JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. The petitioner is the unsuccessful applicant in O.A. No. 180/00416/2016 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam. He initially joined the Postal Department in 1982 and came up in ranks to be a Senior Superintendent of Post Offices. While he was working at Palakkad, in 2014 the petitioner was deputed and posted as Passport Officer at Malappuram, the tenure being three years, as seen from Annexure A1. 2. On 20.07.2015, the petitioner was suspended under Rule 10 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965: he had been in judicial custody for more than 24 hours on his having been arrested by the Central Bureau of Investigation on the charge of corrupt practices. Assailing Annexure A3 order of suspension, the petitioner filed Annexure A4 departmental appeal, which resulted in his reinstatement through Annexure A5. In fact, the appellate authority revoked the petitioner's suspension through Annexure A6 order dated 08.12.2015, and later he was repatriated. But before the petitioner could be repatriated, perhaps in anticipation, he submitted Annexure A7 representation to the authorities pleading that if the petitioner was to be repatriated, he should be given reasonable time; then, Annexure A6 order of repatriation followed. Eventually, through Annexure A11, the petitioner was allotted to Odisha Circle. Assailing Annexure A6 order of repatriation and Annexure A11 allotment to Odisha Circle, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 180/00416/2016. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal, through its order dated 12.01.2017, refused to interfere. Further aggrieved, the petitioner is before us. 3. Sri N.N. Sugunapalan, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has assailed the Tribunal's Ext.P4 order on two grounds: (1) the repatriation is without any reasons; (2) the petitioner's allotment to Odisha Circle, when about five vacancies are available within the State of Kerala, is totally vindictive and perverse. 4. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned Senior counsel has taken us through the record, especially Annexures A6 and A11 orders. According to him, both the orders are cryptic sans any reason or justification why, in the first place, the petitioner was repatriated and allotted to a distant circle. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that the deputation was neither random nor whimsical: the Department had called for options from eligible employees, subjected them to rigorous selection process, and eventually deputed the successful candidates. As seen from Annexure A2, the deputation, contends the learned Senior Counsel, is tenurial. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that the deputation was neither random nor whimsical: the Department had called for options from eligible employees, subjected them to rigorous selection process, and eventually deputed the successful candidates. As seen from Annexure A2, the deputation, contends the learned Senior Counsel, is tenurial. In this context, he has placed reliance on Union of India and another v. S.N. Maity and another, (2015) 4 SCC 164 to hammer home his contention that the authorities cannot lightly interfere with tenurial deputations. 5. The learned Senior Counsel, in the alternative, has submitted that given the tenure of deputation, the petitioner has legitimately expected that he would be continued in his new assignment until the period of deputation came to an end. In other words, Exts.P6 and P11 orders defeat the petitioner's legitimate expectation. 6. The learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, on the other hand, has submitted that the Tribunal's Ext.P4 order is unassailable. The Tribunal, according to him, has supplied cogent reasons why it has refused to interfere. In elaboration, the learned ASGI has further contended that every transfer cannot be branded punitive merely because an employee has been facing criminal prosecution. It is well established, asserted the learned ASGI, that the administrative exigencies may entail the employer to transfer its staff in the best interest of administration. He emphasizes a well-established legal principle: in a writ of certiorari, the judicial intervention is very limited. And this Court has always been loath to interdict any administrative measure which aids the administrative efficacy. He, therefore, urges us to dismiss the original petition. 7. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, apart from perusing the record. 8. As has rightly been contended by the learned Senior Counsel, there are no disputed questions of fact. The petitioner's singular contention, we reckon, is that both the orders of repatriation and his allotment to what is said to be a distant Circle are devoid of any reason, much less justification. True, both Annexures A6 and A11 are cryptic. We, nevertheless, hasten to add that unless statute mandates that an order, which is essentially administrative, is to be backed up with reasons, this Court is avers to insisting that every step, however routine it may be, needs to be infused with reasons. 9. Here, the petitioner has been facing grave allegations. True, both Annexures A6 and A11 are cryptic. We, nevertheless, hasten to add that unless statute mandates that an order, which is essentially administrative, is to be backed up with reasons, this Court is avers to insisting that every step, however routine it may be, needs to be infused with reasons. 