Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. , Mumbai v. State of M. P.
2017-02-07
VIVEK RUSIA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Petitioner has filed the present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 21-3-2016 passed by Naib Tehsildar, Dhar in Miscellaneous Application No. 6/14/SARFAESI. 2. Facts of the case are as under. That Mission Vivacare Ltd. was advanced various credit facilities by the petitioner/bank. Petitioner/bank extended the facilities of foreign bill purchase, foreign bill discounting, post shipment credit in foreign currency, overdraft facility, sales invoice finance, consortium finance, export packing credit etc. The working capital facility like export packing credit was advanced by the petitioner/bank in consortium with the sub banker like SBI, State Bank of Indore, Union Bank of India, Corporation Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Axis Bank etc. The term loan facility was extended by the bank in consortium with SBI and State Bank of Indore. 3. In order to secure the above mentioned facilities plot Nos. 16 and 14 situated in SEZ area of Dhar were mortgaged along with certain movable fixed assets. 4. On account of default in payment of loan/debt petitioner initiated recovery proceeding in respect of the secured assets which are contemplated under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. 5. Petitioner filed an application before the District Magistrate on 17-6-2014 under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act seeking assistance from taking possession of the secured assets. By order dated 24-9-2014 the District Magistrate has allowed the said application by directing the SDM, district Dhar to take vacant possession of the secured assets but no action was taken then petitioner submitted applications to the District Magistrate and the SDM complaining non compliance of the order dated 13-9-2015. Finally SDM issued direction to the Naib Tehsildar vide letter dated 7-11-2015 to comply the order of the District Magistrate and obtained the possession by taking police assistance. Vide impugned order dated 21-3-2016 the Naib Tehsildar has refused to take possession and to comply the order dated 24-9-2014 on the ground that one RRC is pending for recovery of certain amount from these secured assets. The RRC issued in favour of the respondent No. 4 is already pending for recovery of certain amount from these two secured assets. Hence, petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order of the Naib Tehsildar on the ground that Naib Tehsildar has acted beyond his jurisdiction and the authority by non-complying the order of the District Magistrate.
The RRC issued in favour of the respondent No. 4 is already pending for recovery of certain amount from these two secured assets. Hence, petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order of the Naib Tehsildar on the ground that Naib Tehsildar has acted beyond his jurisdiction and the authority by non-complying the order of the District Magistrate. It is further submitted that the Naib Tehsildar is only required to execute the order passed by the District Magistrate and not to adjudicate the issue between the parties. 6. After notice respondents No. 1 to 3 filed return in which it is submitted that before the Registrar there were two orders for recovery of certain amount in pursuant to order passed under the SARFAESI Act as well as award passed under the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘the MSMED Act’). Both the Acts are Central Acts hence the core question before the Tehsildar was that which Act would prevail. It is submitted that the MSMED Act is a special enactment having overriding effects for all Act, therefore, Tehsildar has rightly declined to act under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. 7. Respondent No. 4 who tiled the application for intervention in this petition was permitted to be impleaded as respondent No. 4. That respondent No. 4 is a small scale industry having registered with DIC, Indore. Respondent No. 4 approached Facilitation Council under the MSMED Act and whose favour award for recovery of amount of Rs. 8394584/- including interest up to 18-7-2014 has been passed. Against the said award no appeal has been preferred, therefore, the said amount is liable to be recovered by way of RRC through Collector. While executing the said decree it came to the knowledge of the Tehsildar that there is an order passed by the District Magistrate under the SARFAESI Act. In order to remove the confusion respondent No. 4 made representation to the Facilitation Council with request that Collector be directed to comply the recovery proceeding in accordance with the rules framed under the MSMED Act. The Council vide order dated 17-5-2015 has clarified that respondent No. 4 has the first charge over the property of Mission Vivacare Ltd. i.e. at plot No. 14 and 16 and the amount under the award is liable to be recovered from these properties.
