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2017 DIGILAW 202 (JK)

Rachna Devi v. State

2017-04-18

TASHI RABSTAN

body2017
ORDER : TASHI RABSTAN, J. 1. Through the medium of this petition, the petitioner is seeking a direction to the respondents to pay reasonable amount of compensation for the tortious liability. 2. The facts-in-brief, as projected in the writ petition, are that on the fateful day of 25-5-2001 when the petitioner was going to attend the call of nature at about six in the morning, she came in contact with live electric service wire, which was hanging down to the ground level and as a result of severe electric shock, she suffered serious physical injuries at her thigh, chest and left arm. She was saved by her father, although her father too suffered some minor injuries in saving her from being electrocuted. It is averred that she was taken to Government District Hospital, Kathua on the same day and looking to the condition of petitioner, the doctors attending her had no option but to amputate her left arm from the middle. It is further averred that the amputation was performed on 14-6-2001 and discharged from the hospital on 26-6-2001. It is averred that FIR No. 14 dated 25-5-2001 also came to be registered. It is further averred that due to amputation of left arm of petitioner, her life has been badly crippled in performing day-to-day mundane activities and she has been going through acute depression of inferiority complex. It is further averred that apart from being in the hospital and making expenses in her treatment, the petitioner has been suffering from pain and going through psychological trauma, thus she deserves to be adequately compensated. 3. Learned counsel appearing for petitioner contended that due to negligence and carelessness on the part of respondents, particularly respondent No. 3, in maintaining and rectifying the electric wires, petitioner has become handicapped. He further contended that in terms of Section 33 of the J&K Electricity Act, 1997 (1940 AD), the respondents were under obligation to conduct a statutory inquiry in this regard, but the respondents did not prefer to hold inquiry, thus in this way they have not only committed breach of statutory provisions, but they are also liable for tortious liability and petitioner deserves to be compensated adequately. 4. 4. Objections have been filed on behalf of respondents denying that there was any leakage of power from the power system maintained by the respondents or there was any negligence on the part of respondents in maintaining the power lines. Further, it is averred that the accident took place due to the contributory negligence on the part of petitioner and her father, as her father was illegally extracting the power without taking any legal connection from the department and was hooking the main lines. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing for parties and perused the file. 6. A perusal of objections reveals that the respondents have admitted that the petitioner had received severe electric shock due to falling of service line and that the said accident had taken place on 25-5-2001 at about 6 a.m. However, their stand is that the said accident had taken place due to the negligence of petitioner and her father, as the father of petitioner was illegally extracting power without taking any legal connection from the department. 7. Although the stand of respondents is that the said accident was the result of negligence on the part of petitioner and her father, however, in paragraph-iii of preliminary objects filed by the respondents it is averred that on the preceding day of accident, due to wind storm the service line from the house of father of petitioner had fallen down and the petitioner while passing though the nearby field came in contact with the bare portion of service line, as a result of which she received electric shock in her hand and arm, when her father tried save her, he also got an electric shock, meaning thereby the respondents have themselves admitted that the service line leading to petitioner-s father house had fallen down due to wind storm a day earlier when the petitioner had received the electric shock. Once the respondents have themselves admitted that the said service line had fallen a day earlier due to wind storm, it was the duty of respondents, particularly respondent No. 3 to defuse the transmission of electricity in order to prevent any mishappening and to engage men and machinery/field staff to repair the said service line which certainly was affecting the safety of public. However, if seems the officials of Electric Maintenance & Rural Electrification Wing did not bother to check the electricity supply lines after the storm is over nor did they make any effort to defuse the transmission of electricity, and on the very next day this unfortunate accident had occurred. Thus, it cannot be said that the said accident was the result of negligence of petitioner or her father, rather the same was the negligence of respondents for which they cannot be allowed to escape from their liability. As the cause for the accident is apparently made out, the question of driving the petitioner to go to Civil Court to prove the same does not arise herein and the claim for award of compensation is well maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, when the negligence is per se visible and it infringes Articles 21 of the Constitution of India, relief claiming damage could be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. As regards the contention of petitioner that in terms of Section 33 of the J.