JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The contesting parties are neighbours, it was on the complaint of the private respondent, the petitioners were directed by respondent No. 2 i.e. Senior Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla vide notice dated 2.5.2016 (Annexure P-3) to stop the construction work and take demarcation immediately “by associating your immediate neighbours” i.e. private respondent so that these issues are resolved. 2. The petitioners filed reply to the said notice. However, respondent No. 2 vide order dated 7.5.2016 (Annexure P-5) stopped the construction work being undertaken by the petitioners. 3. Aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No. 2, the petitioners filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Shimla, exercising powers of Appellate Authority (for short ‘Appellate Authority’) who dismissed the same and upheld the order passed by respondent No. 2. 4. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Kusum Chaudhary, Advocate that the learned Appellate Authority has miserably failed to appreciate that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2, though purported to be an order passed under Section 254(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (for short ‘M.C. Act’) does not even remotely meet the requirement of said Section as no satisfaction has been recorded either by respondent No. 2 or by the Appellate Authority that the building work which has been commenced or is being carried out is without or contrary to the sanction referred to in Section 246; secondly, in contravention of any of the conditions subject to which sanction has been accorded; thirdly, in contravention of any provisions of Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 or byelaws made thereunder. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate appearing for private respondent would vehemently argue that the petition is nothing, but an abuse of process of the Court as the orders passed by respondents No. 1 and 2 as affirmed by learned Appellate Authority having been passed after firstly taking into consideration the facts and thereafter applying the law to the same and thus, no exception can be taken to these findings. 6. Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for Municipal Corporation would obviously support the order passed by it and thereafter affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. 7. 6. Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for Municipal Corporation would obviously support the order passed by it and thereafter affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully and meticulously. 8. The initial notice served upon the petitioners on 2.5.2016 (Annexure P-3) whereby the petitioners were directed to stop the construction work reads thus: “SHIMLA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION No. MCS/AP/549/AP/16-3104-05 Dated: 2.5.2016 From Sr. Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla. To, S/Sh. Ashok Thakur & Sanjeev Thakur R/o Thakur Niwas, Chakkar, Shimla. Subject:- Review of sanction given to S/Sh. Ashok Thakur & Sanjeev Thakur R/o Thakur Niwas, Chakkar, Shimla-5. With reference to the subject cited above, it is stated that Sh. Amit Kashyap R/o Prospect Villa, Chakkar, Shimla has filed complaints dated 04.04.2016 and 16.04.2016 wherein it has been alleged that wrong entries of area of land had been made in the revenue documents (submitted by you for approval of the map), during the process of settlement. The correction orders of the same were passed by the Settlement Collector, Shimla vide case No. 247/05 dated 09.05.2007. The appeal of Smt. Uma Devi against these orders was also dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla and further appeal is pending before the Ld. Financial Commissioner (Appeal) H.P. It has been further alleged that the demarcation report submitted by you for getting your drawings approved is not correct as being an immediate neighbour he was not associated with the process of demarcation. Hence in view of the above facts you are hereby directed under Section 254(1) of H.P.M.C. Act to stop the construction work and take demarcation immediately by associating your immediate neighbours so that these issues are resolved. Sd/- Sr. Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Copy to:- 1. Sh. Amit Kashyap R/o Prospect Vila, Chakkar Shimla with reference to letter referred to above for information. Sr. Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla.” 9. Notably, the petitioners filed detailed reply to this notice. However, respondents thereafter issued final order on 7.5.2016 which reads thus:- Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Sd/- Sr. Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Copy to:- 1. Sh. Amit Kashyap R/o Prospect Vila, Chakkar Shimla with reference to letter referred to above for information. Sr. Architect Planner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla.” 9. Notably, the petitioners filed detailed reply to this notice. However, respondents thereafter issued final order on 7.5.2016 which reads thus:- Municipal Corporation, Shimla. S. No. MCS/CAMP/Chakkar/16/01-dated 07.05.2016 To, Shri Ashok Thakur, Sanjeev Thakur, Thakur Niwas, Chakkar, Shimla fo"k;%& fgŒ izŒ uxj fuxe vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 254¼1½A v/kksgLrk{kjh dh larqf"V gsrw ;g ckr lkfcr gks pqdh gS fd vki uxj fuxe dh fcuk Lohd`fr@cnyko o cM+ko dk;Z nqdku@edku uŒ Thakur Niwas, Chakkar Shimla, Stop the Construction work at site. As notice given to you vide office Order No. MCS/AP/549/AP/16-3104-05 dated 02.05.2016 and copy of that notice not been compiled by you. fgekpy izns'k uxj fuxe vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 369 ds vUrxZr eq>s 'kfDr;ksa dk izR;kstu fd;k x;k gS vkSj fgekpy izns'k uxj fuxe vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 254¼1½ ds vUrxZr eq>s lkSaih xbZ 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, eaSa dŒ vfHk;Urk iadt dkS'ky fgekpy izns'k uxj fuxe vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 254¼1½ dh vuqikyuk djrs gq;s vkidks Hkou fuekZ.k dk;Z cUn djus ds funsZ'k nsrk gwWA dŒ vfHk;Urk okLrqd ;kstukdkj 'kk[kk uxj fuxe f'keykA** 10. In this case, this Court is only concerned with the interpretation of provisions as contained in sub-section (1) of Section 254 and same read as under: “254. Order of stoppage of building or works in certain cases. (1) Where the erection of any building or execution of any work has been commenced or is being carried on (but has not been completed) without or contrary to the sanction referred to in Section 246 or in contravention of any condition subject to which such sanction has been accorded or in contravention of any provisions of this Act or bye-laws made thereunder, the Commissioner may in addition to any other action that may be taken under this Act by order require the person at whose instance the building or the work has been commenced or is being carried on, to stop the same forthwith.” 