The Council vide order dated 17-5-2015 has clarified that respondent No. 4 has the first charge over the property of Mission Vivacare Ltd. i.e. at plot No. 14 and 16 and the amount under the award is liable to be recovered from these properties. It is further submitted that Bombay High Court has appointed official liquidator in a winding up proceeding against the Mission Vivacare in company petition No. 479/2011. Now it is for the petitioner/bank to approach the official liquidator. Respondent No. 4 has also filed application before the official liquidator on the basis of the award in his favour. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. That in favour of the petitioner District Magistrate has passed the order dated 24-9-2014 under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. In favour of the respondent No. 4 award was passed by the facilitation council on 10-9-2014 i.e. prior to the order passed by the DM, Dhar in favour of the petitioner, therefore, Naib Tehsildar in his order dated 21-4-2016 has declined to hand over possession to the petitioner by rejecting his claim and continued with the recovery proceeding under the award dated 11-9-2014 in favour of respondent No. 4. The questions involved in this petition is (i) whether the action of the Naib Tehsildar is justified in deciding the claim between petitioner and respondent No. 4? (ii) Whether order passed under SARFAESI Act would prevail or award passed under the MSMED Act would prevail? Both the Acts are Central Acts. 10. The SARFAESI Act was enacted with the aim and object to facilitate the bank and the financial institutions in India to take possession of security and sale them for recovery of their loan and dues without intervention by the Court. Under section 13 the secured creditor may enforce their rights without intervention of the Court or Tribunal against the creditor in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full then the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more measures to recover his secured debt namely by taking possession of the secured assets including the right to transfer by way of lease assignment or sale or to appoint Manager to manage the secured assets.
If the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full then the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more measures to recover his secured debt namely by taking possession of the secured assets including the right to transfer by way of lease assignment or sale or to appoint Manager to manage the secured assets. Where the possession of any secured assets is required to be taken by the secured creditor or if any secured asset is required to sold or transfer the secured creditor may request in writing the District Magistrate by way of application. The Magistrate on such application may take possession of such assets and document and forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor. Any person aggrieved by any measure of recovery under sub section 4 of section 13 taken by the secured creditor may make an application before the DRT and thereafter remedy of appeal is also provided to the appellate Tribunal. The power under section 13 and 14 have given to the secured creditor in which there is no intervention of the Court. Even District Magistrate has been given power to adjudicate any dispute. 11. The Central Government has also enacted MSMED Act to facilitate promotion and development and enhancement to the micro small and medium enterprises and to the matter connected there with. The mechanism has been provided under this Act for recovery of their dues if any buy or refuse to make payment within time to the supplier who is micro or small enterprise defined under section 2(n). The State Government has constituted a Facilitation Council under section 18 to adjudicate the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Council is competent to pass the award in favour of the supplier and the same is liable to be challenged under section 19 before the district Court but no application for setting aside any decree or award made by the council shall be entertained unless the appellant i.e. buy or deposits 75% of the amount in terms of the decree and award. All these provisions have been made to secure interests of the micro and small enterprise.
All these provisions have been made to secure interests of the micro and small enterprise. Provisions of section 15 to 23 shall have over riding effect not with standing in consistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, therefore, the question would be which Act would prevail in this matter. The Apex Court in the case of Pegasus Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. v. Haryana Concast Ltd., reported in 2017 (1) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 25 has held that the secured creditor has a right to enforce its security interest without intervention of the Court or Tribunal under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. In the said case the company was under liquidation under the provisions of the Companies Act, therefore, the Apex Court has held that in the case of grievances the borrower who is in the case of company under liquidation would mean a liquidator will have a right to seek redressal under section 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Para-17 and 25 of the said order is reproduced below: 17. In contrast, the SARFAESI Act was enacted in 2002 to regulate securitization and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Inter-alia, one of the main objects of this Act is to clothe the banks and financial institutions in India with power to take possession of securities and sell them. All its significant provisions have been noted in detail in Mardia Chemicals in which vires of this Act was examined and upheld. A reading of sections 9 and 13 of the SARFAESI Act leaves no manner of doubt that for enforcement of its security interest, a secured creditor has been not only vested with powers to do so without the intervention of the Court or tribunal but detailed procedure has also been prescribed to take care of various eventualities such as when the borrower company is under liquidation for which proviso to sub-section (9) of section 13 contains clear mandate keeping in view the provisions of section 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956.