&K. Electricity Act, 1997, the respondents were under obligation to conduct a statutory inquiry in this regard. In paragraph-4 of the objections the stand of respondents is that there was no need to hold an inquiry because the said accident was due to the fault of petitioner and her father. However, in paragraph-II of preliminary objections, the stand of respondents is that thorough inquiry is required to be conducted in the present case to know the actual cause of accident. It seems the respondents were not sure as to what sort of objections they were required to take in the present case and without going through the factual matrix of the case, have filed the objections just for the sake of objections and nothing else. Further, once the respondents have themselves taken a stand in the objections that thorough inquiry was required to be conducted to know the actual cause of accident, then without conducting any inquiry how could they blame the petitioner and her father that the said accident was the result of their negligences? 9. The accident-in-question is stated to have taken place on 25-5-2001. The present writ petition came to be filed by the petitioner-victim on 9-8-2006. Respondents filed the objections on 14th October, 2006. 9. The accident-in-question is stated to have taken place on 25-5-2001. The present writ petition came to be filed by the petitioner-victim on 9-8-2006. Respondents filed the objections on 14th October, 2006. Today is 18th April, 2017 Almost sixteen years are going to lapse from the date of accident-in-question, however, still the respondents have not initiated any meaningful step to enquire the matter thoroughly so as to know the actual cause of accident, because there is nothing on the file which could demonstrate that the respondents have ever conducted thorough inquiry as averred in paragraph-II of preliminary objections, rather in order to escape from their liability, they have blamed the petitioner and her father having contributory negligence in dealing with the situation. 10. There cannot be any dispute on the count that the maintenance of electric supply is under the control of the respondents, therefore, they are equally bound to ensure that the life of citizens are not put in jeopardy. While discharging the sovereign functions, a duty is cast on the State to take such steps as are required for the safety of the people and, on their failure, they cannot escape the obligation to compensate a victim on the ground of immunity claimed. 11. What is held by the Apex Court in case, titled as, M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar, AIR 2002 SC 551 , while dismissing the appeal filed by the Board, is reproduced hereunder : '7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.' ? '14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Railway. Light Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandry and Ors. (1920) Law Reports Appeal Cases 662 : ( AIR 1920 PC 181 ), that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension current found it sway through the low tension cable into the premise of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road. 15. In W.B. State Electricity Board v. Sachin Banerjee, AIR 2000 SC 3629 (1), the Electricity Board adopted a defence that electric lines were illegally hooked for pilferage purposes. This Court said that the Board cannot be held to be negligent on the said fact situation but the question of strict liability was not taken up in that case.'? 12. What is held by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Srinagar Wing in case, State of J&K v. Mst. Zoomi, 2008 (1) SLJ 414, is reproduced hereunder : '5. Applying definitions to the facts of the instant case, it is quite evident that the appellants department of PDD and its field staff have failed to exercise their duties in removing illegally carried electric lines over the kicker poles and the existing live trees. They have committed the breach of their duty so cannot avoid payment of damages to the respondent/widow. 6. The field staff or their superiors should have timely taken action for stopping the illegality. They have committed the breach of their duty so cannot avoid payment of damages to the respondent/widow. 6. The field staff or their superiors should have timely taken action for stopping the illegality. No action on their part has resulted in electrocution of the deceased and, therefore, appellants cannot be exonerated from their liability.' ? 13. Also, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case, Sagar Chand v. State, 1999 KLJ 614 : AIR 1999 J&K 154 , has held that when injury has been caused by the negligence of its employee, the State if responsible to make payment of compensation. In the said case both the children of the petitioners therein were electrocuted because of the criminal negligence of the lineman of the area. 14. Further, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in State of J. & K. v. Zarina Begum, AIR 2004 J&K 23 , while dismissing the appeal filed by the State, had held that the State can be made liable to pay damages on account of negligence on the part of its officials. In the said case the victim died after coming into contact with a broken live electric wire. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the judgment hereunder : '4. It be seen that so far as defendant No. 4 is concerned, he is said to have obtained an illegal connection for obtaining electric energy and he had not used proper transmission wire. It is not in dispute that the death of Mohd. Bashir did take place. Even if it be presumed that defendant No. 4 had obtained illegal connection, the fact will still remain that the officials of the State defendant No. 3 were guilty of not checking the illegal connection and merely because the said illegal connection was taken by defendant No. 4 would be of no consequence.’