11. It is clearly evident from the above that before passing an order under the aforesaid provision, the Commissioner has to be satisfied that: (i) the erection of any building or execution of any work can only be stopped in case, it has been commenced or is being carried on (but has not been completed) without or contrary to the sanction referred to in section 246. (ii) in contravention of any condition subject to which such sanction has been accorded. (iii) or in contravention of any provisions of this Act or bye-laws made thereunder. 12. Notably, the notice dated 2.5.2016 (Annexure P-3) does not even remotely touch upon any of these pre-conditions as contemplated under Section 254 of the M.C. Act and therefore, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that the power was probably exercised by respondent No. 2 for extraneous reasons and considerations or else, he would have atleast cared to have had a glance of the bare provisions as contained in section under reference. 13. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned senior Counsel, for private respondent would vehemently try to justify the impugned order by contending that probably the reasons may be separately recorded in the official file, though not reflected in the impugned orders. To say the least, this argument is fallacious. 14. It is more than settled that if a law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, then in order that particular act must be done in the prescribed manner alone. That apart, there can be no gainsaying that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion. It is beyond cavil that any Authority cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by it in the impugned action. If precedent is required for this proposition, it can be found in the celebrated decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , of which the following paragraph deserves extraction: “8. If precedent is required for this proposition, it can be found in the celebrated decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , of which the following paragraph deserves extraction: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Commr. of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 : Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of Explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” 15. What is more surprising is that even the learned Appellate Authority after reproducing Section 254 (1) of the Act did not bother to satisfy itself regarding the mandatory pre-conditions which were required to be fulfilled by the competent authority before invoking this provision and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners by according the following reasons: “11. The perusal of the record shows that the respondent No. 3 on 05.04.2016 has moved the complaint before M.C. Shimla with a request to review the sanction given to the appellants. Alongwith the application, the copy of order dated 09.05.2007 passed by the Settlement Collector has also been annexed. On the basis of the above documents, the impugned order has been passed. By virtue of the impugned order, only the work has been stopped and the appellants were directed to take the demarcation. Alongwith the application, the copy of order dated 09.05.2007 passed by the Settlement Collector has also been annexed. On the basis of the above documents, the impugned order has been passed. By virtue of the impugned order, only the work has been stopped and the appellants were directed to take the demarcation. The learned counsel could not satisfy the judicial conscious of this authority, as to how the impugned order/notice is liable to be declared as illegal, wrong, void ab initio whereas a simple direction has been issued to stop the work till the demarcation of the land, that too, on the application of the respondent No. 3. Section 254 authorises the M.C. to stop the work in certain cases. No prejudice has been caused to the appellants from the impugned notice as it has specifically been mentioned in the notice that wrong entries of the area submitted by the appellants for approval of the map. A specific reference has been given in the impugned notice regarding the decision dated 09.05.2007 passed by the Settlement Collector. The demarcation report has also been impugned in the notice by the complainant and the M.C. has simply exercised the powers under Section 254 M.C. Act on the application of the respondent No. 3.” 16. This Court is at a complete loss to understand how the learned Appellate Authority took the impugned order directing stoppage of construction work so lightly, that too, by observing that it did not cause prejudice to the appellants (petitioners). This reasoning clearly reflects total lack of sensitivity, after all, constructions are not raised in the air and it requires men, material and time apart from other things. Therefore, until and unless the construction was in clear violation of the mandate of provisions contained in Section 254(1), the same could not have been ordered to be stopped and said findings could not have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority so lightly. 17. In addition to what has been observed above, it is established that there was gross and blatant misuse and abuse of power and authority by respondent No. 2 justifying interference, then why the Appellate Authority turned a Nelson’s eye is not forthcoming. 18. 17. In addition to what has been observed above, it is established that there was gross and blatant misuse and abuse of power and authority by respondent No. 2 justifying interference, then why the Appellate Authority turned a Nelson’s eye is not forthcoming. 