Since significant amendments were introduced in section 529 while inserting section 529-A through Amendment Act 35 of 1985, effective from 24-5-1985 and with the aid of a non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 529-A workmen's dues were given preference over other dues and made to stand pari passu with dues of the secured creditors, in case of apparent conflict, this Court through various judgments has upheld the proceedings under the RDB Act as it happens to be a later Act with overriding effect over other laws. The interest of the workmen in respect of dues payable to them as per section 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act has been protected by permitting, wherever necessary, association of the Official Liquidator with the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the RDB Act. In our considered judgment, the same view is required to be taken in context of SARFAESI Act also, for the additional reason that section 13 requires notice to the borrower at various stages which in the case of a company under winding up being a borrower would mean requirement of notice to the Official Liquidator. The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for brevity, ‘the Rules’) framed under the provisions of SARFAESI Act also require notice upon the borrower or his agent at different stages. For sale of immovable secured assets, as per Rule 8, the authorized officer can take possession by delivering a Possession Notice to the borrower and by affixing Possession Notice on the outer door or at some conspicuous place of the property. Before the sale also, the authorized officer is required to serve to the borrower a notice of 30 days. Thus the Rules also ensure that the Official Liquidator is in knowledge of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act in case the borrower happens to be a company under winding up. As a borrower, the Official Liquidator has ample opportunity to get the details of the workers dues as ascertained under the Companies Act, placed before the authorized officer and seek proper distribution of the amount realised from the sale of secured assets in accordance with various provisos under sub-section (9) of section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. 25.
As a borrower, the Official Liquidator has ample opportunity to get the details of the workers dues as ascertained under the Companies Act, placed before the authorized officer and seek proper distribution of the amount realised from the sale of secured assets in accordance with various provisos under sub-section (9) of section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. 25. The aforesaid view commends itself to us also because of clear intention of the Parliament expressed in section 13 of the SARFAESI Act that a secured creditor has the right to enforce its security interest without the intervention of the Court or tribunal. At the same time, this Act takes care that in case of grievance, the borrower, which in the case of a company under liquidation would mean the liquidator, will have the right of seeking redressal under sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Madras Petrochem Limited v. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, reported in 2016 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 4 : (2016) 4 SCC 1 has decided the controversy between provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the SARFAESI Act and held that the secured creditor can realise his dues under the SARFAESI Act not with standing the provisions of section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is further held that not with standing non-obstante clauses in the Act of 1985 will have to give way to the measures taken under the SARFAESI Act. Para-36 to 44 of the said order is reproduced below:— 36. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions shows that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 prevails in all situations where there are earlier enactments with non-obstante clauses similar to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Where there are later enactments with similar non-obstante clauses, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has been held to prevail only in a situation where the reach of the non-obstante clause in the later Act is limited - such as in the case of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - or in the case of the later Act expressly yielding to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, as in the case of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
Where such is not the case, as in the case of Special Courts Act, 1992, it is the Special Courts Act, 1992 which was held to prevail over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 37. We have now to undertake an analysis of the Acts in question. The first thing to be noticed is the difference between section 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and section 34 of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 does not include the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 unlike section 34(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due To Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 37 of the Securities and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 states that the said Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of four Acts, namely, the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. It is clear that the first three Acts deal with securities generally and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 deals with recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. Interestingly, section 41 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 makes amendments in three Acts - the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, and the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is of great significance that only the first two Acts are included in section 37 and not the third i.e. the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. This is for the obvious reason that the framers of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 intended that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be covered by the non-obstante clause contained in section 35, and not by the exception thereto carved out by section 37. Further, whereas the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is expressly mentioned in section 37, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is not, making the above position further clear.