? 15. While dismissing the appeal filed by the State, the same view was taken in case, titled as, State v. Altaf Ahmad Ganai, 2010 (4) JKJ 116 . In the said case one arm and one leg of the victim had to be amputated because of electrocution. 16. In Ramesh Singh Pawar v. M.P.E.B., AIR 2005 MP 2 , the son of petitioner came in contact with live electric wire which was hanging from the pole, as a result of which he suffered electric shock and died on the spot. 16. In Ramesh Singh Pawar v. M.P.E.B., AIR 2005 MP 2 , the son of petitioner came in contact with live electric wire which was hanging from the pole, as a result of which he suffered electric shock and died on the spot. While allowing the petition, what is observed by the learned Judge is reproduced hereunder : '16. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the backdrop of discussion made hereinabove and keeping in view the specific findings recorded by the Supreme Court in the case of Shail Kumari, AIR 2002 SC 551 and the observations made in paras 8, 9, 11 and 13 reproduced hereinabove, there is no doubt that not only on the ground of negligence but on the principle of strict liability the Board is liable to pay compensation to the petitioner.' ? 17. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, the present petition also deserves to be allowed. 18. Now the question arises for consideration is what quantum of compensation ought to have been allowed in favour of petitioner and by applying what method. In view of any specific provision in such like matters for awarding compensation arising out of tortious liability. Schedule for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act and the decisions of Apex Court would be of great help in arriving out what quantum of compensation ought to be awarded in the present case. 19. A perusal of the file reveals that petitioner was resident of village Haripur Patel, Tehsil Hiranagar, District Kathua when the accident-in-question had occurred, As per copy of mark sheet of Secondary School Examination, issued by the J.& K. Board of School Education, annexed with the petition, her date of birth is 2-5-1984; meaning thereby when the accident-in-question had occurred on 25-5-2001, in which she lost her left arm from the middle, she was minor, having just 17 years of age. As per copy of Medical Certificate, issued by the Office of Medical Superintendent, District Hospital, Kathua, the petitioner has become physically handicapped and her permanent physical disability is about 70% (seventy per cent.). Since the petitioner was just 17 years of age at the time of accident, at that particular time the best part of her life had yet to come. Since the petitioner was just 17 years of age at the time of accident, at that particular time the best part of her life had yet to come. Therefore, the compensation to be awarded herein should enable her to acquire something or to develop a lifestyle which will offset the pain, shock frustration inconvenience and discomfort arising out of disability, especially keeping in view the fact that in Indian society marrying a girl with disablement is a social problem and there is every likehood that the petitioner would not get a suitable companion/life partner in view of her 70% permanent disability. 20. In Shashendra Lahiri v. Unicef, 1998 ACJ 859, the victim had suffered several fractures in leg resulting in shortening of the leg by three inches. The injured in the above case was 17 years of age. He was a student of B.Com. This shortening of leg resulted in permanent disability. He had undergone bone-grafting and hospitalization for quite some time in different hospitals. An amount of Rs. 33,000/- was allowed by the Claims Tribunal. The amount was enhanced in appeal to the extent of Rs. 58,000/-. The Supreme Court of India awarded Rs. 4 lacs in addition to Rs. 58,000/- already awarded. Interest at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum was also allowed from the date of claim till its payment. 21. This Court, having regard to all the relevant factors involved in the present case and the nature and extent of disability sustained by the petitioner herein, her age at the time she suffered severe electric shock and discomfort arising out of disability is of the considered view that the petitioner is entitled to get the following amount as compensation : i. 70% Permanent disability Rs. 1,80,000/- ii. Pain and suffering Rs. 20,000/- iii. Loss of amenities Rs. 20,000/- iv. Medical & other related expenses Rs. 20,000/- v. Compensation on account of bleak chances of getting a suitable match/life partner in view of her 70% permanent disability Rs. 50,000/- vi. Costs Rs. 10,000/- vii. Total Rs. 3,00,000/- 22. In the result, this writ petition is allowed by directing the respondents to pay a sum of rupees three lacs with 6% interest from the date of filing of the petition till its final realization. Let the whole amount he deposited with the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court within a period of eight weeks from today. Total Rs. 3,00,000/- 22. In the result, this writ petition is allowed by directing the respondents to pay a sum of rupees three lacs with 6% interest from the date of filing of the petition till its final realization. Let the whole amount he deposited with the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court within a period of eight weeks from today. On deposit, the same be paid to the petitioner through account payee's cheque after proper verification and identification.