18. The notice under Section 254(1) cannot be served in a routine, casual or callous manner, that too, only on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint by a neighbour or any other person or even an authority for that matter, before the Commissioner having actually satisfied itself regarding the veracity and contents thereof and after coming to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act, more particularly, Section 254(1) thereof has been violated. 19. After all, the very purpose of giving show cause notice is to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him and such grounds have to be fully detailed in the said notice. But here, as observed earlier, not even a show cause notice was served and straightway an order directing stoppage of construction was issued. 20. It is more than settled that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It is here then that the action of the official respondent is required to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity, fair play and in case its decision is not based on justice, equity and fair play and has been taken after taking into consideration other material, then even though on the face of it, the decision may look to the legitimate, but as a matter of fact the reasons are not based on values but on extraneous consideration that decision cannot be allowed to stand. 21. In this connection, the decision in S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 is relevant. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as follows:- ".........In our view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not suggest the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity' that is one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met......" (Emphasis added) .......In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal........" (Emphasis supplied) 22. In Wade & Forsyth – Administrative law, the learned Authors have said thus:- "A proper hearing must always include a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their view. Lord Denning has added: If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them........." (Emphasis supplied) 23. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them........." (Emphasis supplied) 23. As observed earlier, once the respondent had decided to issue a notice to the petitioners, then it was incumbent upon him to have set out in detail and with precision the various acts of commission and omission to the notice of the petitioners so as to afford them an effective opportunity to meet their case because unless the petitioners were put to such notice, they virtually had no opportunity to meet the case of the private respondent. It is more than settled that a party to whom a notice has been issued must be made aware of the exact allegations, he is required to meet, as this requirement in itself is a requirement of natural justice. 24. In addition to the aforesaid, it would be noticed that in the notice dated 2.5.2016, the order of stoppage was passed only on the basis of the complaint made by private respondent to which a detailed reply (4 pages) was filed. But the respondent No. 2 in a highly illegal, arbitrary and cursory manner that too by using stereotype cyclostyled form, affirmed the stoppage order already passed by him on 2.5.2016 by according the following reasons: ".........Stop the construction work at site. As notice given to you vide office Order No. MCS/AP/549/AP/16-3104-05 dated 02/05/16 and reply of that notice not been compiled by you......." 25. Indisputably, the reasons given subsequently are at total variance to the one given in the notice dated 2.5.2016. It cannot be disputed that the notice is the foundation on which the respondent has to build up its case, therefore, if the allegations in the earlier notice are not specific and are on the contrary vague, lack details and/or unintelligible or do not disclose the real material upon which a proposed action is contemplated to be drawn, then it is sufficient to hold that the noticee was not given proper opportunity to meet the allegations indicated in the show cause notice (and in the instant case the notice dated 2.5.2016). There is no gainsaying that it is fundamental principle of law that adjudication has to be within the four corners of the allegations set out in the show cause notice and any findings given beyond the terms of notice, is hit by the principle of natural justice. 26. Moreover, the requirement for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known to the petitioners is to enable an opportunity to the petitioners to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution so as to enable them to challenge the order, inter-alia, either on the ground that it is mala-fide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. 27. Furnishing of specific and intelligible reasons for the purpose of notice is only a concomitant of the concept of reasonable opportunity and fair play. Unless the noticee knows the precise case is required to meet out, he would be handicapped in putting forth his objections effectively. 28. In Daya Ram vs. Raghunath, (2007) 11 SCC 241 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking order. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 29. In Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others, (2009) 4 SCC 240 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons.” 30. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 29. In Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others, (2009) 4 SCC 240 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons.” 30. Towards the impressing need to inform reasons for a decision and the manner in which they are to be informed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the legal position in Kranti Associates Private Limited and Another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 496, in the following terms:- “(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-37). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires: "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions." (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of due process. 