JUDGMENT & ORDER : This batch of five appeals and one cross-objection arising out of the same vehicular accident and involving a common question of facts and of law were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The common question of law involved is whether the deceased and injured, for which claim petitions were filed, are gratuitous passengers or not. 2. To simplify the controversy, I will first deal with MAC Appeal No. 15 of 2015, which arose out of T.S. (MAC) No. 252 of 2012, and thereafter apply my decision, to the extent possible, to the facts of the remaining appeals. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on 12-4-2012 at about 6.30 AM, when the deceased (Matiya Tripura) boarding the Maxi truck bearing registration No. TR-01-P-1674 proceeding from Wanasapara to Gandacherra market along with jhum products for selling them in the market, reached a place called Hatirmatha, the driver lost control of the vehicle due to rash and negligent driving and fell into deep gorge by the side of the road. As a result, the deceased died at the spot. The deceased was said to be 34 years old, was a registered Government labourer holding a job card with a monthly income of Rs. 4,000/-. The claimant No. 1a to1f are the children of the deceased, while the claimant No. 2 is her husband and filed a compensation of Rs. 7,10,000/- for her death. 3. The claim petition was resisted by the owner of the vehicle (the appellant herein) and the Insurance Company, who filed their respective written objections. In the written objection, the appellant denied that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and that as the vehicle was insured with the insurer (respondent 8 herein), any liability or payment of compensation shall be satisfied by the respondent No. 8. In its written statement, the appellant denied and disputed the claims of the claimants and contended that the Mahindra Max Pick-Up truck was a goods carrying vehicle, which had carried at least 31 persons; the Tribunal was informed to that effect by Gandacherra Police Station. This was in violation of the conditions of the insurance policy and no liability, therefore, could be shifted upon it. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. This was in violation of the conditions of the insurance policy and no liability, therefore, could be shifted upon it. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Did Motiya Tripura sustain any injury on 12-4-2012 at about 6.30 AM at Hatirmatha on Gandacherra Hatirmatha road under Gandacherra P.S. in a road traffic accident involving Maxi truck bearing No. TR-01-P-1674 due to its rash and negligent driving resulting in her death on the same day? 2. Did (Was?) Motiya Tripura was (?) travelling in the vehicle? If so, was she travelling as owner of the goods carried in the vehicle or that (as?) gratuitous passenger? 3. Are the claimants entitled to be compensated under the provisions of the M.V. Act, 1988? If so, to what extent and who shall be liable to pay the same? 5. At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal passed the impugned order accepting the contention of the insurer that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger and proceeded to fasten the liability to satisfy the award amounting to Rs. 5,10,800/- together with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition upon the appellant. Aggrieved by this, this appeal has been preferred by the owner of the vehicle. Since the first point for consideration in this appeal is whether the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, I will straightway reproduce below the findings of the Tribunal to this effect: “The stand of the Insurance Company is that the policy did not cover any person carried as passenger in the vehicle it being a goods carrying vehicle. In this regard, learned counsel of the Insurance Company, laid stress on the police report wherein it is concluded that the vehicle was moving with 33 passengers including the driver whereas the capacity of the vehicle was 3 (1+2) passengers. The police report does not say that these persons were carrying goods. It rather says that they were travelling as passengers. Obviously, all these persons will not be covered even by the amended provision of Section 147 of the Act w.e.f. 14-11-1994 to the effect that the liability shall cover the injury caused to any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle because coverage of persons was 3 (1+2). Obviously, all these persons will not be covered even by the amended provision of Section 147 of the Act w.e.f. 14-11-1994 to the effect that the liability shall cover the injury caused to any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle because coverage of persons was 3 (1+2). So, in the circumstances of the case, the liability of satisfying the award cannot be shifted upon the Insurance Company.” 6. Mr. A Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the Tribunal has grossly erred in relying upon the police report which was never exhibited by the author of the report to hold that the persons boarding the vehicle were not carrying goods, but were travelling as passengers. He relies on the decision of this Court in Rampati Chakma v. Sunil Kuam Ram and ors, (2016) 2 TLR 975 and Puspa Das and ors. V. Sankar Deb and ors., (2014) 2 TLR 14 to support his contention in this behalf. According to the learned counsel, the evidence adduced by the claimant No. 7 (husband of the deceased), who was examined as PW-1 has categorically deposed that on the relevant date, a group of villagers and his wife, the late Motiya Tripura, carried agricultural/jhum goods with them for selling the same in the Gandacherra market, boarded the vehicle as owner of goods and paid the fare of the goods at the starting point of the journey from village Wanasa Para and in the absence of denial by the insurer, the Tribunal ought to have held that the deceased was travelling in the vehicle as owner of the goods. He further submits that the statement of PW-1 was fully corroborated by PW-2 and PW-3. He, therefore, contends that the Tribunal is completely wrong in holding that the liability to satisfy the award could not be fastened upon the insured. Strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel upon National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bommithi Subbhayamma and others, 2005 ACJ 721, Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prem Bai and others, 2016 ACJ 1634 and Gian Vati and others v. Pushpa Devi and another, 2016 ACJ 2317 to fortify his submissions. He, therefore, prays that the impugned award should be set aside in so far as the insurer is held to be not liable to satisfy the award. 