Further, whereas the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is expressly mentioned in section 37, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is not, making the above position further clear. And this is in stark contrast, as has been stated above, to section 34(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which expressly included the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The new legislative scheme qua recovery of debts contained in the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has therefore to be given precedence over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, unlike the old scheme for recovery of debts contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 38. Another interesting pointer to the same conclusion is the fact that section 35 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is not made subject to section 37 of the said Act. This statutory scheme is at complete variance with the statutory scheme contained in section 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 in which sub-section (1) of section 34 containing the non-obstante clause is expressly made subject to sub-section (2) (containing the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985) by the expression “save as provided under sub-section (2)”. 39. This is what then brings us to the doctrine of harmonious construction, which is one of the para mount doctrines that is applied in interpreting all statutes. Since neither section 35 nor section 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is subject to the other, we think it is necessary to interpret the expression “or any other law for the time being in force” in section 37. If a literal meaning is given to the said expression, section 35 will become completely otiose as all other laws will then be in addition to and not in derogation of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Obviously this could not have been the Parliamentary intendment, after providing in section 35 that the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 will prevail over all other laws that are inconsistent therewith.
Obviously this could not have been the Parliamentary intendment, after providing in section 35 that the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 will prevail over all other laws that are inconsistent therewith. A middle ground has therefore necessarily to be taken. According to us, the two apparently conflicting sections can best be harmonized by giving meaning to both. This can only be done by limiting the scope of the expression “or any other law for the time being in force” contained in section 37. This expression will therefore have to be held to mean other laws having relation to the securities market only, as the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is the only other special law, apart from the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, dealing with recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. On this interpretation also, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will not be included for the obvious reason that its primary objective is to rehabilitate sick industrial companies and not to deal with the securities market. 40. An interesting pointer to the direction Parliament has taken after enactment of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is also of some relevance in this context. The Eradi Committee Report relating to insolvency and winding up of companies dated 31-7-2000, observed that out of 3068 cases referred to the BIFR from 1987 to 2000 all but 1062 cases have been disposed of. Out of the cases disposed of, 264 cases were revived, 375 cases were under negotiation for revival process, 741 cases were recommended for winding up, and 626 cases were dismissed as not maintainable. These facts and figures speak for themselves and place a big question mark on the utility of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Committee further pointed out that effectiveness of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 as has been pointed out earlier, has been severely undermined by reason of the enormous delays involved in the disposal of cases by the BIFR. (See paragraphs 5.8, 5.9 and 5.15 of the Report).
The Committee further pointed out that effectiveness of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 as has been pointed out earlier, has been severely undermined by reason of the enormous delays involved in the disposal of cases by the BIFR. (See paragraphs 5.8, 5.9 and 5.15 of the Report). Consequently, the Committee recommended that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be repealed and the provisions thereunder for revival and rehabilitation should be telescoped into the structure of the Companies Act, 1956 itself. 41. Pursuant to the Eradi Committee report, the Companies Act was amended in 2002 by providing for the constitution of a National Company Law Tribunal as a substitute for the Company Law Board, the High Court, the BIFR and the AAIFR. The Eradi Committee Report was further given effect to by inserting sections 424-A to 424-H into the Companies Act, 1956 which, with a few changes, mirrored the provisions of sections 15 to 21 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Interestingly, the Companies Amendment Act of 2002 omitted a provision similar to section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Consequently, creditors were given liberty to file suits or initiate other proceedings for recovery of dues despite pendency of proceedings for the revival or rehabilitation of sick companies before the National Company Law Tribunal. 42. This 2002 Amendment Act came under challenge, which challenge culminated in the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. R, Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1 by which the amendments were upheld, with certain changes recommended by the Constitution Bench of this Court. 43. Close on the heels of the amendment made to the Companies Act came the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003. This particular Act was meant to repeal the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 consequent to some of its provisions being telescoped into the Companies Act. Thus, the Companies Amendment Act of 2002 and the SICA Repeal Act formed part of one legislative scheme, and neither has yet been brought into force. In fact, even the Companies Act, 2013, which repeals the Companies Act, 1956, contains Chapter 19 consisting of sections 253 to 269 dealing with revival and rehabilitation of sick companies along the lines of sections 424-A to 424-H of the amended Companies Act, 1956.