31. Now, the further question that arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent No. 2 while passing the impugned order, has in fact applied its mind and given reasons for his conclusion or has simply arrived at a conclusion without disclosing any reasons. As observed earlier, the reply filed by the petitioners was not even taken into consideration and the impugned order on the face of it is bereft of any reasons. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that while passing the impugned order, the relevant factors have not been objectively considered. As observed earlier, the reply filed by the petitioners was not even taken into consideration and the impugned order on the face of it is bereft of any reasons. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that while passing the impugned order, the relevant factors have not been objectively considered. The minimum that was expected from the respondent No. 2 was that in support of his order, he ought to have given reasons that were cogent, clear and succinct, more especially, when the order passed by him was subject to an appeal. As already observed, the decision being bereft of any reasons is a result of caprice, whim and fancy of respondent No. 2 and suffers from vice of arbitrariness as also non-application of mind. 32. In light of the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed above, it is unnecessary to say anything beyond what has been so eloquently said in support of the need to give reasons for orders made by Courts and statutory or other authorities exercising quasi judicial functions. I only need to reiterate that in a system governed by the rule of law, there is nothing like absolute or unbridled power exercisable at the whims and fancies of the repository of such power. There is nothing like a power without any limits or constraints. That is so even when a Court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary power, for even discretion has to be exercised only along well recognized and sound juristic principles with a view to promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity. 33. The decision making process of respondent No. 2 is itself so flawed that the impugned order cannot be allowed to stand even for a moment. It does not require Solomon’s wisdom to state that it is absolutely sans reasons, bereft of analysis and shorn of appreciation. 34. In addition to what has been stated above, it would also be noticed that while serving notice upon the petitioners, neither the complaint nor the material accompanying the complaint had been provided to the petitioners which is in clear denial of the basic principles of natural justice and fair play. 35. The law is well settled that if prejudicial allegations are made against a person, he must be given particulars of that before hearing, so that he can prepare his defence. 35. The law is well settled that if prejudicial allegations are made against a person, he must be given particulars of that before hearing, so that he can prepare his defence. The fair procedure and principle of natural justice are inbuilt into the rules. As observed earlier, the very purpose of issuing a notice is meant to give a person proceeded against, a reasonable opportunity of making his objection against the proposed action or charges indicated in the notice. Therefore, at that stage, the person proceeded against must be told the charges or proposed action, so that he can give an effective and proper reply to the same. Reply to a notice or show cause notice is not an empty formality because after all justice must not only be done, but it must be manifestly done which principle is equally applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings. The giving of notice containing reasons for the proposed action is after all a basic postulate for compliance of the principles of natural justice. It is axiomatic that unless a party is informed of the reasons for the proposed action, it would be impossible for the noticee to put-forth its point of view with regard to the reasons for the proposed action of notice. It must be adequate so as to enable a party to effectively object or respond to the same. Therefore, in case the respondent No. 2 wanted to rely upon any material which was in his notice, then the petitioners ought to have been put to notice and supplied the same before acting upon it especially when it not only formed the foundation, but the very basis of passing the impugned order. 36. It is high time that respondent No. 2 and other officers of the Municipal Corporation, realise that the public offices both big and small are sacrosanct. Such offices are meant for use and not for abuse and in case repositories of such offices spoils the rule, then the law is not that powerless and would step in to quash such arbitrary orders. 37. The Municipal Corporation being a creation of the statute is admittedly a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and cannot, therefore, act like a private individual, which is free to act in a manner whatsoever he likes, unless it is interdicted by law. 37. The Municipal Corporation being a creation of the statute is admittedly a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and cannot, therefore, act like a private individual, which is free to act in a manner whatsoever he likes, unless it is interdicted by law. It needs no reiteration that the State or its instrumentalities have to strictly fall within the four corners of the law and all its activities are governed by the Rules, Regulations, Instructions etc. 38. Lastly, one of the most important question which unfortunately has not been raised by the petitioners, but still arises for consideration is as to whether respondent No. 2 i.e. Senior Architect Planner was empowered to issue a notice and thereafter pass an order under Section 254(1) of the Act. 39. Section 254(1) of the Act already stands extracted above and it would be evident from the perusal thereof that the only authority empowered and vested with the jurisdiction and authority to issue notice is the ‘Commissioner’ or such authority which may have specifically been vested with the powers of the Commissioner by the State Government. 40. ‘Commissioner’ is defined in Section 2(5) of the Act and reads thus: “2(5). “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of the Corporation appointed by the State Government.” 