JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. Heard finally by consent. 4. This revision application involves a question, as to whether or not the present suit, filed for specific performance of contract, is barred on the face of it by limitation. 5. In the present case, the respondents filed a civil suit bearing R.C.S. No.212/2016, against the applicant. The respondents claimed to be the legal heirs of deceased Ramkalibai Tarachand Gupta, who had entered into an agreement to purchase the suit property comprising two plots admeasuring 2100 sq.ft., as per the proposed layout plan, out of field survey no.7, situated at Mouza Shegaon, Tahsil and District Amravati. This agreement was of 26/04/1985 and it provided for execution of the sale deed, latest by 30/12/1986. This date was extended to 31/03/1989. However, it appears that the sale deed was not executed in favour of Ramkalibai. Ramkalibai died on 13/11/2011. The respondents, being the sons and daughter of deceased Ramkalibai and Tarachand, learnt in the year 2015 about entering into an agreement to purchase the suit property executed between Ramkalibai and the applicant. They demanded specific performance of contract from the applicant, but in vain. Therefore, the respondents filed a civil suit in June-2016 against the applicant, claiming specific performance of contract dated 26/04/1985, by giving the direction to him to execute the sale deed of two plots admeasuring 2100 sq.ft. 6. After filing of the appearance before the trial court by the defendant no.1, who is the present applicant, the applicant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, “C.P.C.”) for rejection of the plaint, contending that on the face of it, by accepting the plaint pleadings as they are, the suit was barred by law. Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act was pressed into service. The application was opposed by the respondents. After hearing both sides, the trial court held that the suit involved a mixed question of law and facts, and therefore, he rejected the application by the order passed on 03/05/2017. Not being satisfied with the same, the applicant is before this Court in this Revision Application. 7. The application was opposed by the respondents. After hearing both sides, the trial court held that the suit involved a mixed question of law and facts, and therefore, he rejected the application by the order passed on 03/05/2017. Not being satisfied with the same, the applicant is before this Court in this Revision Application. 7. Shri Khajanchi, learned counsel for the applicant submits that only on the basis of the plaint pleadings, taken at their face value, one can say that the suit is barred by law of limitation, because the pleadings in the plaint themselves show that there was stipulated in the agreement to sell, time for performance of contract and it was upto 31/03/1989 and the limitation period of three years as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act began to run from 31/03/1989. 8. Shri Pande, learned counsel for the respondents submits that in the present case, it could not be said that the suit for specific performance of contract is barred by limitation because there were several other conditions in the agreement to sell dated 26/04/1985, which were to be performed by the defendants and as they were not performed by the defendants, it could not be said that limitation began to run in this case from 31/03/1989. He also submits that on the date of execution of agreement to sell dated 26/04/1985, the defendants/vendors were not the owners of the suit property and that they acquired the suit property, some time later, and therefore, mentioning of the date of 31/03/1989 as the date for execution of the sale deed is of no consequence, in this case. 9. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the applicant has placed his reliance upon the following cases. (i) Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 614. (ii) Kanayalal Madhavji Thakkar Vs. Shree Padmanabh Builders, 2011(1) Mh.L.J. 939 . (iii) Selwyn Agnelo Botelho Vs. Norton D'Souza, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5017. (iv) Anand Laxmi Enterprises Vs. Vasant Balu Mhatre and others, 2009(1) Mh.L.J. 445 . (v) Venkatanatha Chary Vs. Nalla Raji Reddy, (2016) 15 Supreme Court Cases 654. 10. Shri Pande, learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his submission, has placed his reliance upon, in the case of Popat and Kotecha Property VsState Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) Supreme Court Cases 510. 11. Vasant Balu Mhatre and others, 2009(1) Mh.L.J. 445 . (v) Venkatanatha Chary Vs. Nalla Raji Reddy, (2016) 15 Supreme Court Cases 654. 10. Shri Pande, learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his submission, has placed his reliance upon, in the case of Popat and Kotecha Property VsState Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) Supreme Court Cases 510. 11. The principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of C.P.C. regarding rejection of the plaint or otherwise, are now well settled. The application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C., can be considered only on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint understood in their ordinary sense and at their face value. If the plaint has been filed on the basis of some documents, reference to which has been made in the plaint, the contents of such a document forming part of the plaint can also be gone into. But, consideration of the defence or looking for some evidence in order to decide such an application is a clear no under the settled principles of law. This could be seen from the cases relied upon by both sides and referred to in earlier paragraphs. 12. In the present case, the suit has been filed on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 26/04/1985. It has been pleaded in the plaint that as per this agreement, the sale deed was required to be executed upto 30/12/1986. A clear cut pleading in this regard appears in paragraph no.3 of the plaint, relevant portion of which reads thus: “(3) That, on the date of execution of agreement to sale, as on dated 26/04/1985, the defendant no.1 accepted Rs.5,000/( Rs.2,500/each plot) as an earnest money as partner of Nirbhay Trading Corporation from the mother of plaintiffs Ramkalibai Tarachand Gupta, remaining balance were required to be paid by plaintiff's mother on or before 30/12/1985 and sale deed were required to be executed till 30/12/1986.” 