7. Ltd. v. Prem Bai and others, 2016 ACJ 1634 and Gian Vati and others v. Pushpa Devi and another, 2016 ACJ 2317 to fortify his submissions. He, therefore, prays that the impugned award should be set aside in so far as the insurer is held to be not liable to satisfy the award. 7. Refuting the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. P. Gautam, the learned counsel for the cross-objector/insurer, contends that the decision of the Tribunal was based on the materials on evidence and exhibited documents such FIR and charge sheet filed by the police in connection with the accident, which are clearly admissible in evidence and, as such, the impugned judgment is not liable to be interfered with. Drawing my attention to the registration certificate of the vehicle, the insurance policy and the police report, the learned counsel submits that there can be no dispute that the vehicle in question was goods carrying vehicle with a seating capacity of 1+2 = 3 and could not have insured 31 passengers including the deceased. He maintains that the deceased was merely a gratuitous passenger and the Tribunal correctly held that the cross-objector is not liable to satisfy the award and that the appellant was rather liable to pay the compensation to the claimants. In support of his contentions, he relies on National Insurance Co. v. Prema Devi, 2008 AIR SCW 2023, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Choletti Bharatamma and others, (2008) 1 SCC 423 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vedwati, 2007 AIR SCW 1505 and Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2877 . 8. In my opinion, the law as to whether the insurance company is liable to pay compensation for the death/injury of gratuitous passengers or owner of goods or his representative is no longer res integra after the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003) 2 SCC 223 . Earlier, I have an occasion to deal with the same question of law in MAC Appeal No.144 of 2012 and another (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Khudiram and another) and after going through the various decisions of the Apex Court, particularly, Asha Rani case (supra), I held as follows: “In the instant case, the undisputed fact is that the injured was travelling in a goods vehicle. Ltd. v. Khudiram and another) and after going through the various decisions of the Apex Court, particularly, Asha Rani case (supra), I held as follows: “In the instant case, the undisputed fact is that the injured was travelling in a goods vehicle. The incident took place on 24-7-2010 i.e. after the amendment of Section 147(1)(b)(i) the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 in 1994, which inserted the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” after the words “against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death or bodily”. This effect of this amendment came up for consideration before the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 . The Apex Court held as follows: “10. The proviso to the said sub-section is not relevant here as it pertains to death or bodily injury to the employee mentioned therein. Sub-section (2) provides that a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely: “(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand: Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier.” Hence, under sub-section (2), there is no upper limitation for the insurer regarding the amount of compensation awarded in respect of death or bodily injury of a victim of the accident. It is, therefore, apparent that the limit contained in the old Act has been removed and the policy should insure the liability incurred and cover injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle. The legislature has also taken care of even the policies which were in force on the date of commencement of the Act by specifically providing that any policy of insurance containing any limit regarding the insurer’s liability shall continue to be effective for a period of four months from commencement of the Act or till the date of expiry of such policy, whichever is earlier. This means, after the said period of four months, a new insurance policy consistent with the new Act is required to be obtained. 11. The result is that under the new Act an insurance policy covering third-party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class. Hence the decisions rendered under the old Act vis-à-vis gratuitous passengers are of no avail while considering the liability of the insurance company in respect of any accident which occurred or would occur after the new Act came into force.” (Underlined for emphasis) 9. Thus, in terms of Satpal Singh case, even gratuitous passengers including owner of goods or his representative were deemed to be covered by the Insurance Policy and were, therefore, entitled to be paid compensation by the insurer by indemnifying the owner of the vehicle. However, this decision was reviewed by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003) 2 SCC 223 . This is what the Apex Court said: “8. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the requirements of policies and limits of liability had been provided in Section 95. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a goods vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (1999) 1 SCC 403 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 58 while approving the earlier decision of the Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi case Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745 the Court construed the provisions of Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that while the expression “any person” and the expression “every motor vehicle” are in wide terms but by proviso (ii) it restricts the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, therefore, the vehicle had to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried. The Court further held that the goods vehicle cannot be held to be a passenger vehicle even if the vehicle was found to be used on some stray occasions for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Undoubtedly, Mallawwa case (1999) 1 SCC 403 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 58 was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 9**. In Satpal case1 the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46, by which the expression “injury to any person” in the original Act stood substituted by the expression “injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle”, the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression “to any person” it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression “including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle” which was added to the pre-existing expression “injury to any person” is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal case New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 ; 2000 SCC(Cri) 130 therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. (Italics mine) 10. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. (Italics mine) 10. Thus, the decision in Satpal Singh case that even a gratuitous passengers including owner of goods or his representative are deemed to be covered by the Insurance Policy and are, therefore, entitled to be paid compensation by the insurer by indemnifying the owner of the vehicle, does not seem to be, with due respect, the correct law when the three-Judge Bench in Asha Rani unambiguously held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of the goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. This decision was followed by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v Bhukya Tara and others, (2010) 14 SCC 768 . That was a case where the deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle. The Apex Court held that the case was squarely covered by the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Asha Rani (supra). 11. An attempt was, however, made by Mr. A. Nandi, the learned counsel for the claimants that as there was solid proof that the deceased was travelling the vehicle along with his goods and sustained grievous injuries when the vehicle met with the accident resulting in her death, the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. He strongly relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prem Bai and others, 2016 ACJ 1634 to fortify his submission. In that case, the insurer disputes its liability on the ground that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and since the deceased was not travelling in the cabin he was not representative of the owner of the goods. In that case, the insurer disputes its liability on the ground that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and since the deceased was not travelling in the cabin he was not representative of the owner of the goods. Refuting this contention, the High Court held that the vehicle was a small auto-rickshaw type loading vehicle in which there was no cabin so that the owner of the goods could sit in the cabin and that the owner of the goods and his representatives can travel in the goods vehicle and it is immaterial whether the deceased was sitting in a cabin or not as there would be no violation of policy conditions if a representative of the owner of goods is not sitting in the cabin. Apparently, on facts so found that the High Court held that the insurer was not absolved of the liability to satisfy the award. With due respect, I am unable to accept the view taken the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prem Bai and others case (supra) as it ran counter to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Asha Rani case (supra). The object of the amending Section 147(1)(b)(i) by inserting the words “injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative in the vehicle” therein in Section 2 of the Act of 1994 cannot be overlooked. This was recognised by the Apex Court in Asha Rani case when it observed that the amendment “clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury.” Therefore, when the owner of the goods or his representative such as the deceased was not insured by the insurer at the time of the accident, the insurer cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be liable to satisfy the award. If the accident had taken place prior to 14-11-1994 i.e. before the coming into force of Section 46 the Act 54 of 1994 amending Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with the insertion noticed earlier, things would have been different and the decisions in Satpal Singh case (supra) or Prem Bai and other (Supra) would have come to the rescue of the claimant. Unfortunately, that is not the case here. 12. For example, in one of the cases i.e. CA @ SLPs (C) Nos. 7288-90 of 2003, decided in National Insurance Company v. Cholleti Bharatamma, (2008) 1 SCC 423 , the Apex Court followed Asha Rani case (supra). To understand the implication of Cholleti Bharatamma case (supra), I take the pain of reproducing below paras 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of the report, which read thus: “CAs @ SLPs (C) Nos. 7288-90 of 2003 26. In this case, the accident took place on 1-5-1997. Indisputably, the respondent was travelling as a passenger. The Tribunal, while determining the issue as to whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the first respondent driver of lorry AEW 5199, held: “… The lorry was overturned and caused the instantaneous death of four passengers. He received small injuries. He also deposed that the accident took place due to the negligence of the driver of the said lorry. On perusing his evidence I am satisfied that he is a truthful witness. He was travelling in the crime vehicle along with the deceased along with his goods as per his evidence….” 27. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that from the aforementioned finding, it is evident that the respondent was travelling as the owner of the goods. We do not think that the said submission is correct. PW 2, in his evidence, stated: “I am doing tamarind business. I witnessed the accident which took place about 3 years back at about 6 a.m. at Borrampalem junction beyond Talluru. At the time of the accident I was in the crime lorry by the side of the driver. Myself and 6 others were carrying tamarind in that lorry belonging to us. We boarded the lorry along with our load of tamarind at Dharamavaram to go to Rajanagaram. At the time of the accident I was in the crime lorry by the side of the driver. Myself and 6 others were carrying tamarind in that lorry belonging to us. We boarded the lorry along with our load of tamarind at Dharamavaram to go to Rajanagaram. We were selling the tamarind at Rajanagaram in retail by taking the tamarind there in our lorry from our village of Dharamavaram.” 28. The Tribunal, therefore, correctly recorded that according to PW 2, he was travelling with his goods as owner thereof and not the deceased. 