41. Appointment of the Commissioner is made under Section 45 of the Act and reads thus: “45. Appointment of Commissioner. – (1) The Government shall, by notification, in the Official Gazette, appoint a Class I Officer of the Government having a service as such of ten years, as the Commissioner of the Corporation. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Commissioner so appointed shall hold office for a term of three years in the first instance: Provided that his appointment may be renewed for a term not exceeding three years: Provided further that no officer who has attained the age of superannuation shall be appointed or continued as Commissioner. (3) The Government – (a) shall recall the Commissioner if at a special meeting of the Corporation called for the purpose, a resolution for such recall has been passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members. (b) may in the public interest recall the Commissioner at any time during the term of his appointment.” 42. (b) may in the public interest recall the Commissioner at any time during the term of his appointment.” 42. At this stage, it would be necessary to make note of Section 46 of the Act as therein the State Government has been empowered to appoint Joint/Assistant Commissioner and certain other officers and the Joint/Assistant Commissioner have also been vested with powers and performance of duties as may be conferred and imposed upon the Commissioner under the Act and further delegated to them by the Commissioner as would be evident from bare perusal of Section 46, which reads thus: “46. Appointment of Joint/Assistant Commissioner and certain other officers:- (1) The State Government may, if in its opinion it is expedient to do so in the public interest, appoint a person or persons to be called Joint/Assistant Commissioner appointed under section 45 for the efficient performance of the functions of the Corporation and they shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time. (2) Subject to the approval of the Corporation and rules made in this behalf, the Joint/Assistant Commissioners appointed under sub-section (1) shall be subordinate to the Commissioner and shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred and imposed upon the Commissioner under this Act and are further delegated to them by the Commissioner. (3) There shall be a Legal Advisor-cum-Law Officer to aid and advice the Corporation in all legal matters, to be appointed by the Corporation, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. 43. As already observed above, an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by the statute, must be taken, done or performed in the prescribed manner or not at all. Likewise, when a particular act has to be performed by particular authorities, then it is those authorities alone, who can perform the said Act and nobody else. 44. It is more than settled that an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statute, must be taken, done or performed in the manner prescribed or not at all. 44. It is more than settled that an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statute, must be taken, done or performed in the manner prescribed or not at all. More than eighty years back, the Hon’ble Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the things must be done in that way or not at all and this has been approved and further expanded by the Hon’ble Supreme court in catena of judgments (Refer: Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another vs. State of Vindh-P, AIR 1954 SC 322 ; Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 ; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Others, AIR 1964 SC 358 ; Chandra Kishore Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad, 1999 (8) SCC 266 ; Dhananjaya Reddy vs. State of Karnataka, 2001 (4) SCC 9 ; State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Ambay Cements and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 368 ; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Essar Power Limited, 2008 (4) SCC 755 ; Zuari Cement Ltd vs. Regional Director, ESIC, Hyderabad and Others, AIR 2015 SC 2764 and Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. vs. Sant Singh and Others, 2016 (5) JT 389). 45. The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim “Expressio unius est exclusion alterius” meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following some other course is not permissible. 46. Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation would place strong reliance upon Section 50 of the Act to contend that the powers of the Commissioner can be vested in any other officer and have been so vested in the Architect Planner. Section 50 reads thus: “50. 46. Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation would place strong reliance upon Section 50 of the Act to contend that the powers of the Commissioner can be vested in any other officer and have been so vested in the Architect Planner. Section 50 reads thus: “50. Functions of the Commissioner – Save as otherwise provided in this Act, and subject to supervision and control of the Corporation and its Mayor the executive power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall vest in the Commissioner, who shall also:- (a) exercise all the powers and perform all the duties specifically conferred or imposed upon him by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force; (b) prescribe the duties of and exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all Corporation officers and other Corporation employees, and subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf dispose of all questions relating to the service of the said officers and other employees and their pay, privileges, allowances and other conditions of service; (c) on the occurrence or threatened occurrence of any sudden accident or any unforeseen event or natural calamity involving or likely to involve extensive damage to any property of the Corporation, or danger to human life, take such immediate action in consultation with the Mayor and make a report forthwith to the Corporation of the action he has taken and the reasons for the same as also of the amount of cost, if any, incurred or likely to be incurred in consequence of such action, which is not covered by a budget grant; (d) the Commissioner shall bring to the notice of the Corporation any act or resolution of the Corporation which may be in violation of any Government instructions or the provisions of this Act, provided that if such act or omission of the directions of the Government or the provisions of the Act, as the case may be, is not rectified within 15 days of the communication, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to bring such omission or violation to the notice of the Government.” 