In fact, even the Companies Act, 2013, which repeals the Companies Act, 1956, contains Chapter 19 consisting of sections 253 to 269 dealing with revival and rehabilitation of sick companies along the lines of sections 424-A to 424-H of the amended Companies Act, 1956. Conspicuous by its absence is a provision akin to section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 in the 2013 Act. However, this Chapter is also yet to be brought into force. These statutory provisions, though not yet brought into force, are also an important pointer to the fact that section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has been statutorily sought to be excluded, Parliament veering around from wanting to protect sick industrial companies and rehabilitate them to giving credence to the public interest contained in the recovery of public monies owing to banks and financial institutions. These provisions also show that the aforesaid construction of the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 vis-a-vis the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, leans in favour of creditors being able to realize their debts outside the Court process over sick industrial companies being revived or rehabilitated. In fact, another interesting document is the Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2011–2012 for the year ended 30-6-2012 submitted by the Reserve Bank of India to the Central Government in terms of section 36(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In table IV. 14 the report provides statistics regarding trends in Non-performing Assets bank-wise, group-wise. As per the said table, the opening balance of Nonperforming Assets in public sector banks for the year 2011–2012 was Rs. 746 billion but the closing balance for 2011–2012 was Rs. 1,172 billion only. The total amount recovered through the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 during 2011–2012 registered a decline compared to the previous year, but, even then, the amounts recovered under the said Act constituted 70 percent of the total amount recovered. The amounts recovered under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 constituted only 28 per cent.
The amounts recovered under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 constituted only 28 per cent. All this would go to show that the amounts that public sector banks and financial institutions have to recover are in staggering figures and at long last at least one statutory measure has proved to be of some efficacy. This Court would be loathe to give such an interpretation as would thwart the recovery process under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 which Act alone seems to have worked to some extent at least. 44. It will thus be seen that notwithstanding the non-obstante clauses in section 22(1) and (4), read with section 32, section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will have to give way to the measures taken under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 more particularly referred to in section 13 of the said Act, and that this being the case, the sale notices issued both in 2003 and 2013 could continue without in any manner being thwarted by section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 13. The Bombay High Court in the case of JM Financial Asset Reconstruction Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra through Chief Secretary in W.P. No. 4948/2013 dated 25-11-2016 has decided the controversy that the SARFAESI Act is having over riding effect over the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958. The final conclusion is drawn in para 42 of the order which is reproduced below: 42. In view of the forgoing discussion, we hold that the secured creditor, as defined under the provisions of SARFAESI Act can exercise its statutory rights under section 13 thereof notwithstanding the fact that the borrower has got a notification issued in its favour under the provisions of BRU Act which suspends all its obligations and liabilities to secured creditor. Having held so, we also set aside the impugned letter dated 6th June, 2013 issued by Respondent No. 3. 14. In view of above the law laid down by the Apex Court the provisions of SARFAESI Act would prevail over any other enactment hence the Tehsildar has rightly decided the issue in favour of respondent No. 4. 15.
Having held so, we also set aside the impugned letter dated 6th June, 2013 issued by Respondent No. 3. 14. In view of above the law laid down by the Apex Court the provisions of SARFAESI Act would prevail over any other enactment hence the Tehsildar has rightly decided the issue in favour of respondent No. 4. 15. The another question came that the MSMED Act is a later Act than the SARFAESI Act, therefore, this Act should prevail. Before the MSMED Act, the Act called Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industries Undertaking Act, 1993 (32 of 1993) was in force which was repealed by virtue of section 32 by MSMED Act, 2006 and all such action taken under the Act of 1993 have been treated to be taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act of 2006, therefore, the MSMED Act of 2006 is not a new Act but it is in continuation of the Act of 1993, therefore, the provisions of the Securitization Act, 2002 is treated to be later Act hence would prevail. The impugned order of the Tehsildar is set aside. If the respondent No. 4 is aggrieved by the order passed by the District Magistrate under section 14 and the measures taken under section 13(4) by the petitioner he may prefer application under section 17 before the DRT. 16. With the aforesaid, petition is allowed. No order as to costs.