolkar, and wife of deceased PW6 Jyoti who has lodged report Exhibit 43 and concluded its evidence on examining PW7 Himidkha S/o Mohd. Hasankha, PW8 Prakash Raut, and PW9 Kashiram Daberao, the investigating officer. Learned Trial Judge on considering the evidence and documents on record convicted the appellants as aforesaid. Hence, these appeals. 6. Heard learned counsel Shri C.A. Joshi for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.436 of 1998 and learned counsel Shri S.A. Mohta for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.4 of 1999. Learned counsels submitted that from the evidence on record, no ingredient of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code can said to be established by the prosecution as from the entire evidence there is nothing to establish that the appellants in any manner were instrumental in abetting or has instigated commission of suicide caused by Shripad by consuming poison. In fact, learned counsel Shri S.A. Mohta, on the basis of letter which is an admitted document and marked as Q2, has demonstrated as to how the deceased himself wanted to taste poison "Cyanide" on experimental basis and thus on consuming such poison, died.
In fact, learned counsel Shri S.A. Mohta, on the basis of letter which is an admitted document and marked as Q2, has demonstrated as to how the deceased himself wanted to taste poison "Cyanide" on experimental basis and thus on consuming such poison, died. It is thus contended that the case of the prosecution of involvement of the appellants in the present incident is totally after thought and in fact from the contents of document marked as Q2 it can be said that the deceased was mentally not stable and in fact had died on consuming poisonous substance "Cyanide" as he wanted to taste the same on experimental basis. In the light of facts as aforesaid, it is submitted that no case establishing involvement of the appellants can be established. The appellants have thus prayed to be held to be not guilty. Both the appeals are, therefore, prayed to be allowed. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, supports the judgment of the Trial Court, praying for dismissal of appeals. 8. In the light of the facts as aforesaid and on perusal of the evidence of PW3 Mahadeo it reveals that the deceased was his neighbour and his friend and was proprietor of a business firm situated in the M.I.D.C. Area. About eight to ten days prior to the incident, deceased was found to be under mental pressure and has informed that appellant Nos.1, 2, and 3 were troubling him by forcibly entering partnership with him. As per his further evidence, the deceased was a simple persons and appellant Nos.1 and 2 had provided some financial assistance to the deceased against which deceased had issued them some cheques. In the background of above evidence, it thus appears that PW3 Mahadeo after deceased committed suicide, suspected appellant Nos.1 and 2 and lodged his report Exhibit 23 on the strength of which A.D. came to be registered and was investigated. According to the evidence of this witness, though it has come on record that appellant Nos.1 and 2 on providing financial assistance to the deceased had obtained one cheque from him, no such cheque is recovered during course of investigation nor any investigation is carried out on this aspect. Moreover, evidence of this witness of appellants Nos.1 and 2 forcibly entering partnership firm with deceased is the omission in his evidence.
Moreover, evidence of this witness of appellants Nos.1 and 2 forcibly entering partnership firm with deceased is the omission in his evidence. So also, his evidence about the said two appellants troubling deceased as informed by him also is an omission. As such, this witness had made material improvements when he has agreed to have not stated in his statement to police that because of trouble given to deceased by appellant Nos.1 and 2 deceased committed suicide. Evidence of PW3 Mahadeo thus creates doubt in the prosecution case involving appellants in the present crime to hold that due to their instigation, deceased committed suicide. Similarly, though PW3 Mahadeo has denied that information about alleged trouble provided to deceased by the appellants was given to him by one Shri Deshpande, neighbour of deceased, admittedly said Mr. Deshpande is not examined. In that view of the matter, even this piece of evidence does not substantiate the case of the prosecution in any manner. 9. This leads to consider the evidence of PW6 Jyoti, wife of deceased, to satisfy if her evidence establishes involvement of the appellants in the present crime, from her evidence it has come on record that she was not in the house but was at Badoda on the date of incident on 2.3.1994. On her reaching to Akola on the following day, she was shown four letters by police of her deceased husband, out of which one was addressed to the police inspector, another to the Manager of the State Bank of India, one was addressed to appellant No.2 Gopal Sharma which according to her were in the handwriting of the deceased. Admittedly, from the evidence of handwriting expert PW4 Dilip Ahiwale in spite of his examining said documents on enlarging their photo prints under his supervision, it is opined that in the absence of adequate common identifying characteristics/data, he could not come to the definite conclusion as regards identity of red encircled writing marks on these letters and has, therefore, issued his negative opinion on record at Exhibit 36. In the circumstances, prosecution could not establish that the letter are in the handwriting of deceased. 10.