47. It is evidently clear from the aforesaid provisions that the same in fact does not and cannot confer the powers of Commissioner upon any authority for the simple reason that the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of his own cannot confer his own powers upon someone else as these powers are only vested with the State who may in exercise of powers conferred under Section 46 vest upon any person like Joint/Assistant Commissioner etc., the powers and duties as conferred and imposed upon the Commissioner under this Act. 48. However, Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, would argue that no objection regarding jurisdiction was ever raised by the petitioners before the authorities below, therefore, this question cannot be gone into by this Court in these proceedings. 49. Even this contention is without merit as the Court cannot be conferred jurisdiction by consent of parties and in case there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, then the order passed by such court is void ab initio, nullity and therefore, is coram-non-judice and the decision amounts to nothing. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another, (2005) 7 SCC 791 , which reads as follows: “29. Ms. Malhotra, then contended that Section 21 of the Code, requires that the objection to the jurisdiction must be taken by the party at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case where the issues are settled at or before settlement of such issues. In the instant case, the suit was filed by the plaintiff in 1988 and written statement was filed by the defendants in 1989 wherein jurisdiction of the court was admitted. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the court in February, 1997. In view of the admission of jurisdiction of court, no issue as to jurisdiction of the court was framed. It was only in 1998 that an application for amendment of written statement was filed raising a plea as to absence of jurisdiction of the court. Both the courts were wholly wrong in allowing the amendment and in ignoring Section 21 of the Code. Our attention in this connection was invited by the learned counsel to Hira Lal vs. Kali Nath, (1962) 2 SCR 747 and Bahrein Petroleum Co. vs. Pappu, 1966 (1) SCR 461 . 30. Both the courts were wholly wrong in allowing the amendment and in ignoring Section 21 of the Code. Our attention in this connection was invited by the learned counsel to Hira Lal vs. Kali Nath, (1962) 2 SCR 747 and Bahrein Petroleum Co. vs. Pappu, 1966 (1) SCR 461 . 30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity. 31. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10, para 317, it is stated: 317. Consent and waiver – Where, by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular claim or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. Where the court has jurisdiction over the particular subject matter of the claim or the particular parties and the only objection is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the court ought to exercise jurisdiction, the parties may agree to give jurisdiction in their particular case; or a defendant by entering an appearance without protest, or by taking steps in the proceedings, may waive his right to object to the court taking cognizance of the proceedings. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. A statute limiting the jurisdiction of a court may contain provisions enabling the parties to extend the jurisdiction by consent." 32.1. In Bahrein Petroleum Co. this Court also held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well-settled and needs no authority that where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non-est and its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. 33. In Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan, (1955) 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340 , this Court declared: "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." (Emphasis supplied) 37. In the instant case, Delhi Court has no jurisdiction since the property is not situate within the jurisdiction of that court. The trial court was, therefore, right in passing an order returning the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. Hence, even though the plaintiff is right in submitting that the defendants had agreed to the jurisdiction of Delhi Court and in the original written statement, they had admitted that Delhi Court had jurisdiction and even after the amendment in the written statement, the paragraph relating to jurisdiction had remained as it was, i.e. Delhi Court had jurisdiction, it cannot take away the right of the defendants to challenge the jurisdiction of the court nor it can confer jurisdiction on Delhi Court, which it did not possess. Since the suit was for specific performance of agreement and possession of immovable property situated outside the jurisdiction of Delhi Court, the trial court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction.” 50. Thus, it is evidently clear that respondent No. 2 has illegally usurped the power, authority and jurisdiction that was not even vested in him and proceeded to pass an order which is without jurisdiction and is coram non judice. Unfortunately, the Appellate Authority failed to notice this aspect of the matter and illegally affirmed the order passed by respondent No. 2. 51. Having said so, I find merit in this petition and the same is allowed and the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 2 dated 2.5.2016 (Annexure P-3) and 7.5.2016 (Annexure P-5) are quashed and set-aside. The pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of. 52. However, before parting, it is made clear that henceforth no officers of the Municipal Corporation shall exercise the powers as are vested only with the Commissioner except where such powers have been specifically conferred by the State Government on the officers like the Joint/Assistant Commissioner etc.