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2017 DIGILAW 2006 (JHR)

Prem Kumar v. Bokaro Steel Limited

2017-11-22

PRAMATH PATNAIK

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JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the instant writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing order dated 20.9.2006 issued by Managing Director, communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 22.11.2006 whereby appeal preferred by the petitioner against order of dismissal dated 8.1.1993 has been dismissed confirming the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and further prayer has been made for quashing order dated 8.1.1993 pertaining to dismissal of the petitioner from services. The petitioner has further prayed for direction upon the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in services with all consequential benefits. 2. The factual matrix, as delineated in the writ application, is that initially the petitioner was appointed by the respondents-authorities on the post of Casual Khalasi in the year 1985. It is alleged that for obtaining employment, the petitioner submitted his Original Caste Certificate issued by District Welfare Officer, Begusarai, in which, the petitioner's Caste was mentioned as 'Pasi'. However, on the basis of complaint that the caste certificate produced' by the petitioner is forged one, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, which resulted in dismissal of the petitioner from services. It has further been averred that B.D.O., Balia, Begusarai had lodged an F.I.R. against the petitioner being Balia P.S. Case No. 88 of 1989 (G.R. No. 1337 of 1989) under Sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, in which, the petitioner was acquitted vide judgment dated 11.3.1998. After acquittal from the aforesaid criminal case, the petitioner submitted representation to the respondents-authorities for reinstatement in services with back wages, but it fell on deaf ear, hence, the petitioner knocked the door of this Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 1475 of 2000(R), which was disposed of vide order dated 14.7.2006 with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal and respondents were directed to dispose of the appeal within a period of three months from the date of order. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.11.2006 confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority as well as by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has approached this Court for redressal of his grievances under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Heard Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority as well as by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has approached this Court for redressal of his grievances under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Heard Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disciplinary authority without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, proceeded with the departmental proceeding and passed the impugned; thereby there has been breach of principles of natural justice and violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in view of acquittal in the criminal case, the respondents-authorities ought to have considered the petitioner's case in proper prospective but they did not consider this fact. 6. Controverting the averments made in the writ application, counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents wherein it has been submitted that in spite of ample opportunity being afforded to the petitioner during the course of enquiry proceeding, the petitioner for the reasons best known to him did not produce any certificate from B.D.O. to substantiate that he belongs to Scheduled Caste rather he brought an• affidavit from Executive Magistrate to the effect that he belongs to Pasi Caste. It has further been submitted that in the order-sheet of domestic enquiry proceeding it is clearly mentioned that aforesaid affidavit would not supersede the report of. District Welfare Officer, as the affidavit filed by the petitioner was a self-saying statement being certified by Executive Magistrate. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that domestic enquiry proceeded on independent basis and acquittal in the criminal case, that too in absence of sufficient proof, cannot be a ground for reinstatement. It has further been averred that the dismissal order was passed on the materials brought on record during the course of domestic enquiry proceedings, which clearly established that the charges levelled against the petitioner and as such acquittal in criminal case cannot justify setting aside or quashing the order of dismissal. 7. Mr. It has further been averred that the dismissal order was passed on the materials brought on record during the course of domestic enquiry proceedings, which clearly established that the charges levelled against the petitioner and as such acquittal in criminal case cannot justify setting aside or quashing the order of dismissal. 7. Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents has reiterated the submissions made in the counter affidavit and submitted that it is not the case where there is any procedural irregularity in conducting the departmental proceeding or there is procedural lacuna while deciding the appeal; hence, the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by appellate authority does not warrant interference by this Court. 8. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and on perusal of materials available on record, it appears that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference due to following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements: (i) On threadbare examination of pleadings of the parties and documents available on record; there is absolutely no infirmity in the departmental proceeding so far as findings of the enquiry officer is concerned which proves that the charges levelled against the petitioner has been proved. In that view of the matter, the scope of interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not warranted. (ii) View of this Court gets fortified by the decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and Others vs. Raj Kishore Yadav and Another as reported in (2006)5 SCC 673 wherein at paragraph 4 it has been held that: "4. ........ It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed.........." (iii) It is also well settled position of law that acquittal in criminal case will not ipso facto entail reinstatement in services, as in criminal case yardstick is totally different that of in disciplinary proceeding. In criminal proceeding the yardstick is to prove beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in disciplinary proceeding, the yardstick is preponderance of probability. In criminal proceeding the yardstick is to prove beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in disciplinary proceeding, the yardstick is preponderance of probability. Even if a person is acquitted in criminal case, he can be found guilty in departmental proceeding. Furthermore, in the case at hand, the charges in the criminal case and departmental proceeding are not same and similar. Therefore, the acquittal of the petitioner in criminal proceeding does not come to rescue the petitioner in disciplinary proceeding. View of this Court gets fortified by the decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Inspector General of Police vs. S. Samuthiram as reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 . (iv) Apart from that order of dismissal was passed in the year 1993 and by that time now 23 years has elapsed and by efflux of time, the grievances of the petitioner virtually has become infructuous. 9. As a cumulative effect of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements and as a logical sequitur to the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, being devoid of any merit.