In the circumstances, prosecution could not establish that the letter are in the handwriting of deceased. 10. In that view of the matter, though it is the case of the prosecution that evidence of PW6 Jyoti establish that the letters produced by police, are written by the deceased addressed to the authorities as deposed by her as above, from the evidence of handwriting expert PW4 Dilip Ahiwale it cannot be said these are the letters written by the deceased only. Learned Trial Judge without considering said aspect appears to have much weighed upon the contents of these letters and had reached to the conclusion that from the contents thereof, deceased committed suicide because he was tortured, instigated by the appellants due to which the deceased was not comfortable. It is, therefore, noted that learned Trial Judge appears to have given undue weightage to these documents even in the absence of proof of contents thereof. 11. In view of the charge framed against the appellants as aforesaid, the evidence of PW2 Omprakash Agrawal when perused is to the effect that he had a factory in M.I.D.C. and also knew appellant Madhusudan dealing in plastic business. According to his evidence, deceased had enquired with him about the financial condition of appellant Madhusudan and had informed him that he owes some amount to appellant Madhusudan due to which he had visited deceased on the earlier day of incident and as he could not make the payment, said appellants left shouting upon deceased. Above piece of evidence of PW2 Omprakash also finds to be material improvement when he admits to have stated to police about deceased informing him about visit by appellant Madhusudan and of leaving him, shouting upon him since he did not made the payment. This evidence also appears to be material omission in the evidence of this witness as he is unable to assign any reason why no such fact is mentioned in this statement. The Trial Court had specifically marked the evidence with regard to "Madhu Chillake Gaya" as an omission in the evidence of Omprakash. In that view of the matter, it can even not be said that one day prior to the incident, appellant Madhusudan has scolded deceased for nonpayment of alleged amount payable to him. 12.
The Trial Court had specifically marked the evidence with regard to "Madhu Chillake Gaya" as an omission in the evidence of Omprakash. In that view of the matter, it can even not be said that one day prior to the incident, appellant Madhusudan has scolded deceased for nonpayment of alleged amount payable to him. 12. In the background of above discussed evidence, the case put forth on behalf of the appellants that the deceased on experimental basis has desired to taste cyanide appears to be more probable as from the document marked as Q2 dated 2.3.1994, written by the deceased when perused, reveals that the deceased had written the same. As per the contents of this document, deceased wanted to taste said poisonous substance cyanide so that he would be of some use to have scientific invention and in this background has on the date of incident tasted one substance. In view of the contents of the said document, there appears much substance in the case of the appellants that deceased on his own consuming poisonous substance on experimental basis as aforesaid, had died of unnatural death. In that view of the matter, it is even hard to digest that the deceased committed suicide as alleged by the prosecution much less due to ill-treatment at the hand of the appellants. 13. Thus, on considering the evidence as above, there is nothing to suggest that the appellants at any point of time or immediate prior to the incident had done any act which can said to be an intentional act to abet or to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. 14. By now, law on this aspect is well settled that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts incitement to commission of suicide. Merely on allegations of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to time of occurrence on part of accused which led or compelled person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of section 306 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. Therefore, what is required is that, unless there is any positive action proximate to time of occurrence on part of accused, which led or compelled person to commit suicide conviction under section 306 is not sustainable. 15. Having considered the evidence as aforesaid and the settled legal provision, thus both the appeals are liable to be allowed.
Therefore, what is required is that, unless there is any positive action proximate to time of occurrence on part of accused, which led or compelled person to commit suicide conviction under section 306 is not sustainable. 15. Having considered the evidence as aforesaid and the settled legal provision, thus both the appeals are liable to be allowed. Hence, the following is order : ORDER 1. Criminal Appeal Nos.436 of 1998 and 4 of 1999 are allowed. 2. Judgment and order dated 30.11.1998 passed in Sessions Trial No.42 of 1995 is quashed and set aside. 3. Fine amount, if any, paid by the appellants shall be returned back to the appellants.