29. Shaik Shabbeer Pasha and Shaik Nazeer Pasha are the driver and owner respectively of the lorry which was travelling to Rajahmundry from Visakhapatnam. At Borrampalem, while trying to overtake another speeding lorry, the same turned turtle. Three persons who were travelling in the vehicle had been killed. Claims for compensation were filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The appellants therein opposed the claim. The Tribunal awarded compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased. 30. Challenging the legality of the award of the Tribunal, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the deceased were gratuitous passengers and the policy did not cover their lives. Learned counsel also submitted that the decision in Satpal Singh case (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130: 2000 ACJ 1 being referred to a larger Bench in Asha Rani case (2003) 2 SCC 223 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 493, the same was not a binding authority. 31. While stating that the submissions of learned counsel for the Insurance Company could not be sustained, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the Insurance Company following Satpal Singh (2000) 1 SCC 237 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 130: 2000 ACJ 1. 32. In view of the nature of evidence available before us, we have no other option but to set aside the judgment. These appeals are, therefore, allowed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs in each case.” 13. The net effect of the afore-mentioned decision is that after the amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in 1994, the insurer cannot be held liable to satisfy the award passed by the Tribunal in respect of claim petition made by the injured or in respect of deceased gratuitous passengers including the owner of the goods or his representative travelling in a goods carriage vehicle. In the instant case, there is no dispute, nor there any dispute, that the vehicle in question was a goods carriage vehicle as can be seen from the registration certificate and the insurance policy. Therefore, the Tribunal correctly held that the insurer is not liable to satisfy the award for compensation payable to the claimants. The impugned judgment, therefore, does no call for the interference of this Court. 14. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. Cross-Objection (FA) No. 8 of 2015 filed by the insurer is, accordingly, allowed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. 15. Coming now to the facts of MAC Appeal No. 26 of 2015, the appellant is the owner of the same vehicle, which was involved in the same accident. The claimant was injured in that accident and claimed a compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in that vehicular accident. As in the previous case, he claimed that he was travelling in that vehicle along with his jhum goods for selling the same in the market. As the facts in the previous case (MAC Appeal No. 15/15) are found to be similar, the Tribunal held that the liability of satisfying the award could not be shifted upon the insurer. In the light of my above decision, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without costs. 16. This then takes me to MAC Appeal No. 27 of 2015. In this appeal also, the appellant is the owner of the same vehicle, which was involved in the same accident, which gave rise to the previous appeals. In this case, the claimant, who has now been substituted by her legal heirs after her death on 12-8-2015, was the injured, who also claimed that she was travelling in the vehicle along with her jhum goods and was, therefore, entitled to compensation as the owner of the goods travelling in that vehicle. She was awarded a compensation of Rs. 29,610 together with interest @ 9% per annum, but the liability was ordered to be satisfied by the appellant and not by the insurer. Aggrieved by that, the appellant-owner preferred this appeal. She was awarded a compensation of Rs. 29,610 together with interest @ 9% per annum, but the liability was ordered to be satisfied by the appellant and not by the insurer. Aggrieved by that, the appellant-owner preferred this appeal. As in the previous case, the legal heirs of the claimant do not stand in a better position than the claimant in the previous case. The Tribunal correctly held that the appellant, and not the insurer, is liable to pay the awarded compensation. This appeal sans merit is, therefore, dismissed but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs. 17. Coming now to MAC Appeal No. 28 of 2015, this case also must meet the same fate. The appeal is preferred by the owner of the vehicle involved in the same accident of the previous case. The claimant was injured in that accident and was awarded a sum of Rs. 22,730/- as compensation for the injury caused to her in that vehicular accident. The appellant is aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal holding him, and not the insurer, liable to pay the compensation. The claimant claimed that she was boarding that vehicle along with her jhum products for sale in the market. As in the previous case, the Tribunal, on facts found by it, correctly held that it is the appellant, and not the insurer, who is liable to pay the compensation. There is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed but without cost. 18. In MAC Appeal No. 29 of 2015 also, the appellant is the owner of the same vehicle involved in the vehicular accident of 12-4-2012. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 20,395/- to the claimant for the injury caused to her in that accident, but fastened the liability to satisfy the award to the appellant/owner of the vehicle. Aggrieved by this, this appeal is now preferred by him. As in the previous case, the claimant claimed that she was travelling in that vehicle along with her jhum products for sale in the market. This case shall also be governed by my decisions in the previous case. The Tribunal rightly held that the liability to pay the compensation could not be fastened upon the insurer. The appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs. 19. This case shall also be governed by my decisions in the previous case. The Tribunal rightly held that the liability to pay the compensation could not be fastened upon the insurer. The appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs. 19. It is clarified that any compensation or any portion thereof, already paid to the claimants in these five appeals, shall not be refunded to the insurer, who may, however, recover the same from the appellant in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Apex Court.