13. In paragraph no.4 of the plaint, there is further pleading to the effect that the date of execution of the sale deed was extended up to 31/03/1989. The relevant portion of this pleading is reproduced, as below: (4) That, the plaintiff's mother paid Rs.7,000/on dated 02/06/1986 to the defendant no.1 who extended the date of execution of sale deed upto 31/03/1989.” 14. The relevant portion of this pleading is reproduced, as below: (4) That, the plaintiff's mother paid Rs.7,000/on dated 02/06/1986 to the defendant no.1 who extended the date of execution of sale deed upto 31/03/1989.” 14. Except for these two pleadings, there is not a single pleading contained in the plaint to the effect that time was not of the essence of the contract or that the sale deed was not intended to be executed only up to 31/03/1989 and that there was a possibility of execution of the sale deed even after the date of 31/03/1989. It is also not pleaded in the plaint that execution of the sale deed was mainly dependent upon the performance of the some of the conditions of the contract, which were not performed by the defendants. It is also not pleaded in the plaint that the defendants were not the owners of the suit property on the date of execution of the agreement dated 26/04/1985, between the parties. Rather, what has been specifically pleaded in the plaint is the fact that initially the sale deed was to be executed upto the date of 31/03/1989. This pleading will have to be understood in it's ordinary sense and at it's face value and doing so, what emerges on record is the fact that in the present case, a specific date was fixed for performance of contract and so the limitation period of three years under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, would begin to run from the date fixed for performance of contract i.e. 31/03/1989. So, the suit in the present case, for enforcement of specific performance of contract, ought to have been filed by the respondent, on or before 31/03/1992. I must say, this is not a case where the suit could have been filed within three years from the date on which knowledge regarding refusal of the performance of contract was acquired by the plaintiff and this is a case where time for performance of the contract is already stipulated. Therefore, the suit in the present case, ought to have been filed within three years from 31/03/1989 i.e. latest by 31/03/1992. But, it was not filed on or before that date. Therefore, the suit in the present case, ought to have been filed within three years from 31/03/1989 i.e. latest by 31/03/1992. But, it was not filed on or before that date. Therefore by following the principles of the cases relied upon by both sides, I would say that on the face of it, as disclosed by the plaint pleadings only, the suit was barred by Law of Limitation and hence liable to be rejected. 15. These aspects of the case have not been considered at all by the trial court. In fact, on the face of the plaint pleadings, it is possible to hold that this is not a case which involves a mixed question of law and facts, and therefore, would require the parties to adduce the evidence to prove the fact that the suit is or is not within limitation. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 16. Of course, learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the case of Popat and Kotecha Property Vs State Bank of India Staff Association (supra), has strenuously argued that even in that case there was an agreement dated 19/01/1983 entered into between the appellant and the respondent, which stipulated that after completion of construction of the entire building, the respondent would execute the sale deed in appellant’s favour and the suit seeking enforcement of this clause along with other clauses was filed in July1990. He submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the factual background of that case held that the plaint could not have been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of C.P.C. 17. True it is, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Popat and Kotecha Property VsState Bank of India Staff Association (supra) against the backdrop of the facts of that case that plaint in that case could not have been rejected by resorting to the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 (D) of C.P.C. But, the reason, I would say with due respect for holding so lay in the facts and circumstances of that case. This could be seen from what has been observed in paragraph no.25 of the judgment. It is seen that there were different claims made and that non-execution of the lease deed was just one of those claims. This could be seen from what has been observed in paragraph no.25 of the judgment. It is seen that there were different claims made and that non-execution of the lease deed was just one of those claims. Therefore, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when diverse claims were made by the plaintiff in that suit, the High Court was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the non-execution of the lease deed was the basic issue. It also observed that even if it is accepted that the other claims were relatable to the issue of non-execution of lease deed, still the other claims had independent existence. Therefore, it was found that the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. was not applicable in that case. 18. Facts of the present case, discussed earlier, are entirely different. In the present case except for the claim relating to specific performance of contract, no other claim has been made by the respondents. Therefore, the limitation period in the instant case would have to be ascertained, as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, either from the date stipulated for performance of the contract or where no such date is stipulated, from the time when the performance is refused. In the instant case, there being a specific date stipulated for performance of contract, it would be the first part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which would be applicable and going by it, I have already found that the plaint filed in the present case is barred by limitation. The question is answered accordingly. 19. In the circumstances, the revision application deserves to be allowed and it is allowed accordingly. 20. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. 21. The application of the applicant vide Exh.10 is allowed. The plaint stands rejected.