9. Here, the petitioner has been facing grave allegations. Further, he has been only on deputation. It is too well established to be disputed that a deputation continues at the employer's pleasure and the repatriation can take place at any point in time. Legion are the precedents. The Tribunal, in the impugned order, has referred to many of those precedents and has given cogent reason why neither of the orders calls for any interference. 10. At any rate, the learned Senior Counsel has made S.N. Maity the sheet-anchor of his arguments. As seen from the Apex Court's judgment, once a deputation is tenurial, it cannot be interfered with without compelling reasons, which need to be reflected in the very order. Trying to analogize the facts of this case with those in S.N. Maity, the learned Senior Counsel would have us conclude--though the record is laconic and silent--that in this case, too, the deputation is tenurial. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the petitioner faced an examination, got selected, and then deputed. In other words, the deputation is an appointment by deputation, rather than a mere transfer by deputation. 11. There is no cavil that S.S. Maity draws a distinction between deputation by transfer and deputation by appointment. If we were to accept the assertions made across the Bar on their face value, perhaps S.S. Maity would come to the petitioner's rescue. The fact, nevertheless, remains that both before this Court and before the learned Tribunal, the pleadings are laconic and blissfully silent on the mode of deputation. Given the pleadings, the Tribunal has--in our view, rightly--treated the deputation as deputation by transfer and rendered its order accordingly. In a writ of certiorari, this Court is concerned with, usually, a jurisdictional error or an error apparent on the face of the record which, if left undisturbed, would result in manifest injustice and perversity. Such errors as these alone could be interfered with. 12. In a writ of certiorari, this Court is concerned with, usually, a jurisdictional error or an error apparent on the face of the record which, if left undisturbed, would result in manifest injustice and perversity. Such errors as these alone could be interfered with. 12. Even if the petitioner, hypothetically speaking, could try to supply the deficiency in the pleadings about legitimate expectation, that belated effort, regrettably, could not turn the clock back. In this regard, we may profitably refer to U.P. Gram Panchayath Adhikari Sangh & others v. Daya Ram Saroj, (2007) 2 SCC 138 . The Apex Court has held in para 34 of the judgment that unless there is a foundational pleading concerning the legitimate expectation, it cannot be pressed into service. On facts, Daya Ram Saroj reveals that the employee, at the appellate stage urged, belatedly, the ground of legitimate expectation; it was, perhaps, inspired by the High Court's observation that the appellant ought to have pleaded legitimate expectation. When the High Court took that plea into account, the Supreme Court has held that such an approach is impermissible. To hold thus, the Apex Court has quoted with approval National Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66 . 13. As we have already noted, this Court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction does not concern itself with the errors of fact or even, for that matter, errors of law except those, for instance, apparent on the face of record, or those resulting in perversity of findings, or those causing manifest injustice. Once the Tribunal has justifiably rendered an order on the strength of the pleadings before it, with the additional materials supplied subsequently, this Court cannot re-visit the impugned order and invalidate it. We, therefore, express our inability to apply the ratio of S.N. Maity to the facts of this case. 14. Further, examining the scope of deputation and the right a deputed employee could have, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1990 SC 1132 has held that an employee on deputation could be reverted to his parent cadre at any time and he does not get any substantial right. 15. In sum, it cannot be said that the petitioner's is a punitive transfer. Further, for reasons essentially administrative, the Department has repatriated the petitioner and allotted him to Odisha Circle. 15. In sum, it cannot be said that the petitioner's is a punitive transfer. Further, for reasons essentially administrative, the Department has repatriated the petitioner and allotted him to Odisha Circle. To a specific query, the learned Senior Counsel has fairly submitted that the petitioner holds an all India Cadre post, and he could as well be transferred on an all India basis. 16. At any rate, the petitioner's contention remains that given the vacancies existing in the State of Kerala, there does not seem to be any compelling reason for the authority to transfer him to Odisha, a distant place. That said, we should also acknowledge that it lies in the realm of administrative discretion in what manner and at which place it can use its employees' services. This Court has the least say in those matters. 17. Before parting with the matter, we may consider the petitioner's alternative plea: given what is said to be the hardship faced by the petitioner and given the-middle-of-the-year transfer, we observe that once the petitioner joins at the place he has been posted, he is free to request the authorities to post him to a nearer place, preferably in the State of Kerala, where posts are still vacant. Then, the authorities may consider the petitioner's request. We, however, hasten to add that this observation does not amount to any judicial suggestion or recommendation; the authorities may exercise their discretion unfettered and decide according to law. We, therefore, dismiss this original petition. No order on costs.